Baroness Noakes (Con)

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 51 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I also have four other amendments in this group. One of my concerns about the Bill is that Great British Energy is the last in a long line of unelected quangos, which have precious little parliamentary oversight and weak accountability processes. All the amendments in this group in one way or another seek to increase the role of Parliament, and thereby go some way towards remedying the accountability deficit that exists in the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has already reminded the Committee, the Constitution Committee has called out Clause 5 as being disguised legislation. I agree with that. I do not agree with it in relation to Clause 6, which I will explain when we get to that clause. The important thing is that this underlines the need for strong parliamentary processes around Clause 5. Amendment 51 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is important. If the Secretary of State delays setting out his strategic priorities, the company, Great British Energy, will be left rudderless and may start to spend taxpayers’ money in ways that are not in line with what the Secretary of State wishes to prioritise. Alternatively, a less generous perspective is that the Secretary of State might delay issuing the statement of strategic priorities in order to delay laying it before Parliament and thereby exposing it to public scrutiny. There is no unanimity even among the green lobby as to what would amount to a good use of taxpayers’ money under the Great British Energy banner. Some of the things that the Secretary of State might choose to prioritise may well horrify some of the climate activists. We might expect nuclear to be one of those examples. The Secretary of State could probably get Great British Energy to act in accordance with his wishes without going through the Clause 5 process by using—or more likely, threatening to use—the Clause 6 power of direction, which we will debate later. He could thereby sidestep public and parliamentary scrutiny for quite some time. Whichever analysis is the correct one, it is clearly important that we ensure that there is a public statement of priorities as soon as possible. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, generously allows for six months after the Act comes into force. I could easily argue for less time, but six months is good enough for today’s debate. On the question of timing, I also note that in Clause 3 there is no time limit for the Secretary of State to lay his statement after he has prepared it. Amendment 51 concentrates on a time limit for the preparation of the statement, but similarly does not have a time for when it has to be laid before Parliament. That is another defect in this clause that we will need to seek to remedy on Report. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has already referred to some of my amendments. Amendment 119 is another way of making sure that the strategic priorities statement is pursued quickly. It allows Clause 5 to come into effect immediately after Royal Assent, but the rest of the Bill cannot come into effect until the statement is laid before Parliament. Importantly, that means that Great British Energy could not make any practical progress until the statement of strategic priorities had been dealt with in accordance with Clause 5. Amendment 52 tackles a different problem, namely the toothless involvement of Parliament in the statement of strategic priorities. As we have heard, under Clause 5 the Secretary of State merely has to lay a copy of that statement, or any replacement statement, before Parliament. That is it. Parliament has no say whatever. My Amendment 52 gives each House of Parliament 40 sitting days to resolve not to approve it, and in that event the Secretary of State has to withdraw it and have another go. That is the procedure adopted, for example, in relation to the national procurement policy statement published under Section 13 of the Procurement Act 2023. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has suggested, it is probably the lightest of the parliamentary procedures that are available to give Parliament some opportunity to challenge the Secretary of State’s priorities. The amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, is in similar territory but would require the Secretary of State to table a Motion. It does not, however, specify what that Motion might be or the consequences if the Motion were not agreed. There could be other formulations for parliamentary oversight of the strategic priorities. The important point is that it should not be a “take it or leave it” situation when Parliament is given the statement of strategic priorities. Parliament is entitled to some substantive involvement in the priorities. My Amendment 128 is a companion amendment to Amendment 52. It is similar in structure to Amendment 119 so that the commencement of the Act after Royal Assent, other than in relation to Clause 5, would be delayed until 40 sitting days had passed. That would ensure that GBE could not be operationalised until Parliament had had an opportunity to consider the statement of priorities. That is a belt-and-braces addition to Amendment 52. Lastly, my Amendment 58 in this group is also intended to enhance Parliament’s oversight of Great British Energy. Under Clause 5(8), Great British Energy’s articles of association have to ensure that GBE will publish its own strategic plans and act in accordance with the statement of strategic priorities. My Amendment 58 goes further and would require GBE to send a copy of the plans to the Secretary of State, who then has to lay them before Parliament. It is clearly insufficient for Great British Energy simply to upload its strategic plans to its website. There needs to be a formal communication of those plans to Parliament. That is all that my amendment is aimed at, and I hope that is not controversial. The broad thrust of all the amendments in this group is effective parliamentary engagement. The Minister might not like the detail of the amendments, but he ought to subscribe to the notion that effective parliamentary engagement in the work of quangos is necessary. I hope he will see that the parliamentary involvement allowed for in the Bill falls short by some way. I am sure the whole Committee would be delighted if the Minister were to take this issue away and bring forward government amendments to achieve proper recognition of the role of Parliament in Great British Energy’s scrutiny. If he is unable to do that, I am sure we will need to return to this aspect on Report.