Contribution
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. It is good that we are discussing this in prime time, rather than at 11.30 pm, or whatever it was, on Monday. It has made the debate more spirited.
I will make some preliminary remarks before I respond in detail to the amendments. As well as Hillsborough, we have discussed many disasters which have given rise to the need for this Bill. However, I open my comments with my sincere, heartfelt sorrow for the families of the Aberfan disaster: 60 years have passed but, sadly, the lessons of that day are still being debated here and now. Justice for families is at the forefront of our minds, today and for the rest of our discussions on this Bill.
Before I respond to the amendments in this group, I return to a question that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, raised in Committee on Monday and which was followed up by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Alton. The noble Baroness asked about the potential prosecution of a chief constable who deliberately doctored the crime statistics to boost his or her own success. Of course, behaviour such as this could currently be caught under the common law misconduct in public office offence, and will continue to be something that could be caught within the new seriously improper acts offence, which is one of the replacements for the misconduct in public office offences inserted by Part 3 of the Bill. All the elements of the offence must be met, of course, but if the misleading behaviour to which the noble Baroness refers involves the officeholder using, or failing to use,
“their office to obtain a benefit … or to cause another to suffer a detriment, and … they know, or ought to know”
that their action is “seriously improper”—the circumstances she suggests certainly seem to indicate that—then the seriously improper acts offence could apply. I hope that I have clarified that.
I turn to the amendments in this group, beginning with Amendments 81, 83 and 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and supported by a number of noble Lords around the Committee, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I hope that the noble Lord will be reassured to know that our policy intentions align absolutely with his. The new misconduct in public office offences should continue to be conduct-based offences. That means that it should not matter whether a benefit is actually obtained or a detriment suffered. However, I agree that it is essential that there is no ambiguity in how this part of Clause 13 might be read and interpreted by the courts. I also accept that this should carry through into the directions given to the jury. I therefore commit to working with the noble Lord ahead of Report on how we may best achieve this. I see some nodding from various noble Lords, so that has clearly gone down well, but it could go either way from here.
I turn to Amendments 85, 86, 88 and 89, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I understand that the main concerns raised include that a reasonable excuse defence model is too broad and could lead to defendants raising unmeritorious or far-fetched excuses. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, stressed that point. These could, at best, place an undue burden on prosecutors to disprove the defences and, at worst, prevent convictions. That is clearly something that the Government would want to avoid. However, I must be clear that we do not share these concerns about the reasonable excuse defence as a model. This is a common and well-used defence throughout the criminal law, so the courts are well accustomed to assessing whether any excuse offered is relevant and genuinely reasonable in the circumstances. Equally, this would be reflected in any direction that the court needed to give to the jury.
After further detailed consideration, although it is difficult to identify any circumstances where a public interest consideration would not also form part of a reasonable excuse defence—I think that was the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—conversely, we have concerns that the much narrower public interest defence could potentially exclude legitimate circumstances that would otherwise fall within a reasonable excuse defence. We cannot foresee every scenario and would not want to limit the courts’ ability to assess what would constitute a reasonable excuse by altering the defence in this way. The excuse given has to be reasonable; it cannot be just any excuse. The examples that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave are ones that we should think about. As I said, the Government believe that the courts are well versed in understanding the limits of a defence. Finally, the current common-law offence requires the prosecution to establish the absence of a reasonable excuse or justification. Retaining this approach supports one of our main policy objectives: to clarify the law, rather than change it.