Andy McDonald

I am enormously grateful to the Secretary of State for that clarification. That is immensely helpful, but I revert to my point that in seeking to reassure one constituency, there is a risk of undermining the confidence of others—not only in the Government’s approach to reconciliation, but in their ability to secure truth, accountability and access to justice. Most seriously, I fear that some of these proposals risk cutting across the detailed institutional safeguards established through the Good Friday agreement and the reforms that followed it. The first is Government new clause 50 and the Attorney General’s consent to prosecutions. That new clause would require the Attorney General’s consent before proceedings could be instituted for the most serious troubles-related offences. What is the compelling justification for introducing this additional political safeguard into the prosecution process? That question has been raised by other Members, and I join them in asking it. It is not simply a technical adjustment; it risks undermining a central reform arising from the Good Friday agreement. The 2000 criminal justice review specifically sought to protect prosecutorial independence by removing the Attorney General’s power to direct prosecutors in individual cases or on policy matters. That reform was particularly important because of the history of political interference and concerns about the prosecution of members of the security forces during the conflict. The independent Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland already applies evidential and public interest tests when deciding whether to prosecute. Why should a further decision now rest with a Government-appointed law officer who is potentially exposed to representations from ministerial colleagues? The de Silva report into the murder of Pat Finucane documented political pressure on the then Attorney General over the prosecution of state agent Brian Nelson. That history demonstrates precisely why those institutional safeguards were introduced. Government new clause 50 also appears to impose no requirement on the Attorney General to explain a refusal of consent, while the availability of judicial review may be limited. How can families have confidence in a process where an independent prosecutor might conclude that a serious offence should be prosecuted, only for a Government law officer to prevent that prosecution without adequate explanation or scrutiny? The Good Friday agreement was not simply a political declaration of peace and reconciliation. Its implementation required detailed reforms to institutions, including the criminal justice system, designed to establish independence and to instil public confidence. We have to tread with the greatest care not to undermine the Good Friday agreement in any way. We should be extremely cautious about disturbing those safeguards, particularly when it would risk reviving precisely the concerns that they were intended to address. I therefore urge the Government to reconsider new clause 50. Fairness for veterans must not mean creating a new mechanism through which serious criminality could escape prosecution.