Railways Bill
Wednesday, 21 October 2026
Contributions
Committee (6th Day)
Scottish and Welsh legislative consent sought . Relevant document: 4th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee.
Amendment 213
Moved by
213: After Clause 58, insert the following new Clause— “Driver-only operation on new GBR passenger services(1) A new GBR passenger service may be provided only if it is operated on a driver-only basis.(2) Great British Railways and every GBR company must exercise their functions relating to—(a) the planning and introduction of GBR passenger services,(b) the award and performance of public service contracts, and(c) the preparation of working timetables,so as to secure compliance with subsection (1).(3) The ORR may exempt a new GBR passenger service from subsection (1) only where it is satisfied that driver-only operation would create an unacceptable risk to the safe operation of the railway.(4) In this section, “driver-only” means operation without the necessary presence of a guard.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require all new GBR passenger services to operate on a driver-only basis, subject only to a limited safety exemption granted by the ORR.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments is a bit of a ragbag, covering a broad and diverse range of topics. I hope noble Lords will understand if I take the full time available to me or something close to that in order to cover at least those amendments which stand in my name. Amendment 213 would require new passenger services provided by Great British Railways to operate on a driver-only basis. As I have said before, there is something tremendously backward-looking about this legislation, when we think about the lack of anything in it about new technology and the way of working that the new Great British Railways might adopt. One of those respects is working practices. We have seen very recently with Chiltern Railways the RMT once again objecting to proposals for driver-only operation on new east-west rail services. I appreciate that Chiltern Railways has recently had its franchise terminated, but on other of its services, driver-only operation works very satisfactorily. As an occasional customer of Chiltern Railways, travelling to Solihull and Birmingham, I am very aware of that. I am not saying that that is the only reason why the east-west rail service is not operating this way, but it is a significant point. The RMT argues that the arrangements water down safety, because a second member of staff would necessarily perform a safety-critical train manager role. However, Chiltern has confirmed that every east-west rail service will still have two people on board: the driver, and another colleague responsible for looking after passengers, checking tickets, assisting those who need help and dealing with issues on board. Chiltern has also made it clear that it has operated most of its trains with the driver controlling the doors for decades. That brings me to the purpose of this amendment. If we are creating Great British Railways, we should also be looking seriously, as I say, at how the railway can operate more efficiently. The noble Lord will probably say that this is all a matter to be entrusted to Great British Railways once it is up and running, but it is one in which the public and Parliament have a very legitimate interest, and it would not be inappropriate to have something along these lines on the face of the Bill. We should not automatically preserve working practices simply because they have existed historically, particularly where technology and modern operating practices mean that they are no longer necessary. Driver-only and driver-controlled operation are hardly novel concepts. The independent safety regulator has previously concluded that with suitable equipment, proper procedures and competent staff in place, driver-only operation can be a safe method of working. The ORR’s current guidance similarly makes it clear that driver-controlled operation can meet legal safety requirements where the proper systems and safeguards are in place. This amendment therefore establishes a clear presumption that the new GBR passenger services should operate on a driver-only basis. That would allow GBR to design new services around modern and efficient operating practices from the outset, rather than importing unnecessary staffing requirements into every new service. Bear in mind, of course, that GBR will be much more vulnerable to industrial action in the future if, as has been discussed on other groups, there is an eventual drift—as I am sure there will be if the unions get their way—to a single employer. Crucially, however, the amendment has a safety override, because it includes a provision in proposed new subsection (3) expressly giving the ORR the power to exempt a service from this requirement when it is satisfied that driver-only operation would create an unacceptable risk to the safe operation of the railway. If Great British Railways is genuinely going to deliver a more efficient railway, it must have the ability to modernise the way in which new services are operated, while maintaining the higher standards of safety. Turning to Amendments 305A and 305B, Amendment 305A is about ensuring that, as employees move into the new structure, existing employment liabilities move with them in an orderly and transparent way. This amendment has been tabled by me at the urging of Railpen, the body that manages the railways pension scheme. I am sure that it has made similar representations to the Government, and I wish to hear how the Government have responded to them. Nearly everybody who works on the railway has a pension scheme. There are multiple schemes, but nearly all of them come under the umbrella of the same railways pension scheme, and their management agent goes under the name of Railpen. It has explained clearly that if there is to be a transition of staff and the pension —the liability mentioned here—is to travel with them, it needs a considerable run-in period to manage that in a legally safe way, to ensure that there are no questions about the entitlement to a pension that a staff member has accrued. It estimates a minimum of 12 months’ notice; that is what was said to me—it may have a firmer figure it can put on the table in conversations with the Government, but there is approximately 12 months’ clarity. This amendment would build that clarity into the Bill, and it is a very important consideration for staff. Whatever the Government’s plans may be—and I do not think there are any at the moment—for the pensions of future railway staff, those who have in good faith accumulated an entitlement to date should not have it put at legal risk, even temporarily, by a botched and hasty transition. This amendment seeks to prevent that happening. Turning to Amendment 305B, there needs to be much greater clarity, for similar reasons, about the corporate and employer structure of Great British Railways, including where employees will sit and how these pension arrangements will work. Further detail on the proposed structure and implementation timetable is vital if the Government’s commitments are to be delivered effectively in practice. Without clear and timely information, there is a greater risk to employee outcomes, effective governance and long-term sustainability of pension arrangements. This is not the sort of amendment that, even if we were on Report, I would currently want to press. It is designed to elicit clear commitments from the Minister in Committee at the Dispatch Box that will satisfy Railpen and the beneficiaries of the pension schemes. Turning to Amendment 306, the Minister in the other place said that the Government have no plans to remove the ORR from its role in train driver licensing and certification, but added that a future Government might need to alter who performs that function, following changes to industry structures and responsibilities. Why? Why would any circumstance arise that would remove the power of licensing and certification from the ORR, the independent safety regulator? We have been assured that, although the ORR’s position is being greatly diminished in some respects, in regard to safety its power and authority remain untouched and sacrosanct. In what circumstances would the Government imagine this coming about? This amendment is designed to ensure that they cannot do that, but it gives the Minister an opportunity to explain why the Government would want this power in the first place and to see whether noble Lords would accept that explanation. Amendments 319, 320 and 342 go to the wider problem that the Government are creating for industrial relations on the railway. The first would restore minimum service levels during strike action. The Government chose to repeal the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act through the Employment Rights Act 2025, removing the framework that was intended to protect a basic level of service for passengers during industrial action. As I said a moment ago, the risk of a national industrial strike is greatly enhanced by this legislation, The requirement that there should be appropriate thresholds for ballots to take place and that there should be a minimum service level, as required by the previous legislation, seems the barest minimum that the Government should do in order to protect passengers and the travelling public. Amendment 320 is on a workforce productivity framework. It is also very important. If Great British Railways is to deliver better value for taxpayers and passengers—that must be and is one of its objectives—it cannot simply absorb existing working practices without challenging whether they remain appropriate. If there is one all-singing and all-dancing Great British Railways that is in charge, that should be set to music in a plan that can be scrutinised and challenged. When you had multiple employers and the fragmentation that the Minister so deplores, one can understand how it is difficult to draw all that together. But one of the great advantages, if there are any advantages, to GBR is that it should be put to the challenge on exactly the question of how it is going to improve workforce productivity. It is not enough to say, “Leave it to us”. We need a serious programme of workforce modernisation. Finally, Amendment 318 is not in my name, if I am correct, but my noble friend Lord Grayling is unfortunately not able to be here for the early part of the Committee, although I believe that he is going to join us later. This is an amendment in his name that he has asked me to mention, which I am pleased to do. It concerns the training of staff in relation to railways—people working on the railways and people who might want to work on the railways in the future. He proposes the merits of a national rail college or academy. It does not necessarily have to be in one building in one place—modern educational systems have more diversity to them than that. It would be a national railways academy to help train and improve existing staff, but also to encourage newcomers and to create pathways, partly through apprenticeships and partly through graduate routes, to encourage people coming on to the railway. Again, if there is any advantage in having Great British Railways as a single operator, it would be the possibility to move forward with bold ideas such as that, which can set a fresh path for the railways, encourage young people and give them hope and aspiration to work on the railways, which can be, as I think we all know, a very rewarding and enjoyable career. I beg to move.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 306A, which seeks a commitment from the Government to ensure that train companies bear the cost of training, licensing and certification of train drivers. The Bill in its present form can enable the current or future Secretary of State to introduce fees for drivers receiving or renewing their licence and/or train-driving certificate. This would create a financial barrier to increasing the supply of train drivers. A fee system for drivers could discourage job applications, especially from younger applicants, at a time when the Government have lowered the train-driving age to 18. A shortage of drivers leads to an overreliance on overtime to keep the railway system running; given this and an increased number of retirements in the near future, there is no need to add any barriers to the process of recruiting new drivers.
If GBR is proposed as the licence issuer, drivers working for employers outside of GBR—in freight, in open access or under devolved authorities—could be forced to pay a fee to the infrastructure manager and operators of passenger services, on top of their employer paying access charges. In a recent survey, which elicited 5,000 responses, 94% of ASLEF drivers opposed the introduction of fees for licensing and 95% did not support fees for certificates. The majority said that they would have been less likely to apply for the job if they had had to pay fees for their licence.
This amendment seeks clarity and certainty. I suspect that the Minister might respond by saying that the Government have no intention to charge individuals. If so, that should be stated clearly in the Bill and this should set a benchmark in case a future Government are tempted to introduce personal fees. I am well aware that the current Bill requires the Government to consult with train drivers and others, but it has no requirement stronger than saying “have regard to”. That is the phrase used, so after consultation it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the views of train drivers and their representatives would be disregarded. We all remember the minimum service levels legislation: in 2023, the Government consulted but, despite opposition, went ahead with the legislation anyway. Some people say that they did not have regard to the views expressed and, subsequently, the legislation could not be implemented. It was simply impractical.
This amendment seeks certainty and clarity from the Government. It asks Parliament to define who may be charged for licensing and certification. The Government state that they have no intention to charge any individual. It would be helpful for the Minister to confirm this by accepting this very modest amendment to the Bill.
Lord Hampton (CB)
My Lords, I am going to speak to Amendment 330C in my name. I declare, as this is the first time I have spoken today, that I am a teacher in a state school. I am not sure if I have to declare this, but I am an officer on the APPG on Apprenticeships, which has a bearing on this. We are in a skills crisis. We no longer have to explain what NEET stands for. We all know. We have just had the Milburn report and the zeitgeist is very much that we need to do something about it. The Armed Forces are the biggest provider of apprenticeships in this country and the Army is the largest part; it has about 90,000 people working for it, which I believe is about the same number as Great British Railways will have. I think that your Lordships can see where I am going: I would like Great British Railways to commit to becoming the largest provider of apprenticeships as a proportion of its workers. It is based around the country and, when the railways were formed, they were one of the biggest employers in the country. I think that this would be the perfect opportunity to work around the country with organisations such as Skills England, local mayoral authorities and local skills improvement plans to provide a highly motivated, highly skilled and faithful workforce. I think that the Prime Minister might like it as well.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to four amendments in this group, most of them relatively briefly. I support Amendment 213, moved by my noble friend Lord Moylan, who clearly set out the reasons for it. I add only that it is a useful amendment because it effectively changes the presumption, which is helpful for GBR. It would still allow the ORR to say that you need not have driver-only operation if there is a very good reason for doing so, but it would mean that the default is that you would have it. This comes back to a discussion we had the other day. If you are going to run a competitive railway and deliver it at a reasonable cost, the advantage of staff not doing jobs that can be done more efficiently is that this frees up GBR to deploy its staff in a way that better serves customers. I briefly refer to our discussion on Monday about the need to have more staff focused on supporting passengers with disabilities and other needs. There are only so many people to go around and there is only so much cost that can be borne, and delivering this driver-only operation more efficiently enables GBR to deploy staff to serving passengers in the way we wanted to see when we discussed this on Monday. All I add to my noble friend Lord Moylan’s Amendment 305A on pensions is that it is not just important, in getting this transition right, to protect employees’ rights and financial benefits. That is of course very important, and his amendment does that. The second thing about having a proper transitional process is making sure that the management of what is a large pension scheme is efficient. Sadly, with the management of Civil Service pensions moving from one provider to another, we have already seen that, if that is not well handled, current employees trying to find information about their pensions and people who are retiring and need that information get a very poor service. If the pension scheme is forced into a transitional process too quickly, not only does that put at risk ensuring that the financial rights of pensioners are protected but it potentially delivers terrible customer service, which can be incredibly damaging for pensioners. Making sure that that is handled in a sensible and orderly way is beneficial for both GBR and its workforce. There is no interest for anybody in having that not well handled. I support Amendment 320 on workforce productivity, which my noble friend set out well. We talked a lot about costs and who bears the cost of that—the taxpayer or the fare payer—but the important point is to reduce the cost of delivering rail services so that, however we split that cost, it is as low as possible for both taxpayer and fare payer. My noble friend sets out a good scheme for doing so. I absolutely support the thrust of Amendment 330C, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, just spoke. If he were to bring it back on Report, depending on what the Minister says, the wording would need tightening up, because he said he wanted GBR to be the largest provider of apprenticeships as a proportion of its workforce, which is not what the amendment currently says. I support the first part of it, which is about increasing the number of apprenticeships, but I am not sure that having a target for GBR to be the biggest one is a sensible thing to write into statute. The thrust of the noble Lord’s amendment was to have GBR become a significant provider of apprenticeships across, importantly, the whole of its workforce, not just what is currently the Network Rail side—the engineering side and people delivering the infrastructure—but the whole business, including customer services and some of the back-office operations, such as finance and managing it. All those provide great jobs for people and training for that workforce. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, mentioned, a significant number are getting towards retirement age, and training a workforce and making sure that we have a workforce for the future is valuable. I commend that amendment to the Committee.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, I have a couple of comments on this group of amendments. The first is on Amendment 213 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. It is very sensible, to the extent that we have lots of passenger trains sitting in sidings doing nothing. East West Rail comes to mind, and at Waterloo station there are several hundred trains which have been there for a number of years because there is no agreement on whether the driver is able to close the door or it needs to be somebody else. Of course, it is not about anything particularly relevant to this service and it seems to have got caught up in the web of obfuscation. I am interested to know from my noble friend what arrangements are being made for the new trans-Pennine services and whether they will have a driver or a guard to shut the door, and whether the driver will not shut the door and the guard will also do the very important duties elsewhere on the train. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on that. Amendment 319, on minimum service, is important. Those of us who have studied the goings-on in France over the last few decades—not at the moment—always came away with the impression that there was a railway strike happening somewhere in the country. That was probably true most of the time, because most of the strikes were very small, and regional or local in application. However, the one thing that the Government and SNCF have done more recently is to require SNCF to run a minimum service on the main lines, even if the rest of their people are on strike—some of my family got caught up in this in years past. It is something like running one train in three or one train in four, which inconveniences many passengers but means that those who need to get around for some important reason, even if there is a delay, can do it. I hope my noble friend will look at that as an option for dealing with the worst effect of strikes if they ever happen. Finally, Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, is on apprenticeships, and of course I fully support it. I have been trying to encourage firms in Cornwall in the maritime sector to take on more apprenticeships. They have had many discussions with Skills England and have taken on a number of apprenticeships, which is very good for the area. Skills England recently cancelled its apprenticeships and said there was no demand. As there were several students already doing it, that seems a bit odd. I am in touch with our colleague the Minister on this, but I hope that, in the apprenticeships seen in the railway sector, we take this extremely seriously and try to cover as much of the country as we can. In the future we will need these people to replace some of the older members of the team.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Bradshaw is not able to be in his place today, so he has asked me to speak to his Amendment 308, to which I have added my name, and which concerns Clause 94. Most train drivers have a staff history that follows them as they move through the system. It is updated as they qualify for different sorts of track and rolling stock, and their route knowledge is also recorded and updated. This is the responsibility of the company employing them, and it works as it is. My noble friend Lord Bradshaw strongly feels that it should not need to be altered. The small number of drivers involved in running trains in France and beyond need licences, which should be the responsibility of their employers; of course, these are mainly Eurostar, Eurotunnel and freight drivers. My noble friend is really concerned. He can see no purpose in a central register containing drivers’ details. He thinks this will create far more bureaucracy in the system, which he says would be better avoided. It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s thoughts on my noble friend’s amendment. I turn to a couple of other amendments in this group. On Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, I fully support the idea of having far more apprenticeships on the railway. In fact, my father started his career with an apprenticeship on the railway, working in Eastleigh in Hampshire. He then qualified as a carpenter and a joiner, working on freight containers before moving on to a teaching career. My family has a history of this, and I think it is really important, particularly as young people are currently struggling to find careers. This is a way to have high-quality jobs, some of them very technical. I hope that Great British Railways will support this, as have other big projects, such as Crossrail in London. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, on a national rail training and technology academy, is really interesting. A tunnelling academy was developed as part of Crossrail, and we know that there are many issues around driver training, shortages and using new technology in the railway. The suggestion from the noble Lord is welcome, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Dacres of Lewisham) (Lab)
I remind the Committee that, as per paragraph 4.29 of the Companion , interventions should be brief and questions should be asked for clarification only. Speeches should not be made, so I ask noble Lords seeking to intervene to keep their contributions concise. Thank you.
