Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful for the support of Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and His Honour Peter Rook KC, a former Old Bailey judge, former vice-chair of the Parole Board and co-author of one of the leading academic texts on sexual offences.
This amendment has two purposes. First, it would ensure that a direction on harmful myths and stereotypes is given to juries in all cases where such a direction is needed, but, importantly, it does not seek to dictate what the formal content of that direction should be. Secondly, it addresses timing. If these directions are to be effective, they should not necessarily be left until the very end of a trial, after assumptions and misconceptions may already have taken root in jurors’ minds. In appropriate cases, my amendment would encourage judges to give them at the outset and, where necessary, reinforce them during the course of the proceedings. The amendment enshrines a simple proposition: trials should be decided on evidence, not on misconceptions about how victims are expected to behave.
What are these harmful myths and stereotypes? They are assumptions about how a so-called “real” victim of rape or domestic abuse would behave. For example, some people assume that rape will usually result in visible injury and that, therefore, if there is no injury, the allegation is somehow less credible. Yet research demonstrates that many victims of rape sustain no physical injury at all. Some assume that a genuine victim would report what had happened to them immediately, yet delayed reporting is common. Some assume that, if a victim remains in contact with the perpetrator, returns to an abusive partner or continues with aspects of everyday life, that somehow demonstrates that they were not really a victim. Again, research and experience tell us that the reality is far more complex. Those are examples of things that are not evidential conclusions; they are harmful misconceptions based on stereotypes, and they matter because of the nature of the offences with which we are concerned.
Rape, serious sexual offending and domestic abuse usually occur in private. There are usually no eyewitnesses. Physical evidence may be limited or non-existent. As a result, in most of these cases juries are being asked to make difficult assessments of credibility and reliability. Jurors bring integrity, experience and common sense to their role, but they are ordinary members of the public. They are not specialists in trauma, victim behaviour, coercive control or the psychology of abuse. Faced with difficult questions, it is entirely understandable that jurors may ask themselves how they think they would have reacted, how a friend or a family member might have reacted or how a victim would usually behave. The difficulty is that those assumptions are often wrong. That is why the judicial directions on myths and stereotypes matter. Their purpose is not to tell a jury what conclusion it should reach. Their purpose is not to favour the prosecution. Their purpose is not to make convictions easier to obtain. Their purpose is to remind jurors that there is no single correct way for a victim to behave, and that assumptions therefore should play no part in their assessment of the evidence.
Far from undermining fairness, these directions are intended to protect it. Indeed, nothing in my amendment would prevent robust defence advocacy. Defendants are entitled to be defended fully and fairly, and defence advocates must remain free to challenge evidence, test reliability and explore apparent inconsistencies. What should not happen is an invitation, whether explicit or implicit, for a jury to reason from stereotype. The proposition that a complainant did not report immediately and therefore must be lying is not an evidential argument; it is reliance on myth and misconception. The purpose of a judicial direction is simply to ensure that jurors understand that distinction.
This amendment would not solve every problem that has been identified, particularly in some recent high-profile cases, but it would provide a modest and important step towards ensuring that our courtrooms consistently reinforce the principle that cases should be determined by evidence rather than by prejudice or stereotype. The principal objection raised to this proposal is that it intrudes upon judicial independence. During the Private Notice Question on 9 November, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who I am sorry to see is not in his place this evening, asked whether it was
“unprecedented for Parliament to seek to instruct judges on how they should direct juries”,
and suggested that doing so would constitute
“an unacceptable intrusion upon judicial independence”.—[Official Report, 9/11/26; col. 17.]
I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord and could not agree more that judicial independence is one of the cornerstones of our constitution. Indeed, if my amendment sought to tell judges how to decide cases, what verdict a jury should return, what evidence should be believed or what sentence should be imposed, I would oppose it myself—but it does none of these things. It would merely require a judge, in appropriate circumstances, to remind jurors that assumptions and stereotypes are not evidence. It does not seek to dictate the words used, because these are entirely matters for the discretion of the trial judge and will depend wholly on the issues in the case.
Judicial independence protects judges from interference in their decisions, but it does not prevent Parliament legislating for fair trial procedures. With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, I question whether drawing that constitutional distinction is really sustainable. All jury directions are themselves part of the law. They exist only because Parliament and the senior courts recognise that certain things matter sufficiently that jurors must be reminded of them or helped with how to approach them.
Nor is it correct to suggest that statutory directions are unprecedented. Parliament has legislated before where it considered that fairness required a warning or direction to be given to the jury. I will give four examples. I am sorry to be boring about it, but it is important that they are on the record and it is known that this has happened. They are four examples of when Parliament has required that a jury be directed about particular topics. Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires a warning in relation to certain confessions made by mentally disabled people. Section 90 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires a warning to the jury where a witness anonymity order has been made. Section 32 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 requires a warning to be given where evidence has been given using special measures. Section 39 of the same Act requires a direction to the jury where a defendant has been prohibited from personally cross-examining a witness. In all four examples, the mandatory language is used in the statute.
The principle that Parliament may require a judge to warn a jury about a recognised evidential danger is well established. The real question is not whether Parliament may legislate in this area—Parliament plainly may—but whether myths and stereotypes create a sufficiently serious risk to the fairness of proceedings to justify legislative action. That is a policy question, not a constitutional one. In fact, Clauses 8 to 10 of this Bill all represent parliamentary intervention in areas where judges already apply the existing law. They do so because the Government have concerns about consistency of judicial approach and want to make the law clearer about admissibility of evidence and when certain applications can be made. This Bill itself therefore proceeds on the basis that Parliament may legitimately act where greater consistency or greater protection is required. If that proposition is constitutionally acceptable elsewhere in the Bill, it is difficult to see why it suddenly becomes objectionable here. The real issue is not whether Parliament can act but whether it should.