Contribution
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for Amendment 16 and for this short debate. In the groupings for Committee, there are some very substantial numbers of amendments about access in groups 26 to 31, so I will answer these amendments very briefly because I am sure we will have very detailed debate subsequently. Indeed, I will leave some of the points that noble Lords have made this evening in order to come back to them when we get to groups 26 and 31.
I want to be very clear that the existing access framework is, in our view, not fit for purpose. It is built on 30 years of complex legislation, regulations, contracts and codes. It requires Network Rail and the ORR to take decisions using inconsistent criteria, based on differing duties and objectives, with no common vision. Fundamentally, no single party is responsible for planning the best overall use of the network and ensuring that access decisions deliver that plan. The current system has too often been characterised by fragmentation and delay, and it is clear that nobody is in overall charge. That has led to inefficient use of capacity and decisions that serve neither passengers nor freight well.
There are clear examples of the consequences. The May 2018 timetable failure—the original catalyst for rail reform—saw punctuality and reliability plummet across large parts of the network. Keith Williams’ review highlighted how this was the result of a complex, fragmented system with no single person in charge. Timetables are often built by trying to piece together layers of past decisions and contractual rights. On the east coast main line, the current system resulted in years of decision-making paralysis, with neither Network Rail, the ORR or operators able to agree a timetable. Service improvements that were supposed to result from £4 billion-worth of taxpayers’ investment were delayed by several years. The only way this could be resolved in the end was by me, as Rail Minister, stepping in to make the decision that no one else wanted to, which is clearly not an acceptable outcome at all.
Noble Lords will recall last December, when the ORR ruled that the 0700 from Manchester Piccadilly to Euston would have to run fully staffed but with no passengers on it, against the wishes of both the operator and the network provider, which agreed that it should run. The ORR itself acknowledged that it did not have all the facts when it took that decision.
The current system has failed to unlock meaningful freight growth. Too often, the needs of freight operators and their customers have been put to the back of the queue. Paths labelled as “strategic freight” are not strategically planned at all and may not even join up, as they are often just a mixed bag of surrendered paths and leftovers.
In the current system there is no overarching strategy—no overall plan for how to make best use of the network—and where no single body has end-to-end authority, critical information can be missed, escalation is unclear and blurred accountability leads to capacity being used in ways that increase disruption, letting down both passengers and freight customers.
An integrated railway under GBR’s leadership is the only way to fix this. As the single directing mind for the railway, GBR will proactively plan how to make best use of the network. It will be empowered to ensure that access decisions take proper account of that plan, implementing an achievable and reliable timetable that makes the very best use of the limited capacity available. Better co-ordination of the timetable will minimise delays, improve reliability and reduce costs—and may well open space for new routes and services. For freight operators, the new system will provide much greater certainty about the capacity available for them to grow their services, with GBR enabled and empowered to protect that capacity. The truth is that, if we leave it as it is, the system will never change.
I will deal with the crucial distinction between Clause 60 and 63 when we get to the detailed debates, but in the meantime I do not accept Amendment 16, which would fundamentally undermine the purpose of these reforms. It is unacceptable and I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Amendment 221 would require the access and use policy to set out not only a process for dealing with disputes but a right of appeal. Of course I agree that GBR’s strong leadership under the new system must be accompanied by strong accountability. That is why the ORR will act as a robust and independent appeals body for access, capacity allocation and charging decisions made by GBR on its network. The ORR’s appeals function will provide a clear, credible and accessible route to challenge those decisions.