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, I shall begin with Amendments 213 and 320. A range of staffing models for rail services is used across Britain’s rail network by different train operators. Railway managers take many factors into account when deciding staffing levels, such as passenger accessibility, the technological capability of the train, and infrastructure. On driver-only operation in particular, put simply, not all rolling stock, train services or routes are suitable for driver-only operation. It is, therefore, not efficient or appropriate for primary legislation to determine how those and other trade-offs should be resolved. Additionally, the proposed new workforce framework set out by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, suggests changes that could be a breach of an individual’s contractual terms and conditions of employment. Such matters are for the employer and employee to negotiate, through their trade unions, under collective bargaining agreements. On Amendments 319 and 342, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, notes, the minimum service levels legislation was repealed by this Government, under the Employment Rights Act, as it did not support a positive and productive relationship between employers, employees and their trade unions. In fact, it served only to exacerbate the national rail disputes under the previous Government, which saw two years of widespread strikes and disruption to millions of passengers. More to the point, it was unworkable. Although many rail employers had the opportunity to use the minimum service levels legislation, none—not even those companies that were controlled by the Government at the time the legislation was passed—chose to do so as they deemed it unworkable or unnecessary. There is, therefore, no argument for including it here. Turning to Amendments 305A, 305B and 317, I agree very much that it is in the interests of rail employees, employers and customers to ensure that employee transfers are orderly, not least to limit the impact on rail operations and users of the railway. Well-established procedures and arrangements already exist to ensure this. Under the existing transfer of undertakings regulations, employees transferring from one employer to another do so with appropriate protections for their existing contractual terms and conditions, which include protections for an employee’s occupational pension, redundancy and severance terms. There are also transfer scheme provisions in the Bill at Clauses 88 to 93, which enable the Government to transfer staff on the same or similar terms as TUPE. They must also comply with the Cabinet Office statement of practice, which again follows TUPE principles. Therefore, staff terms and conditions will be protected in transfers to GBR. I turn to pensions specifically. Pensions are protected not only by TUPE principles but through the existing legal and contractual framework governing the Railways Pension Scheme, which specifically protects accrued pensions. TUPE is established in the railways, and no additional protection is needed. As Minister Mather previously stated on the Floor of the House in the other place, our intention is for the Railways Pension Scheme to remain the main pension provision under GBR. We are in regular contact with the Railways Pension Scheme; I have met its representatives and believe the existing provisions are sufficient.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt because I will have an opportunity to speak later, but it might be helpful if I say something about pensions at this point. The question is not about legal protection. The Minister has answered entirely in relation to the legal protection that exists for pensions. That was not the point at all. The point is the practicability of making the transfer of very large numbers of staff from one employer to another, including the records that will have to be changed and updated and the back-office work, which is enormous in a pension scheme. Just think of the back office and the number of people involved in a pension arrangement. Of course, I do not understand or expect to understand exactly how that works, but it has been represented to me in all seriousness by those responsible for managing it that they need a guarantee of adequate notice; 12 months was suggested. They want to hear the Government say that that notice will be given. It is a question not of legal protection but of making sure that people get their pension in their bank account from the appropriate source on the day of the month on which it is due. Just think of the recent Civil Service pension problems.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
If I may say so, that is precisely why we are in regular contact with the Railways Pension Scheme and why any transfers that take place are managed in an orderly way. It is a very good and well-administered pension scheme and the dialogue that has taken place, is taking place and will continue to take place gives it sufficient notice and confidence. Furthermore, we would not dream of transferring large numbers of people if we did not believe that those administrative arrangements were capable of being made within the timescale in which we are proposing to do it.
Lord Harper (Con)
If I may intervene briefly before the Minister moves on, he said that he is satisfied that the Government have given or will give the pension scheme sufficient notice. Can he confirm on the record that the pension scheme and those who administrate it have confirmed to him that they are satisfied that they have been given the appropriate amount of notice and are comfortable with the ability to deliver what is required?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I certainly believe so, but I am happy to go and check with them. As I said, we would not dream of transferring any staff, whether large or small in number, without making sure that those arrangements could be properly carried out. I think the scheme is well administered and capable of doing everything we would want it to in the timescale we are looking at, but I will confirm that. With regard to Amendment 305B, the Government are committed to engaging transparently with employees, trade unions and the wider industry as rail reform is implemented. As I have already outlined, the transfer process will be subject to established TUPE consultation requirements, ensuring that staff and their representatives are informed and consulted in good time before any transfer is made. Those discussions will take place over a number of months ahead of any transfer, following familiar and well-understood processes that help ensure that transfers of this significance are delivered in an orderly and effective manner. However, it is extremely unusual for there to be a requirement in legislation that the entire corporate and employment structure be settled 12 months in advance in order to use the power in question. In a reform of this complexity, those arrangements will necessarily evolve through consultation and negotiation with relevant stakeholders. This requirement would remove a degree of flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to any developments or adjust aspects of transfer or design in response to consultation and it risks locking the Government into proposals before that process is complete. That could ultimately delay the transfers themselves and the establishment of GBR. I do not therefore consider a need for further legislation on this matter. Amendment 306 would require the Office of Rail and Road to issue both train driver licences and train driver certificates. I should explain that under the current Train Driving Licences and Certificates Regulations 2010, licences are issued by the ORR while certificates are issued by employers such as train operators. The reason for this is that the overall train driving licence issued by the ORR is a national-level qualification but, in comparison, the certification issued by employers is designed to demonstrate that drivers are competent to operate particular routes and rolling stock. It would not be appropriate to transfer the certification function to the ORR, as the employers are best placed to understand which services trains drivers will be deployed on and then to train them appropriately for that specific rolling stock. The ORR would not have the route and rolling stock expertise to perform this function. Moreover, Amendment 307 proposes specific consultation requirements. The existing drafting requires government to consult with representatives of train drivers and any other person deemed appropriate. This enables a proportionate and flexible approach to consulting on a topic that involves significant technical and medical detail. It involves the Government consulting people—for example, including medical professionals—if needed, but acknowledges that, each time the power is used, a different set of consultees may be appropriate, depending on the use of the power. On Amendment 306A, I reassure my noble friend Lord Sikka that there are no plans to change the existing train driver licensing and certification fee arrangements. They are not currently paid for by drivers and that will not change. In fact, his amendment would prevent the status quo from staying as it is by making it so that only GBR or train operators can pay fees in the regulations, whereas today the ORR pays the licence fee, which is less than £10. That is then recouped through the rail safety levy. Employers currently only pay for the certification aspect of the fees and I expect them to continue to do so. The power in Clause 94 and the specific subsection that he seeks to amend does not create a targeted mechanism to introduce fees for drivers in obtaining their licences, including any training. The intention of this power is to allow the train driver licensing framework to evolve over time, as opposed to being frozen as it is currently. There are clear safeguards attached to the power, including mandatory consultation, impact assessments and parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that this provides my noble friend with the reassurance that he is looking for. On Amendment 308 of the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, the powers in Clause 94 are critical if the Government are to ensure that the framework for train driving remains robust, responsive and fit for purpose in the years ahead. They will allow the regime to evolve in line with best practice, incorporating advances in technology, innovation, operations and safety knowledge. For instance, the legislation currently names the Ishihara test as one to be used by doctors when assessing colour blindness, despite there being more modern methods available to industry that have arisen since the legislation was first made—for example, the colour assessment and diagnosis test or the Farnsworth dichotomous test—and are more effective. The ability to update this legislation on an enduring basis will help to modernise the framework and support health and safety outcomes for drivers, as well as avoiding operational impacts such as train drivers being unable to be deployed on account of not passing outdated medical tests. That means that the legislation needs to cover both international and domestic operations, which Clause 94, as drafted, will provide for. I turn to Amendments 318, 344 and 330C. On the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, I first say that the Government and I strongly support the intent behind this arrangement. I hope that noble Lords took note of last week’s announcement that Great British Railways will create up to 600 new apprenticeships over the next four years, demonstrating our commitment to investing in the workforce of tomorrow. These new rail foundation apprenticeships are possible thanks to the continuing work of Network Rail and DfT Operator, together with industry and Skills England through the rail apprenticeship and skills funding industry steering group.
This shows that apprenticeships will be an important part of building the skilled workforce that the railway needs now and in the future. Undoubtedly, Great British Railways needs to continue to play a significant role in supporting that ambition; indeed, it will have no option, and there will be no diminution of demand if noble Lords look at the age distribution of current railway staff. The Government’s focus on apprenticeships is not new, however, and currently Network Rail trains between 800 and 1,000 apprentices each year and the department-funded passenger train operators trained around 2,600 apprentices in 2024-25. I absolutely expect GBR to continue working closely with Skills England to support the development of the rail workforce and to help expand high-quality apprenticeship opportunities across the sector in future. I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord that this is absolutely a key priority for the Government and that therefore he will not press his amendment.
On Amendments 318 and 344, in our view workforce development and technological innovation should be fully integrated with the strategic leadership of the railway. We know skills and technology must be aligned with the wider priorities of the network, and it would be better to be done within GBR than be overseen by a separate statutory body. This matters because technology, operations and workforce skills are interdependent. For example, introducing new digital signalling requires not only investment in technology but also changes in the operational process and new ways of working for the workforce. If training were overseen separately, there would be a risk of developing skills programmes that are not significantly aligned with wider changes on the network.
That is why, under our reforms, GBR will bring together the functions needed to plan for the railway’s future. We are particularly committed to ensuring that the railway has the skilled workforce and technological capability that it needs and we are already putting the structures in place to ensure that GBR delivers this. For example, we are continuing to develop new routes into the industry, such as lowering the minimum train driver age from 20 to 18 to encourage more people to choose the railway for their career path. By utilising GBR’s strategic reach, we will be able to build on this to identify future workforce requirements as part of its long-term planning and business arrangements. I do not think that it makes sense to introduce fragmentation between the skilled workforce and operations. I hope that my remarks have reassured noble Lords and enables them not to press their amendments.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I am not going to add further to the debate, except to express disappointment in relation to the staffing matters. I just do not think that the general tenor of the Government’s position—throughout, it has been that we should not inquire because they can be trusted to manage it well—works in the modern age. An organisation seeking the level of independence that Great British Railways is looking for needs to recognise that there will have to be mechanisms for scrutiny that involve Parliament and these are simply not present adequately in this Bill. I make that as a general comment; it applies to a number of the areas that came up. My comments about pensions have been made and I look forward to reading what the Minister writes to my noble friend Lord Harper, who asked a very relevant question. I would only add—and the Minister might wish to take note—that it is not simply a case of whether Railpen is happy now. Will it be given adequate notice when transfers take place over a period, as no doubt will be the case, in the future so that it is happy with the arrangements for the future and the commitments given by the Government for the future? That is what I think my noble friend was looking for and I look forward to reading the Minister’s response. With that, with the leave of the Committee, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 213 withdrawn.
Amendments 214 to 220T not moved.
Clause 59: Access and use policy
Amendment 221 not moved.
