Contribution
My Lords, we have some reservations about the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, that Clause 6 should simply be removed from the Bill. Broadly speaking, though, we take the view that the amendments, particularly those relating to permission to appeal, moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, should be supported. That, again, is subject to some reservations that I will mention now.
It is as a matter of simple justice, as I think everyone who has spoken in this Committee has recognised, that workable, stable and effective rights of appeal from magistrates’ courts should be in place, so that, where magistrates’ courts make decisions that are wrong, those decisions should be open to reversal by a higher court, which we agree should be the Crown Court, and that that reversal should not be dependent upon technical difficulties being overcome by appellants who are often unrepresented.
The restrictions on appeals in the Bill seem to be based largely on a desire simply to cut the number of appeals and to make an associated cut in the resources spent on such appeals. We cannot accept that desire as a justification for those restrictions. As has been said several times in this Committee, if we consider present appeals from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court, the system is generally working well. There is not an undue number of appeals—indeed, that number is very low—and they have a very high success rate. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, put that position very persuasively, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, himself gave the statistics, as he did at Second Reading.
This is all much more important because, if this Bill now goes through as drafted, there will be many more, larger and more serious cases to be heard by the magistrates, both because of the removal of the right of election and because of the increased sentencing powers that are to be given to the magistrates. So the Bill should be a reason for improving the appeal procedure, not restricting it. Certainly it should be streamlined. We agree that it is reasonably arguable that appeals be heard in the context in which they should be heard—that is, appeals against conviction should be allowed if the convictions are unsafe, and appeals against sentence should be allowed if the sentences are manifestly excessive. Those principles and that context should go without saying.
For our part, we can see some reason for a permission stage, but I am far from clear that the case advanced by the Government makes the permission requirement necessary. One has to consider the delay and the cost inherent in a permission stage as well as the high success rate of the system as it operates at present. However, if there is to be a permission requirement, I fully agree that there needs to be an oral permission hearing if requested, and that the original decision on paper should be reversible, much as it is in the Court of Appeal. That process needs to be well organised, and it needs to work efficiently and without undue delays.
We also accept that there is a reasonable argument that appeals against conviction should be by way of review rather than a complete rehearing, with the need for witnesses to be recalled to give evidence for a second time, which often causes trauma for witnesses and brings with it the dangers of inconsistency, and of inconsistency itself being relied upon during the course of the appeal hearing, which sometimes lengthens hearings unnecessarily. Those are difficulties that need to be overcome.
We accept entirely Amendment 37, whether from the duet or the quartet, as it has been an extraordinary anomaly that we have not had recorded hearings in the magistrates’ courts and transcripts as a matter of course. If we are to establish a reasonable appeal procedure, it is essential that there are recordings and transcripts. We are simply unpersuaded by the hesitation of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on the question of recording and transcripts. His questioning of the use of AI may be acceptable given the present state of AI—though even that I doubt—but it goes far too far. We must have recordings and transcripts, and they must be able to be relied upon during the course of any permission hearing.
We have heard also in the amendments about magistrates’ training, which of course is part of the picture. Magistrates’ recruitment is also part of the picture. We are concerned about the speed with which this is happening, given the Law Commission’s impending advice. We agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that we should await that advice before proceeding. We need to consider, exactly as she suggested, giving some sort of assistance to appellants in putting their appeals together in such a way as to illuminate the points of law that arise. Whether that is by a system of national or regional offices, it would involve a rethink of the way we deal with these matters. If defendants are going to be unrepresented at the lower court and will then have to put together grounds of appeal in such a way as to convince the court that they have a reasonable argument for appeal, it is difficult to see how that can be done in our present system, where parties get very little outside help, particularly if they are unrepresented at the hearing at first instance.
All these things need real consideration and I am not sure that we have had enough consideration to date. The Law Commission may well help.