Hansard·Lords Chamber·Vol. 861

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Monday, 16 November 2026

155 contributions19 members

Contributions

  1. Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)

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  2. Amendment 52A

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  3. Moved by

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  4. 52A: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause— “Private prosecutions brought against alleged victims: review(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a report on the law relating to private prosecutions in criminal proceedings brought against a person (“the defendant”) by a person whom the defendant has previously accused of committing an offence against the defendant.(2) The report must consider— (a) whether the law relating to private prosecutions in criminal proceedings, including section 6 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, should be amended to provide additional safeguards in the circumstances described in subsection (1),(b) the exercise of the power to take over such prosecutions, including whether the earlier accusation is taken into account when that power is exercised, and(c) the compatibility of the law and practice in these circumstances with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.”Member’s explanatory statement This probing amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament on whether the law on private prosecutions in criminal proceedings, and on the taking over of such prosecutions, should be strengthened where the prosecution is brought against a person by someone they have accused of an offence against them.

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  5. Baroness Brinton (LD)

    My Lords, on 5 November, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women—CEDAW—which found that the UK had violated the rights of a young woman prosecuted for allegedly making a false rape accusation. There was a private prosecution initiated by the man she had accused of rape, which was subsequently taken over by the UK public prosecutors. I do not want to discuss the details of this case, which is very complex. It has taken 12 years of campaigning by the young woman’s father, but I shall look forward in due course to the Government’s response to the final report now that it has been published. As a courtesy, I alerted the Minister in advance to today’s amendment, because this case raises some questions about what happens in rape and serious sexual assault offences, or RASSO, and violence against women and girls, or VAWG, cases. This case involved a young woman reporting to the police that she had been sexually assaulted by a young man. She happened to be vulnerable, as she had bipolar disorder and other issues. The police were clear in deciding there was not enough evidence to proceed and the case was dropped. The alleged perpetrator then brought a private prosecution accusing her of perverting the course of justice by making a false rape allegation. The consequence was that the woman then received a summons to the magistrates’ court, which triggered her losing all her safeguards and her anonymity and severely reduced her access to support services, including her counselling services for the alleged sexual assault. All this was severe enough; a court had not found her to have perverted the court of justice yet. However, at this point, the young man’s lawyers approached the CPS and asked it to take the case over. The report says that the CPS relied on the information that the young man’s solicitors had found, but no further statement was taken from the young woman nor was she interviewed again by the police. Despite the lack of police support, or statement from the young woman, the CPS then decided there was enough evidence to continue. Three days before the trial, the young woman took her own life. The recommendations from CEDAW are that the UK Government review whether effective safeguards were in place for a young woman who had all the protections as a likely victim and had them removed without the CPS interviewing her, and with the police saying that they did not support the CPS taking over the case. One point made by CEDAW is that the perpetrators of RASSO may also use coercive control or other mechanisms, including retaliation through the courts, to regain control of the victim. The moment the private prosecution process started, everything changed for the alleged victim in the previous criminal case. CEDAW was also concerned that the CPS had not asked the police to assess the evidence that the young man’s lawyers had produced. As the report was published only on 5 November, I do not want to go into the detail of this case, but I do want to look at some of the processes that happen when a case moves from the criminal courts to a private prosecution, and then suddenly, in the private prosecution, the CPS chooses to take it over, and what happens to the victim on that route. Are the Government considering reviewing the procedures in both VAWG and RASSO cases where an alleged perpetrator takes out a private criminal prosecution? Would they, at the very least, consider continuing those protections until the conclusion of that private prosecution? Are the Government considering ensuring that in such cases the police take further statements if new evidence has emerged since the beginning of private prosecution and prior to the CPS taking the case over? Finally, should the police recommending no further action on a case brought in a private court weigh more with the CPS in its decision? I beg to move.

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  6. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, I can be very brief. This amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would require a report from the Lord Chancellor regarding the law on private prosecutions in criminal proceedings that considers whether the law should be amended to provide additional protections where someone is prosecuted by a person against whom they have previously made an accusation. I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns that this could be used in a retaliatory manner against someone making an accusation. Of course, the CPS can take over a prosecution and bring it to an end, where appropriate, but safeguards must be carefully designed. I therefore look forward to the response of the noble and learned Baroness the Minister on that point. One reason to rise to my feet was also to point out that private prosecutions have been something of a running sore in the sense that the House of Commons Justice Committee, in its Private P rosecutions: S afeguards report in October 2020, recommended stronger safeguards for private prosecutions. However, I am particularly interested in the Ministry of Justice’s consultation on private prosecutions, which opened on 6 March 2025 and closed on 8 May. There was a Question in the other place on 10 June 2026 as to when the responses to that consultation would be provided. The response from the Minister was “in due course”. That Question was repeated on 13 November 2026, and the response was “in due course” again. Of course, we are now well beyond the three-month target. I am well aware that “in due course” is the parliamentary equivalent to “mañana”, but it does not convey quite that same sense of urgency. If the Minister cannot give us any reassurances this evening—and I understand why she might not be able to—perhaps she could do a short note indicating when there hopefully would be a response to that consultation, without using the words “in due course”.

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  7. The Advocate-General for Scotland (Baroness Smith of Cluny) (Lab)

    My Lords, I understand and share the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—and indeed as expressed by the noble Lord—that the ability to bring private prosecutions is not misused. At the same time, the right to bring a private prosecution is a long-established feature of our criminal justice system and can provide an important route to justice where a prosecution is not otherwise brought. The threat or instigation of a private prosecution can understandably be deeply troubling for defendants, particularly where the individual bringing the prosecution is known to them. It is therefore crucial that private prosecutions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and safeguards. That exists already, as the Director of Public Prosecutions has full power to take over a private prosecution. They make their decisions in accordance with the full code test as set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors . This is supplemented by clear CPS guidance setting out the circumstances and manner in which private prosecutions should be taken over. In addition, magistrates may refuse to issue a summons where they find that a person is bringing the private prosecution vexatiously. However, I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concerns about potential abuse. The Minister, my noble friend Lord Lemos, will be happy to explore with the Attorney-General’s Office and the Crown Prosecution Service how existing guidance on private prosecutions could be strengthened further. The noble Baroness also raised concerns about the position of complainants who later become the subject of criminal proceedings arising from the making of an allegation. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that individuals do not lose appropriate protections—as mentioned by the noble Baroness—simply because related criminal proceedings are subsequently brought against them. The application of those protections in individual cases will depend on the particular facts, the applicable law and the balance with safeguarding the defendant’s right to a fair trial. These are matters that we can no doubt discuss in more detail. It remains crucial, however, to note that Section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 provides lifelong anonymity for complainants in respect of allegations of sexual offences. I hope that, with these assurances and the commitment to meet, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will withdraw her amendment. I give a commitment that I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in terms that I hope he will find acceptable.

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  8. Baroness Brinton (LD)

    I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the Minister for responding. I laid this amendment at short notice, because I am interested in the procedure. I am also serious that I will be interested in the Government’s response to the CEDAW judgment in due course, but that is not my point. I am grateful for the offer of a meeting and will take that up. I do not think that my issue about some of the process was responded to, and I hope that that will be possible during a meeting. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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  9. Amendment 52A withdrawn.

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  10. Amendment 52B not moved.

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  11. Amendment 52C

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  12. Moved by

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  13. 52C: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause— “Criminal Division of the High Court(1) Section 5 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (divisions of High Court) is amended according to subsections (2) and (3).(2) In subsection (1)—(a) for “three divisions” substitute “four divisions”;(b) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (b);(c) at the end of paragraph (c) insert, “; and(d) the Criminal Division, consisting of the President of the Criminal Division, who may be either the Lord Chief Justice or a Lord Justice of Appeal, and such of the puisne judges as are for the time being attached in accordance with this section.”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The establishment of the Criminal Division does not affect the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division or any other Division of the High Court.”(4) In making arrangements for the attachment of judges to the Criminal Division and for the deployment of those judges, the Lord Chief Justice must have regard to the complexity and sensitivity of criminal proceedings and must seek to ensure the effective use and development of judicial experience and expertise in—(a) criminal law,(b) criminal procedure,(c) evidence,(d) sentencing,(e) jury management, and(f) the participation of defendants, witnesses and victims in criminal proceedings.(5) The Lord Chief Justice must make arrangements for judges sitting in the Criminal Division to undertake criminal business appropriate to their experience and expertise, including sitting in the Crown Court and in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal.(6) Nothing in this section—(a) transfers the jurisdiction of the Crown Court or of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal to the High Court;(b) prevents a judge attached to another Division of the High Court from undertaking criminal business where appropriately experienced and qualified;(c) affects the independence of the judiciary in the allocation or determination of individual cases;(d) affects the assignment of cases presently assigned to the King’s Bench Division.(7) The Lord Chancellor must, before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a statement, prepared after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, setting out the arrangements for implementing this section, including arrangements relating to judicial deployment, training and administrative support.” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment establishes a Criminal Division of the High Court, recognising criminal law and procedure as a distinct judicial specialism and promoting the effective deployment and development of criminal expertise within the senior judiciary. The amendment preserves the existing jurisdiction of the Crown Court, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal and the existing Divisions of the High Court, whilst maintaining judicial responsibility for deployment and case allocation.

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  14. Baroness Levitt (Lab)

