Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)

My Lords, I declare my interest as a RAMP associate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Teather—who I think of as a noble friend—said in her deeply moving speech, for the second week running we are here debating secondary legislation that represents another step in what the Home Secretary has described as “the most significant reform to our migration system in modern times ”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/11/25; col. 509.]. In another critical report, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has drawn the regulations to the attention of the House. The committee has been working overtime on asylum legislation, and we should be grateful to its members for their work. Once again, they complain about lack of clarity on aspects of the new policy, which “makes it impossible to scrutinise this measure adequately”. They draw attention to tensions and risks associated with the policy, which are not adequately addressed by the Home Office. Once again, my noble friend the Minister, who is always most gracious in dealing with our criticisms, has my sympathy for having to defend the regulations. I am glad that his throat is no longer protesting against the task, and that he feels better this week. I will focus on the revocation of the duty to provide asylum support. Starting with process issues, the committee yet again draws attention to the lack of consultation, which was justified in the Explanatory Memorandum on grounds of the wider policy development of which this change is a part. The Home Office has given assurances that views will be sought from stakeholders once the proposals reach a “sufficiently developed stage”. The committee suggests that we ask my noble friend what criteria will be used to determine when a “sufficiently developed stage” has been reached to trigger consultation. I do ask that, but I also want to put on the record my view that the important principle of revoking a right to support for a particularly vulnerable group of people, as we have heard, should itself have been the subject of consultation regardless of wider policy development, the timeline for which remains unclear. If, as the Home Office argues, policy is insufficiently developed for the provision of a proper impact assessment, then, as the Refugee Council argues, it should have waited and introduced a measure as part of the primary legislation expected in the next Session. Indeed, as some of us argued last week, and as my noble friend Lord Dubs, who is unable to be in his place, pointed out, this and the changes as a whole “are quite fundamental to the way in which we deal with asylum seekers and refugees ”.—[Official Report, 14/4/26; col. 299.] and should be included in primary legislation in the name of democratic accountability. I welcome the fact that, despite the revocation of the duty to provide asylum support, families containing a child aged under 18 will continue to receive support for the whole household where otherwise adequate accommodation or the child’s essential living needs are not being met in line with Section 122 of the 1999 Act. I would be grateful if my noble friend confirmed that my reading of this is correct so that it is on the record. Nevertheless, I am worried about the likely impact of the removal of the duty to provide support. The SLSC tried to get clarification of what the EM meant when it said that support will remain available to those “in genuine need”. One example given was an asylum seeker who has the right to work. When the committee asked whether support might be withdrawn where an asylum seeker is not able to exercise the right to work because they cannot find employment—particularly bearing in mind that changes to the list of jobs they are allowed to take after 12 months could mean it becomes harder for those who do not have the necessary skills—the answer was: “We are developing our policy on this”. That really is not good enough. Another example given was “where an asylum seeker could be supported by friends and family”. How on earth will this work? Will an asylum seeker have to give a list of friends and family, and will they then be means tested to see if they can afford to support them? Even if they can afford to do so, there is no legal obligation to support family and friends in this way, in either the short or longer term. Personally, I find this suggestion extraordinary. I am not surprised that the committee considered the inability to answer questions about the meaning of “genuine need” unsatisfactory, despite Home Office assurances that cases will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, as my noble friend said earlier, taking account of obligations under the ECHR—which, as the committee notes, raises questions about staff resources. Moreover, there is an underlying issue here that the report did not explore: the difference between a right and a discretionary power. The EM states that “human rights legislation and equality law … ensure that any changes to policy will operate within a framework that respects fundamental rights”, a point made by my noble friend. Sir Jonathan Jones KCB KC points out for the Institute for Government that this means that decisions not to grant support could be subject to judicial review. But that is a last resort, and I am concerned about the implications for everyday decision-making. I have been around long enough to remember when some basic elements of the social security safety net were subject to discretion rather than set out as clear rights. Discretion opens the door to inconsistency and even discrimination, not necessarily conscious. Back in 1975 the official Supplementary Benefits Commission warned that discretion provides scope for decision makers’ own “moral judgments” to shape decisions on eligibility, so the promise that the decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis is not necessarily reassuring. Discretion robs asylum seekers of dependability and certainty and reinforces their sense of precarity, which the noble Baroness referred to, along with the changes debated last week. While it might meet the letter of our international obligations, I am not sure it meets the spirit expressed in a statement from the UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that asylum seekers should be able “to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights without discrimination”. One reason why rights are so important in this context, as we have heard, is that they provide a firmer protection against destitution, although it should be remembered that asylum support provides a pretty minimal standard of living. Asylum seekers are already disproportionately likely to be in deep poverty and to suffer food insecurity. It is disgraceful that the press release accompanying the draft regulations had the headline: “Asylum handouts and accommodation removed for illegal migrants abusing Britain’s generosity”, once again conflating asylum seeking and illegal migration and using pejorative terms such as “handouts”. As Minister Norris himself said in a debate last year, “we have legal and, I would argue, moral imperatives not to create mass destitution”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 285WH.] Nevertheless, the SLSC was concerned about the likely risk of destitution due to the revocation of the duty to provide support and how this could lead to crime, illegal working and homelessness, in conflict with the national plan to end homelessness and, according to the Times, the subject of an internal warning from the MHCLG. It notes: “The Home Office has not set out how it will manage these risks, and the House may wish to enquire further”. I hope my noble friend can be more forthcoming now, including on the particular dangers for women, who Women for Refugee Women fear will be at increased risk of abuse, violence and exploitation, including being forced into sex work. Given my noble friend’s welcome repeated assurances last week that “equality considerations are at the front and centre of our work”,—[Official Report, 14/4/26; col. 321.] I hope he will give this point serious consideration. Here I find it difficult to believe the Explanatory Memorandum’s statement that “no significant … impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies” is foreseen. Again, to pick up on what the noble Baroness said, surely the risk of destitution could have a significant impact on local authorities and on refugee and homelessness charities, which will have to pick up the pieces. Before making my final point on these regs, I take this opportunity to raise the question of the move-on period. The Refugee Council points out that the third set of regulations published alongside those that we are debating provided the perfect opportunity to update the previous 28 days to the 42 days now in operation. I ask my noble friend why that opportunity was not taken. Will it be taken soon? Is he able to tell us what arrangements will be made for monitoring the 42-day move-on period, which is a real improvement that I welcome but is less than the 56 days in the initial pilot which was what local authorities and charities had been calling for? Is he able to commit to publication of the evaluation of that pilot before Parliament is prorogued? I raised these matters in a letter that I sent my noble friend yesterday so I apologise for repeating them today, but anything that he is able to put on the record now would be helpful.