Amendment 222
Moved by
222: Clause 59, page 34, line 8, at end insert— “(ea) include provision about the procedure for allowing access to and the use of GBR infrastructure by heritage rail operators,”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would require GBR to include provision for heritage rail operators in its access and use policy.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, and I have Amendments 222 and 225 in this group. The first, Amendment 222, would require Great British Railways “to include provision for heritage rail operators in its access and use policy”. As we turn our attention in Committee to that access and use policy, noble Lords may think it eccentric that we start with the implications for heritage rail operators, but this is an instance where the implications for them are much the same as for operators of other kinds, be they freight operators, open access operators or those working in a devolved manner in regions across the UK. This may be so in perhaps a more granular and specific way but, as the Minister knows well, a number of companies operate heritage charter services on the main line. Such companies include Vintage Trains, LSL—Locomotive Services Limited—West Coast Railways, and Belmond, whose British Pullman I had the pleasure of seeing speeding through Denmark Hill station on Friday last week. All are important parts of the UK’s soft power, as well as engines of our visitor economy. West Coast Railways’ the Jacobite is known better in some quarters as the Hogwarts Express from Harry Potter. It draws tourists from around the world to come and see the Glenfinnan Viaduct, and to visit the Scottish Highlands and west coast. They form memorable occasions for families of all generations, forming the backdrops to significant birthdays, wedding anniversaries and much more. They are also an important recruiting sergeant for our railways, not just in making rail travel attractive and encouraging people to think about travelling by rail rather than road, but by inspiring the next generation of engineers, drivers and much more. These charter services are also anchor attractions in the areas in which they operate, forming an important spur to hospitality and tourist businesses right across the United Kingdom. Since 1993, they have operated on the basis of goodwill rather than a statutory guarantee. There is no mention of heritage charter services in the 1993 Act, as the Minister knows, but the direction of travel when that Act of Parliament was passed is very different from the one that we confront today. The whole thrust of the 1993 Act was to open the railways to a series of other operators and providers with common track and infrastructure. The purpose here is to set up a single controlling mind in Great British Railways and, in some ways, puts GBR in the intolerable position of having to decide on the allocation of capacity while being a major operator itself. That is a concern not just for charter and heritage operators but for many others. In our Amendment 225, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, and I have suggested some criteria to try to make the decision-making process of GBR a bit clearer, for the sake of better decision-making and to give some certainty and surety to other operators. For instance, we think it should consider “the period of time a non-GBR operator needs to promote their operation and manage their alterations, … the impact of train cancellations and schedule variations … the commercial interests of non-GBR train operators, … the enhancement of rail travel that non-GBR train operators bring”, and much besides. There is some nervousness among heritage operators, and other operators of all forms, about the lack of certainty set out in the Bill as drafted. That is important for the complex routing and planning decisions that have to take place for these services to occur and for those booking and looking forward to journeys, particularly those centred on important occasions. Many of the companies, although commercial operations, operate on tight margins and are connected to charitable trusts that look after heritage locomotives and rolling stock. Therefore, even minor alterations in decision-making have significant implications for their businesses and their viability. There are no checks and balances written into the Bill. There is an opportunity, as we look at this, for the Committee to decide whether Parliament ought to set these out more clearly in the Bill. As we have touched on in other areas, if we are passing legislation now which lasts as long as the 1993 Act has, while the Minister has a strong reputation for his protection of, championing of and affection for our railway heritage, we want to ensure that the regime that we are bringing about stands the test of time under future Ministers and Governments, too. Heritage operators, like others, believe that the starting point should be a right of access which might then be subject to operational conditions and decisions. This does not just affect those operating charter services on the main line but has implications for those operating on a mixture of preserved and main lines—for instance the North Yorkshire Moors Railway, the North Norfolk Railway, the Swanage Railway and others—and for those which rely on the main line to move locomotives and others around the country for galas and to reach preserved lines in different parts of the country. The current model for heritage and charter operations on the national network generally works well at the moment, but it is dependent on the right people in the right places within Network Rail and in government who want to make it happen and who often move heaven and earth to ensure that it does. The Bill and the access and use policy give an opportunity to ensure that this vital part of our heritage railway landscape and, indeed, other operators which rely on our railways have a firmer and more certain footing in the generations to come. I beg to move.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, I say very briefly that the Committee will be relieved to know that I will not follow the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, with another defence of the heritage railway movement: he has put the case extraordinarily succinctly and clearly. I hope that, judging from the conversations that he and I have had with my noble friend the Minister, we will get reassurances at the end of this debate. I have a speech I want to make on Clause 60 about access agreements, and we will come to that in a moment.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, with the leave of the Chair and the Committee, I hope it will help if I set out some of the Government’s intentions on access at the outset. A few noble Lords have suggested to me that it might be helpful for me to explain some specific points; if the Committee are happy to hear me, I will continue. We are reforming the access regime because the current system is demonstrably broken. There are far too many parties involved, with nobody in overall charge. The ORR takes decisions on access. Network Rail must then produce a timetable that is consistent with the access rights that have been granted by the ORR. Train operators must then run the timetables that Network Rail has produced. This is the system that gave us the notorious 07:00 Manchester Piccadilly to Euston ghost train, which was set to run fully staffed but without any passengers, the disastrous May 2018 timetable failure and years of delay to timetable improvements on the east coast main line, as well as further decades of anaemic growth in rail freight.
The point of these reforms is to bring together all these different decisions into one place—a single directing mind that is Great British Railways. To help the Committee’s debate on these clauses, I will briefly outline a few key components of the new system and how they fit together. First, the access and use policy will set out GBR’s overall approach: how it will make decisions about who gets what access to the network. GBR must have regard to the statutory duties set out in the Bill when it prepares and finalises this policy. The draft policy published by Network Rail for consultation clearly sets out how the statutory duties will be reflected in GBR’s decision-making. I have already heard from industry how positive the engagement has been throughout the draft access and use policy’s development and that Network Rail has genuinely taken on board views and goals. I am also pleased to hear that the access and use policy draft has reassured many with its transparent and robust processes where there are sufficient significant changes, but also with a commitment to keep those parts of the current system that work.
Secondly, the infrastructure capacity plan in Clause 60 will set out GBR’s assessment of the best use of the network: how much capacity on different parts of the network should be allocated to different categories of use, such as GBR passenger services, other public passenger services, including devolved services, private passenger services, including open access, heritage and charter services and freight services. The ICP is crucial because it will provide a coherent overall view of how to make best use of the network, which is conspicuously absent from the current system, and it will guide GBR when it decides on individual access applications from specific operators.
More broadly, the long-term planning work that GBR will do to inform the infrastructure capacity plan will also support long-term improvements. That is because it will enable GBR to understand where to prioritise enhancements, rolling stock and signalling interventions to best achieve its performance, public interest and freight growth objectives. It can reflect this thinking in its business plan, so that for the first time in decades there will be a funded plan based on a whole-system view of the network. GBR must be fair and even-handed when it allocates capacity in the infrastructure capacity plan. Clause 60 is deliberately explicit that GBR must consider the need to accommodate other operators’ passenger services and freight services as well as its own.
The statutory duties in Clause 18 will also apply to GBR in full when it develops and decides on the infrastructure capacity plan. The capacity duty at Clause 63 does not apply at this stage. This is clear from the clause, which sets out the specific limited circumstances in which it does apply. I reiterate that the infrastructure capacity plan is the stage at which GBR will make the key decisions about how much capacity should be allocated to freight, open access and other non-GBR services. At this point, as I said, the duties in Clause 18 apply in full. That means that GBR cannot use the capacity duty as a reason to prioritise its own services in the ICP at the expense of freight or other passenger operators. If GBR did use the capacity duty at Clause 63 in this way, I would expect an appeal to be upheld.
The capacity duty applies later in the process. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, asked why it is necessary to disapply the Clause 18 duties entirely when the capacity duty applies. This ensures that those duties cannot be used by GBR as an excuse not to provide the services for which it has been funded. It is important to disapply all these duties. If the Bill did not do this, GBR might seek to argue that running fewer services than it is funded for would support its duty to improve reliability or its duty to reduce the impact that the provision of its services has on the environment, or its duty to reduce the cost that will need to be met from public funds.
Also on the capacity duty, some noble Lords have questioned whether Clause 63 really makes the link to taxpayer funding that I have outlined. I am happy to explain that this is achieved by Clause 63 referring to GBR passenger services. The definition of that phrase later in the Bill refers to the public service contract between the Secretary of State and GBR. This contract is where the Secretary of State will confirm the services that she requires GBR to operate, using the taxpayer funding that is provided. Clause 63 indeed requires GBR to retain sufficient capacity to operate the service that the taxpayer has funded it for.
I also reassure the noble Lord, Lord Young, about the reference in Clause 63 to services that GBR
“expects will in future be GBR passenger services”.
This language does not allow GBR to retain capacity for services that it has only some vague notion that it might think about operating in future. These words in Clause 63 are carefully chosen. They mean that GBR must have a clear and genuine expectation that the Secretary of State will wish to secure and fund those services through the public service contract in future. For example, assumptions about those services might be contained within an approved business plan.
Finally, I have been asked to clarify whether an aggrieved party can take a competition claim to the Competition and Markets Authority. The CMA and the ORR are both public enforcement authorities of competition law. I can confirm that they may carry out investigations, both in response to complaints from third parties and of their own initiative. They have arrangements in place to decide which of them will consider any particular issue or complaint. Should either of these authorities establish that an infringement has occurred, individuals may seek damages through what is called a follow-on action. As well as having the opportunity to take a complaint to either the CMA or the ORR, it is also open to a complainant to bring private legal proceedings through the courts.
I apologise for having spoken at some length, but I hope that these remarks have been helpful in providing some clarity before we debate the next few groups of amendments in detail. I thank the Committee for its patience.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the meeting that we held last week. He has just informed the Committee about the Government’s intentions on some issues that were the subject of our discussion. It is helpful that he set this out in the way he did; it provides a degree of reassurance. I want to explain the purpose of my Amendment 224. Notwithstanding what the Minister said, it is still a relevant question to ask, but the Minister leads me to think that it might be sensible to refer to my stand part notice on Clause 63 on the capacity duty, at this point, so I do not have to repeat it again in the next group. From my point of view, we understand what Clause 59 is intended to do, as the Minister explained. It is intended to back up the establishment of an access and use policy. We have seen a draft of that from Network Rail, which would be the basis on which GBR would, in due course, set out its access and use policy. I think that I tabled Amendment 224 before we saw that draft, but I had a look at the consultation and it does not do precisely what the 2016 regulations do presently. I will just quote from Regulation 5.1 so that this is on the record: “A railway undertaking must be granted, on equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent conditions, access rights to such railway infrastructure as may be necessary for the purpose of operating all types of rail freight, or international passenger, services”. I think that the Committee will be aware that this is a statutory entitlement to access rights granted under the existing 2016 regulations. This takes us to the interaction between Clause 59, which gives the basis for an access and use policy, and Clauses 60 and 63. Clause 60 sets up the infrastructure capacity plan and, by establishing what is the best use of that infrastructure capacity, resolves the conflicts of interest between the relative users of that whole infrastructure. That process dispenses with the statutory entitlement to access rights, because they are intended to be taken into account in the infrastructure capacity plan under Clause 60. From my point of view, in Amendment 224 I am not setting out to create a statutory entitlement. I hope the Minister understands that that is not the purpose. The purpose is to say that, under Clause 59, when the access and use policy establishes what criteria should be applied by Great British Railways, one thing that should be included is the substantive criteria that it should be equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent. Looking at the consultation draft that we have at the moment from Network Rail, I am not sure that it sets out those criteria in the way we would want. This is a probing amendment, of course. The purpose at this stage is to try to see how that will be delivered in the future. Maybe we will return to it on Report, and perhaps the Minister will be able to give us some reassurance that that will be taken on board in the consultation that is yet to conclude. I will make my point about Clause 63 now to save repeating it on the next group. I was always worried about this, and I approached it and saw it as something that allowed GBR, when thinking about its requirement to provide passenger services or to provide future passenger services, to dispense with the need to accommodate other competing uses of the infrastructure capacity. Interestingly, I was looking at it as a bottle half empty, as it were, and the Government are looking at it as a bottle half full. What they mean by it is that Great British Railways is entering into agreements with the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to provide passenger services, et cetera, and it must fulfil that capacity duty and exercise its decision-making under Clause 60 in order to satisfy those requirements. The point the Minister has just made, to be fair to him, reiterates something in the Explanatory Notes, which make it clear in paragraph 169 that the capacity duty and Clause 63 do not “enable GBR to secure more capacity for its own services than it thinks would equate to best use”. So we should be reassured that it is not a threat to freight. From my point of view, the Minister is reiterating—and I hope reassuring us—what he said about an expectation that the Secretary of State would not support the concept that the capacity duty under Clause 63 should be used for self-preferencing GBR relative to competing uses of the capacity. As he said, the Competition and Markets Authority, or the ORR as a concurrent competition authority, could have a good look at self-preferencing and act against it if it saw it. So that is quite a degree of reassurance. We may return to the question of the extent to which the application of the capacity duty in Clause 63 justifies the disapplication of general duties on such things as the public interest or the effective use of public funds, since there are no circumstances in which those general duties should be disapplied. But, for these purposes, I will not speak again to the Clause 63 stand part notice in the next group. I just wanted to draw attention to the fact that Amendment 224 makes the point that these are important criteria: equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent conditions. They are not reflected in the draft that we have seen now, and they should be carried forward from the 2016 regulations in that way.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
I will follow my noble friend Lord Lansley and refer to Clause 63, which the Minister touched on in his opening remarks. Like my noble friend Lord Lansley, I had a helpful meeting with the Minister and his officials last week, and it allayed my concern to some extent. My noble friend Lord Lansley has revealed one of the tensions behind this Bill. The risk is that the monopoly owner of the infrastructure—namely, GBR—will prefer its own passenger train services to others because of its ownership of the infrastructure. The Minister has sought to reassure us that that abuse cannot take place.
The concern that I had, which in one sense the Minister has addressed, but in another case he has not, was Clause 63(2), which says:
“Great British Railways must exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for … the operation of GBR passenger services and of railway passenger services that it expects will in future be GBR passenger services”.
That is a “must”, and I think that overrides the general duty in Clause 60 that it must ensure that the infrastructure is used to its best potential.
In the meeting that I had with Ministers, officials sought to reassure me by saying that what I have just read out is qualified by a subsequent definition of passenger services in Clause 73, which says that
“‘GBR passenger service’ means a railway passenger service provided by Great British Railways or a subsidiary of Great British Railways … under arrangements made under section 4, or … under a public service contract awarded under section 31”.
That is a much tighter definition than the definition the Minister gave when he spoke, when he said that they could exercise that power in Clause 63 as long as there was a clear and genuine expectation that they would provide the service, or, as I think he also mentioned, if it was an approved business plan. That is, as I read it, looser than what is in Clause 73, where there has to be a contract awarded by GBR before that exemption can be applied. It would therefore be helpful when the Minister speaks again—I think he has his own amendment somewhere in his group—if he could just clarify which of the definitions of passenger services is right: is it the one in Clause 73 or the one he read out at the beginning?
Just as a final word on this, the letter that the Minister sent me on 25 March said that
“we intend that the ORR will remain as competition regulator for the rail sector. This means that any party that feels that GBR is acting in a way that is in breach of competition law may raise concerns with the ORR”.
The trouble with that is the Bill severely constrains the powers of the ORR. If one looks at the briefing we were sent, the executive summary refers to:
“A reduced role for ORR in relation to access and use of the network”.