    My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 52C, 67A and 70A standing in my name. I am very grateful to Professor David Ormerod, one of the most distinguished criminal lawyers of his generation, for his assistance in developing these amendments. They ask a straightforward question: why is criminal justice the only major jurisdiction of the High Court without a recognised institutional home of its own? The criminal law occupies a unique place within our legal system. Every day, judges sitting in the criminal courts determine questions of guilt and innocence, make decisions affecting personal liberty, protect the public from serious harm and give effect to the rights of victims. The consequences of those decisions are profound, not merely for defendants and victims but for public confidence in the justice system as a whole. Despite the significant of those responsibilities, the High Court contains a Family Division and a Business and Property Division, but no criminal division. Parliament has long recognised the distinctiveness of criminal justice at appellate level through the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. The question raised by these amendments is: why is that distinctiveness not recognised within the structure of the High Court itself? Recent developments make that question particularly timely because, this year, the Business and Property Division replaced the former Chancery Division. Whatever view one takes of that change, it demonstrates an important constitutional point. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, clearly has some thoughts on that matter; I very much look forward to him sharing them with us. Whatever view one takes of that change, the divisional structure of the High Court is not fixed for all time, as is proved by this change. It can evolve where a convincing case exists for doing so. Such a case exists in relation to criminal justice. My case rests on three propositions. First, criminal judging is a distinct judicial specialism. Secondly, criminal expertise should be recognised and deployed systematically. Thirdly, specialisation need not come at the expense of flexibility. My starting point is that criminal judging is different. Of course, every branch of the law is demanding, and every division of the High Court contains judges of exceptional ability. Nothing in these amendments should be understood as a criticism of the King’s Bench Division or of the arrangements under which criminal work is currently undertaken. The issue is not capability; it is specialism. Serious criminal trials require a combination of skills and experience that is not easily replicated elsewhere. Judges are required to manage vulnerable witnesses and defendants, rule on complex evidential questions in real time, assess the potential impact of disputed evidence on a jury and explain difficult legal principles to 12 citizens with no legal training. These are not skills that are acquired solely through academic study; they are developed through sustained practical experience. One senior criminal judge described trying a serious Crown Court case as being like driving a heavy goods vehicle with no brakes and unreliable steering, while somehow still being expected to arrive safely at the correct destination. Behind that humour lies an important truth: criminal trials are dynamic, highly pressured and unforgiving of error. That distinctiveness does not disappear on appeal. Criminal appellate judges are frequently required to evaluate decisions taken in fast-moving jury trials and to assess whether difficult rulings made under considerable pressure were, in fact, correct. If criminal judging is distinctive, then criminal expertise has value. I do not mean the expertise acquired many years earlier before moving permanently into other fields of practice; I mean expertise grounded in the contemporary realities of criminal litigation. That should not be a controversial proposition. We readily accept that specialist experience matters in family law and in commercial and business litigation. There is no obvious reason why criminal law should be treated differently. Indeed, many criminal practitioners would argue that criminal law has too often suffered from an assumption that it is somehow less intellectually demanding than other legal specialisms. In reality, criminal judges deal daily with difficult issues of evidence, disclosure, procedure, human rights and sentencing. They preside over proceedings involving digital evidence, scientific and expert testimony, and vulnerable witnesses and defendants. They operate in an environment where emotions run high and the consequences of error can be profound. Moreover, criminal law is marked by particularly frequent and significant change, particularly in the area of legislation. Few branches of the law evolve as rapidly or as fundamentally. Keeping abreast of those developments requires continuing specialist engagement. The structure of our courts should reflect that reality. The second proposition is that the jury system should make systematic use of criminal expertise. This argument is not ideological but practical. A criminal division of the High Court would provide a clearer framework for identifying, retaining and deploying specialist criminal expertise. It would strengthen the contribution of experienced criminal judges to appellate decision-making, help ensure that the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with the most relevant experience, and, above all, give institutional recognition to a specialism that already exists in practice. There is also a broader point concerning progression, diversity and public confidence. For many years, Parliament, the judiciary and the legal profession have rightly sought to widen the diversity of those who reach the most senior judicial offices. Important progress has been made but concerns remain. I am sure it will readily be recognised that criminal practice has historically provided opportunities for lawyers from backgrounds that have traditionally been underrepresented at the highest levels of the profession. Many criminal practitioners are state educated, many are first-generation professionals, and many have spent their careers working directly with the communities most affected by the justice system. A significant number go on to become district judges, recorders and circuit judges, and acquire exceptional expertise in the conduct of criminal trials. Yet criminal expertise has not always enjoyed the same institutional recognition as some other legal specialisms. That matters because structures influence careers; they influence aspirations, opportunities and progression. A criminal division would not of itself solve questions of judicial diversity but it would create a clearer route through which outstanding criminal practitioners and judges could progress to the most senior levels of the judiciary while remaining within the specialism to which they have devoted their professional lives. That is a question not simply of representation but of legitimacy and public confidence. I turn briefly to two possible objections. The first is the concern that a criminal division would encourage excessive specialisation. I respectfully suggest that that concern is overstated. The principle of specialisation is already well established within the senior courts. Parliament accepted long ago that family justice warranted a separate division, and the existence of the Business and Property Division reflects a similar recognition in relation to commercial expertise. The real question, therefore, is not whether specialisation is acceptable but whether criminal justice is sufficiently distinctive to justify comparable treatment. For the reasons I have already outlined, I suggest that it is. Nor would these amendments create a judicial silo. The drafting deliberately preserves flexibility. Judges from other divisions could continue to undertake criminal work where appropriate, and cross-deployment and cross-fertilisation would remain possible, so the proposed division would be specialist but not isolated. The second objection concerns cost. Again, I suggest that that concern is overstated. These amendments would not create a new court system, require new court buildings or establish a significant new administrative structure. This proposal concerns the organisation and deployment of judges who already exist within the courts. In any event, costs must be considered alongside effectiveness. The present system functions well because considerable effort is devoted to matching judges with cases according to their experience and expertise, but that process itself carries costs, as do appeals, retrials and delay. These burdens are borne not only by the courts but by victims, witnesses and defendants. Again, I am not suggesting that a criminal division would eliminate such difficulties, but it is reasonable to suppose that a structure designed to identify and utilise specialist expertise would assist in the effective deployment of judicial resources. Most importantly, I ask that we remember what is at stake. The criminal courts determine whether individuals lose their liberty, whether victims receive justice and whether the public are protected. In that context, the relevant question is not whether expertise has a cost but whether we are making the fullest possible use of expertise where the consequences of error are greatest. I have a final word on the drafting. The amendments are deliberately modest. The Lord Chief Justice—that is the traditional wording but, of course, at the moment it is a Lady Chief Justice—could serve as president of the division, avoiding the need for a new salaried leadership office. The amendments build on existing statutory mechanisms governing judicial deployment. Although Section 7 of the Senior Courts Act already provides machinery by which divisional arrangements may be altered, these amendments proceed on the basis that the creation of a criminal division is a matter of sufficient constitutional significance that Parliament should make the decision expressly. I readily accept that this is an ambitious proposal. However, I hope that there can be agreement on a number of underlying propositions: that criminal judging is distinctive; that criminal expertise has value; that criminal judicial experience should be recognised, retained and developed; and that public confidence is strengthened when the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with substantial and relevant expertise. If family justice merits a division and if business and property litigation merits a division, it is surely legitimate to ask whether criminal justice should continue to stand alone without equivalent institutional recognition. These amendments ask that question. I suggest that they provide the right answer. I beg to move.

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  15. Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)

    My Lords, I have the greatest respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, but in this she is entirely wrong. First, the amendment is unnecessary. Why change something that is working perfectly well? That question must be asked. She has not set out what happens at this moment. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, would want to be here. I have consulted him. What I have to say has his approval. Currently, if you change a division of the High Court, it is an Order in Council that makes the change. That is what has happened in the past. If there is a need for a separate division of crime, why on earth can it not be done by an Order in Council? Parliament has never up to now taken part in setting out the divisions of the High Court. The noble Baroness has also not told the Committee that the King’s Bench Division is the division in which the criminal court sits. The head of the criminal courts is the Lady Chief Justice. Under her, dealing with it on a day-to-day basis, is the vice-president of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, was the vice-president, so we can see how important that court and his position are. There is always a vice-president, answerable to the Lord Chief Justice or Lady Chief Justice, who runs the criminal courts. All the judges of the King’s Bench Division sit as judges of the criminal court unless for some reason they are unsuitable or prefer not to do so. There is therefore always a high calibre of judges in the Crown Court sitting as High Court judges in the really difficult cases. We have the Crown Court, which has mainly circuit judges, as well as the High Court judges. All this is monitored and run by the vice-president. The appeals from the Crown Court and the High Court go to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. That is staffed regularly by senior judges. The Lady Chief Justice sits there most days when she is sitting. Although I was a family judge, I sat from time to time in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, as did many other judges from other divisions. As noble Lords know, I was a family judge. Until I became President of the Family Division, I sat regularly there because they were short of judges. However, they never let me do anything that really mattered—and I always sat with two other judges. The serious cases are tried either by the Lady Chief Justice, the president of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division or one of the other very senior judges. I say again: it works. I have never heard of any criticism. The noble Baroness did not actually criticise what is happening at the moment. She is out on a limb in saying that because we have a Family Division, which I used to run, and a Chancery Division, which is now called “Business and”—I forget what the other thing is called.

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  16. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    Property.

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  17. Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)

    It is the Business and Property Division. There was an Order in Council recently that created the Business and Property Division, taking over the Chancery Division and parts of the King’s Bench Division. But the Criminal Division works perfectly well within the King’s Bench Division because it is the same judges who do both parts of the work. No High Court judge of the King’s Bench Division goes out on circuit without having to try at least some criminal cases and probably most of his time he tries entirely criminal cases as a judge of the King’s Bench Division. There is not any problem with it. It is not that the noble Baroness has pointed out what is going wrong. What she is saying is that, because the criminal courts are so important, they should have a separate name. But if it works, why change it? My experience, which goes over many years sitting in the criminal Court of Appeal and the High Court, was that the circuit judges sitting as Crown Court judges are perfectly content working within the umbrella of King’s Bench Walk but doing it entirely separately under the vice-president of the criminal side. I just say to your Lordships: why change it?

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  18. Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)

    My Lords, with enormous respect to my noble and learned friend, whom I respect enormously, I am afraid I disagree with her profoundly on this occasion. I will give your Lordships a little anecdote from my own experience. One day I was appearing in a murder case, and a new High Court judge called me into his room before the case started. He said, “Look, Alex, the only murder case I have ever seen was when I was a judge’s marshal in Mold Crown Court when I was 23 years-old, and I have never actually been in a criminal court since then. So, if during this trial, my first murder trial, I do anything stupid, please would you ask for an adjournment and tell the usher you want to come in and tell me what I have done wrong”. I need to declare an interest, which has been declared by many others today, which is that I am a member of the Bar. I think I am probably safe to say that I have done more criminal cases than any other Member of this House, with the possible exception of my noble kinswoman who has just moved this amendment. I have seen it all, and I have been involved on both sides of cases and have done lots of criminal appeals. First of all, we have a situation in which—and I use my old friend who is no longer a judge as my example—not enough people who have made their careers at the criminal Bar are appointed to the High Court Bench. There has been intellectual snobbery against the criminal Bar, and I put it as directly as that, because it has been thought that those who do criminal cases are not as bright as all the others. Well, if noble Lords look at the complexity and changes in the criminal law, as mentioned by my noble kinswoman, they will discover, as she said, that criminal cases being tried today are immensely complex. Almost every criminal case has complicated computer-generated material as part of the evidence. A great number of cases have experts and, as we discussed earlier, not all the experts are as expert as they claim to be, and it needs real criminal experience to sort the wheat from the chaff. The demand that is made upon criminal barristers in terms of engagement with their clients at moments of high tension places a special responsibility on the mental health and the stability of those people who, on the whole, manage being criminal barristers at every level very well. So far as the arrangement of the courts is concerned, the answer to my noble and learned friend is that of course it can be done by an Order in Council, but it has not been done by an Order in Council, which is why we are having this debate today. If the Minister were to say there will be an Order in Council in the next 28 days appointing a criminal division of the High Court, I suspect that my noble kinswoman would withdraw her amendment with enthusiasm—maybe with a bit less than enthusiasm, judging by her expression, but with satisfaction anyway. The architecture of the criminal courts is not working properly. The criminal courts are the most public, exposed, dynamic—by force, not by choice—and society-engaged part of our justice system. It seems odd that they should be lumped in—even if a senior judge takes charge of them—with a very large number of civil cases, judicial review and the Administrative Court, and not have their own separate division. That is not just so that it has the dignity of its own separate division. There are more complaints about criminal cases than any other feature of the law. That is inevitable, because of the human story told in them. There is greater demand for there to be inspections of judges trying criminal cases. For the last 20 years, since I first wrote an article on the subject, I have suggested that there should be a judicial inspectorate particularly aimed at the criminal courts—and not one that sits in an office in London but one that literally goes out and inspects what is happening in courts if it hears that something may be going wrong, whether in a small Crown Court somewhere in the country or in the Old Bailey. I feel that now is the time for public accountability of this very important part of our justice system to be recognised by creating a criminal division of the High Court for the whole of England and Wales. That would ensure that the quality of justice delivered to the public, which we debate so much at the moment, is publicly accountable and of the highest quality.

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  19. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, those of us who recently returned from the burial of the Chancery Division approach this invitation to the birth of a criminal division in two minds. No doubt it will be said that it was not buried but was subsumed, but it was subsumed into the Business and Property Division—I say only that if it is good enough for Delaware still to have a chancery division, I do not know why it is not good enough for us. But never mind; I will move on to the amendment. Any amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, needs careful consideration. She doubled that by saying that it had the support of Professor Ormerod. Anybody who knows anything about criminal law—and I know far less than everybody who has spoken so far—knows that Professor Ormerod is an absolute authority, so we must listen to him very carefully. That said, and although I will listen to what is said from the Government Benches, I have some concerns about the structure proposed. The amendment has obviously been very carefully drafted, but as I read proposed new subsection (2)(c), the judges who would be attached to this criminal division would be individual High Court judges. Particular judges would be attached to the division. I understand the point about specialism. I also see that, in proposed new subsection (6)(b), nothing “prevents a judge attached to another Division of the High Court from undertaking criminal business”, as the noble Baroness said, but it is quite rare for a judge in one division to sit in another division. The financial list was not a division but a joint list run by the Chancery Division, God rest its soul, and the Commercial Court, which was part of the King’s Bench Division and has now been subsumed into the Business and Property Division. Although this may not be what is intended, my concern is whether, in practice, judges doing, for example, commercial work would actually continue to sit on criminal appeals. My understanding from many if not all those judges is that they find that work important and it keeps them in touch with other areas of law. I do not understand there to be any higher incidence of complaints, for example, about commercial judges hearing criminal cases rather than, so to speak, normal King’s Bench Division judges hearing them.

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  20. I suggest that it is important that our judges who hear criminal cases are also drawn from across the judiciary. Of course, it is a specialism, and there needs to be specialist training and people need to be ticketed as specialists. Not every judge can hear a rape case; as we heard in previous groups, any judge who hears sexual offences cases has to have appropriate training. However, I am concerned that, because of the way the amendment is structured, it would in time lead to a cadre of judges who hear criminal cases and only criminal cases.

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  21. That said, I am interested in what the Government have to say about this. The history of divisions of the High Court is odd: we used to have the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, known famously as “wills, wives and wrecks”. If we look at criminal law, we see that there are other anomalies out there. I will take 45 seconds to highlight just one. At the moment, if you appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal Criminal Division has to certify a point of law of general importance. It can give you permission, but, if it does not, you can get it from the Supreme Court. However, if it does not certify, you are stuck. That has always seemed to be a real problem to me, because it means that, if the Court of Appeal Criminal Division decides a point of law and declines to certify, in effect it shuts out the Supreme Court from looking at it.

