Contribution
My Lords, if the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, finds a point difficult, it must be almost by definition a difficult point. I have listened to the debate and very sound points have been made on both sides, but ultimately these Benches are unable to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I will take a few minutes to sketch out why.
This amendment seeks to require judges to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that might affect the jury’s assessment of evidence in a trial for a sexual offence. As everybody has said, we are all extremely concerned to make sure that all trials, but in particular sexual offence trials, are conducted in a proper way. This also extends to domestic abuse offences. Together with my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, I took the Domestic Abuse Bill 2021 through this House. I will say candidly that, before taking the Bill through, this was a subject about which I knew very little. The reading, the understanding and the people I met as I took it through the House and it became an Act deepened my knowledge of the subject and, frankly, introduced me to a part of life that I did not really want to know about, but now do. It is something we have not confronted fully in our law.
Coming back to this amendment, first, I suggest that it is unnecessary to place this in statute. The Crown Court Compendium has been referred to. It says that the Court of Appeal has already accepted that
“a judge may give appropriate directions to counter the risk of stereotypes and assumptions about sexual behaviour and reactions to non consensual sexual conduct … There may be cases where guidance on myths and stereotypes may be appropriate to benefit a defendant”.
Judges are therefore able to issue some directions to the jury, if they believe them necessary. The repeated use of the word “may” in the compendium is at the heart of this debate: should this be discretionary or mandatory?
Of course, the amendment—which has been, as one would expect, very carefully drafted by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—would not require any particular direction as to verdict or sentence, or any particular form of words in the direction. But it does require a direction. In fact, it requires one twice: either at the beginning of the trial or when the issue is first raised, and then again in the summing up. At least as I read the amendment, that would be the effect of proposed new subsections (1), (3), (4) and (5).
Reference has been made by a number of contributors to the report of the Law Commission Evidence in Sexual Offences Prosecutions from July 2025. I suggest that that response may well provide the answer to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, who both said, “Well, if it’s still going on, obviously some judges are not getting it right”. As I read the report, the Law Commission accepted that there were cases where directions were improperly given or improperly not given. None the less, it recommended not imposing a general obligation but having improved judicial guidance and a strong expectation that directions would be given. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, that the mere fact that the Law Commission came to that conclusion does not mean that we have to follow it. It does not absolve us of our responsibility in this House, but I for one always think twice—if not three times and often four—before departing from the views of the Law Commission, which are generally very well thought through.
I listened very carefully to the four precedents that the noble Baroness put forward. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I will also check Hansard, but at first listening it struck me that they appeared to be examples of legal consequences of evidence being given to the jury rather than of the imposition of a general duty to correct supposed misconceptions. It did not strike me that any of those examples were absolutely on point, although I accept that they are examples where Parliament intervened in a more general sense.
The real question is whether this should be left to judges on a discretionary basis or made mandatory. I listened very carefully yesterday to the Lady Chief Justice, who warned that Parliament must be “extremely cautious” before legislating to dictate when directions ought to be given to juries in rape trials. I respectfully and wholeheartedly agree with the Lady Chief Justice on that. I do not think it either necessary or desirable to mandate in primary legislation how the judge is to conduct the trial.