Perhaps the Minister can confirm that, notwithstanding anything in the Bill, such as the constraints on the ORR that I have just read out, the CMA has a total freedom, unconstrained by anything in the Bill, to challenge a decision made by GBR to award or not to award a franchise to an open access operator if it feels there has been a general breach of competition law, notwithstanding anything that is in the Bill. If the Minister could put that assurance on the record, it would be of enormous help, not just to me but to open access operators.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and rather unusual, in that my noble friend the Minister made a very long and interesting statement. Sadly, we do not have it in writing, but maybe there will be another opportunity to comment on it. However, I would like him to comment on one or two amendments that I have in this group which relate to freight. Amendment 232 would require Great British Railways to publish a statement setting out the criteria it would apply when preparing the timetable, including how the rail freight growth objectives, presumably mentioned in the target under Clause 17, are considered in capacity conflict. That is of serious concern to the rail freight sector generally, and I am sure we will want to pursue it further in due course. Moving on, Amendment 238 follows on from the rejection by Great British Railways of a relevant application for access. It is very important that GBR publish the specific reasons forming the basis of that. Of course, this is something that some operators may wish to challenge through the Office of Rail Regulation or some other means, depending on what is decided when the Bill reaches Royal Assent. Amendment 239 suggests that the infrastructure capacity plan must take into account the needs of the rail freight growth target, which may end up as 50%, 75% or whatever figure we end up with over so many years. It is important that we put as much as we can in the Bill when it comes to the comfort that the rail freight sector will get from knowing that there is a fair means of achieving capacity; that it is not being hoarded by GBR for other purposes; and that there is a proper, simple and quick appeal process.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, first, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay on his ingenuity in managing to get amendments on heritage railways into many groups in the Bill, and in therefore having the opportunity to explain to the Committee how important they are. Again, I wish to use this opportunity briefly to mention the Dean Forest Railway. It is a heritage railway based in the Forest of Dean, which is in my former constituency and is where I currently live. As I have said previously, it runs on its own track but interacts with GBR infrastructure at Lydney. Access to that network is, therefore, important. So, again, I congratulate my noble friend on reminding the Committee of the importance of heritage railways and the importance of fair access to GBR infrastructure. I say at the outset that, as I think the Committee can see, this whole issue of access to infrastructure is one of the biggest concerns people have, given that this group and the following five groups are all about access. We are going to spend the rest of the day here, I think, talking about access in one form or another, including how it is decided and how the processes work; that is very important. I should say at the beginning—to save the Minister pointing this out—that the draft rail reform Bill for which I was responsible when I was the Secretary of State also removed decision-making around access to infrastructure from the ORR and gave it to GBR. So, in principle, I do not have a problem with that. The difficulty I have, which is why I am supportive of the comments made by my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Young, is that the Government have taken the very important decision, which we would not have taken, to change fundamentally the context in which GBR will make these decisions. When we were thinking about it, we wanted to bring together decision-making on track and train—I support that—but we did it in a context where we were envisaging most, if not all, passenger rail services being operated by competing private operators. So, when GBR was making decisions about access to infrastructure, it would have been making decisions between competing private operators, open-access operators and freight operators. It would not have had its own passenger rail services which it would have been tempted to self-preference, as my two noble friends have referenced. The context that we are now in—where, in the next couple of years, most passenger rail services will be operated by GBR or its own companies—clearly sets up at least the temptation for self-preferencing. In the meeting the Minister had with me—I am grateful to him for that meeting and for his remarks at the beginning—and those he had with my two noble friends, he has provided some assurances to some extent about how these powers will operate. However, independent operators—open access operators, freight operators, and indeed those operating international rail services—still have concerns. Obviously, there are decisions being taken at the moment about competing operators through the Channel Tunnel, and those are also decisions that will that fall to GBR. Those operators will hear the Minister’s assurances and, I think, to some extent will be reassured, but it will be important for their boards and investors to have some of this reinforced in statute, to give them confidence. That is where I would support the thrust of my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 224, which would provide that “equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent conditions” are in place, and Amendments 228 and 229, which would reinforce the presumptions in place for open access operators. Again, I ask the Minister, notwithstanding what he has already said, and even if he is not supportive of Amendments 224, 228 and 229, to reflect on whether there are things that can be done in the Bill to strengthen and put into statute some of his assurances. I ask him to reflect on whether he could bring those forward on Report, which would obviate the need for others to do so. Finally, I come back to this point about future capacity, to which my noble friend Lord Young referred. The Bill as drafted says in Part 2, on the capacity duty, that GBR—my noble friend is right— “must exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure.” Then there are two conditions. One is “the carrying out of work necessary to maintain and improve GBR infrastructure”. That sounds perfectly sensible, but it also talks about “the operation of GBR passenger services and of railway passenger services that it expects will in future be GBR passenger services”. The Minister at least provided reassurance that the “expects in future” has to be pretty firm. It cannot just be some vague notion that, at some point in the future, maybe someone might provide some rail services. That was helpful, but I would challenge the presumption of self-preference, giving GBR the ability to reserve capacity for services that, even if it is quite solid that they might turn up in a year or two, it is not currently providing. An open access operator could come along and say, “We have a pretty solid plan to get these services delivered within a reasonably short timeframe. We have our plans to get our rolling stock. Here is our application”. I do not see why GBR should be able to turn that down, even if it may want to provide those services in the near future. If someone is ready to do that now, can operate that on a commercial basis and does not require taxpayer subsidy to do so, that would be a better use of the infrastructure than assuming that GBR was able to do it. Also, not allowing GBR that self-preference would mean that GBR has to get a move on. In other words, if there were services that it wanted to provide, it would have to get a move on in doing its planning, securing its rolling stock and getting on with it because otherwise, somebody else might come along and do it more quickly. Setting up that tension and that competitive process would be sensible, good for passengers, and good for getting rail services delivered more quickly. It would set up a bit of competition. I am therefore not sure that I agree with the ability for GBR to reserve that capacity for future use at all. Notwithstanding that, there are the valid questions that my noble friend asked about the extent to which that future use has to be underpinned by a contract or some clear commitments that the Secretary of State has made about what she intends to do, or whether it can be vaguer than that, notwithstanding that it cannot be at the outer edges of vagueness.
I conclude by saying that I do not agree with the self-preferencing. The Minister should understand that there has been a huge contextual change, from the plan that we envisaged to the plan that he is delivering, because he is nationalising passenger rail services and increasing the temptation for GBR to self-preference its own passenger rail services. That means that open access providers and rail freight providers will need more reassurance in this context than they would have done if GBR were not operating all those passenger services. Notwithstanding his opening remarks, I look forward to hearing how he responds to the questions that he has been asked by colleagues in the Committee.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I come to this debate somewhat late. I had this rather comfortable idea, being somewhat to the extreme left end of the political spectrum, that you were nationalising the railways, taking in hand all the passenger railways as they exist, more or less—there are always technical bits around the edge—and that the objective of the directing mind, which is absolutely the essence of the Bill producing benefit, would be to provide capacity in the optimal way for that block of capability, which, it being nationalised, we own. Then there is a debate about what is left over, and that, in my mind—and I am not saying that this is right—would be relatively small. It would be important that that small group ended up being handled in what I loosely call an equitable way. The problem is that, reading all the bits about what I was thinking was a small group, left me confused. I do not think that even this Committee is a good place to try to thrash this out. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, for bringing this point out quite starkly. I hope that the Minister may think of trying some other forum for the people concerned about this, because what we do not want is to create a situation where some people working in Great British Railways are thinking as I am thinking and some other people are thinking like the noble Lord, Lord Young, so that they end up with internal conflict. This is possibly the most important issue in the Bill and in the future operation. I hope that the Minister might find some way in which we can get together in a more discursive environment to pursue a much clearer view of where the split should be.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments is trying to understand the thinking behind the access and use policy and to understand access for others, such as open access operators, freight operators and the heritage sector, alongside Great British Railways services. The Minister has given some clarity and assurance on that, for which I am grateful. The debate seems to overlap with future groups and the whole afternoon is going to be on access, so some of these points will start to merge. The heritage sector, which we have heard so much about in Committee, must be considered and included as part of the access and use policy. I am sure that the Minister will assure us of this. Amendment 251 requires Great British Railways to consult open access operators on its access and use policy. Surely any proper organisation of that size would consult all key partners as it develops such a policy. I am not therefore sure that that needs to be in the Bill. We are content with the Government’s amendment in this group and look forward to the Minister’s further comments on it.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his innovative leaping-in at the beginning of the group and helping to set the terms of the debate. That was a useful contribution and helped all of us. Perhaps I may say, briefly, in relation to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that it is not a small residue. On current patterns, 25% of train movements on the network after this system is brought into place will not be GBR movements; they will be non-GBR movements. That is not a small residue. It is to protect the interests of those parties, to understand and ensure that they are protected, fundamentally, that we are embarking on this debate. The fact is that all organisations, even those run by the most professional and well-intentioned people, have a tendency to self-prefer. That is not controversial. It is well established in any business book that you look at. But it is implicitly admitted by the Minister, who would not otherwise have spent a considerable amount of the debate this afternoon explaining how he is going to mitigate against that tendency for self-preference. Can we take that as common ground? While my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Young of Cookham explored in detail how those mitigations might work—that was a valuable exposure—it was my noble friend Lord Harper who put his finger on the matter. He asked, “Why are we creating this problem in the first place? We are setting out to create a problem in which there is a reward for self-preference. We don’t have to do it.” My noble friend Lord Harper explained that, when he was in charge of policy formation, the system that he was going to propose did not contain that. You could argue that he was wearing rose-tinted spectacles and that objections could be raised. I am not buying in necessarily to his solution just because it is his, but I am making the point because it shows that there are alternatives that could work better and avoid this enormous problem. I take one example. I will come to my detailed amendments in a moment. Amendment 223 in my name is now defunct because the Government have more or less pre-empted it. There was a conflict in the text between the provisions in the regulations that said that an infrastructure manager could not make a decision about access. The thrust of the Bill is that an infrastructure manager will make a decision about access. My amendment was exploring that but only then did I spot that in the Commons the Government had got ahead of me and had eliminated this prohibition in the pre-existing regulations where an infrastructure manager could not make those decisions, thus actively removing a conflict in the text by creating a conflict of interest. They were building conflicts of interest into the Bill quite deliberately. It is staggering that this is going ahead and being allowed. The Minister says that these things must be internal; it must all be under one directing mind. That is an assertion of faith. There is no evidence that it must all be under one directing mind. My noble friend Lord Harper has given his alternative view, and I could give another. It is perfectly possible—this is the thrust of my clause stand part notices—to say that those access decisions are taken outside the structure by an independent decision-maker; it does not have to be a regulator, as such. The ORR is making those decisions already. They are to be moved inside. Why? Only for the purpose of creating conflicts of interest, which will almost certainly work themselves out badly, and the protections are almost entirely internal. The Minister refers to appeals to the Competition and Markets Authority. That is a fine body. It comes to mind that, for many years, it produced reports saying that competition in the supermarket sector was robust and did not need to be challenged by the regulator. Then Aldi and Lidl came along, and we found out just how robust the competition was in the supermarket sector, as it collapsed in every direction when new efficiencies were introduced by new competitors. Last week I asked a Question in the Chamber about the huge premium—20p a litre—being charged on fuel in motorway service stations. The Minister admitted that the Competition and Markets Authority had found that there was weak competition in that sector. We have known for years that there has been weak competition. What has been done about it? If you represent a heritage railway, let us say the Dean Forest Railway, and you cannot get access to the Great British Railways network that you need for the services and activities that you are undertaking in the next six months or so, there is absolutely no point in going to the Competition and Markets Authority to talk about it; that is the wrong address to go to. As for the ORR, we know that the Bill deliberately confines the basis of its appeals to procedural matters that are akin to judicial review proceedings. The Minister today sent a letter of several pages, which I have seen, to my noble friend Lord Lansley, following a meeting they had. All it did was to describe how judicial review works; there was nothing more in it than that. Everything in it we know already; nothing is being added to this at all. It is deliberately setting out to create conflicts of interests. I will not, therefore, spend much more time on my amendments. My stand part notices for Clauses 59 and 69 would, in effect, keep the decisions on access with the ORR, which has a track record in doing it. Let us also bear in mind that, after all, Network Rail, DFTO and the various components that will go together to make Great British Railways do not have any expertise in doing this at the moment. The expertise, such as it is, is with the ORR. This all has to be built from scratch. They have no experience of doing this, but it is all being transferred to them and taken away from the people who might know what they were doing. I have referred to Amendment 223. Amendments 227 and 251 are much more minor. Amendment 227 would require the access and use statement, which we will not see in its final form until the spring, to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Amendment 251 would require formal consultation on the access and use policy with the open access operators and others. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, does not see the need to have that in the Bill, but it is quite common to have consultation requirements in Bills and in such processes as planning processes and so forth. They are statutory consultation requirements. They become statutory because they are referred to in a Bill; it is very common. I would go further and remind noble Lords that there are powers in the Bill to revise and replace this document, and open access operators should be statutory consultees when revisions arise—not simply on the first iteration of the document. This should apply to freight and heritage railways and other users of the infrastructure, too.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Before the Minister responds, I listened with interest to my noble friends Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Harper and want to put a question to the Minister. When the capacity duty is being exercised by GBR, and in particular when it is looking at what its future requirements for passenger services look like and what capacity it will require, I understand that the Minister intends it to do so by reference to the passenger services designated under Section 31 and subject to the award of a public service contract from the Secretary of State. That is how Section 31 works. I do not remember when we considered Section 31 how specific about future GBR passenger services the designation by the Secretary of State will be. If it is not very specific, GBR will be free under the capacity duty to think rather expansive thoughts about its future passenger services, which technically would not fit under the definition in Clause 73 that my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham was referring to because they are not designated under Section 31. There is a bit of tension there and I would be interested to see, if not now then at a later stage, how the Minister sees that particular question being resolved.
Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)
My Lords, once again I remind noble Lords that under section 4.29 of the Companion there can be brief questions for clarification, not speeches; and I ask noble Lords seeking to intervene to keep their remarks concise.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, that was not an intervention; it was a speech. We are in Committee and I am allowed to make more than one speech.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Committee for listening to my earlier speech, and noble Lords will be relieved to know that I have deleted quite a lot of the remarks I would otherwise have made, because I have said them already. The only thing I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is simply that the present system does not work. I will not repeat the examples that I have used, but nobody is currently in charge of allocating proper use of some extraordinarily expensive infrastructure on the railway and that is what we are seeking to deal with. Looking at Amendments 222, 224, 225, 228 and 229, I again place on the record that the Government fully recognise the value of open access, international, freight, heritage and charter rail operators, and Clause 59(2)(a) requires GBR to set out the process by which third-party operators, including all the ones I have just mentioned, can apply for and obtain access to the network. The draft AUP published for consultation last month provides further detail. I have discussed it individually with some noble Lords and encourage all noble Lords to review it and engage with the consultation. Fairness and non-discrimination are at the heart of this process. GBR will be subject to public law principles and competition law, with the ORR continuing to provide independent oversight and enforcement. GBR will be bound by the duties in Clause 18, including duties to promote freight and promote the interests of passengers, and it must have regard to the rail freight growth target set by the Secretary of State under Clause 17. As a result, GBR must consider the interests of all network users when determining the best use of the network and cannot simply favour its own services. On heritage rail specifically, I again reassure the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, that the future access framework is intended to build on, rather than replace, many of the mechanisms familiar to heritage and charter operators today. I will not repeat some of the statistics I have previously used about the relative success of the present system for them, even though, as he says, it is not really provided for in any of the existing arrangements. I was delighted to speak with the noble Lord yesterday, together with my noble friend Lord Faulkner, about how to ensure that heritage and charter operators can obtain the confidence they need through a specific response to the access and use policy. If either or both of the noble Lords choose to respond to the access and use policy in the terms we discussed yesterday, I would be delighted to write and support that. There is a significant overlap between some of the duties set out in Amendment 226 and the duties that the Bill already applies to GBR under Clause 18. The Bill already requires GBR to consider passengers, disabled passengers, freight certainty for businesses, social and economic factors, the environment and cost when carrying out all its access activities. I therefore do not think that a separate duplicative set of duties for access is useful. On Amendment 224 from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, sections 2.22 and 2.23 of the access and use policy are clear that GBR must allocate capacity in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory way. I hope that is helpful. The noble Lord, Lord Young, raised two points, one of which was about the powers of the CMA. This Bill does not affect the CMA’s powers at all—it retains the power to intervene. The ORR’s powers in this respect are not altered by the Bill; only its actual role on access is. The noble Lord, Lord Young, made some points about Clause 63 and “must”, which the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Lansley, also raised. It is worth saying that GBR cannot reserve capacity for future use in a way that contradicts its infrastructure capacity plan, which will already have considered the extent to which an open access operator could provide services that better use the infrastructure. Clause 63 is, in our view, not for self-preferencing. It is designed to ensure that funded services are delivered. But I will reflect further on the points that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made, because I would like to read what he said very carefully in Hansard . I want to be clear about my response to it, rather than speaking now, so that we have the definition and clarity that we seek.
