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Lord Lansley (Con)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 21 October 2026

Debate

Railways Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group, which are not all for entirely the same purpose. They are essentially to explore the question of how exactly appeals to the ORR on the part of operators of rail freight and others will be considered. I am grateful not only for the meeting last week with the Minister but for the letter that he sent this morning, which my noble friend Lord Moylan referred to earlier. I did not think it unreasonably long; it quite thoroughly explained how judicial review might be thought to work. From my point of view, it demonstrated that, although judicial review is often thought of as a narrow, very limited potential for appeal, it is possible to go to further grounds using judicial review principles, but not as far as we need to. Noble Lords who have been Ministers will be well aware of the reasons why Ministers put judicial review appeal grounds into legislation: it is because they want it to be narrow. The letter that the Minister sent me was very clear, for example, that if a decision-maker is not taking something into account or is taking into account something that is irrelevant to the issue, that may give grounds for judicial review. But the letter was slightly wrong in talking about not taking proper account of statutory duties. It is not quite that wide; it concerns where account is not taken of statutory duties. There is also the question of the circumstances in which a decision is held to be rational or not. The letter from the Minister quite accurately says, “Is it within the range of reasonable decisions for a public authority?” In essence that is to say—as we are often very clear when thinking about judicial review—could a reasonable decision-maker have arrived at this decision? That is not the same as balancing the considerations that a regulator has a responsibility to balance. We will doubtless return to this on Report. There are three solutions, the first of which is the judicial review solution, in which there are three broad grounds for appeal. One is that the decision is illegal. I do not think we are arguing about that; if it is wrong in law, it can be appealed on judicial review grounds. The second is that the decision is irrational; I just referred to the question of whether it is a decision that a reasonable decision-maker could make. That gives a limited scope for appeal. The third asks whether the decision is the subject of procedural impropriety, which gets us into the territory that I really want to explore, because it is, in essence, procedural. Was a matter considered or not? Was an irrelevant matter considered or not? It is not: how were the considerations that should form part of that decision balanced by the regulator? Was it a proper balancing, taking account of all the circumstances in the legislation, or not? My Amendment 258 is the operative one here for these purposes. We can leave out the first part—if there is an error of fact of any significant importance, it could be the basis for an appeal, even on a judicial review basis. The second grounds proposed are “that GBR failed properly to have regard to a relevant matter”. I think the Minister would say that that could be a judicial review decision, but the word “properly” is of limited use in a judicial review context. The next two parts are the most important. One is “that GBR failed to give appropriate weight to a relevant matter”. It is not just that GBR did not consider it; it is that it did not consider it properly or give it weight. The question of how much weight should be given to issues is at the heart of the balancing of responsibilities and duties by a regulator. The next one is “that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”, which, frankly, is just a way of expressing the view that the regulator has many powers and responsibilities, so have they been exercised in a way that is proper? I did not make all this up—I looked to see whether there might be suitable examples elsewhere that give us scope for thinking about this. The one that I came across was in the Civil Aviation Act 2012, Schedule 1 to which relates to where operator determinations might be appealed against in the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Paragraph 3(1) says that the appeal against operator determinations to the CAT could be made on the basis that it was wrong on one or more of the following grounds: “that the determination was based on an error of fact; … that the determination was wrong in law; … that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”. That is why I have used the third of the grounds and put it into Amendment 258, because that is the operative basis, and it encompasses in that phrase whether appropriate weight has been given to the matters that a regulator has to consider. We are in territory between judicial review and an appeal on its merits, as my noble friend said. I have applied myself to the Bill on the basis that the Bill is around establishing a directing mind. It is clear that, if one were to give an appeal on its merits, one would substantially create a second directing mind—an appellate mind, as it were—and the intentions of the Bill would not be established. We may not agree on whether that is the right intention, but I do not think that we can simply put something into the legislation that so fundamentally undermines the purposes of the Bill itself. We may come back to that on Report. Some people may want to do that; I personally would not. There have been many instances in recent years when previous Administrations have likewise thought that giving an appeal on the merits is going too far—that it effectively deprives the original decision-maker of the ability to establish the policies and decisions that it is their responsibility to achieve. The only other thing is that there are other amendments that are looking at the question of what the ORR can do if it determines that an appeal should be upheld. There are two amendments that do different things—let us not bother with precisely how it happens—but essentially I have not seen any reason why the legislation should not be simpler. Instead of the current drafting, where the ORR upholds an appeal it should send it back to GBR to reconsider that decision and have the ability to give a direction to GBR about how it should conduct that reconsideration. I do not see the need for everything else—it should be able to quash all or part of the decision and send it back to the ORR, and nothing more than that. That would seem to be the simple and effective way of the ORR behaving. I would suggest that that reinforces the view that it is fundamentally GBR that has to make the decision, so when it goes back for the reconsideration it can make sure that it is consistent with all its responsibilities as the intended directing mind for the railways. I hope that that explains this. It is quite a wide range of issues that we have to think about—but fundamentally at this stage it is just about setting out that there is scope to bring into the legislation something appropriately beyond judicial review for the particular purpose of enabling there to be appeals that can look at where there has been some transparent failure on the part of Great British Railways to balance the competing duties and responsibilities that it has to exercise.

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