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  22. I suspect that the reason for that is the same reason averted to by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, which is that there may have been a historical reluctance on the part of criminal specialists in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division to have an Appellate Committee of this House, in its old days, trampling all over criminal law, when the majority of the members of the House of Lords Appellate Committee were not criminal law specialists.

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  23. Lord Leggatt, a justice of the Supreme Court, pointed out in the Libor appeal, R v Hayes and R v Palombo, that the current position raises serious problems. It may not be something that the Government can respond to this evening but, if we move at the trial level to more specialism in criminal law by a criminal division, we have to recognise that appeals from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division should be able to go to the Supreme Court without that division having to certify a point of law. With that, I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

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  24. Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)

    My Lords, the structure of the courts and the deployment of judges are matters of considerable constitutional and operational importance. It is a well-established constitutional principle enshrined in Section 7 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 that decisions concerning the deployment of judges and the allocation of work to judges are for the judiciary. It is essential that any structural change should be developed carefully with the senior judiciary, which has everyday responsibility for our courts. Where the senior judiciary seeks structural reforms, the Government are committed to working closely with it, as we have done with the measures in this Bill to unify the leadership of the tribunals and courts judiciary in England and Wales under the Lady Chief Justice, and recently in supporting the judiciary’s proposals to modernise the High Court with the historic creation of the Business and Property Division delivered via secondary legislation—with much heartache, it appears. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, my noble friend Lady Levitt’s speech did not identify anything actually going wrong, so it appears that her amendment is a principled move not a practical one. The Government do not consider it appropriate to make any structural change to the High Court without detailed consideration by and engagement with the judiciary. Our focus is now on the structural reforms being planned for the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court through the Bill. With this explanation, I hope my noble friend Lady Levitt will withdraw her amendment.

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  25. Baroness Levitt (Lab)

    My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken, particularly to my noble and learned friend the Minister for her careful response. The purpose of these amendments was less to prescribe a particular institutional solution and more to start a conversation about how we recognise and nurture criminal judicial expertise within our senior courts. I have, as I think the entire Chamber has, the most enormous respect for the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I hope that she will understand that I say with affection that I accurately predicted the outrage with which this amendment would be greeted by the senior judiciary. She did not disappoint. There may be differences in views about the merits of a criminal division, but I hope there is broader agreement that criminal judging is a demanding specialism, that criminal expertise matters and that we should always be looking at how best to support and develop it. It is not an issue that will be resolved this evening. Questions about the structure of our senior courts deserve thoughtful reflection rather than hurried conclusions. I am grateful for the constructive and good-tempered engagement and hope that the discussion I have prompted may continue beyond Committee. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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  26. Amendment 52C withdrawn.

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  27. Clause 16: Welfare of the child: repeal of presumption of parental involvement

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  28. Debate on whether Clause 16 should stand part of the Bill.

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  29. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, I oppose Clause 16 standing part of the Bill. I will set this out fairly quickly. My purpose is to raise the question of why the current statutory presumption should not be maintained. The clause as drafted seeks to remove the current statutory presumption of parental involvement. Before I go any further, I will say—this will be shared by everybody who speaks—that when children are abused by their parents, it is a terrible tragedy. They are abused by the very people with whom they ought to be safest. Although every abuse of a child is appalling, abuse by parents, if there is such a concept, is doubly appalling. However, when one is dealing with law, it is important that laws are not changed as a result of a few extreme cases. Hard cases may make bad law, but bad laws lead to worse decisions in many cases. The point of the parental presumption is that, in the majority of cases—one might even say the vast majority—it provides the healthiest and safest outcomes for a child. It is important to note that the presumption is what it says on the tin; it is only a presumption. Indeed, in legal terms, as drafted in the Children Act, it is a fairly weak presumption. The phrase there is “presume, unless the contrary is shown”. It allows for parents to be kept away from the child if there is evidence in the case that parental involvement would prove detrimental to the child. The presumption is certainly not an absolute right that parents retain contact with their children in all circumstances. If the situation is unsafe, the courts already have the power to act on that. That is why I raise this issue by way of a clause stand part notice. I hope that the Committee will allow me to say a very quick word about Amendment 53A, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lady Barran. I do not want to pre-empt what she will say, but that amendment requires an evaluation on outcomes following the repeal of the parental presumption. That is a very sensible proposal, because if the focus of these changes is intended to promote the well-being of the child, it is essential that the legislation is then measured on whether that target has, in fact, been achieved. I am sympathetic to the amendments from my noble friend Lord Farmer and will listen carefully to them. I hope to be able to work with my noble friends and the Minister between now and Report.

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  30. Lord Farmer (Con)

    My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 53, which has been co-signed by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who cannot be in his place. It would insert a so-called parental relationship test into the welfare checklist and place a requirement on judges to evidence their reasoning for a decision based on all elements of that checklist. I also express strong support for the opposition to Clause 16 standing part of the Bill from my noble and learned friend Lord Keen and my noble friend Lord Wolfson. In November 2020, the MoJ launched, “a review of the ‘presumption of parental involvement’, to make sure the right balance is being struck between the risk of harm to children and victims, and a child’s right to have a relationship with both parents where this is safe”. The review was explicitly to ensure that, “any decisions made are rooted firmly in evidence”. However, as I said at Second Reading, evidence of poor practice around the operation of the presumption is not at all the same thing as evidence that the statutory presumption itself has caused or materially contributed to that poor practice. The review did not include evidence about the long-term outcomes for children where the effect of a court order is that they have no contact with a parent. As 84.6% of lone-parent families are headed by mothers, it is far more likely that they will be missing a father. Indeed, Millennium Cohort Study research found that although only 2% of children aged 11 had no contact with their biological mother, 11% were not in contact with their biological father. If this were extrapolated to the current UK population of children aged under 18, possibly around 1.6 million have completely absent fathers. That is a very large number to pronounce upon without having relevant research. What about their Article 8 right to family life and the UNCRC’s Article 9.3 right for children of separation “to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests”? Much academic research shows the lifelong benefits to children of high father involvement, including better emotional well-being, future mental health, higher levels of cognitive and social competence, greater capacity for empathy and social responsibility, higher self-esteem, social maturity, self-control and life skills, and better school adjustment, academic progress and workplace success in adulthood. We are in real danger of ignoring this research if we send the signal that both parents and both extended families are not that important. Women’s Aid reports that 69 child homicides over 32 years were associated with unsafe contact arrangements following parental separation. In exceptional circumstances, children do not benefit from contact with both parents. However, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson, hard cases make bad law. Six years ago, the harm panel report that led to the MoJ review said: “To the extent that the courts’ pro-contact culture operates as a barrier to addressing domestic abuse, it serves to reinforce that culture”. This needs unpicking. The assertion that there is a pro-contact culture in the courts is challenged by senior judiciary. Also, we are in a different world now as regards addressing domestic abuse. Much of the evidence used by the review pre-dated the harm panel, yet significant advances have been made since 2020, such as updated practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. Notably, that Act raised awareness of, and outlawed, the many forms that abuse can take. Many researchers have found clear evidence of parents with care perpetrating legal and administrative abuse against non-residents’ parents, mainly fathers, where structures and processes of the legal system are weaponised by ex-partners as a form of post-separation abuse. How many fathers of the estimated 1.6 million children with no contact are victims of such abuse? This was not considered in the MoJ review. Neither was the effect on the pre-court space, a key target area for the presumption in 2014. Approximately 140,000 families with dependent children experience parental separation each year, affecting an estimated 280,000 children. If 62% of separating families do not use the courts, that is around 173,000 children for whom the rebuttable presumption is the starting ground. It is a vital bulwark against vindictive parents with care emotionally and psychologically abusing non-resident parents and, more importantly, denying children contact with both parents and with safe parents.

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  31. I turn to Amendment 53 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. There is now far greater recognition in law and policy of the importance of relationships than was the case in 1989, so the welfare checklist needs updating to reflect that. Our amendment refers to the quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent. This was first proposed by Members on the Benches opposite in both Houses during the passage of the Children and Families Act 2014. This extra item on the checklist assumes nothing but assesses the benefit of a meaningful, loving, consistent and enduring relationship with both parents, where safe, and the potential harm from denying or limiting their ability to develop or maintain such relationships and pre-separation caregiving roles. It also assesses how the relationship between the parents affects the child; levels of parental conflict; their ability to communicate about the child’s needs; and their readiness to engage in dispute resolution.

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  32. Both parents’ willingness and capacity to support the child’s relationship with the other parent, where safe, requires considering each one’s ability to put the child’s needs first. Cafcass says it already does this, but survey data challenges its consistency. Embedding this parental relationship test in the welfare checklist would not require co-operation between parents at any cost nor prioritise parental involvement over child safety. It would ensure that relationships and conflict were assessed consistently, transparently and proportionately. It would also strengthen safeguarding by embedding clearer scrutiny of relational dynamics within existing domestic abuse and risk-of-harm protections and supervised contact arrangements. It therefore aligns with the Government’s child-focused courts, which should be further strengthened with the specialist domestic abuse support proposed by my noble friend Lady Barran and the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, in Amendment 53B.

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  33. Our amendment would also require judges to evidence their reasoning for a decision based on the enhanced welfare checklist in a far more targeted way. This would address the safety concerns that are driving calls for the repeal of the presumption.

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  34. Lastly, if the Government are determined to press on with Clause 16, I add my support for the amendments by my noble friend Lady Barran and the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, to conduct three-year and five-year reviews of the effect of repeal. However, the focus seems to be exclusively on outcomes for children whose parents have brought applications for child arrangement orders to the family court. I reiterate that there is a bigger cultural issue at play here that reaches beyond the minority who go to court and affects those who operate in the shadow of the law and receive advice from professionals, all of whom are very safeguarding conscious.

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  35. The presumption is the starting point for teachers who notice changes in a child’s well-being, behaviour or attendance following family breakdown, perhaps if a parent is wholly absent. It influences early health practitioners and social workers to encourage constructive and safe shared parenting. Family hub workers are required to support parents and children upstream of court proceedings. A change in the legal framework would subtly shift the messages they gave to parents that both of them were important. So if this review becomes a fallback option, it must consider the whole of the separating population and not ignore the majority of parents who do not use the courts. They are the ones who will arguably be most affected by the presumptions of appeal.

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  36. Baroness Barran (Con)

    My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the wise words of my noble friend Lord Farmer. I very much support the spirit of his modest but very important amendment. I want to start by thanking the Minister for his very helpful letter that he sent me at the end of last week, which tried to address my concerns directly. I am aware that not all ministerial letters achieve that, so I put on record my gratitude to him and his team for having done that. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, for adding her name to my amendments. I will briefly set out the purpose of my amendments and the gap they seek to address. I will start with Amendment 53A, to which my noble friend Lord Wolfson referred. My noble friend promoted me so many grades. At Second Reading, I debated whether to confess that my highest legal qualification was a law O-level, but he made me “noble and learned”, so I will roll with that in future. Amendment 53A calls for a long-term evaluation of the outcomes for children subject to child arrangement orders, with specific reference to the impact of Clause 16. In his letter to me, the Minister referred to the work of the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and her report on the family court review and reporting mechanism—an acronym I will not risk at this time of night. He pointed out his department’s commitment to fund the second phase of that research, which of course is very welcome, although I note the Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s disappointment that there is a gap in financial and economic abuse in that regard. The work of phase 2 of the family court review and reporting mechanism does not answer the question asked at Second Reading: to what extent will the removal of the presumption of parental involvement impact on the ability of children to have the involvement of both parents in their lives, where it is safe and beneficial to do so? The mechanism does not explore the extent to which that will impact on the longer-term relationships with the non-resident parent or analyse the long-term impact on the safety and well-being of children subject to those orders. I would argue, and I know others would agree, that a longitudinal analysis is really important. As my noble friend Lord Farmer said, we do not have good evidence of the impact of the court’s decisions on the lives of children, whether in the more than 55,000 private law cases heard every year or the much larger number that are resolved outside the courts. Amendment 53B looks at the importance of specialist support for victims of domestic abuse in these cases. Again, I note the Minister’s letter, which sought to reassure me about the funding and quality of the specialist domestic abuse support. He helpfully referred me to the target operating model for the child-focused courts and the statutory guidelines for the Independent Domestic Violence Adviser—IDVA—services. At this point, I am not sure whether I should declare an interest, but, around 2004, there was a document on my kitchen table that contained the definition of what an IDVA was. We got it on to one page; I am pleased to see that the Government have picked up on that. My amendment looks at the recruitment, retention, training, supervision and delivery of specialist support services and the appropriate funding to underpin that. On page 13 of the target operating model document, reference is made to the fact that referrals can be made to a specialist domestic abuse service with the consent of the victim, that children are “victims in their own right”, and that the provision of “specialist support for child victims of domestic abuse is currently limited but can be offered under the Child Focused Model and is something that we are continuing to explore”. Does the Minister have anything more to say about the department’s exploration, and does he see a possibility that children will have a right to support in the child-focused court model? It also talks about the provision of support in cases of counterallegations. Can the Minister give the Committee a sense of how frequently this has happened in the pilot courts and whether it has been handled effectively? One can see some of the challenges for a small domestic abuse service responding to both parties. Can the Minister explain the Government’s plans for training? Courts are highly technical environments, and I wondered what evidence there was from the pilot about the training needs. My amendment also talks about securing appropriate funding for these services. Page 14 of the target operating model document refers to funding from police and crime commissioners. Can the Minister update the Committee on how that will work once we no longer have police and crime commissioners? Page 23 of the document states: “Specialist domestic abuse services are introduced under the Child Focused Model … The local funding for domestic abuse services will depend on relevant private law receipts and the rate at which referrals are made to service. The funding for domestic abuse services within Child Focused Courts is provided by the Ministry of Justice and is a permanent requirement of the model”. Can the Minister explain how this works in practice? It sounds like there is a guaranteed element of the funding and then another portion linked to the number of cases heard. Can he confirm whether I have understood that correctly and whether the department has estimated how much funding will be needed once the model is rolled out and how that would split between the two elements—the guaranteed and the per-case element? More broadly, the document talks about funding for IDVAs to use the DASH risk assessment to make a “professional assessment and summary of risk and impact”, which will be provided by the IDVA to the child impact report author. I was honestly concerned to read this. I was very involved in the development of the DASH risk assessment. It was never designed to be a risk assessment; we spent a long time calling it a risk identification checklist. Its purpose was to identify cases that would meet the threshold to be referred to a MARAC, at which more information could be shared and the risk properly assessed. It is not a full risk assessment, and it was never designed to assess the risk to children. If the Minister shares my concerns, I would be more than happy to meet him at a more civilised hour to talk about this, if he thinks it is worth looking into. Finally, I express my strong support for Amendment 53C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, who I know will introduce it with great expertise.