Lord Harper (Con)
On that point, as the Minister has concluded that little section, I am grateful that he said that he is prepared to reflect on this. But the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, was very helpful—I am not sure he realises how helpful it was. He made two points. One was on assumptions about the capacity on the network used by non-GBR players, which my noble friend Lord Moylan set out clearly. The assumption of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, at the beginning was that the point of the allocation would have been to preference the services that are being nationalised and that GBR is operating. The noble Lord is an experienced railwayman and person who has operated in this sector, and it is exactly that assumption that open access operators and freight operators are so worried about, because they think that that is exactly what will happen. By putting those principles in statute, my noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment would be a better guarantee than just having it in the access and use policy. Perhaps, when the Minister is reflecting, he could consider that point as well.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My answer to the noble Lord is that, in my view, the construction of this Bill precisely recognises the current use of the railway. The distinction between Clauses 60 and 63, and the clarity that I am seeking to bring to the limited circumstances of Clause 63, are designed to show that, given the number of users of the railway, and the precious nature and cost of the infrastructure, there is a job to do to use it in the best way. This is separate from the job that Clause 63 seeks to do, which is to make sure that GBR operates what the Secretary of State pays it to operate. We have never intended Clause 63 to say anything other than that. This is worth saying, because there might be future circumstances in which GBR prefers, financially, not to operate literally all the services that the Secretary of State is paying it to operate—but it has to. That is my point. However, I echo the point that I made earlier, which is that I would like to reflect on this debate after we have had it, because I want to make sure that the Bill that we bring to the next stages is as clear as it can be about what we are doing here. I hope that noble Lords have noticed that, in particular, we recognise the current users of the railway, whoever they are, and that we are seeking to make sure that they have as much clarity for the future as possible, because they provide some important services themselves. With Amendments 223 and 227, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is basically seeking to reinstate the present access and management regulations. He will not be surprised to learn that it is the existence of the current regulations, which prevent the integration of train and track and the best use of the infrastructure, that we are seeking to change. The three-month parliamentary laying-in period in Amendment 227 would create a significant operational and financial risk to the railway. Unnecessary delays will not be welcomed by either freight or open access operators, both of which rely on timely access decisions. It is important to recognise the nature of the access and use policy: it is a technical industry document designed to provide a fair and transparent process through which operators can apply for access. It sets out matters such as timescales, the information that applicants must provide and the way in which GBR will assess applications in line with its statutory responsibilities. It is therefore completely right that it is an industry-led and expert-led document, rather than one that requires ministerial or parliamentary scrutiny. I urge the noble Lord not to press those amendments. I turn to Amendments 251 and 251A. We have already seen that the consultation on the draft access and use policy has been developed closely with, and welcomed by, the industry. I draw noble Lords’ attention to paragraph 1.3 of the document, which provides a list of parties that GBR will consult before making changes to the AUP. This explicitly includes parties that hold track access contracts and those that are registered with GBR as prospective applicants. That is to ensure that existing and prospective open access freight and heritage operators are all able to feed in their views. Clause 66 requires consultation in relation not only to the AUP but to the preparation and revision of the working timetable under Clause 61. That ensures a transparent and consultative process, without requiring long lists of names. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and my noble friend Lord Berkeley that they do not need to press their amendments. I turn to Amendment 252 in my name. As I mentioned, Network Rail has now launched the access and use policy consultation, working in close collaboration with the railway industry and devolved Governments, ahead of the establishment of GBR. As I said, this has been welcomed by people across the sector who are keen to see this as soon as possible. The Government’s intention has always been that GBR, once established, should be able to rely upon Network Rail’s consultation on the AUP. To support that objective, we sought to include a provision in the Bill. However, following further legal analysis, it has become clear that a small but important technical correction is required to enable GBR to treat the consultation undertaken by Network Rail as having been carried out by GBR. This amendment gives effect to that original policy intention. Without it, there would be practical implications for the industry, including the need to participate in a wasteful repeat of the consultation process. It would also prolong uncertainty for operators. Given that this is simply a technical change to correct a mistake in the drafting, I hope the Committee will agree with this amendment today. Finally, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, the regulation of international services through the Channel Tunnel is not affected by this legislation. My noble friend Lord Berkeley spoke to various amendments, but he will find that they are all in the next group and I will respond to them then. Of course, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe for his view, and I am more than happy to discuss this further, having reflected on the discussion that we have had today on this group and that we will have on other groups.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for both the remarks he has just made and his earlier ones; hearing from him twice on this group of amendments, which relates to access and use, has been helpful to the Committee’s deliberations. The heritage rail operators are fully aware that they are part of the 25% of movements that will, as my noble friend Lord Moylan said, remain after the creation of GBR. As I said in my opening remarks, many of the issues facing them affect many other operators. I am grateful to the Minister for the time that he made available to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, and me yesterday. We will certainly respond to the consultation on the access and use policy, and we will continue our discussions with him. I hope that we can do so in concert, as he said; that would be very welcome. On the specific issues facing heritage railways, as in our Amendments 222 and 225, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 222.
Amendment 222 withdrawn.
Amendments 223 to 227 not moved.
Clause 59 agreed.
Amendments 228 and 229 not moved.
Clause 60: Infrastructure capacity plan
Amendment 230
Moved by
230: Clause 60, page 34, line 32, at end insert “including heritage rail services,” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would require Great British Railways to have regard to the need to accommodate heritage railway services in its infrastructure capacity plan.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I do not want to try the patience of the Committee with what my noble friend Lord Harper described earlier as my ingenuity and my finding lots of ways to mention heritage rail. Again, the issues that I and the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, are raising in our Amendment 230 are not specific to heritage railways; they affect all the other operators that will operate in the new landscape. In our debate on the previous group, I listened with particular interest to the contributions from my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Young of Cookham on Clause 63 and the duty on Great British Railways, whereby it must “exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for … the operation of” its own services and “services that it expects will in future be” its own services. Our amendment relates to the need to accommodate other services in the infrastructure capacity plan that Great British Railways will look at. Capacity is already tightly constrained. In the case of heritage charter operators, as has been mentioned previously, constraints affect the popular paths from the North Yorkshire moors to Whitby, while constraints on platform capacity affect the Polar Express at Euston, for instance. There is nervousness that, as capacity remains constrained, other operators—not just heritage railway operators—will be easy to squeeze, particularly in the light of the duties in Clause 63 and elsewhere on GBR. More broadly, the Bill, the access and use policy and the remarks that we have had so far are all about managing existing capacity and identifying how it should be used rather than envisaging any additions. The story of our railways has been one of growth and innovation. It might be helpful to hear from the Minister about how he sees additional capacity, new routes and new uses featuring in the new landscape. I mentioned previously in Committee the way in which infrastructure decisions can affect the operation of other services. I mentioned before that we saw in the 1980s and 1990s, in the days of British Rail, a contraction of some of the infrastructure, including passing loops and stabling sidings, which were important to charter services. There were even instances where disagreements about cost attributions between different business sectors of British Rail ended up with routes being abandoned. That underlines the important connection between decisions over infrastructure and the viability of different operators. I look forward to the debate on this group and beg to move my amendment.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 233 in this group is not about heritage railways, but I strongly support the efforts that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, has made in raising that issue on several occasions—ingeniously, when it comes to procedure. My amendment is about a completely different subject: timetables and the provision of information to the public about what trains are actually going to run and when. It is extraordinary that we have reached a point when most or many operating companies simply do not publish or produce timetables. We are therefore dependent on information obtained from station staff or the use of apps and websites on a telephone or iPad, which is often very impractical. Many people find it a difficult method to use to get information about what trains are available, and people find it particularly difficult if they are rushing around. Perhaps they are on a shopping trip to Edinburgh, it is raining and there is a crowd in the street, and the only way to find out when the next train will be is to open their phone and find the appropriate site and garner the information from that. It results in a situation that I shall come to in a moment. In the meantime, I want to say that LNER on the east coast main line has actually produced a timetable. Noble Lords might cheer at that point until they discover that it expired on 16 May 2026 and has not been replaced. Furthermore, if you looked at it in more detail, you would discover that it did not contain any trains of any operators other than LNER, even though, when LNER reduced the service from stations such as Berwick and Durham, it said that it was not a problem because people would be able to use connecting services and pick up its trains further down the line. Those connecting services are wholly absent from the timetable. Station staff at stations such as Berwick get frequent requests from people saying, “I’m going to Edinburgh for the day—what time can I come home? What trains are there? I am not sure what time I’ll finish my business or my shopping trip in Edinburgh”. So what do the staff do? They produce a timetable on their own initiative—I have it in my hands; it is a strip of paper about six inches long and an inch wide. It tells you every train from Edinburgh from all the different operators, but it is a desperate measure produced by a staff who are not provided with the tools to keep rail users properly informed. That applies particularly on lines where services do not follow a regular clock face patten, as is the case for most stations on the LNER main line. I have discussed this with the Minister. We had a lengthy meeting some time ago, and I think that he agrees with me that it is ludicrous to have timetables that include only one operator’s trains when the journey may well depend on two operators’ trains. These things are thought to be about to disappear by magic—once GBR is in place, all these conflicts and difficulties will evaporate, we are told—but I am afraid that they will not unless some provision is made and the public is informed about when trains go. My amendment is a bells and whistles, Rolls-Royce version of a timetable. My case is not that we have to go back to the mammoth timetable volume—of which I am sure the Minister always had a copy, long before he was in his present post—which gave you every train on every line in the country. I found that useful, but it is not what most people are after—most people would want a more local timetable—but they have no timetable at all, neither in a form that they can carry away nor in the form of a poster in a station, listing the train times. Very often, when you are in a station, you do not just want to see the electronic display of the trains in the next hour; you want to see what trains are available later in the day. If you are making a journey, you do not necessarily want simply to get onto a website and find out which train to get if your plan is to leave at 9 o’clock. You might want to look at the timetable and consider whether it is feasible to stop off at York for a couple of hours and make a visit out of your day. All these sorts of things that people did with the aid of local and regional timetables are not provided for. The purposes of my amendment could be satisfied in a more limited form, but modern technology should enable GBR, which will have to produce a working timetable anyway, to make available a proper timetable to meet the needs of its customers. Its absence is a handicap to encouraging rail use.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak relatively briefly to this group since we covered some of these issues in the previous group. I reiterate my congratulations to my noble friend Lord Parkinson, but I will not repeat my praise for Dean Forest Railway apart from just mentioning it. I want to reference two amendments in this group. Amendment 231 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moylan I think would be very valuable. It proposes that when producing the infrastructure capacity plan GBR would have to consult people. The current drafting of the clause says that GBR must issue the document, “setting out how, in its view, the best use can be made of GBR infrastructure” It says: “When preparing, revising or replacing the document … Great British Railways must have regard to the need to accommodate ... GBR passenger services, … other railway passenger services, … services for the carriage of goods by railway, and … the maintenance and improvement of GBR infrastructure”. I note that it always lists GBR passenger services first. Again, this may not mean anything legally but, mentally, it rather suggests that that is the order in which it is going to prioritise railway services because that is the order in which it is listed. When doing lists, people tend to put the important things at the top. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said, it will make people think that that is how GBR will allocate it. At the moment, the clause refers to producing a document with GBR’s views. It does not say that it has to consult anybody. My noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment proposes that it would have to, “consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services”, a reference that I think would be very valuable and welcome to those operators. It would mean that when producing the infrastructure capacity plan, GBR would have to talk to them and listen to them seriously. I also wish to touch briefly on Amendment 234, again from my noble friend Lord Moylan. It would replace part of Clause 63 and would deal at least partially with the issue that I raised when we were discussing Clause 63 in the previous group. It would remove GBR’s ability to preference its own services and refers equally to freight, open access operators and GBR’s services. It would stop GBR being able to reserve capacity for the future, which I think would be welcome. I am not wedded to the form of words tabled by my noble friend. If, when the Minister does his reflection that he referred to on the previous group, he would like to come back with something different, that would be fine. This is a helpful starter for 10, as it were, for dealing with some concerns raised by my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Young of Cookham and me about Clause 63 in the previous group. When the Minister reflects on this group and this issue, I hope that he will look at the amendments tabled by my noble friend with an open mind.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, the reference to timetables by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is one with which I have the most enormous sympathy. When my brother died, he left me an extraordinary collection of Bradshaws, not the noble Lord’s noble friend in the Liberal Democrat Party but the founder of an institution that lasted until 1960. There have been various attempts since to produce all-line timetables and, indeed, it is possible to find one produced by Network Rail online, but it is not the same as the bound book, which, as he said, contained every train running on every day—well, in theory running on every day. One of the difficulties about using it was that the reality of the timetable sometimes was not matched by the reality of the railway.
That takes me to the main point I want to make, which is that the one argument that is coming through from this debate, and in the debate on the previous group, is the utterly important role of Great British Railways as the directing mind. In his opening statement my noble friend referred to the infamous 0700 from Manchester to Euston, which, for a few days only, happily, ran without passengers entirely for the benefit of Network Rail and not for the benefit of any of the customers of the railway. That reminded me of some of the scurrilous things that used to be said when I was working for the British Railways Board in the 1970s and 1980s about how much easier it would be to run a railway without any passengers on it—life imitating art, in the case of the 0700 from Manchester. However, my noble friend, who I know does not often get the credit for this, intervened and banged heads together, making it possible for the service to run in the timetable, with real people being carried on it.
All the decisions that we are talking about—access for heritage railways, freight and other operators—depend on there being a proper directing mind that can determine allocations for the network and make the best use of it. It is not a question of giving preference to its services first. GBR is, after all, a great public asset that is going to be receiving very substantial amounts of public money, and it would be mad for the Government to run the risk of that revenue being lost because some of it was being siphoned away by other operators. I am afraid that that sometimes includes open access operators, whose role I warmly welcome, not least because they have encouraged more people to travel by train than otherwise would be the case. However, it must not be at the expense of the core railway, and it is the core railway that I look to GBR to provide and manage and, I hope, bring the various factions together.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee very long, but I apologise for speaking to Amendments 232, 238 and 239 relating to freight. I trust that my noble friend will be able to respond positively to the issues I have raised and the questions which I have asked.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 236 in this group requires Great British Railways to retain sufficient capacity over Great British Railways infrastructure not only to operate passenger rail services, which is important, and to carry out works to maintain and improve the infrastructure but to meet its freight target as set out in Clause 17. I have to say that reading the legislation it feels like an obvious gap given that freight has featured so heavily in our debates in Committee and there is an ambition to grow freight, yet it is not set out explicitly in Clause 63. I hope the Minister will respond positively to that amendment. My noble friend Lord Beith has set out his desire to see a proper timetable available easily for all passengers, and even brought props with him, which I have not seen for some time on the railway. He is right: the accuracy of timetables is critical for people to have confidence in using the railways. With technology now, certainly some years ago on one of the train operators’ websites, you used to be able to design your own bespoke timetable between which station you lived at and where you wanted to go—maybe your regular commute—and you could print it off so it just had those stations and all the times. I am sure that that is still possible with technology now, and Great British Railways may want to consider it as part of its online offer. I look forward to the Minister’s response to this group of amendments.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I can afford to be fairly brief, because my noble friends have already spoken to most of my amendments in this group. Amendment 231 requires consultation with the freight industry on the infrastructure capacity plan. I do not need to elaborate further on that. Amendments 234 and 237 had been given a new twist in the previous group by the Minister, who redefined what the reference to a GBR passenger service means. That will require some reflection; no doubt we will return to this on Report, but there is little point belabouring it now since I think I know what the Minister will say, because he has already said it. Amendment 235, which is also in my name, is linked to Amendment 124, which we have already debated. It seeks to tie Great British Railways, when allocating capacity, to an obligation to meet its key performance indicators. But the Minister does not want key performance indicators so that is now a nullity. That is all I have to say. I want to comment on the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester. I think everyone agrees—and the Minister has made a good case for it—that the allocation of capacity should be centralised and made by people who know what they are doing, in the interests of optimising the use of an expensive piece of infrastructure. However, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has not answered the challenge—and maybe he feels that he does not have to answer challenges from this side—on why that needs to be inside an organisation that is providing passenger rail services. That is the nub of the evils the Bill creates, with its multiple conflicts of interest, and that will not go away. If the noble Lord wants to persuade this side of the Committee to support his view, he needs to go on and address that, but perhaps on another occasion. I do not mean that rudely or to be challenging in any sense; I am just trying to explain why we are not satisfied with that answer. Before I sit down, the noble Lord may wish to say something.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
I just want briefly to ask the noble Lord if he accepts that the present division between the train operators and Network Rail is far more damaging to the way our railways are run than having a single entity or directing mind, which Great British Railways would be.
