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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 16 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, this amendment, ably moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is about the right of the jury to acquit as a matter of conscience—a right that is at the heart of our jury system. In a few moments, I will turn to the question of whether we should duck the issue now and wait for court proceedings, but the principle is that, once a jury is empanelled for a trial, the defendant is in the jury’s hands. It is for that reason that, when a judge makes a decision that the prosecution has adduced insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction—in this, I agree with two of the speeches that have been made—it is still for the jury to give the decision. That is why the judge is bound to invite the jury, on the basis of the insufficiency of evidence, to return a verdict of not guilty. The defendant is in the charge of the jury. So it is with the right to acquit. Even if it is the case that the judge expresses the view that the evidence of the defendant and the defendant’s witnesses do not amount to a defence, it is for the jury to make the decision of guilt or innocence. That is one of the reasons why, in our discussions on this Bill about jury trial and the right to elect, many of us have argued that the jury system democratises criminal justice. It is not just that a jury of citizens is involved in the decision but that the decision as to guilt or innocence is genuinely the decision of the jury. It is a question of the jury’s conscience being constitutionally permitted to trump the rigidity of the strict law. That is the principle that has been upheld by the courts time and again. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, referred to the decision in Bushel’s case and the decision of Chief Justice Vaughan. The jurors had been fined for delivering a not guilty verdict of unlawful assembly against William Penn and William Mead in the face of a direction from the recorder of London that they convict. The Chief Justice held that the jury was entitled to give a verdict according to their convictions, and that principle has been followed throughout the common law jurisdictions. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made the point that they include not just Canada but notable cases in the United States, New Zealand and other jurisdictions. We all remember the Ponting trial in 1984—at any rate, we do in this House—when, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, Clive Ponting was tried on an indictment under the Official Secrets Act for leaking classified documents about the sinking of the “General Belgrano” during the Falklands War in 1982. He was acquitted in the face of a plain direction from the trial judge that the defence—that his actions were in the public interest—should fail. The case of Trudi Warner in 2024, just two years ago, concerned a prosecution of Miss Warner for contempt for holding a placard outside a court, which was in the course of hearing a case against a number of climate change activists. Her placard read: “Jurors, you have an absolute right to acquit a defendant according to your conscience”. For that action, the then Solicitor-General sought to bring contempt proceedings. In refusing the Solicitor-General permission to proceed with those contempt proceedings against Ms Warner, Mr Justice Saini cited the Hamlyn lecture delivered in 1956 by Patrick Devlin, then a High Court judge, from which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has quoted.

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