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  37. Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)

    My Lords, I think your Lordships know that I was President of the Family Division. I also played a very small part in the creation of the Children Act 1989 by being the chairman of the report of the Cleveland child abuse inquiry, some of which got into the Act. I took the trouble to talk to one of the Family Division High Court judges, who made two quite interesting points. The first was that, in his view, technically, the presumption was in conflict with Section 1(1) of the Children Act, which says: “When a court determines any question with respect to … the upbringing of a child … the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration”. This judicial friend of mine pointed out that you did not need a presumption because the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, but he also took the view that it was quite unnecessary because the court is dealing with what is necessary for the child as its paramount consideration. I also refer to Section 1(3), which is long. Section 1(3)(f) says that a court will have regard to “how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs”. Consequently, you have under Section 1 everything that is needed, including the reference to the parents, so the presumption in Section 2 is not needed. I can see nothing wrong with the Government deciding that it would be probably more suitable to get rid of it because of concerns of domestic abuse.

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  38. I can say with absolute certainty that in all the years that I did family law—probably 15 at the Bar and about 30 as a judge—the issue of whether both parents were suitable was absolutely up front; every judge considered that both parents mattered, until you had to consider whether, for one reason or another, one parent might not be suitable. I can tell your Lordships that there were cases where I thought the mother was quite unsuitable and had no difficulty in handing the child to the father. I understand that psychologically, and probably politically, there are concerns that the press will pick up on presumptions, but if this is properly sold to the public—forgive me for using the word “sold”—it really does not need to sound as significant as I think it really is not.

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  39. One interesting issue that has not been discussed so far is a project that I remember discussing with the then President of the Family Division, on which he was extremely keen. It had been put forward by the Lord Chancellor of the last Government, whereby, whenever there is a question as to a child’s assessment, or what we used to call contact, or indeed who lives with which parent, instead of the case going to the judge—in all too many private law cases, the parties are not represented nowadays—it goes instead to the welfare service. That service makes all the relevant inquiries, including on issues of domestic abuse; it is in touch with the police, the health service, the local authority, the social workers and anyone else who might be relevant to the family, and it gets together a report that goes to the judge. I am told that in the places where this project has taken place—I think there have been six up to now—most such private law cases have been dealt with in two hours, instead of a judge trying to find out what on earth the parents are talking about, since one parent will tell a story that is so completely different from the other that it is difficult to know what the facts really are.

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  40. I understand that this project is supported also by the present Government and is likely to be rolled out across the country. It would deal with many of the issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, has been talking about and would be an extremely good way not only of reducing the time that judges deal with the cases but, much more importantly, of providing the opportunity to see the least worst result for a child. For any child, the fact that their parents are separated is almost always a very sad event. I always remember a book in the United States written by social workers called something like “The Least Worst Outcome for a Child Once the Case Comes to Court”.

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  41. I really think that this is, in a sense, a storm in a teacup, because I do not think that Clause 16 is dealing with anything that is monumental, for the reasons that I have given. What matters is that Section 1(1) of the Act says that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration of the judge. The more you let the judges at every level get on with doing this extremely difficult and terribly important job, the better.

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  42. Lord Farmer (Con)

    I just come back to what I was saying about separating families outside the court system. The presumption is important for them. They do not have a judge looking at it; they are not in the court system. The fact that there is a presumption that the child needs to have access to both parents, where safe, is a bulwark against the parent who has the guardianship of the child abusing the other parent. The presumption says that it is in the child’s best interest. It is for the great number of children outside the court process that this is a safeguard. That is the point I was making.

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  43. Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)

    I have the most enormous sympathy for what the noble Lord is saying, but when the presumption existed, even in the cases of reasonable parents, it was not uppermost in their minds—uppermost in their minds was to win. With any luck, those parents who sensibly do not come to court do get some mediation advice. There is no reason why it could not be made public by the Government, in dealing with Clause 16, that there remains great importance in both parents playing a part with the children, save in the cases where it should not happen.

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  44. Baroness Neate (CB)

    My Lords, I am honoured to support the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barran and Lady Brinton. I will speak briefly to my Amendment 53C, but I first want to make clear my strong support for Clause 16 on the removal of the presumption of contact with both parents. I declare an interest: like the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, I have a long history in the domestic abuse sector. With Claire Throssell—who was sitting here until just a few minutes ago but had to go to catch her train— I launched the campaign to remove the presumption well over a decade ago. As I said at Second Reading, repealing the presumption of contact updates the law in line with our understanding of domestic abuse. Since the presumption was introduced, the UK has made significant progress on domestic abuse under Governments of both main parties. Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 recognised the offence of coercive and controlling behaviour. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 recognised children living in a household where there is domestic abuse as victims in their own right, because of the extreme damage that this causes to children. The same Act introduced legal recognition of post-separation abuse, including coercive and controlling behaviour. Repealing the presumption of parental involvement responds to these developments, in the knowledge also that domestic abuse is a feature of a huge majority of cases before the family courts. There has been much discussion of the fact that the presumption holds that the involvement of both parents in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare. There has been less discussion of the element of the presumption that states that a parent is presumed not to be a risk unless there is evidence to the contrary. In practice, this can place the onus on a victim of abuse to prove that the other parent presents a risk of harm to the child. This is not likely to minimise ongoing conflict or the trauma of the family courts for abuse survivors. Let us go back to the point when the presumption was being considered. I refer noble Lords to the final report of the Family Justice Review panel in 2011, which considered substantial research evidence of the Australian experience of shared parenting legislation before the presumption was introduced in the UK. The panel’s final report recommended against introducing a statutory presumption because it could compromise the principle of the Children Act 1989 that the child’s welfare must always be the paramount consideration. Since then, Australia has repealed its shared parenting legislation because of the harms and risks to children. We now understand enough about the impacts of domestic abuse on children and the prevalence of coercive control and post-separation abuse to do the same. There is not a lack of evidence here. In wholeheartedly supporting Amendment 53B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, I add that the support of specialist domestic abuse advocates is not only needed as child-focused courts are rolled out but needed in the family courts. While this Bill has been before Parliament, I have heard from local domestic abuse support organisations—and the committee of this House examining the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 has heard from survivors themselves—that this crucial support for survivors in one of the most difficult experiences of their lives is hanging by a thread due to a lack of recognition of how essential it is and, consequently, a lack of appropriate funding. I urge the Government to consider this when acting to make the family courts safer for domestic abuse survivors and their children. My Amendment 53C seeks to ensure that unregulated and unqualified experts can no longer carry out assessments of parties in child contact cases, nor provide advice to the courts. Even the President of the Family Division until recently, Sir Andrew McFarlane, has stated that it is “unhelpful and potentially confusing” that the “generic label ‘psychologist’” is used by individuals who do not, in fact, have expertise or qualification. The evidence that these people give has profound impacts on the lives of both children and adults. It can be, and is, used to support the spurious claims of perpetrators of domestic abuse. There is a real opportunity here to prevent this risk to children.

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  45. Baroness Brinton (LD)

    My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, whose work in domestic abuse and the repeal of the presumption has led the way and will be very useful to your Lordships’ House. I will start with the clause stand part notice, having heard the introduction to it by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. I found the Ministry of Justice’s final report of the review of the presumption of parental involvement, published in October 2025, extremely helpful. The press release to that review noted that Claire Throssell’s “tireless campaigning” over 12 years for the change in this law was critical, after her two beloved sons Jack and Paul were killed by their abusive father following a court giving him access despite evidence of abuse. I am sorry that Claire could not stay, but it was very helpful to have her here earlier. We thank her for her extraordinary campaigning; may this change in the law always be a blessing to her sons’ memories. The review is helpful in that it sets out that this type of case is rare but involves the capacity for injury, or worse, in a case where a child may not be safe. Decisions about a child should always put the safety of the child at the centre. On some rare occasions, that may mean a parent is denied what they think is their entitlement. So be it: the child must come first. Amendments 53, 53A and 53B offer, respectively, parental relationship tests in the welfare checklist, the evaluation of outcomes for children following the repeal of presumption of parental involvement, and specialist domestic abuse services in child-focused courts. Amendment 53C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, which I have signed, asks for the regulated status of expert witnesses. All try to ensure the safety of children after the repeal of the presumption, and I hope that the Minister will respond to each of them to leave your Lordships’ Committee in no doubt that mistakes of the past will not be repeated. These amendments are needed, because on pages 38 and 39 of the Review of the Presumption of Parental Involvement it says: “The apparent high incidence of orders where there were indicators of risk, alongside qualitative evidence that cases with indicators of high risk still ended with orders for direct involvement, suggested that courts were ordering direct contact between children and parents who caused or posed a risk of harm … Whilst the Review made clear that many children benefitted from contact with both of their parents, this stance was not appropriate when a child was at risk. Moreover, children at risk of harm from one or both parents were significantly over-represented in the family court. Decisions about their welfare must be made on the basis of the individual circumstances of the child, including an understanding of the potential harms to their physical and emotional wellbeing. The evidence of the Review suggested that practice in the family justice system and the decisions made by courts could leave children at ongoing risk of harm”. I quoted that at length in response to the earlier concern of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, about the rights of parents, because the panel was very clear about where the priority lies.

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  46. My Amendment 53D in this group would go somewhat further than Amendment 53C, from the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, in that it also wants to see in the family court, for the use of psychological assessments, that the court may appoint only an assessor who is a member of an appropriate regulatory body—I said we would return to this from earlier on. For example, a psychiatrist must be regulated by the General Medical Council and a psychologist must be regulated by the Health and Care Professions Council.

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  47. In recent years, there have been growing concerns about the use of experts, particularly unregulated experts, in allegations of so-called parental alienation against survivors of domestic abuse. In 2022, the UN Human Rights Council said:

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  48. “Abuse of the term ‘Parental Alienation’ and of similar concepts and terms invoked to deny child custody to the mother and grant it to a father accused of domestic violence in a manner that totally disregards the possible risks for the child must be discouraged. Accusations of parental alienation by abusive fathers against mothers must be considered as a continuation of power and control by state agencies and actors, including those deciding on child custody”.

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  49. I thank the Government for recognising in their violence against women and girls strategy that parental alienation is a pseudoscientific term with no basis in law or medicine, and that it should not be recognised. In some cases, these experts are not qualified psychologists and are not regulated by any professional bodies. There have also been some cases in the press where regulated experts have prioritised their own financial interest in the recommendations for the treatment that they give. All these issues have severe consequences for children’s lives and safety.