Lord Moylan (Con)
This takes us all the way back to 2024, when I spoke on the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill. As I have said, the present arrangement involving franchise services has flaws. In my view, those flaws were systematic and built in from the beginning, but they did not become apparent because the growth in passenger numbers and the revenue generated masked them, to some extent. They were becoming apparent in the years leading up to the Covid pandemic, and they were thoroughly exposed and shattered by the effects of the pandemic. I have not said a word in your Lordships’ House or in this Committee to suggest that the existing system should be preserved. That is a petard—if that is the correct expression—on which I am not going to be hoist, and that is how I meet the noble Lord’s challenge. However, as my noble friend Lord Harper, Mr Keith Williams and others have said, there are alternative methods to eliminating the evils of that system that would not create the vast internal conflicts of interest that will be created by the measure proposed by the Government. Those conflicts of interest are unnecessary because of this slightly different model, which is the reason why the noble Lord’s comments—although they were welcome and made in good faith; I do not challenge that—are not sufficient to satisfy this side of the Committee. That is all that I meant.
Lord Harper (Con)
Just before my noble friend sits down, may I add to the point he has made? The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, as did the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, illustrated one of the points when he talked about what is called abstraction of revenue from other operators against the GBR services. If I may say so—and it is not meant as an insult—that is very much the Treasury’s view. My worry, and the worry of the other operators, is that that is exactly what will happen. The Treasury’s view is that anybody that operates rail services that compete with the GBR ones is basically stealing its money; that will inevitably shape the decisions that are taken. That is the concern people have, and that is the conflict that I think my noble friend refers to that needs to be dealt with.
Lord Moylan (Con)
It is one of many.
Lord Harper (Con)
It will be exacerbated once all the passenger rail services that were under private operators are owned and operated by GBR. That conflict becomes worse, not better.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Faulkner for supporting the premise that we need a directing mind for the railway. I hope I will not prolong the previous discussion but will say only this: only GBR, as the principal operator, has the expertise to decide how best to use the infrastructure and transfer that into a plan for its better enhancement. We have not had that for 30 years, which has resulted in parts of the railway being far too full—and being unable to support any further trains, whoever operates them—and a sizeable amount of money going to schemes that are perfectly welcome but are a suboptimal use of funding. I will try not to repeat the opening statement I made, which the Committee was patient enough to listen to, other than to say that this is, again, about the infrastructure capacity plan and Clause 60. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggested that the list set out in Clause 60 might somehow be in some particular order. All I would say is that you cannot refer to other operators until you have referred to the principal operator of passenger services, so there is some logic in it, but we will also clarify in the Explanatory Notes that the list is not in any preference order. I am as keen as other people to show that this process is designed to be fair and open. I also think, for what it is worth, that, were the years of expertise in the ORR to have been shown to be useful, they were certainly seriously damaged by the 0700 Manchester Piccadilly to Euston experience. The regulator was definitive that it was not capable of being run, despite the fact that its operator and the infrastructure owner said it should be. It is running today, and it runs perfectly satisfactorily. From time to time, I look to see whether it runs to time, and it does, because it would have run anyway. That is the sort of thing we are trying to stop here. I will be brief on Amendment 230 from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. He has made his case well. For the avoidance of doubt and for the record, I think the reference in Clause 60 to other railway passenger services refers to all non-GBR services that carry passengers, including those of charter and heritage services and those on the main line, to the degree that they are on the main line. Because he referred to it and because I know there is a particular worry in that direction, I say to him that I am determined that operators who have regular train paths be dealt with in the same way in Clause 60 as others. They are operating them because they provide a public service and a purpose, and to some extent they provide income to heritage railways, and I am absolutely determined that they should continue, which is why it is referred to in that way. But, as I said, there is something more to be said about all that in the AUP. The clearer his letter is, the more delighted I will be to support it.
On Amendment 231, where GBR issues, amends or replaces a plan, Clause 66(2)(a) already requires it to consult
“such persons as it considers appropriate”
and, as I said in a previous group, the AUP makes clear that GBR will consult parties which hold track access contracts and parties that have registered with GBR as prospective applicants. It is also important to note that were GBR to alter a capacity plan without undertaking the required consultation, it would be acting in breach of its statutory obligations under the Bill. Such a failure would provide affected parties with strong grounds to appeal to the ORR.
I turn to Amendments 232 and 233. The Bill is clear about the basis on which GBR will prepare the working timetable. As with the ICP, GBR must comply with its statutory duties, including having regard to the freight growth target in Clause 17, when developing and producing the working timetable and will need to take account of the ICP as a whole too. The access and use policy, as noble Lords have already heard, establishes a transparent framework for resolving competing demands for timetable paths. It therefore provides the clarity that my noble friend Lord Berkeley seeks in Amendment 232. In addition, the access and use policy confirms that these timetabling decisions will continue to be subject to a contractual dispute resolution mechanism, as they are today, providing a route to resolve these detailed disputes before resorting to an appeal process. Taken together, these provisions provide clear and robust safeguards for timetable decisions.
On Amendment 233, the provisions in the Bill are principally concerned with the development of the working timetable for the railway industry. They provide the foundation on which passenger timetable information will be produced and made available. Following a productive meeting with the noble Lord, I committed to undertaking some further research on the availability of route-based national timetables for passengers. I am pleased to confirm that the national rail timetable is available electronically via Network Rail’s website and I expect the accessible provision of information that enables passengers to plan their journeys to continue under GBR. That timetable includes route-by-route timetables and services provided by all passenger operators, which I think is what the noble Lord wants to see.
However, having had significant difficulty in finding its myself on the website, I will raise with Network Rail how we can signpost passengers more easily to access the information more effectively. I completely agree with the noble Lord that prospective passengers would like to see all the passenger services provided by every operator from one station to another and it ought to be more easily available than it is. I would say to the noble Lord that I keep only one old train timetable at home. I got rid of all the old British Rail timetables because they were like doorstops and the only one I keep is the last Great Western timetable from December 1947. I delight in the fact that Great Western Railway decided on all the timetabling changes on its railway because it was in charge of it. That is the right way to do it.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
Is the Minister aware that the Cotswold Line Promotion Group, of which I have the honour to be president, at its own expense produces a timetable for the route between Paddington, Oxford, Worcester and Hereford? It is produced in co-operation with Great Western Railway, the present operator, and we hope it will be with the new operator. The timetable is distributed to members with a magazine and made freely available at stations. There is no charge and it costs about £500 a year.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I am delighted to hear it. One of the things we need for the future is for as many people as possible to understand the totality of passenger train services on the network, whoever operates them, in order to sustain the maximum number of passengers in order to justify a very expensive set of infrastructure.
Lord Beith (LD)
Before the Minister leaves the subject, I am glad that he is still working on those things that are supposed to be available but are very difficult to find. Does he recognise that, in addition to what can be made available online, it is beneficial, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has just illustrated, if alternative means can be used to make timetables available which people can carry around with them and compare with others. They provide a useful aid for discovering when trains are available. There should be some encouragement and if GBR does not produce them itself, it should surely encourage the kind of enterprise that the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has described.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
The noble Lord hits on a very useful topic. We are trying to—and will—remove the massive inconsistency in information between different train operators on the network. I sympathise very much with his view. If you tried to collect published information from all the train operators in Britain, it would come in a variety of sizes, booklets and pieces of paper. As the noble Lord remarked, some of it is not available. We must rationalise this information so that it is comprehensive, people know where to find it and, whether you are looking for information on a journey from Penzance or Berwick-upon-Tweed, it comes in a format that you can understand. I totally sympathise with the noble Lord and say that one of the reasons why we are setting up GBR is the unsatisfactory inconsistency between operators. I turn to Amendments 234 to 239 and the Clause 63 stand part notice. I hope that I have already made the case that the purpose of Clause 63 is straightforward. I do not feel that it is the best use of the Committee’s time for me to reiterate yet again that it does not in any way undermine the requirement in Clause 60 to determine the best use of the network. I will leave it at that, other than to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, that when GBR is deciding on the best use of the network under its infrastructure capacity plan at Clause 60, it will have to take into account its statutory duties at Clauses 16 to 18. That will include its duty to promote freight and have regard to the freight growth target. Indeed, if it does not do that, we will not satisfy the freight growth target and, clearly, Clause 60 would not be working in the way that was intended. Freight operators would be the first to complain and appeal about that. Having prepared that plan, GBR cannot simply ignore it. The infrastructure capacity plan informs the contract between the Secretary of State and GBR and, once agreed, that contract in turn determines the passenger services for which capacity must be retained under Clause 63.
Lord Moylan (Con)
Will the Minister acknowledge that “have regard to” is the lowest form of legal obligation that can be imposed on a public body? Those of us with local government experience have come across language such as, “in general conformity with”, which is higher; “in conformity”, which is even higher; and “comply with”, which is higher still. As the Minister himself explained, “have regard to” simply means that you have to look at something in the right way for the right amount of time and show that you have thought about it. It is not very convincing to those who are concerned about it, including the noble Baroness, the wider freight industry and other users of the network.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
The consideration given to freight and indeed other sorts of services on the network will differ in accordance with time and location. GBR has a pretty serious job to do, but the reason why the freight growth target is enshrined in this legislation more than once is to emphasise the need to grow freight. The provisions of Clause 60 are sufficient to make sure that GBR, when it needs to, will make that provision, because it will not need to make the same provision everywhere. Indeed, the freight operators will know that there are parts of the network that they do not and will never serve, and there are other parts where capacity is sorely needed but is not currently available. I finish by saying that transparency, which my noble friend Lord Berkeley raised, is baked into this process. The access and use policy on page 14 commits GBR to publishing its decisions with a clear rationale explaining why the decision was reached and how it reflects GBR’s statutory duties and decision-making criteria. That is a further reason to be reassured about the freight growth target, because those who are seeking to operate either the existing or future volumes of freight will be looking very carefully to make sure that GBR prioritises freight growth where it needs to in order to expand that market.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, again, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses, in particular, his helpful clarification that the reference at Clause 60(4)(b) to “other railway passenger services” includes heritage charter operators. I associate myself with my noble friend Lord Moylan’s remark that “have regard to” is not a binding guarantee, but it is helpful to know that that reference brings those operators in. So, although I look forward to the further debates that we will have on this area, I am happy to withdraw my Amendment 230.
Amendment 230 withdrawn.
Amendment 231 not moved.
Clause 60 agreed.
Clause 61: The working timetable
Amendment 232 not moved.
Clause 61 agreed.
Clause 62 agreed.
Amendment 233 not moved.
Clause 63: Capacity duty
Amendments 234 to 239 not moved.
Clause 63 agreed.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I should advise the Committee that, if the next amendment is agreed, I will not be able to call Amendment 241. Clause 64: Charging scheme Amendment 240
Moved by
240: Clause 64, page 36, line 31, leave out paragraph (b) Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains which are planned to use GBR infrastructure but do not operate, or do not operate in full.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, we are trespassing into what might be slight newer ground, having so far been discussing broadly similar subjects in relation to access. Some of these amendments might appear a little trivial—or, at least, technical—but they are of importance to the freight industry, in particular, and to other users of the network. My Amendment 240 relates to charging, particularly charging for the non-use, so to speak, of booked slots. There is already provision for a reservation charge under the existing 2016 regulations. This amendment would eliminate that, but its purpose is purely a probing one: to establish what the Government’s plans are because there is considerable uncertainty, not least in the freight sector, for freight operators. Their services are often driven by customer demand and cannot always be predicted with the same certainty as passenger services, so a charge for non-use clearly has a commercial effect on them. The question is: what do the Government intend to do over and above existing practice? When the Government are a player and have a financial interest, again, it is one of those conflicts of interest that is being baked into the system, which does not exist at the moment; they need to explain themselves, tie themselves down, give some account and be under some sort of supervision, in my view. Amendment 241 has a slightly converse effect. It prevents non-operation charges applying where the train could not operate because of a GBR infrastructure failure, or because GBR took the capacity for engineering or other network activities and work. What it does is prevent GBR making a cancellation charge for trains that do not operate for that reason. Again, this is a probing amendment seeking clarity, which might lead to a substantive amendment on Report when we get there.
I come to Amendments 243 and 246, which address a very worrying clause. The Bill obliges GBR to create a scheme of access charges but also gives it the power to increase those charges in certain circumstances. In the past, the power to increase charges has been driven by what the market can bear. Now it is to be changed to relate to what an efficient operator can bear. That is a very different thing. First, it requires GBR to have a capacity, wholly absent at the moment, to know what an efficient operator can afford to pay. That is a large economic analytical undertaking. We know that because we have regulators which have to answer the question of whether something is being operated efficiently. We have it in the water sector, we had it under the London Underground PPP and we have it in other utility sectors. Considerable skills, techniques and models have been generated over the years that require this; it is not a light undertaking to establish efficient operation. So the first thing is: how is GBR going to work it out?
The second thing is: why should GBR be able to increase charges simply because it thinks that an efficient operator could pay them? The assumption would be that it considers the existing operator to be inefficient, perhaps because it is meeting passenger demand in a different way, and that it can force up prices to require a change in behaviour. I suppose that is what it might be trying to do. My first question is: how does it even know how to work that out, and why should it have the power? It is a source of very considerable concern to the freight sector and others, and it raises a very important point.
Amendment 246 relates to this. The ORR commissioned detailed work on future access charging, which considered the legal framework, economic principles, incentives created by different charging structures, the recovery of infrastructure costs, impacts on passengers and freight markets and the trade-offs between efficiency, competition, investment and cost recovery. The ORR did that work but it is being taken out of this; it will not have a say in these matters any more. Will GBR be expected to apply these principles when deciding appeals on efficient operators? Will the Government be applying these principles? How are the Government going to approach the question of establishing what an efficient operator is? Where are the skills going to be? That is my first question. What are the principles on which the exercise will be conducted? That is my second.
On Amendment 245, under the current system, major charging changes are normally dealt with through the ORR’s five-year periodic review, giving operators notice and certainty in advance. However, Clause 64 allows GBR to revise or replace its charging scheme at any time. If that flexibility is to remain, there should be at least a minimum notice period, which my amendment requires: 12 months seems entirely reasonable for businesses making long-term investment and operating decisions.
