Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I note that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, said, there has been a deal of consensus. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and others set out a depressing and dispiriting litany. I do not underestimate at all the importance of these amendments and the behaviour, the mischief, they seek to address. This is clearly central to one of the main aims of the Bill. It is paramount that public officials who deliberately delete or destroy information in advance of an inquiry or inquest are properly held to account. If this type of offending is not stopped, relevant and important information may no longer exist to be considered. I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Beamish about—if I may describe them as such—lax procedures in keeping information.
We are confident that the Bill already protects against the destruction of documents, in two separate ways, which I want to set out. First, Clause 2(4)(a) requires authorities and officials to provide information likely to be relevant to an inquiry or investigation if requested. They will not meet this obligation if they allow the information to be lost or destroyed when they ought to be providing it. Intentionally or recklessly destroying documents in order to impede an inquiry or an investigation is an offence. In addition, the individual in charge of an authority must take all reasonable steps to secure the authority’s compliance with the duty, including ensuring that documents are accessible.
Secondly, in appropriate circumstances—I think this goes to the question that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked—in appropriate circumstances and where the other elements of the offence are met, the destruction of documents could also be caught by the new “seriously improper acts” limb of the misconduct in public office offence. I hope that that is clear. For example, a public officer could commit this offence if they use their position with the intent of obtaining a benefit or causing another to suffer a detriment and when doing so they know or ought to know that their conduct is seriously improper. A benefit could include seeking to protect themselves or their organisation from reputational harm or damage. Actions such as shredding documents or ordering that information be destroyed could therefore potentially be caught.
The criminal law can already capture this type of conduct through offences such as perverting the course of justice. In March this year, for example, a serving police officer was convicted of perverting the course of justice for deliberately disposing of digital evidence— a number of noble Lords raised digital evidence—contained on a mobile phone. Contempt of court could also apply where records are destroyed in contravention of a court order. This type of conduct can also be, and has been, caught by the existing common-law misconduct in public office offence, and I have already commented on how the replacement might apply. The two new misconduct offences are intended to cover the same breadth of offending as the existing common-law offence. It is important to remember, nevertheless, that the key point of the new offences is the purpose for which a person carries out the act. This ensures that the criminal law captures those who act with improper intent.
Bespoke or unnecessary duplicate offences can risk creating confusion for those enforcing, prosecuting and seeking to abide by the law, so we should try to avoid them, though I note the strength of feeling in the House and I should be happy to continue the discussion on this and other matters between now and Committee. On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, about the atomic tests, I promise to write to him with the latest position.
The Government consider that both the existing law and the provisions in this Bill already provide suitable mechanisms for addressing the deliberate destruction of relevant records. Creating additional or overlapping offences when the conduct is already capable of being prosecuted perhaps risks unnecessary complexity and confusion for investigators, prosecutors and public officials alike. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will withdraw her amendment, though, as I say, I promise to carry on the conversation.