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  50. The Ministry of Justice’s harm panel report found that parental alienation is often alleged by perpetrators of domestic abuse to undermine and silence a survivor, and allegations are often accepted by the family court without robust scrutiny. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner warns that there is evidence that continues to indicate that counter-allegations of parental alienation are often taken more seriously than those of domestic abuse. One survivor quoted in a Women’s Aid report recounted the devastating impact on her and her daughter:

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  51. “My story started with my daughter disclosing abuse by her father, and finished with me losing her and being told to seek treatment for parental alienation”.

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  52. In Re C ( ‘Parental Alienation’; Instruction of Expert Judgement ) , the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, stated that it was “unhelpful” and “potentially confusing” that the

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  53. “generic label ‘psychologist’ is not protected and may be used by any individual, whether registered”

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  54. with a professional regulatory body

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  55. “or not”.

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  56. He also said that

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  57. “the court is used to a stricter regulatory scheme”

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  58. in most other fields, leading to dangerous misinformation being presented as fact.

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  59. The Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2026 are welcome. They enable experts to be appointed if they are listed on an accredited register, but this does not go far enough to ensure that survivors are protected from harm caused by both regulated and unregulated experts. Is the Minister prepared to follow the advice and experience of Sir Andrew McFarlane and ensure that anyone carrying out a psychological assessment is a member of an approved regulatory body?

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  60. Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)

    My Lords, it has been humbling to listen to a lot of the speeches, and I particularly pay credit to the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, and her vast experience in the field of domestic abuse. In general, I am a great admirer of her work, but I support the removal of Clause 16 from the Bill because it is unnecessary and could have unintended consequences. There has been a lot of confusion, if not misinformation, about the present status quo. Somehow the legal presumption that the involvement of each parent in the life of a child is good for a child’s welfare has become problematised and even demonised, and, worse than that, associated with abuse, although the current law obviously includes safeguards to restrict the involvement of either parent where it is detrimental or dangerously unsafe. I was reflecting on the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about the presumption not being needed. When it was brought in, I thought that, but the problem now is that it is within the law, and I am concerned about what the message will be if it is removed. Indeed, the Government have said that its removal would send a message, because it is implied that the presumption has been the cause of some of the real tragedies that we have seen. Given that there is gap in what is happening, there is a need for greater accountability for any state failures that might contribute to the awful, tragic deaths of children that we are all so vividly familiar with, and that are at the forefront of our minds, which are so often associated with domestic abuse. It is absolutely appropriate for us to identify any shortcomings in family court practices or those of any other state bodies. I am all for a culture change in the family justice system and for improved risk assessment, and I think the child-focused courts and specialist domestic abuse services proposed in Amendment 53B, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Barran and Lady Neate, should be seriously considered. However, I stress that there is no empirical evidence that a statutory presumption of parental contact is connected in any way to the kind of tragedies that are at the forefront of our minds. Overturning the law could become a convenient scapegoat, but it would not help any child at all, and it might do some damage. The principle that both parents matter to a child’s welfare is an important principle to hold on to, and to suggest otherwise represents another type of threat to a child and their welfare. That shift could send a divisive message, which might further inflame relations between bitter, separated parents in a way that is converse to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, that it could become weaponised and lead to more toxic accusations. It is always grim when one parent tries to poison a child’s opinion of another parent or a child gets tossed around. One hopes that the courts would see things out, calm things down and act in the best interests of children—and one admires the courts most when they do so—because children want the love of both parents and a relationship with both parents. Sometimes, it can be difficult to juggle all that. More often than not, children love both their parents, even if their parents do not love each other. It is a messy area for the state to have to get involved in. In the midst of that, I want to counter the derisory, insulting war against what has become known as pro-contact culture. In that sense, I welcome Amendment 53, from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. Adding a parental relationship test to a welfare checklist for any child seems an elegant idea and a way of countering some of the more negative views of parental contact as problematic. An important part of the amendment is the requirement that judges evidence their reasoning on key decisions. This seems to be lacking in the discussion on this part of the Bill. Finally, the proposed requirement in Amendment 53A for an independent evaluation of the outcomes of this repeal of the presumption of parental involvement is essential. The measure may lack evidence. I do not want the Government to abolish it and I do not think they have the evidence to abolish it, but, at the very least, the Government should gather evidence on its outcome if they do abolish it. That is why Amendment 53A has my support.

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  61. Baroness Kitching of Penistone (LD)

    My Lords, before I start, I offer my apologies that I was not present for Second Reading on 27 October. I hope that noble Lords will grant me their forgiveness for that, as I was not introduced to this House until 2 November. Iusb have, however, thoroughly brought myself up to date with the debate via Hansard . I speak in support of Clause 16, on the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. In doing so, I note and give thanks to the honourable Member for Peniston and Stocksbridge, Marie Tidball, for her tenacity and determination in ensuring that this clause is in the Bill. I have a particular reason for wishing to speak on this matter. Clause 16 is Jack and Paul’s law, as we have already heard this evening, which is named for the beautiful sons of Claire Throssell. The boys, aged 12 and nine, were killed in a house fire in Peniston, the town where I live, in 2014. That fire was set, deliberately, by their father, a known domestic abuser, on a court-ordered unsupervised contact visit. I have known Claire for very many years, because everyone in Peniston knows Claire, the tragedy that she has endured, and how the community pulled together to support her. I remember the day that that news broke, and the grief that was and is still felt by the whole town. I have watched Claire campaign bravely and fiercely to fulfil her last promise to her boys that no more children would die at the hands of an abusive parent. She has done incredible work as a survivor ambassador to protect victims and children—I know that many noble Lords are well familiar with her and her work—and she has won awards and accolades for that, including an MBE in 2021. As Claire’s local councillor since 2018, I have offered her my support and my love, but I have been powerless to offer anything further. When I was appointed to this House, I promised her that I would speak in support of Jack and Paul’s law in this Chamber, with a view to completing the excellent work done in the other place on this matter. It really is an honour to do so today. Presumption has no place in keeping children safe. By “presumption”, I refer to the double presumption laid out in the Children Act, as has already been stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life “will further the child’s welfare”, but also that a parent is presumed not to be a risk of harm to the child unless there is evidence to the contrary. It is on that second part of the presumption that I wish to focus. It places an overwhelming burden on victims and survivors of domestic abuse to prove that that risk exists—on survivors such as Claire, who was kept in silence, shame and isolation for 16 years of marriage by a constant barrage of physical, emotional and financial abuse, and on children such as Jack and Paul, who lived in the shadows for their entire lives, witnessing, hearing and experiencing that abuse but unable to speak up for fear of worsening the situation and putting their mother at risk. However, please do not think that this is about one case or a handful of tragic cases. The former Government’s own harm report, published in 2020, attests to the fact that this burden is too great and the threshold of proof is too high. Moreover, UK law has changed and progressed since 2014. The ways in which that has happened have been laid out in detail by the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, so I will not repeat them now. Evidence from the Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s 2025 review of child arrangement cases found that domestic abuse—including coercive and controlling behaviour, witnessing abuse and post-separation abuse—was a factor in 87% of family court case files, and the most likely outcome of all those cases was unsupervised overnight contact with a non-resident parent. Sometimes, that unsupervised contact has devastating consequences. Claire’s experience, sadly, is not unique. We know of 19 more children who have died at the hands of domestic abusers since Jack and Paul were murdered in 2014, making a total of 68 child homicides since Women’s Aid started researching the issue. It was fascinating, earlier in this debate, to hear the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, refer to the 68 children who were murdered by a parent as not benefiting from parental contact. That feels quite the understatement.

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  62. This is not to say that the presumption is the cause of these deaths, but that same harm report from 2020, six years ago, was clear that the pro-contact culture of the family court operates as a barrier to addressing domestic abuse. It stated that the presumption should not be retained in its present form and recommended an urgent review. I witnessed at first hand Claire’s distress and frustration at the inaction of the previous Government on this matter. I am grateful that this Government have moved forward.

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  63. We all know that the vast majority of children are not at risk of homicide, but many more are at risk of ongoing exposure to emotional, physical and sexual abuse. I appreciate that more must be done to strengthen the work of the family court. I support the other amendments in the group that seek to do that. The purpose of this clause is to strengthen the protection of children. It is crucial that family courts can deal with every case on its individual merits.

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  64. Noble Lords opposing this clause at Second Reading said that we must listen to current concerns about a pro-contact culture and children and parents who are affected by domestic abuse. The words of the previous Government have made it clear that the pro-contact culture puts children at risk, and that the presumption has resulted in courts not looking at the facts, in children’s voices being lost and in cases being judged generically rather than based on the individual child.

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  65. I close with the words of the incredibly brave Jack Sykes, whose words were not heard by social services, Cafcass or the family court when he raised those concerns about the risk that his father posed to him and his brother. He spoke some words that have created a legacy. When firefighters found Jack that evening, he was in a truly terrible state, with third-degree burns on 56% of his body, smoke inhalation and lacerations from falling out of the attic hatch in an attempt to drag his younger brother to safety. He managed to say to those firefighters, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose”.

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  66. Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)

    My Lords, I will briefly tell the Committee what we have been hearing on the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 Committee that is conducting post-legislative scrutiny. One of the things that we thought would make a real difference in the passage of the Act was, for the first time ever, having children defined in their own right as victims of domestic abuse. The evidence that we have been hearing since we started sitting in February is that this great and good intention has woefully underdelivered. The lack of clarity about the actuality of being depicted as a victim in your own right has not been made flesh. This has contributed to the problem. The vast majority of contested cases of parental involvement involve domestic abuse. Domestic abuse, together with anti-social behaviour, are the two great scourges in terms of the volume of abuse that is taking place. One of the recommendations the committee will be making is that the Government really focus on defining much better how to protect children and how to identify the issues that should be taken into consideration in accounting for them as victims in their own right. That is very much part of the context behind this, and I am entirely in favour of Clause 16, because it is pushing in exactly the direction the evidence the committee has heard requires us to follow.

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  67. Lord Lemos (Lab)