Sometimes I think GBR forgets that the people using the network, representing 25% of train movements —even if we leave the heritage sector out of it—are private businesses concerned with making private investments, which can be recovered only over the long term. They cannot be messed about with by sudden changes to pricing models. If the Minister thinks another notice period, not 12 months but something else, is appropriate, I am happy to have a discussion about what it should be, but it surely cannot be at no notice.
On Amendments 248 and 249, Clause 65 expressly protects GBR from having to make payments where disruption is outside its control. But there is no equivalent protection in the Bill for freight or open access operators. The Government may say that those operators would not normally be penalised when they did not cause the disruption. If that is the case, why not say so clearly in the Bill? If protection from events outside one’s control is right for GBR, the same principle should apply to every operator using the network. One thinks of a case where a freight train might be derailed, causing congestion and disruption but it is nobody’s fault, if you see what I mean, or fault has to be established. Should there be a charge for that? What is the system going to be? People need to know.
On Amendments 247 and 250, the Government should be laying the charging scheme before Parliament and the measure should not commence until we can scrutinise it, given its importance. Amendment 250 is simply a drafting improvement. I beg to move.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for introducing this group of amendments, some of which are in my name. It is particularly relevant when you look at the way in which freight trains operate, how much they pay and what happens when things go wrong. Things do go wrong occasionally. It is then a question of apportioning blame, if that is the right word, to the alleged cause of the delay and what is going to be done to mitigate it. This is where the independent regulator’s role comes to the fore, because the train operators will say, “Well, it’s not my fault”. They may even get into an argument with one of the operators whose wagon has failed. Where is the liability there for the freight train being delayed and the other trains, be they passenger, open access or GBR trains? It is a system that seems to work quite well at the moment and I do not see the point of changing it, because there will be endless arguments. I am afraid that, at the end of the day, it must be an independent body such as the ORR that makes a decision on the fairness and transparency of the whole process.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I will intervene briefly on this group of amendments, which deals with Clause 64 on the charging scheme. Behind my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendments and the concerns we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is a concern that open access and freight operators might be, in effect, priced out by GBR deciding on an access charge that is beyond their capacity to pay. It is in connection with that that I will quote very briefly from a letter that the Secretary of State for Transport wrote to the ORR on 6 January 2025. It underlines the concerns that my noble friend expressed: that open-access operators might be discouraged by the impact on the taxpayer. The Secretary of State wrote: “We need to be mindful of the impacts of Open Access such as the level of revenue they can abstract from contracted services and the associated implications for passengers and taxpayers”. I suspect that that letter was prompted by the Treasury, because the loss of revenue from GBR’s passenger services will have a direct impact on the subsidy that GBR gets from the Treasury. Before we get to the question of what the access charge should be, at the moment there is a process—I cannot find any reference to it in the legislation—which is carried out by the ORR and is called the abstraction rate. If you are an open access operator and want to operate a new service, you have to demonstrate that no less than 70% of the revenue that you will get comes from an existing operator. In other words, you have to show that your service will increase the overall passenger numbers by 30%. Only if you overcome that hurdle do you come to the next one, which deals with the access charges. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether they had any plans to change the abstraction rate—because if you tweak the abstraction rate you do not even get to Clause 64, as far as I understand it, which is what your access charge would be. I had a very helpful meeting with the Minister last week, where we discussed the abstraction rate. The information that I got from officials was that they were moving slightly away from a simple, crude abstraction rate to a more broadly based formula that looked at the abstraction rate as well as what was described as social factors. In one aspect, that might be helpful to the open access operator, because there might be social reasons for agreeing to the application that are not entirely captured by the abstraction rate. The question I have for the Minister on this is, first, will there still be an abstraction rate, and are there any plans on the part of GBR to change it? Secondly, can we have slightly more detail on the formula that will be used, which, as I understand it, complements or perhaps replaces the abstraction rate, so we have a clearer idea of the criteria that will be used? Finally, why is there no reference at all in any of this legislation to the abstraction rate, which is a crucial factor in determining whether an open access operator can succeed?
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I have some questions in this section, as my noble friend Lord Young had. Like him, I broadly agree with the thrust of my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendments; they are very helpful, and they allow us to have a discussion about Clause 64. I have two specific questions. Clause 64(3) says that the charging scheme “may provide for a higher amount to be charged in particular circumstances provided that it does not exceed the amount that Great British Railways considers is the amount that an efficient operator would be able to pay in those circumstances”. I would like to know what “in those circumstances” actually means. What are the circumstances that would have to exist that would enable GBR to charge more than is set out in the charging scheme? As far as I can see, it does not say that anywhere. Unless those circumstances are delineated in some way, it provides GBR with the ability to decide on a whim that it wants to deviate from a scheme that it has had to set out, consult on and go through a proper process. There should be a very limited set of circumstances, if any. I would be interested to know what the circumstances are that the Minister envisages. It must be a limited set of circumstances, not an open-ended one.
The second thing is more fundamental. In Clause 64(5) it says:
“The scheme may not provide for charges to be made in relation to GBR passenger services”.
In other words, GBR passenger services do not have to pay anything for access to the network. Some people might say, “What’s the point of that, because obviously they are all part of the same entity?” The problem is, GBR passenger services has to make decisions about what fares it will charge and whether it will be profitable or not, and obviously that will affect the taxpayer subsidy. If it is not having to pay anything for access to a network, but open access operators are having to pay for access to the network, that immediately strikes me as rather unfair.
It may be that the money all ends up being with the taxpayer, but it is important that in terms of the charging structure, GBR’s passenger services, which operate in competition with other operators, should be treated in the same way. This model says they do not have to pay anything for access to the network, which means, on the face of it, that they would be able to undercut open access operators when they are making decisions. Of course, that means that if they are not paying anything for access to the network, the network infrastructure part of GBR will clearly not have as much revenue and will be losing more money and requiring more subsidy from the taxpayer. However, given that there are competitors involved here, it seems that if we are going to have a level playing field and GBR is going to treat its own passenger services and GBR companies fairly as compared to open access operators and freight operators, surely GBR passenger services should have to pay for access to the network.
That is what happens at the moment: money goes from passenger operators to Network Rail, and they all have to pay for access to the network. If you start not having transparent charges, you start hiding where the losses are. It makes it very difficult for any of us to work out whether particular services that are being operated are profitable or not, and you also then cannot make sensible decisions. GBR then will not be able to make sensible decisions about which services are loss-making but which have a social value where it wishes to have them subsidised by the taxpayer. However, you cannot make those decisions if you do not have open, transparent accounting.
We already had a bit of a discussion when we were talking about the retail operations and we had some amendments which were about making sure there was transparent accounting and that the retail operations would be in a separate legal entity or a separate part of the business, so that it would be clear and transparent that there was no anti-competitive behaviour going on. It seems to me that the same would need to happen here.
Therefore, there is a fundamental problem. I have looked at the Explanatory Notes, and I cannot see that I am missing anything. It seems that there is a bit of a gap here about how GBR will be set up, how its accounting will work, and the level of transparency that will be available to, if not the public, at least to Ministers and others to be able to see which services make losses. I do not understand how the Secretary of State will be able to set out the services that she wishes to procure if there is not a clear idea about how much those services cost to deliver and produce, and then, when those services are being delivered, if she is unable to see on an ongoing basis whether they are profitable or not. I do not see how in that situation the department will make sensible, financially rational decisions about which services to run.
As I said, even if the services are not profitable, if they lose money, to make rational decisions about it on subsidy, you need to understand how much subsidy is required and then Ministers, perfectly properly, can make a judgment about whether the level of subsidy is outweighed by the social value of the service. However, unless you have good and transparent accounting, if you do not know what those numbers are, how can you make a sensible decision about whether you wish to have those services run or not, and whether the amount of taxpayers’ money needed to subsidise them is sensible? There is a bit of a gap here.
It may be that I am missing something incredibly obvious, which the Minister will be able to set out, but I cannot see it. Again, this would lead other operators to see that they are not being treated in the same transparent and fair way and leave them concerned that there is not a level playing field. As I said, if I have missed something obvious, I would be grateful to the Minister for pointing it out. Otherwise, I look forward to his answer to my questions.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
Does the noble Lord, Lord Harper, have a view on how the compensation charges that we discussed earlier would apply to GBR services and the fares and charges that they may or may not be making? Is there an imbalance there or is it something that will be resolved?
Lord Harper (Con)
It is a fair question. People listening to this from outside might ask, given that GBR runs the infrastructure and services, what the point is of one bit of the business charging another bit. However, if you are going to make economically rational decisions, it is quite important that the passenger services part of GBR, which makes decisions about which services to run, where there is demand for those services and what people are prepared to pay for them, uses the same cost basis—in other words, access to the valuable infrastructure. The Minister has said on many occasions that the infrastructure is expensive—it is—and that it is important that it is used in the most economically beneficial way. That can be done only with proper pricing and charging. As soon as you start saying that GBR passenger services does not have to pay for access and that it is not being treated on the same basis, you will lose the transparency and the ability to make those rational economic decisions. That is the bit that I am missing. If this is not set up properly, we will end up making bad economic decisions, which is bad for the public, because all those costs land on the taxpayer. There are two other problems. I will finish after those. First, the Minister talked about the importance of investment in producing infrastructure. That is right but, given that capital is limited, that capacity investment must be in the bits of infrastructure that will deliver the best return for the taxpayer. That means that you need to charge for it properly. Secondly, I am not yet clear to what extent GBR will publish its financial information. Some of that will be commercially confidential, as it will operate in a competitive market. However, as this service is being considerably subsidised by the taxpayer, I would expect as much information as possible to be published. Given that Ministers come under enormous pressure to preserve existing services and deliver new services, to have that sensible conversation with both elected representatives and the public, you have to be able to demonstrate the benefit of the service and how much it costs to deliver. Without that level of transparency and without charging for the infrastructure, I do not see how you will be able to do so.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the questions that have been asked and look forward to the Minister’s answers. I am here to explore the business impact of the Bill outside passenger services, and I will speak later on open access. Having seen this clause, I am interested in the impact on rail freight because, if its economics are uncertain, rail freight will move on to the road. Has the Minister consulted the freight industry or big users such as supermarkets? When I was at Tesco, I remember that we moved on to rail away from road to great public acclaim. It was part of our carbon reduction programme. Have business sectors been consulted in preparing this legislation and, if so, what have they said? Are they happy with the arrangements or are there outstanding concerns of which the Committee should be aware?
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, some important questions have been raised to fully understand access charging, which is a concern to the wider sector. Many of them were set out by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. Charges need to be transparent and fair to providers. They need to cover the true costs; there has been a suspicion for some time that that has not always been the case. I think my noble friend Lord Bradshaw and I raised this at Second Reading, but we certainly have in conversations. If the Minister can provide some clarity it would be very helpful.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I will begin with Amendments 242 to 244. As my noble friend Lord Berkeley said, I will be primary decision-maker on charging. That is why the Bill requires GBR to levy the costs directly incurred as the baseline charge, but it leaves the precise methodologies and supplementary charges to be developed by GBR through consultation with industry. We have consulted with industry; the access and use policy is the result of a significant amount of consultation with the industry itself. We have left the industry to consider, as it naturally would, the relationship with its customers; it would be odd of us to go to the customers of rail freight companies when the industry knows its market perfectly well and we intend it to continue to be in the private sector. We believe it is preferable to allow GBR’s charging framework to evolve over time, subject to consultation, rather than fixing a particular approach in legislation. This means that the charging arrangements can continue to evolve over time, as they have done over the years that the ORR has been responsible for the charging framework. To support industry engagement with the charging proposals, the draft access and use policy includes a section on charging and explicitly describes the calculation of costs directly incurred as based on “the best available and reasonable view of efficient costs” that “arise from, and vary with, the operation of train services, and which would not be incurred to the same extent in the absence of that operation”. The consultation also identifies that the “short-run marginal components of these total costs will be identified, measured, and attributed in a manner that is appropriate and proportionate”. Of course, if GBR seeks to pass unreasonably high costs on to operators in its charging scheme, those charges can be appealed to the ORR. I recognise the concerns from the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Moylan, that charges above the cost directly incurred should not be set at a level that undermines operators’ ability to operate efficiently and sustainably. The railway incurs costs beyond the immediate—
Lord Moylan (Con)
Can the Minister explain: if the scheme of charges is based on an assumption of an efficient operator—as he seems to say, if I understand it correctly—then why does GBR need a power to set a charge higher on the basis that it could be afforded by an efficient operator? It was the variation to meet the efficient operator test that I was objecting to.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
To answer the noble Lord, there is a similar test today; I think he or another noble Lord referred to it. It is the ORR test called the “market can bear” costs. The reason for that is that the railway incurs costs far beyond the immediate wear and tear caused by individual services. As under today’s framework, the Bill allows GBR to recover an appropriate share of the costs for operating, maintaining and renewing the network for those who use it but can also afford it, so it does not fall solely on the taxpayer. That is why Clause 64(3) permits charges above the costs directly incurred, but only when they are affordable for an efficient operator. As I said, that is, in practice, a similar test to one that the ORR uses today. The purpose of the provision is to strike a fair balance between enabling GBR to recover an appropriate contribution towards the costs of the railway and ensuring that charges do not undermine the viability of operators or the incentives that support growth, innovation and investment across various markets. GBR is expected to develop and publish a methodology setting out how affordability will be assessed in consultation with industry. Indeed, the draft access and use policy sets out how GBR will go about it. As I said, operators will have a right of appeal to the ORR if they consider that GBR either is acting inconsistently with its statutory duties or has applied charges in a discriminatory or anti-competitive manner. We have talked already about the efficient operator.
Lord Harper (Con)
Before the Minister moves on, what is the answer to my question: what are the particular circumstances in which GBR can charge this higher amount of money?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
This is replicating something that is already happening, because the costs of the infrastructure are in excess of the summation of what people are charging. We are not envisaging anything terribly different from what happens today. The reason why I have described rights of appeal and so forth is that, although I expect this to be dealt with in the way that it is today, it is always open to operators to appeal if they believe that it is being dealt with in an anti-competitive manner.
Lord Harper (Con)
With respect to the Minister, that does not really answer my question. It may be what is happening today, but what is the answer to the question about the circumstances in which GBR will be able to charge this higher amount of money? That is all I am asking. If it is happening today, it should be a relatively straightforward question to answer.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
It should be. The answer is that I should write to the noble Lord on how it is happening today.
