The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)

Noble Lords will be aware that we have one outstanding issue on this Bill still in play. Unsurprisingly, it is the reserve power on asset allocation. As this is the fourth time the House has been asked to consider the question, I will spare noble Lords a detailed exposition of the merits of this policy. Let me simply say that the Government’s underlying position has not changed, reflecting our policy intent to ensure that savers’ best interests are secured by bigger and better pension schemes investing in a wide range of assets. Today, the Government return to their previous amendments, all of which the elected House endorsed. These spell out the intended purpose of the reserve power to underpin the industry’s commitments in the Mansion House Accord and rule out other uses, such as a focus on any specific asset or asset class. Today, we are also bringing forward a final set of changes that aim to respond to points made in this House and the other place, while retaining the policy intent I have set out. These have three elements. First, there is a new requirement on regulators, in this case the TPR and the FCA, to make an assessment of the extent to which there is evidence for the collective action problem that we have discussed in debates on this Bill. There will be a requirement for this assessment to be incorporated into the production of the ex-ante report that the Bill requires to be published before any use of the reserve power. Our amendments today would also place a duty on the Government to have regard to this regulatory assessment before any use of the power. It was always the Government’s intent to evaluate progress against the Mansion House Accord commitments in terms of the broad direction of travel over a substantial period of time rather than shorter-term movements in private asset exposure. To reinforce this, we also propose to add to the Bill that the power cannot be exercised any earlier than 2028. Our second set of changes builds on the savers’ interest test to reinforce the central role of trustees and providers. Our amendment in lieu would change the bar required to engage the savers’ interest test. Rather than having to demonstrate that meeting the asset allocation requirements would be likely to cause material financial detriment, a scheme would instead have to show that meeting the requirement is likely not to be in the best interests of members. This reflects language regularly used when considering trustee duties. In addition, we have more tightly specified the regulator’s role, confining it to ensuring that the trustees’ or providers’ assessment of what is in the best interests of members is reasonable, rather than replacing that assessment with its own. Thirdly, our amendments address worries about differential treatment of particular investment vehicles by allowing for consideration of direct or indirect holdings in the six asset classes named in the Mansion House Accord. This Bill has its roots in much work that has been under way for some time in government but also in Labour’s commitment to ensure that workplace pension schemes take advantage of scale and invest in a wider range of productive assets. That was why one of the first things the Government did on taking office was to launch a comprehensive review of pensions investment. That review found clear evidence that the DC pensions market is operating with an excessively narrow focus on cost, to the detriment of saver outcomes. That is where the reserve power comes from. It exists because the review found, and the industry itself has told us publicly and privately, that the competitive pressure focused on cost minimisation is the single biggest barrier to diversifying in savers’ long-term interests. Of course, things can change over time, and a range of other factors may come into play; the changes that we propose today address that worry and others. They require regulators to assess whether these competitive pressures remain a material barrier to more diverse private asset investment before any use of the power. They put trustees’ or providers’ assessments of savers’ best interests centre stage. I am grateful for engagement across the House with this Bill and for the engagement with the opposition parties particularly in recent times. This House has done its job in revising this Bill, and I commend the government amendments to the House. I beg to move.