    My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for participating in this debate. It has been very powerful and, indeed, moving at times. I also thank noble Lords for meeting me beforehand. I am not sure I will be able to answer every one of the detailed questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, particularly given the lateness of the hour—I rather think she was expecting that. But as we seem to have done well with the last letter, we will try again with another one. I want to be clear—and I am sure that this is a statement of what we all think—that we all share the same goal, which is that we want safe decisions that put children’s welfare first. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said the child must come first, and that is what we all stand by. Our presumption review identified, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kitching, Lady Brinton and Lady Neate, said, a pro-contact culture in the family courts. The Government are not suggesting the presumption was the main driving force behind this culture, but it was a factor. Addressing this requires changes to practice, procedure and legislation. I will set out some of the other steps the Government are taking, as well as this clause on presumption. We are rolling out child-focused courts nationally, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, mentioned, bringing information-gathering and risk assessment earlier in proceedings, strengthening multi-agency working and ensuring that children’s voices are heard. This holistic approach will help our courts better understand risk. But the legislation must also change. I noted with great respect the wise words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about how this presumption fits into the wider context for these decisions. Repealing the presumption means courts will adopt from the outset an open-minded inquiry into a child’s best interests, rather than starting from any presumption about parental involvement. Where involvement is safe and, I stress, in the child’s best interests, of course courts will continue to order it. It is together that these reforms will help courts make the safest possible decisions. It is court decisions we are talking about—decisions that are grounded in a full understanding of each child, their family, their circumstances, their wishes and feelings, and the risks they may face. I urge noble Lords to support Clause 16. Turning now to specific amendments, I will start with Amendment 53 from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. The Government are concerned that this proposal risks reintroducing the very problems that repeal of the presumption of parental involvement seeks to address. Singling out parental relationships risks giving those considerations undue weight, rather than allowing their significance to be assessed based on the individual child before the court, which is the issue with which we are concerned. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, the welfare checklist remains an effective and enduring piece of legislation. It requires courts to pay particular regard to a list of factors that affect a child’s welfare, while providing flexibility to assess individual circumstances. This is essential to ensure individual child-focused decisions. The welfare checklist already requires the court to have particular regard to, among other things, how capable each of a child’s parents is of meeting the child’s needs. I reassure the noble Lord that this framework already enables courts to consider the matters he raised, where they are relevant to the child’s welfare. On Amendment 53A from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, I agree that we must understand the outcomes for children and families as these reforms take effect. As I said, repealing the presumption is part of a package of reforms to keep children’s safety and welfare at the heart of family justice. These measures work together, so it is important to consider their combined impact rather than look at repeal in isolation. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that this work is already under way. We are monitoring rollout of child-focused courts, which is such an important intervention, so that we can learn and improve as implementation progresses. Independent expert scrutiny is vital. That is why, as the noble Baroness noted, we asked the Domestic Abuse Commissioner to continue her research into domestic abuse in the family courts and we committed £500,000 over two years to support the second phase of the family court review and reporting mechanism, which will identify and disseminate best practice in child arrangements cases involving domestic abuse. These measures provide a robust approach to learning from these and other reforms without the statutory evaluation proposed. On Amendment 53B, also from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, I agree that specialist domestic abuse support services are essential to the child-focused model and must have the resource and expertise they need. I noted her comments about training and will deal with that in writing. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that arrangements are already in place to support this. As part of the child-focused courts national rollout, we provide dedicated funding to local areas to commission specialist domestic abuse services. She asked me about that and I will write to her on that too. We also have clear expectations for service quality. Domestic abuse service providers receive training on the child-focused model, and our target operating model, to which the noble Baroness referred, sets out requirements to ensure consistent delivery. We work closely with local areas and commissioned services to monitor delivery and identify emerging pressures. Our national network enables services to share best practice and resolve challenges, while helping us identify lessons and work with partners to improve provision as the model expands. These existing funding, commissioning and oversight arrangements enable us to identify and address issues as they arise, without the need for additional statutory requirements. Amendment 53C is from the noble Baroness, Lady Neate. I was grateful to the noble Baroness for the meeting we had. This Government share the concerns about unregulated experts, often using the title “psychologist”, being instructed in the family courts. We have already taken action to address the concerns she raises. Earlier this year, the family procedure rules were updated to limit the instruction of unregulated experts in most circumstances. The changes to the rules and practice directions now require any expert in relevant children proceedings, subject to limited exceptions, to be regulated by a UK statutory body with an approved regulator under the Legal Services Act 2007 or appear on a register accredited by the Professional Standards Authority. In the Government’s view, the family procedure rules are a more appropriate place to address this concern. They can be more readily updated than primary legislation, allowing us to respond more quickly to changing practice in the family courts. I hope the noble Baroness agrees with me that primary legislation is not required to resolve this issue. Finally, on Amendment 53D, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, it is vital that judges in the family court can hear evidence from appropriately qualified experts to support their decision-making. That is why the family procedure rules, as she noted, and their associated practice directions make clear provision around the regulation and accreditation of experts in family proceedings. I particularly draw the noble Baroness’s attention to the changes made by the family procedure rule committee which came into force in July. These mean that any expert instructed in relevant children proceedings must, aside from limited exceptions, be regulated. I know that the instruction of psychologists has been a particular concern, and I note the case to which the noble Baroness referred, Re Y, and the judgment by the former President of the Family Division. This clarifies that courts should not give permission for the instruction of an expert “psychologist” who is neither registered by a relevant statutory body nor chartered by the British Psychological Society. I appreciate that it is late, but I hope that my responses to these amendments have done them sufficient justice to reassure noble Lords. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, not to press his amendment.

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  68. Clause 16 agreed.

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  69. Amendments 53 to 53D not moved.

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  70. Clause 17 agreed.

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  71. Schedule 3 agreed.

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  72. Clauses 18 and 19 agreed.

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  73. Amendment 53E not moved.

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  74. Amendment 53F

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  75. Moved by

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  76. 53F: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause— “Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration(1) The Lord Chancellor may appoint such number of inspectors of criminal court administration as he considers appropriate.(2) Inspectors under this section are collectively known as “His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration” (“the Inspectorate”).(3) The Lord Chancellor must appoint one of the persons so appointed to be His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Criminal Court Administration.(4) The Lord Chancellor may make to or in respect of inspectors of court administration such payments by way of remuneration, allowances or otherwise as he may determine. (5) It is the duty of the Inspectorate to inspect and report to the Lord Chancellor on—(a) the administration and operation of the system that supports the carrying on of the business of—(i) the Crown Court, and(ii) the magistrates’ courts;(b) the efficiency, effectiveness and accessibility of those courts and their services, having particular regard to the experience of witnesses and victims;(c) the delivery by those courts, and by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, of victims’ entitlements under the code of practice issued under section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, the extent to which trauma-informed practice is embedded in those courts, and the adequacy of court facilities.(6) Any report under subsection (5) must make recommendations to the Lord Chancellor in respect of subsection (5).(7) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—(a) any report under this section within one month of receiving it, and(b) his response to the recommendations of a report within six months beginning on the day on which the report in question is laid.(8) A response under subsection (7)(b) must describe—(a) any action the Lord Chancellor proposes to take, and(b) where the Lord Chancellor does not propose to take any action, a reason why he proposes not to take action.(9) The Lord Chancellor may not issue any direction to the Inspectorate in relation to its duty under subsection (5).(10) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make further provision about the Inspectorate.(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would establish His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration as an independent statutory body to inspect and report on the administration of the criminal courts, with particular regard to the experience of victims and witnesses and the delivery of their entitlements under the Victims’ Code.

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  77. Baroness Brinton (LD)

    My Lords, my Amendment 53F seeks to re-establish “His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Criminal Court Administration as an independent statutory body to inspect and report on the administration of the criminal courts, with particular regard to the experience of victims and witnesses and the delivery of their entitlements under the Victims’ Code”. An independent courts inspectorate would provide robust oversight of Crown Court and magistrates’ court performance, helping to identify systemic inefficiencies, improve transparency and accountability, and support efforts to reduce delays. It would also assess how effectively courts deliver for victims and witnesses, ensuring that victims’ experiences are also recognised as a core measure of performance. It would have the powers to make recommendations requiring a formal government response. This means that the inspectorate would provide an early warning mechanism to identify emerging problems. Accountability, transparency and consistency would ensure that court reform delivers meaningful improvements for victims and the wider justice system. The mechanism would deal with a considerable number of concerns raised earlier in discussions on the Bill, including court backlog reduction, treatment of victims in the criminal justice system—especially victims of rape and serious sexual offences who need more protection than other victims and witnesses—and the wider effectiveness of court facilities. Reform will succeed only if its implementation is subject to effective and consistent scrutiny and accountability. The CPS, police, prisons and probation are all independently inspected. However, there remains no body responsible for assessing court performance. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, supported the re-establishment of a courts inspectorate, saying that the arguments for its closure have not stood the test of time. Our late, much-missed Baroness Newlove, in her 2025 Victims’ Commissioner report, Justice Delayed , also called for the reinstatement of the court inspectorate. Her report found that many of the issues identified by the former court inspectorate in its 2007-08 joint review of victims and witnesses’ experiences remained evident in 2024, demonstrating the persistence of long-standing shortcomings within the court system. It concluded that a reinstated inspectorate could play a vital role in identifying inefficiencies, driving improvements in court performance and monitoring victims’ experiences to ensure compliance with the victims’ code. Along with my honourable friend Jess Brown-Fuller MP, I am proud to support the Victims’ Commissioner with this proposal, which will ensure improved scrutiny of the courts and the courts estate, and identify and correct where systems fail. Victims are clear too. I had the privilege of meeting Lee and hearing about his experience. Lee first reported allegations of abuse in September 2021. Following a lengthy investigation, charges were brought against his perpetrator in March 2024. A trial listed for March 2026 was vacated shortly before it was due to begin and relisted for May 2028 due to court capacity issues. In July 2026, Lee gave evidence through Section 28 special measures, recorded for use at trial. I am sorry to say that the prolonged delays have had a significant impact on Lee’s well-being, working life and ability to plan for the future. He said: “I have a few things I would like from this Bill. I’d like to see a credible plan to reduce waiting, and I would ask Peers to demand clear milestones, sufficient resources and public reporting. I would ask how Ministers will demonstrate that the reforms actually reduce prolonged waits, and for accountability for avoidable adjournments. Reasons should be recorded, recurring failures identified and responsibility assigned for fixing them. Victims should receive prompt explanations and there should be consistent communication and support. Victims need a clear point of contact, realistic updates and support through repeated delays. Use victims’ experiences as a measure of performance. I would suggest you test every proposed reform against a straightforward question: will this reduce the time victims spend waiting, improve how they’re treated and make someone accountable when the system fails them?” A reinstated courts inspectorate would help to deliver the accountability that Lee is calling for. Is the Minister prepared to reconsider the previous decision, over a decade ago, and reinstate the courts inspectorate? I agree with Amendments 54 to 57 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, which ask for clarity on scope and a review of the arrangements of the court system. I also support my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendments 59, 60 and 67B on the appointment and scope of court reviews, and Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, asking for a statement in relation to delays on the transportation of persons in custody to court. I beg to move Amendment 53F.

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  78. Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)

    My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 54 to 57 and 61 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, who wished very much to attend but is not quite ready to be here today. I am sure he will be very grateful for the support indicated by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. The collective purpose of these five amendments is to broaden the scope of the review envisaged in Clause 20 and ensure that it is both comprehensive and effective. Amendment 54 would ensure that the review takes specific account of defendants of different ages, sex or disability status, and in particular defendants suffering from mental disorders such as learning difficulties and autism. Amendment 55 would ensure that the review covers defendants who may have difficulty in understanding or participating effectively in proceedings, in particular those who depend on the help of intermediaries or other support services. Amendment 56 would require the review to take account of changes, once the Act is in force, of the use of cautions and other kinds of out-of-court disposals. Out-of-court resolution was the subject of Amendment 51 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and of several recommendations by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson. Amendment 57 would require the review to consider how far defendants under the new system were or were not legally represented and the effect of the rules on legal aid. As previously discussed in Committee, legal aid is a matter of considerable concern to many noble Lords. Finally, Amendment 61 would ensure that reports are not simply shelved. It would require the Lord Chancellor to publish within six months the Government’s response to any interim or final report, the reasons for accepting or not accepting the recommendations, and any action that the Government propose to take. The inspiration for these amendments comes from solicitors who work among the most disadvantaged in our society. I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, in hoping that they will be given a fair wind.

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  79. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, I will be extremely brief, given the time—

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  80. Baroness Hamwee (LD)

    My Lords, I apologise, but I was waiting to see if anyone else would come in. I have Amendments 59, 60 and 67B in this group, but I will first say a couple of words from these Benches on some of the other amendments. My noble friend Lady Brinton’s Amendment 53F calls for an inspectorate. While reading it, it occurred to me that one of the characteristics of inspectorates, as we know them in different contexts, is that inspectors tend to be pretty good at asking the views of people who are affected—the views of users. I suspect that might have been in my noble friend’s mind. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, has been very focused on inclusivity—I use that as shorthand—in the course of this Bill. I like that, in Amendment 55, he uses words about understanding and participating effectively in proceedings. It made me realise just how focused he is on not just using words as rather meaningless formulae but what they actually mean. I think the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was channelling the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, when, in mentioning Amendment 56, he referred back to my noble friend Lord Marks’s amendment during the previous day in Committee on out-of-court disposals—a matter that I know he is going to continue to pursue during the course of this Bill. I had thought that we were going to get an amendment on prisoner transport, so I was waiting for the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, to come in. If I may, I will make one comment on that—I think she will explain her amendment. It occurred to me that surely the information that she requires is being recorded. Otherwise, how do we assess the performance of the contract by those who are providing prisoner transport? It ought to be there, and one would hope that it is being used, but it seems not. My amendments are about independent review. The Government’s fact sheet says that they will, as one would hope, “thoroughly evaluate the impacts of these measures … In addition, we will undertake wider evaluation of the operation and impact of the reforms, in line with government best practice on evaluation”. We will be interested to see what criteria are applied. I am suggesting going a bit further and a little bit differently. The reviewer or reviewers should be appointed immediately the Act comes into force, so that the reviewers can have an input into the data to be collected to enable a wider assessment and a thorough report. How often have noble Lords heard, when discussing whether something or other is happening, “We do not have the data”? Let us see whether we can make sure that we do have the data. With that, I commend the amendments to the Committee.

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  81. Baroness Goudie (Lab)

    My Lords, Amendment 62 is in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I thank them both. At Second Reading, I ended my speech on defendants who were not brought to court on time. I raised the human rights obligation that we have to prisoners awaiting trial and on remand. When delays cause trials to collapse, defendants face longer waits for decisions. Their families do not know what is happening. That determines their liberty, and victims face prolonged trauma.

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  82. I am not alone: noble Lords on every side of the House raised prisoner transport in that debate—among them the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Bellamy and Lord Garnier, and my noble friends Lady Mallalieu, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lord McNicol. The Minister ran out of time and kindly said he would write, and this amendment gives him a further opportunity to consider the matter.

