Contribution
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 52C, 67A and 70A standing in my name. I am very grateful to Professor David Ormerod, one of the most distinguished criminal lawyers of his generation, for his assistance in developing these amendments. They ask a straightforward question: why is criminal justice the only major jurisdiction of the High Court without a recognised institutional home of its own?
The criminal law occupies a unique place within our legal system. Every day, judges sitting in the criminal courts determine questions of guilt and innocence, make decisions affecting personal liberty, protect the public from serious harm and give effect to the rights of victims. The consequences of those decisions are profound, not merely for defendants and victims but for public confidence in the justice system as a whole. Despite the significant of those responsibilities, the High Court contains a Family Division and a Business and Property Division, but no criminal division. Parliament has long recognised the distinctiveness of criminal justice at appellate level through the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. The question raised by these amendments is: why is that distinctiveness not recognised within the structure of the High Court itself?
Recent developments make that question particularly timely because, this year, the Business and Property Division replaced the former Chancery Division. Whatever view one takes of that change, it demonstrates an important constitutional point. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, clearly has some thoughts on that matter; I very much look forward to him sharing them with us. Whatever view one takes of that change, the divisional structure of the High Court is not fixed for all time, as is proved by this change. It can evolve where a convincing case exists for doing so. Such a case exists in relation to criminal justice.
My case rests on three propositions. First, criminal judging is a distinct judicial specialism. Secondly, criminal expertise should be recognised and deployed systematically. Thirdly, specialisation need not come at the expense of flexibility.
My starting point is that criminal judging is different. Of course, every branch of the law is demanding, and every division of the High Court contains judges of exceptional ability. Nothing in these amendments should be understood as a criticism of the King’s Bench Division or of the arrangements under which criminal work is currently undertaken. The issue is not capability; it is specialism.
Serious criminal trials require a combination of skills and experience that is not easily replicated elsewhere. Judges are required to manage vulnerable witnesses and defendants, rule on complex evidential questions in real time, assess the potential impact of disputed evidence on a jury and explain difficult legal principles to 12 citizens with no legal training. These are not skills that are acquired solely through academic study; they are developed through sustained practical experience. One senior criminal judge described trying a serious Crown Court case as being like driving a heavy goods vehicle with no brakes and unreliable steering, while somehow still being expected to arrive safely at the correct destination. Behind that humour lies an important truth: criminal trials are dynamic, highly pressured and unforgiving of error. That distinctiveness does not disappear on appeal. Criminal appellate judges are frequently required to evaluate decisions taken in fast-moving jury trials and to assess whether difficult rulings made under considerable pressure were, in fact, correct.
If criminal judging is distinctive, then criminal expertise has value. I do not mean the expertise acquired many years earlier before moving permanently into other fields of practice; I mean expertise grounded in the contemporary realities of criminal litigation. That should not be a controversial proposition. We readily accept that specialist experience matters in family law and in commercial and business litigation. There is no obvious reason why criminal law should be treated differently. Indeed, many criminal practitioners would argue that criminal law has too often suffered from an assumption that it is somehow less intellectually demanding than other legal specialisms.
In reality, criminal judges deal daily with difficult issues of evidence, disclosure, procedure, human rights and sentencing. They preside over proceedings involving digital evidence, scientific and expert testimony, and vulnerable witnesses and defendants. They operate in an environment where emotions run high and the consequences of error can be profound. Moreover, criminal law is marked by particularly frequent and significant change, particularly in the area of legislation. Few branches of the law evolve as rapidly or as fundamentally. Keeping abreast of those developments requires continuing specialist engagement. The structure of our courts should reflect that reality.
The second proposition is that the jury system should make systematic use of criminal expertise. This argument is not ideological but practical. A criminal division of the High Court would provide a clearer framework for identifying, retaining and deploying specialist criminal expertise. It would strengthen the contribution of experienced criminal judges to appellate decision-making, help ensure that the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with the most relevant experience, and, above all, give institutional recognition to a specialism that already exists in practice.
There is also a broader point concerning progression, diversity and public confidence. For many years, Parliament, the judiciary and the legal profession have rightly sought to widen the diversity of those who reach the most senior judicial offices. Important progress has been made but concerns remain. I am sure it will readily be recognised that criminal practice has historically provided opportunities for lawyers from backgrounds that have traditionally been underrepresented at the highest levels of the profession. Many criminal practitioners are state educated, many are first-generation professionals, and many have spent their careers working directly with the communities most affected by the justice system. A significant number go on to become district judges, recorders and circuit judges, and acquire exceptional expertise in the conduct of criminal trials.
Yet criminal expertise has not always enjoyed the same institutional recognition as some other legal specialisms. That matters because structures influence careers; they influence aspirations, opportunities and progression. A criminal division would not of itself solve questions of judicial diversity but it would create a clearer route through which outstanding criminal practitioners and judges could progress to the most senior levels of the judiciary while remaining within the specialism to which they have devoted their professional lives. That is a question not simply of representation but of legitimacy and public confidence.
I turn briefly to two possible objections. The first is the concern that a criminal division would encourage excessive specialisation. I respectfully suggest that that concern is overstated. The principle of specialisation is already well established within the senior courts. Parliament accepted long ago that family justice warranted a separate division, and the existence of the Business and Property Division reflects a similar recognition in relation to commercial expertise. The real question, therefore, is not whether specialisation is acceptable but whether criminal justice is sufficiently distinctive to justify comparable treatment. For the reasons I have already outlined, I suggest that it is. Nor would these amendments create a judicial silo. The drafting deliberately preserves flexibility. Judges from other divisions could continue to undertake criminal work where appropriate, and cross-deployment and cross-fertilisation would remain possible, so the proposed division would be specialist but not isolated.
The second objection concerns cost. Again, I suggest that that concern is overstated. These amendments would not create a new court system, require new court buildings or establish a significant new administrative structure. This proposal concerns the organisation and deployment of judges who already exist within the courts. In any event, costs must be considered alongside effectiveness. The present system functions well because considerable effort is devoted to matching judges with cases according to their experience and expertise, but that process itself carries costs, as do appeals, retrials and delay. These burdens are borne not only by the courts but by victims, witnesses and defendants. Again, I am not suggesting that a criminal division would eliminate such difficulties, but it is reasonable to suppose that a structure designed to identify and utilise specialist expertise would assist in the effective deployment of judicial resources.
Most importantly, I ask that we remember what is at stake. The criminal courts determine whether individuals lose their liberty, whether victims receive justice and whether the public are protected. In that context, the relevant question is not whether expertise has a cost but whether we are making the fullest possible use of expertise where the consequences of error are greatest.
I have a final word on the drafting. The amendments are deliberately modest. The Lord Chief Justice—that is the traditional wording but, of course, at the moment it is a Lady Chief Justice—could serve as president of the division, avoiding the need for a new salaried leadership office. The amendments build on existing statutory mechanisms governing judicial deployment. Although Section 7 of the Senior Courts Act already provides machinery by which divisional arrangements may be altered, these amendments proceed on the basis that the creation of a criminal division is a matter of sufficient constitutional significance that Parliament should make the decision expressly.
I readily accept that this is an ambitious proposal. However, I hope that there can be agreement on a number of underlying propositions: that criminal judging is distinctive; that criminal expertise has value; that criminal judicial experience should be recognised, retained and developed; and that public confidence is strengthened when the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with substantial and relevant expertise. If family justice merits a division and if business and property litigation merits a division, it is surely legitimate to ask whether criminal justice should continue to stand alone without equivalent institutional recognition. These amendments ask that question. I suggest that they provide the right answer. I beg to move.