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  83. The amendment would do four things. First, the Lord Chancellor must publish a monthly statement on the late delivery of defendants to criminal hearings. Secondly, the statement must name the prisons and the contractors involved. Thirdly, it would mean that, when a hearing was delayed by late arrival, the court recorded it and any comment from the judge or the magistrate and sent it to the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice. Fourthly, if one provider’s delays exceeded 1% of its journeys for three months running, the Lord Chancellor must review that contract.

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  84. The theme running through the Bill is that delays matter. Behind every late van is a hearing that does not start: victims and witnesses wait in the corridors; jurors sit idle; counsel, interpreters and court staff wait too long; and the defendant on remand, who is presumed innocent, waits another day for a decision on their liberty. Between February and June this year, barristers sent to the Bar Council 213 reports of late delivery—about 13 a week—from 69 courts and 59 prisons across all six circuits. One-quarter of those delays lasted more than five hours. That is quite unacceptable.

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  85. The Government’s figures look very different. In April 2026, Ministers told us that escort contractors delivered prisoners on time in 99.91% of cases. In some cases, delay may be due to the contractors. In others, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, noted at Second Reading, a van may be late because a remand prisoner has not been housed in a prison near the court. That is exactly why the amendment names prisons as well as contractors.

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  86. The amendment is not about blaming one company; it is about seeing the journey from the cell to the dock. The key figure that we wish to understand is whether the defendant was in the dock when the judge sat. For the victim, the jury and the defendant, it makes no difference whose fault it is; the court time is lost either way.

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  87. I understand that courts already file court exception reports when a hearing is delayed, and Ministers have told Parliament that they cover prisons, courts and prisoner issues, as well as the escort contractor. Those reports go to the Prison and Probation Service. What is missing is publication. I welcome the steps that the Government have taken, including the ministerial chaired Prisoner Delivery Oversight Board and the work with Transport for London. Publication would strengthen that work. It would let this House see whether it is succeeding and would allow us to scrutinise the performance of prisoner escort and custody services.

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  88. I cannot claim that 1% over three months is the perfect trigger, but I would welcome the Minister’s view of the right measures. The principle is simple: persistent failure should prompt a review that Parliament can see. If we are serious about tracking the backlog in criminal courts then we must address the root causes of the delays. This should come before the House as we consider proposals to restrict fundamental safeguards in our criminal courts.

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  89. So I have two requests for the Minister. First, will the Government regularly publish court exception report data on late delivery from all cases—not only contractor fault—broken down by court, prisoner and provider? Secondly, when current escort contractors are due for renewal, will delays from all causes count in the decision? The Minister told us that justice delayed is justice denied; I agree. This amendment asks only that we count delays, name where they have happened and act when they persist.

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  90. Lord Jabbar (Lab)

    My Lords, I welcome the inclusion of Clause 20 and the Government’s decision to provide an independent review of the impact of these reforms. At Second Reading, the Minister spoke about the importance of monitoring the outcomes and impact of the reforms. He also spoke more broadly about the breakdown in public confidence in our criminal justice system and he made it clear that these are intended to be principled reforms, not reforms based simply on expediency and efficiency. The significance of these reforms is precisely why I particularly welcome the commitment to review their impact on particular groups and sectors. We are changing the rules that will affect how people experience the criminal justice system and how justice is delivered to them. When we do that, particularly where there is a possibility that those changes may have different effects according to race or socioeconomic circumstances, we assume a particular responsibility to understand those effects. Socioeconomic disadvantage is not simply something we record about somebody’s background; it can shape their experience of the justice process itself. Somebody living in poverty or insecure employment, with limited literacy or education, or somebody from a particular racial background, may experience exactly the same form of procedure very differently from somebody who understands what is happening or does not suffer from the same disadvantages. This is why access to effective legal advice and representation matters, and it is why effective participation matters. I made that very clear in day 1 of Committee. Can the defendant really understand what is happening? Can they understand the decisions they are being asked to make? Can they engage properly with their lawyers and participate effectively in the proceedings against them? However, disadvantages do not necessarily present themselves in convenient, separate categories. Somebody may be economically disadvantaged and may also have a learning disability or a mental health difficulty, limited literacy or a communication need. These vulnerabilities intersect and can compound one another. There is an important difference between applying the same rules to everybody and ensuring that those rules operate fairly for everybody. My concern is that, unless we monitor those effects carefully and in a timely manner, we risk introducing a further degree of arbitrariness into the system—a new process that has a very different impact on different people, not because of the merits of their case but because of the particular combination of disadvantage or vulnerability with which they encounter the criminal justice system. We know from the data that there are already disadvantages within the criminal justice system. The question before us is what new obstacles are created by the changes we are now proposing. I am not suggesting that every difference in outcome amounts to unfairness, but a fair criminal justice system must be capable of recognising those differences without allowing them to determine the quality of justice that somebody receives. If race, socioeconomic disadvantage and a lack of representation or vulnerability begin, separately or in combination, to affect a person’s ability to understand the process, participate effectively or exercise their rights, this should concern us. A system perceived to operate arbitrarily helps nobody caught within it—neither defendants, victims or witnesses—and ultimately undermines public confidence in our system to deliver justice fairly and consistently. Clause 20 should provide an important mechanism to check and correct. It allows us to ask not simply whether these reforms are working but how they are working and whether the impact is fair. I want to mention one more important point. The two-year and five-year reporting period gives useful structure to the formal review, and this is to be statutorily imposed, but monitoring cannot begin and end with those reporting dates. If a significant racial or socioeconomic disparity begins to emerge some months after the operation of these provisions, or if there is evidence that suggests that particularly vulnerable defendants are struggling to participate effectively with the new arrangements, we should not wait two years, much less five, before paying attention to them. Monitoring should, and I hope will, begin when these provisions come into force and continue as they operate. I welcome the recognition in Clause 20 that significant reform should be accompanied by serious scrutiny of its consequences. Monitoring and learning, and, where the evidence requires it, adapting, must form part of responsible reform and is an essential safeguard to any system of justice that these reforms are ultimately intended to secure.

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  91. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, I apologise for popping up rather too quickly, but I promise I will pop down very quickly as well, given the time. I have just two points, which I invite the Committee to consider and which I would be interested in hearing about from the Minister. The first is on Clause 20 and the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. As he pointed out, Clause 20 establishes a review of the court system with a focus on inequality of outcome based on racial identity and defendants of different socioeconomic status. It also says, in paragraph (b), that the review can extend to “any other matter specified in the appointment”. Therefore, given that the Government have not set their face against the review going beyond different racial groups and different socioeconomic status, what reason is there in principle not to accept the amendment that would extend it to age, sex, disability and mental disorder as defined in the Mental Health Act 1983? I look forward to the Minister’s response on that point. While I am on my feet, I hope I will take less than a minute to draw the Committee’s attention to Clause 20(4), which says: “A person appointed to be a reviewer must be a person appearing to the Lord Chancellor to be independent of the Lord Chancellor”. In the time that I have had, I have done a little bit of digging into this, and it seems to be a provision with an interesting history. It seems to start off in the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which then became an Act, back in February 2000. David Heathcoat-Amory objected to this formulation, which then was of a person appearing to the Minister to be independent of the Prudential Regulation Authority. He said that the problem with this is that it does not actually say that the person has to be independent; they just have to appear to the Minister to be independent. Okay, but at least then they were independent of somebody else: the Prudential Regulation Authority. Then this formulation extended—I accept that this was under the Government of whom I was a part, but just look at this—in the Building Safety Act 2022, where the person had to appear to the Secretary of State to be independent of the Secretary of State, but of other bodies too. In the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, they had to appear to the Secretary of State to be independent of the Secretary of State and of RICS—at least another third party. Now we have the apogee of this: a person “appearing to the Lord Chancellor to be independent of the Lord Chancellor”. This seems to be Alice in Wonderland drafting. I do not expect the Minister to respond to this in detail, but I gently suggest that this sort of drafting is a bit of a nonsense, because to say, “A person appearing to X to be independent of X” does not impose any real degree of independence at all. With that, and given that the hour is late, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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  92. Baroness Hamwee (LD)

    My Lords, the hour is late and, at the risk of making myself very unpopular, I particularly agree with the noble Lord on that last point, which suggested to me that the Lord Chancellor could appoint only somebody whom he did not know. I want to return to the noble Lord’s reference to the wording of Clause 20. I raised this towards the end of our proceedings on the first day and asked the Minister what other matters the Government have in mind, bearing in mind the paragraph that says: “any other matter specified in the appointment”. The Minister answered: “The review that is promised is specifically on the question of disproportionality as it affects Black and minority-ethnic people ”.—[ Official Report , 10/11/26; col. 208.] That seems to be considerably narrower than the clause as we have been reading it. If the Minister is able to expand on the Government’s view of this and our reading of the clause, that would be helpful.

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  93. Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)

    My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendment 53F. The Government agree that it is right that the administration of the criminal courts is subject to independent scrutiny. I also thank the noble Baroness for bringing to our attention the story of Lee and the search for accountability. I argue that, in the broadest frame, the Bill is about seeking faster justice for everybody involved in the criminal justice system, but also accountability. The noble Baroness and many others mentioned that, in his independent review of the criminal courts, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recommended that there should be a mechanism to scrutinise His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. This mechanism could be through the National Audit Office, the joint inspectorates or a re-established inspectorate. There was a variety, and the Government have taken a specific item from that menu.

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  94. The Courts & Tribunals Service is already subject to significant external oversight, including through the Government Internal Audit Agency, the National Audit Office, the Justice Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. All these mechanisms provide valuable, independent inspection of the effectiveness and efficiency of the courts. The criminal justice joint inspectorates are also able to take forward thematic inspections, looking at issues spanning multiple criminal justice agencies, including within HMCTS. The work of these bodies is at their own discretion. However, the NAO has recently announced a new study relating to HMCTS, which will examine value for money and efficiency in relation to workforce planning. The Government certainly welcome this review.

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  95. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, acknowledged, the previous Inspectorate of Court Administration ceased operating in 2010, as the then coalition Government found it unnecessary and not good value for money. We do not disagree. For these reasons, we do not believe that introducing a criminal courts inspectorate is necessary, given all the other mechanisms for accountability. That is not to say that accountability is not very important.

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  96. Amendments 54 to 57 and 61 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, spoken to very adroitly by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seek to expand the scope of the independent review. We are absolutely committed to understanding disparities in the justice system, addressing disproportionality and ensuring that everybody has equality before the law. That is why we introduced a new clause in the other place that committed the Lord Chancellor to commission an independent review to allow us to fully understand whether any of our reforms have created or exacerbated any differences in treatment or outcomes between defendants of different racial groups or socioeconomic status. My noble friend Lord Jabbar spelled out very eloquently why that is so important.

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  97. Clause 20 is explicitly drafted to specify certain matters but also provide enough flexibility to determine matters via the terms of reference with the reviewer who is appointed. There is a balance to be struck between certainty of inclusion and timely deliverability of the review. One could argue that if you continued to add in a number of different demographic factors, when would you be able to make sense of it all and deliver a timely review? The independent reviewer can expand the review in their terms of reference, and they are independent, but the review itself is purposefully narrow.

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  98. Amendment 56 seeks to assess the impact of court reforms on the use of out-of-court resolutions and diversion. However, the purpose of the independent review is to provide focused scrutiny on the impact of court reform measures in the Bill, which are directed at criminal court processes rather than pre-court disposal decisions, including the use of out-of-court resolutions and diversion.

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  99. Amendment 57 would require the review to examine rates of legal representation in the magistrates’ courts. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that legal aid is available for those who need it most and that the financial eligibility threshold should reflect this. We have, in principle, accepted the recommendation from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, to increase the legal aid income thresholds at magistrates’ courts, with final decisions subject to future funding decisions and operational considerations.

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  100. Amendment 61 would require the Government to formally respond to recommendations in both the interim and final reports. I draw your Lordships’ attention to the measures in place that will support post-legislative scrutiny. Alongside the independent review, we will undertake wider evaluation of the operation and impact of the reforms, in line with the Government’s best practice on monitoring and evaluation. Should the review find adverse impacts, we will look to understand and mitigate these.

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  101. I turn to Amendments 59, 60 and 67B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 59 seeks to bring forward the appointment of the independent reviewer or reviewers to the date on which the first of the court reform measures in the Bill comes into force. Clause 20 already specifically allows for more than one reviewer to undertake the work to ensure that we can secure the appropriate expertise. The current six-month window post implementation provides the flexibility to ensure sufficient time for an appointment process, which includes undertaking the appropriate due diligence —the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, dilated on this in terms of the drafting; I am afraid I am not entirely sure I can shed a huge amount of light on the nature of the drafting at this late hour—and reaching agreement on the scope and terms of reference. It does not mean that the reviewer will not be appointed until six months post implementation. Given the need to address the dire situation in the Crown Court, it would be perverse indeed if implementation was delayed while we finalised the details of the appointment of a reviewer or reviewers.

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  102. Amendment 60 is concerned with data collection and seeks to ensure that the reviewer will have access to the information they need to carry out the independent review. As noble Lords will be aware, much data is already collected in relation to the criminal justice system. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will be reassured to hear that data already exists to allow the reviewer to investigate any differences in treatment or outcomes between defendants, as specified in Clause 20. Broader questions about the operation and effectiveness of the reforms will continue to be considered through wider evaluation work in line with government best practice on monitoring and evaluation to support post-legislative scrutiny.

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  103. Amendment 67B seeks to bring forward the commencement date of the duty to undertake an independent review; however, I must say that this will have no practical impact. The timelines for the appointment of the reviewer or reviewers and delivery of the reports are detailed in the clause itself and are not dependent on when it is commenced.

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  104. Finally, Amendment 62, tabled by my noble friend Lady Goudie, would require the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament a monthly statement of delays in transporting persons in custody to criminal court hearings in England and Wales. As my noble friend said, she has already had correspondence on this with my noble friend Lord Lemos. We are already taking action to address prisoner transport delays. My noble friend raises an important point, not just about the timeliness of the delivery of prisoners as part of the criminal justice system being efficient but about how it impacts on prisoners and their health and well-being.

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  105. The Government absolutely recognise that defendants, including those remanded in custody, are entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. Delays that prevent a hearing taking place or result in proceedings being adjourned can contribute to individuals waiting longer for their cases to be resolved, which is why we are working across the criminal justice system to reduce delays and improve timely production of defendants at court.

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  106. The Government are working with local councils to grant prison vans access to bus lanes to help defendants to reach court on time and prevent avoidable disruptions. One route, I am pleased to say, is already operating between HMP Forest Bank and Manchester Crown Court and has cut journey times by up to one-third. Following other successful rollouts in Bristol, Salford and Nottingham, the Government have written to other local authorities to push for wider adoption of the scheme nationwide.

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  107. Prisoner transport and delivery is an end-to-end criminal justice system process, including partners across the whole system. As my noble friend Lady Goudie said, we have established a ministerial prison delivery oversight board to further identify and tackle the causes of delays and hold stakeholders to account.

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  108. My noble friend asked two specific questions on monitoring and metrics. On publicly available data regarding the performance of the prisoner escort and custody service—PECS—key performance indicators are published quarterly via the Cabinet Office for transparency and return on KPIs for government contracts. The quarterly performance reporting for PECS includes three priority KPIs, one of which is a narrative assessment of supplier performance and courtroom delays.

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  109. On metrics and the 1% that my noble friend suggests, I reassure her that PECS contracts are already actively managed through a range of contractual and operational performance measures. The Government do not consider it appropriate to require statutory review based on a single performance metric. Contract management should continue to take account of a range of factors and the full range of performance information. Given this action, and some of the reassurances that I hope I have just provided, I hope that, when the time comes, she will not move her amendment and that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will withdraw hers.

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  110. Baroness Brinton (LD)

    My Lords, I thank everyone who spoke in this short debate; it was short, given the number of amendments, and I think everyone was very restrained. I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I may have to read Hansard as he was speaking very quickly, though I understand why. On that basis, I will withdraw my amendment.

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  111. Amendment 53F withdrawn.

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  112. Amendments 53G and 53H not moved.

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  113. Clause 20: Independent review

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  114. Amendments 54 to 61 not moved.

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  115. Clause 20 agreed.

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  116. Amendment 62 not moved.

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  117. Amendment 62A

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  118. Moved by

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  119. 62A: After Clause 20, insert the following new Clause— “Review of listing of cases by criminal courts(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must undertake a review of criminal court listing practices, with a particular focus on identifying good practice that can be implemented in areas where criminal court listing has been shown to be inefficient.(2) In preparing the report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—(a) the Lord Chief Justice,(b) presiding judges,(c) resident judges,(d) judicial governance bodies,(e) court administrators and listing officials, and(f) other such persons that the Secretary of State deems to be relevant.(3) The Secretary of State must publish a report on the review undertaken under subsection (1) and lay it before both Houses of Parliament.”Member's explanatory statement This new clause seeks to require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of listing practices in criminal courts with a particular focus on identifying good practice that can be implemented elsewhere.

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  120. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 62A, together with my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, to bring attention to the varying length of backlogs. This amendment seeks to help the Government in their mission to reduce the backlogs in the Crown Court by proposing a review of criminal court listing practices, with the view that best practice could be used across the system and therefore increase efficiency across the criminal justice system as a whole. To take one example, given the hour, in Liverpool—I declare the obvious interest—Preston and Cardiff, a number of measures, including active Crown Prosecution Service case ownership and early trial readiness reviews, have enabled the reduction in backlogs. If those measures were rolled out to other courts—that could be identified in the proposed report—that would assist them as well. Equally, there could be an opportunity to use technology, including AI, to improve the efficiency of our court listing system. I listened with great interest a couple of days ago to the Cabinet Secretary, with her close interest in the efficiency gains made possible by AI, and I am conscious that she is a former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Justice; indeed, we were there together. I would therefore be interested if the Minister could help us understand whether officials in his department have looked at proposals to use AI to increase efficiency of listing. This would provide an alternative solution to backlogs without overburdening the magistrates’ courts and simply shifting the backlog. For future reference, I have another important point on listing that the review could pick up. The Committee will appreciate from earlier groups that I yield to no one in my desire for judicial independence; I made that point very clear in a number of groups. But when it comes to listing, we have to distinguish between two different things. There is the question of whether Crown against A is going to be heard before or after Crown against B. That is obviously a matter for judges. But then there is the question of whether, for example, domestic burglary cases should be given priority over offences against the person cases. If a future government were to campaign on a manifesto commitment that they regard domestic burglary as the worst possible thing and that it should be given precedence in the criminal justice system, should it be right—I ask with due deference and rhetorically—for listings to remain a judicial practice solely and entirely? It is not clear to me that that ought to be so. Clearly, a Minister should not be saying whether Smith gets his trial before Jones gets hers, but it is not clear to me that the categories of cases should always be a judicial function. It also was not clear to me when I was in the Ministry of Justice how best practice is rolled out across the system, and what mechanisms really exist to make sure that resident judges not only can but do share best practice, and how best practice is actually enforced. Indeed, the data I saw showed that different courts with the very same mix of cases had very different through-puts and efficiencies. Ultimately, as the Minister knows—sometimes to his cost—Ministers are responsible to Parliament for the justice system and have to come here and answer questions on it. It is not clear to me, therefore, that all elements of listing should remain solely a judicial function, but perhaps we need to pick that point up in more detail on a future occasion.

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  121. Finally, Amendments 62B, 64A and 71A are signed only by my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and not by me, but I can assure the Committee that the distinction is one of authorship and not agreement—I think my name was left off for time reasons. They seek to prevent the Bill coming into force until the Government have published the evidence on which they base their assertion that limiting the right to jury trials will reduce the backlog in the courts. Of course, we dispute that the measures are necessary, but on any analysis, we suggest that the Government should not bring in those provisions without publishing the evidence which is said to underpin them. For those reasons, I commend those amendments.

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  122. Lord Lemos (Lab)

    Yes, of course it can be right that this should remain a judicial function. I am afraid the noble Lord will have to yield to me in my respect for judicial independence. It is a judicial function, and it is going to remain one. Individual listing decisions are made under judicial responsibility, with HMCTS providing the information, processes, tools and operational support required to enable effective decision-making. The new judicial national listing framework, which came into effect on 10 October, expressly preserves judicial discretion and local leadership while providing greater national consistency in how cases are prioritised and listed, so I am afraid we will have to differ on that. Substantial work is already under way through the HMCTS listing improvement programme, which includes the deployment of AI tools. I think it is right to say that the MoJ has led the way. People are often critical of the MoJ, but it has led the way on the adoption of AI tools to achieve the objectives envisaged by this amendment. Amendments 62B, 64A and 71A, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, seek to prevent this Act coming into effect until the Government have published their evidence on the expected impact of the reforms on the court backlogs. The noble and learned Lord asked me this before, and I do not really understand why he is asking me again. The Bill’s economic impact assessment was published in February this year, alongside the Bill’s introduction, as is standard practice. It set out a detailed cost and benefit analysis for each Bill measure, as well as our modelling for the overall impacts on the criminal justice system. The impact assessment is accompanied by other material setting out our modelling in a range of scenarios, covering our overall approach to criminal court improvement, financial investment, modernisation and structural reform. As I said, I have made those points before. Following the Government’s decision in October not to proceed with the Crown Court bench division, we published further modelling. Our modelling shows that, with these reforms, the backlog peaks in 2028 before starting to fall rapidly over 2029. I realise that the Opposition will not support these reforms, so they look relentlessly for other opportunities to divert the stream that is joining the backlog. I am afraid that the ones that the noble Lord has put up tonight are particularly unconvincing. In fact, without the operational challenge of creating a new division of the Crown Court, we can move faster with other reforms and turn that tide sooner, peaking in 2027 before starting to fall. For those excellent reasons, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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  123. Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)

    My Lords, the reasons may or may not be excellent, but they are certainly familiar, because I think I used to read out almost the same formulation when the point was put to me. For present purposes, I should say that I am certainly not persuaded that it is as simple as that formulation, even as elegant as the Minister makes it sound, but I am persuaded that these amendments ought not to be pressed.

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  124. Amendment 62A withdrawn.

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  125. Amendment 62B not moved.

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  126. Clause 21: Power to make consequential amendments

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  127. Amendments 63 and 64 not moved.

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  128. Clause 21 agreed.

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  129. Clauses 22 to 25 agreed.

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  130. Clause 26: Commencement

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  131. Amendments 64A to 75 not moved.

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  132. Clause 26 agreed.

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  133. Amendment 76

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  134. Moved by

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  135. 76: After Clause 26, insert the following new Clause— “Expiry of sections 1 to 6(1) Sections 1 to 6 of this Act expire three months after the date on which the condition in subsection (2) is met.(2) The condition is that the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court has been below 40,000 in each of the previous four quarterly reporting periods.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of cases awaiting trial in the Crown Court is that which is calculated by HM Courts and Tribunals Service.”Member’s explanatory statement The purpose of this amendment is to provide a sunset clause in the event that the “backlog” in the Crown Court returns to the approximate pre-pandemic level of 40,000 cases.

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  136. Viscount Hailsham (Con)

    My Lords, in moving Amendment 76, I propose to be extremely brief. The Government’s stated justification for Clauses 1 to 6 is to get the backlog down to a tolerable level. I will take them at their word. If the backlog falls to a tolerable level—around 40,000, which was the pre-Covid level—they should withdraw Clauses 1 to 6 and they should cease to have effect. I beg to move.

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  137. Lord Katz (Lab)

    My Lords, I will try to be quick—though maybe not quite as quick as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I thank the noble Viscount for tabling Amendment 76, which, as we have heard, seeks to cause Clauses 1 to 6 to expire when the backlog in the Crown Court returns to 40,000 cases over a sustained period. These reforms are not short-term emergency measures; the pressures facing the criminal justice system have long-term drivers that are not going away. We have discussed many of them over the two days in Committee, such as the way that digital and other types of evidence have prolonged and extended court cases. Reducing the backlog alone will not alleviate those pressures, and demand will continue to grow. These measures are principled reforms, intended to address those long-term structural pressures and deliver lasting improvements to how the justice system operates. The Government are committed to a thorough evaluation of the impact of these measures. The statutory independent review will consider the impacts of these reforms on disparities between defendants of different racial and socioeconomic groups, as we discussed just a couple of groups ago. In addition, in line with government best practice, we will undertake a wider evaluation of the operation and impact of the reforms on evaluation and support post-legislative scrutiny. Before I finish, I add that we very much want to drive the backlog down to the level that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, talked about, but what happens if the level starts going up again? I am not entirely sure that noble Lords would enjoy being stuck in Committee at 11.30 pm having to discuss the same set of reforms to turn back on again the measures that we are proposing. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Viscount will withdraw his amendment.

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  138. Viscount Hailsham (Con)

    My Lords, I am quite sure that your Lordships do not want to spend any longer in Committee. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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  139. Amendment 76 withdrawn.

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  140. Clause 27 agreed.

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  141. House resumed.

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  142. Bill reported without amendment.

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  143. House adjourned at 11.39 pm.

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Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5438050.