Lord Moylan (Con)
Will the Minister write to me as well?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
Of course. I try to copy all my letters to all noble Lords. I will write to say how it applies today and how it will apply in the future. I turn to Amendment 240, on charges when capacity is not utilised. Clause 64 does not force GBR to levy charges whenever a service fails to operate. Rather, it requires GBR to set out transparently how such circumstances would be treated within its charging framework. Whether a charge is applied in any given case will remain a matter requiring judgment and discretion. The ability to consider charges for unused capacity already exists within the current legislative framework. Although it is not currently actively used, we believe that it is important to retain this capability as GBR brings together responsibility for access and charging decisions. With such finite capacity on the network, it is important, when operators are granted access, that they make a reasonable effort to make use of it and are disincentivised from simply holding on to capacity. Therefore, the ability to levy a reservation charge is a useful tool to drive the right behaviours and incentives on the network, ensuring that best use is made of capacity and that operators remain accountable for providing the services they previously agreed to deliver. Having said that, GBR will need to take into consideration divergent industry operating models, such as freight, which is market driven and therefore has less assurances on services. On that basis, GBR would, of course, need to consider its duties to promote freight growth before ever levying such a charge. Alternatively, however, the concept of one freight operator preventing another freight operator being given those rights instead is equally detrimental to freight growth. In today’s framework, when a freight operator holds on to rights that it is not using, Network Rail finds it extremely challenging to incentivise that operator to release that path so that it can reallocate the rights to another freight operator that does have business—through a contract with a freight customer—to use the path as intended. However, with GBR as the directing mind, there is an opportunity to utilise reservation charges in a useful way to compliment best use while protecting and promoting the growth of the freight sector. Network Rail analysis of some key freight markets suggests that just over two-thirds of useable freight paths in the timetable are actually utilised, though this varies substantially by commodity, location and market conditions. That is not to say that the remaining paths are not needed or that they should all be subject to reservation charges. Freight demand is not constant, and the origins and destinations of traffic vary according to customer needs. We would never expect anything approaching 100% utilisation.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, briefly, can my noble friend explain, if there is a delay on the line caused by GBR infrastructure, who pays whom, if it is a GBR passenger train, an open access freight train or an open access passenger train? Do they all pay the same? Who do they pay? It looks to me as if GBR will be paying itself.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
If my noble friend will forgive me, I will get to that subject shortly. What I have said highlights the potential role for reservation charges in encouraging operators to release paths where they are genuinely no longer required, helping to ensure that scarce capacity can be repurposed to support new freight services and future growth where there is demand. The Bill therefore balances the important flexibility needed for those differences to be considered fairly, while simultaneously avoiding blanket exemptions that could undermine effective capacity management and efficient use of the railway. On Amendments 241, 248 and 249, I begin by clarifying that Clause 64 concerns the framework for GBR’s charging scheme and the circumstances in which charges may apply. It is not the mechanism through which disruption is addressed. That is the purpose of Clause 65 and the performance regime. The Bill is clear that, where GBR is responsible for disruption, it should compensate affected operators. Indeed, we expect GBR to remain liable in most circumstances because it will almost always have the ability to influence service recovery, infrastructure resilience or operational decision-making. However, there may be exceptional circumstances where disruption is genuinely outside GBR’s control. For example, following a major terrorism incident, where the railway is subject to police investigations, security searches or evacuations, GBR may have little or no ability to influence when normal services can resume. In such circumstances, it would not be right to automatically require taxpayers to fund compensation payments for events that GBR could neither prevent nor reasonably mitigate. Importantly, the Bill does not attempt to define every such circumstance in legislation. Instead, GBR will be required to consult on its approach, publish its policy transparently and remain subject to appeal through the ORR. That allows the framework to evolve alongside the railway and its users, rather than being constrained by a fixed statutory definition. I want to provide some reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, regarding freight operators and Amendment 249. Clause 65(3)(b) applies specifically to GBR because GBR is uniquely responsible for the operation, maintenance and renewal of the national rail infrastructure. Third-party operators do not carry those responsibilities and therefore are not exposed to liability for infrastructure failures, engineering works or other matters that sit beyond their control. For that reason, an operator outside GBR could not be held responsible for disruption caused by infrastructure failures or planned engineering works undertaken by GBR. The Bill already allocates responsibility according to which party is best able to manage and influence the risk in question. More broadly, Clause 65 is intended to achieve a fair balance between protecting operators when they are affected by the actions of others and protecting taxpayers from bearing costs where GBR could not reasonably have prevented or mitigated the disruption. On Amendments 245, 246, 247 and 250, the charging and performance schemes will not be developed in isolation. As under the current framework, GBR will be required to develop these arrangements through a detailed and highly consultative process, working closely with the sector, including the ORR. That is why the published draft access and use policy is being consulted on currently, and I hope it will demonstrate this approach. The Bill already establishes important safeguards. It sets out the matters GBR must consider when developing charging arrangements—for instance, in relation to transparency, requirements for consultation with affected parties, and in providing route to appeal where operators believe decisions are inconsistent with statutory requirements or published policies. Given those circumstances, a requirement to lay these schemes before Parliament for a further three months would not add any substantive protections for operators. In fact, all this would realistically achieve is delaying implementation and reducing the system’s ability to respond efficiently to industry needs. The noble Lord also suggests a minimum of 12 months’ notice be given before changes are made to the charging scheme. The Bill already provides significant stability through the wider funding and charging framework. Charges will be developed within the context of GBR’s funding period review process, conducted every five years, giving operators greater visibility of costs and future expectations. In the highly unlikely event significant changes were ever required to be made in the middle of a funding period, the Bill also requires GBR to consult affected operators, specifically before making, replacing or revising its charging scheme. Operators will therefore have an opportunity to review and make representations about proposed charges. They will also retain rights of appeal to the ORR. Finally, the analysis referred to by the noble Lord’s amendment was produced by the ORR in advance of the new access and charging framework set out in this Bill ever being developed. Its purpose was to inform ORR decision-making under different sets of regulations, institutional arrangements and responsibilities—which the Bill disapplies for GBR. We would expect GBR to consider relevant evidence, analysis and stakeholder views when developing its own charging policies. However, we do not believe it would be sensible for Parliament to require GBR, potentially many years or decades from now, to have regard to a particular publication produced under the previous framework, especially given that the organisation it applied to no longer holds the charging responsibilities it sets out in the first place. Rail markets, technology and the needs of users will continue to evolve, and charging policy must be able to evolve alongside them. The Bill already provides for consultation, transparency and regulatory oversight of any future charging scheme. We believe these are the appropriate safeguards, rather than tying future charging decisions to legislation or specific documents. To the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, about the abstraction rate, he will, I hope, have seen—because we discussed it last week—the access and use policy at page 35, a piece which is seeking to move away from a narrow, not primarily extracted test and towards a fuller assessment of what delivers the greatest benefits to passengers, taxpayers and the wider economy, ensuring decisions are based on the full picture rather than weighted towards a single abstraction metric. It will still include an abstraction rate, but it will allow these wider factors to be considered. We believe that is beneficial to applicants. We also think that railway capacity is too valuable and too scarce to be allocated based on a single headline measure. I know from conversations that applicants find that single test to be disproportionately difficult when some of their cases include some of the things that people want from the railway network which go beyond abstraction itself. The right decision depends on the circumstance of each case, including passenger demand, operational performance, capacity constraints and the wider benefits a service can bring, and the approach will ensure that all these considerations are taken into account, rather than applying a crude pass and fail test. If a proposed new service brings significant economic benefits, perhaps by opening new direct rail connections that will support economic regeneration, jobs, housing and growth, then GBR will need to weigh those benefits against any abstraction impacts, and in some instances there may be a strong case to grant access even where there are higher levels of abstraction.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
On that, it seems a bit odd that the legislation provides all sorts of protection against an open access operator being overcharged—which is what Clause 64 does—but there is absolutely nothing in the legislation at all about the abstraction rate being changed, and no protection from it. I understand exactly what is in the consultative document and what the Minister has said, but there is absolutely nothing about this in the legislation. Therefore, while I understand what is proposed, GBR could just change it and say that, because of the impact of the loss of revenue to the Treasury, the abstraction rate will no longer be 70% but 60%. In other words, you will have to show that your application will increase the overall traffic by 40% instead of 30%.
As I understand it, there is absolutely nothing that an open-access operator could do if the criteria that the Minister just read out were changed. There is nothing in the Bill about it. The Minister says that the decisions will have to be reasonable, but will they be transparent, and what is the process for challenging them? If I have correctly understood what the Minister just said, as it stands, it seems that there is a major loophole in the legislation on the protection of open access operators.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
The first thing to say is that the abstraction rate is not currently in any legislation; it is a set of rules applied by the Office of Rail and Road. In the draft access and use policy, we are helping people who seek to broaden passenger train operations on the railway by including a greater number of benefits that could be supplied rather than solely applying a crude pass-and-fail test. My understanding is that people spend a very long time attempting to match some number to get their application to pass the test, when a more reasonable proposition is to ask, “What is the total benefit of this?” I will not repeat all the conditions that I described. We are not disapplying something currently in legislation; it has become customary to apply this test, because the ORR has written its own rules on it. We are trying to make the test broader, in support of the broader economic benefits that a railway service can bring.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
I am sorry to press the Minister on this again. He is quite right: there is currently nothing in legislation about the abstraction rate. But crucially, it is set by the ORR, independently of GBR and Network Rail. Under the Bill, it will no longer be independently set by the ORR; it will be set by GBR, which has a clear conflict of interest. I read the letter from the Secretary of State to the ORR, which made it quite clear that the Treasury has an interest in the abstraction rate and the loss of revenue. As I understand it, there is nothing in the legislation that stops the abstraction rate being changed; there is no process of appeal, and the decision need not be transparent. At the moment, it seems that this is a loophole in the protection of open access operators, freight operators and others. Before Report, the Minister should give serious thought to whether this loophole and clear conflict of interest can be addressed.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I certainly respect the noble Lord’s view. However, I reiterate that the industry as a whole has become used to the test applied by the ORR in circumstances where, so far as I am aware, there was no consultation in the first place about what the abstraction rate was. We are trying to make these applications more representative of the wider benefits that these sorts of railway services can bring. I will reflect on what the noble Lord said, because I understand the point he made. However, I hope he will recognise that, from my point of view, what is in the access and use policy on page 35 is designed to make it easier for people to pass this test. There may well be other benefits of the services that those people propose to operate which are not currently considered, because the abstraction rate is a primary test, and if you fail it, you do not get anywhere.
Lord Harper (Con)
Just so that the Minister does not end up reflecting on the wrong things, and to be clear, I think that my noble friend and I agree that having that slightly wider test is sensible. The real issue is that, at the moment, the abstraction test is carried out by an independent body, and it will now be done by an organisation that is effectively part of the Government. Having dealt with the Treasury on this—as I am sure my noble friends Lord Young and Lord Grayling have —I am afraid that it has a very clear view about open access and about abstraction rates. It views anybody else operating on the network as basically taking money that belongs to it. If you do not have an independent body setting the rules, the temptation will be there. That is what people are concerned about and what the Minister should reflect upon, if I may humbly suggest.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I have listened to both noble Lords and paid close attention to what they have said; I will reflect further on it. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, will note that in Clause 64(5), GBR will have to calculate what the charges would have been in order for people to see what it is doing—I am sorry that I am being a little incoherent; I cannot read my own writing. The noble Lord suggested that this calculation would not be made, but Clause 64(5) requires it to be made. On a wider basis—
Lord Harper (Con)
Just to be clear, there are two different things going on here. What the Minister is talking about—he is right that it is covered by the second part of Clause 64(5)—is the charges for the infrastructure. What I suggested was that if the passenger services part of GBR is not having to pay access to the infrastructure, how will it calculate its fare structure and fares in a way that is fair and equal to its competitors? A similar example is what happened with British Telecom; this was why Ofcom forced it to take its infrastructure business and separate it as Openreach, with an independent board and independent financial structures. It knew that BT was tempted strategically to favour its retail operations in accessing its infrastructure. I absolutely accept that the infrastructure pricing will be fair, but I am concerned that the retail operations—the rail services—will not be priced fairly and equitably because they are not paying for access to the infrastructure. As far as I can tell, that is not covered by the Bill.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I point out to the noble Lords that I believe that Clause 64(5) covers that circumstance, and one of the benefits of having GBR is that, for the first time in a very long time, we are able to see the costs and revenues associated with particular parts of the network. Another of the benefits is that this information will be more widely available than it has been; in fact, it was not available for 30 years. When I first got to Network Rail in 2015, there was no connection between any costs spent on or from the network, or any of the income accrued. That is one of the reasons why decisions on the railway have not been terribly well made. I believe that what I have said about Clause 64(5) covers what the noble Lord has mentioned. However, in order to make progress, I will reflect on it to ensure that my belief is correct.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, Great British Railways embarks upon this knotty matter of how to charge other people for using its infrastructure with no established expertise, no criteria for how it will make decisions—apart from one line in a Bill—and no certainty for private investors. It is subject to no appeal other than on JRR grounds, with a clear conflict of interest and with a miserly Treasury looking over its shoulder. It is bound to be a huge success. I acknowledge that I have left this a bit late, but I did not want to add to the interruptions of the noble Lord as he was winding up. So I perfectly understand if he does not answer the question I am going to add now but, since we are in Committee, I hope I can a stray a little to ask it. It struck me in the debate that there is a power in Clause 64(4) to charge a lower rate “in circumstances in which Great British Railways considers that to be appropriate”. Paragraphs (a) to (d) are for a purpose but (e) is “for any other reason”, so for any other reason GBR can choose to charge a lower rate. This made me think about the freight industry because the Government have a freight target. It could be that the Government charge freight a lower rate—I do not know, as I am merely speculating—in order to meet their target. It is a very loose target; it is not even measured until 2040. It is a 2050 target with a staging post in 2040. Could that lead to circumstances where the same infrastructure was available to freight companies at one very low, advantageous rate and to open access companies at a very much higher rate? Could it even lead—and these might be particular circumstances, in response to my noble friend Lord Harper—to open access operators being charged a super-premium in order to help compensate for the discount given to freight operators, in my theoretical example, to encourage meeting the target? As I say, it is unfair to ask the Minister to respond to that now, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 240 withdrawn.
Amendments 241 to 247 not moved.
Clause 64 agreed.
Clause 65: Performance scheme
Amendments 248 to 250 not moved.
Clause 65 agreed.
Clause 66: Consultation
Amendments 251 and 251A not moved.
Amendment 252
Moved by
252: Clause 66, page 38, line 28, at end insert— “(4) At any time after this section comes into force, Great British Railways may elect to treat any consultation that was carried out by any person before that time as having been carried out by Great British Railways.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment would assist with an orderly transition to the body corporate that is to be designated as GBR, allowing for the efficient progression of documents, timetables or schemes to be consulted on under subsection (3).
Amendment 252 agreed.
Clause 66, as amended, agreed.
Clause 67 agreed.
Clause 68: Appeal procedure
Amendment 253
Moved by
253: Clause 68, page 38, line 36, leave out subsection (1) Member's explanatory statement This amendment removes the requirement that appeals may only be made under Judicial Review principles.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I have been very neglectful in earlier groups in not thanking noble Lords who have given me support for my amendments, so let me start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for putting his name to my first amendment in this group, Amendment 253. I can be very brief because, although I have a large number of amendments in this group, their purpose is to work together to achieve a single effect: the ORR, acting as an appeal body, should be able to consider an appeal on its merits rather than simply on the process grounds suitable to a judicial review proceeding. Moreover, it should, having reached a view, have a power to substitute its decision for that made by GBR. The reason for this is plain equity. I think this was brought out very clearly in the debate we have just had on charging, as I think the Government are in a state of complete confusion and are not able to answer the very pertinent questions raised by my noble friends and others. The conflicts of interests built into the structure deliberately chosen by the Government are so stark that a proper appeal process has to be available. That means one that can look at the merits of the case and substitute its own decisions.
I note that there are amendments in this group from my noble friend Lord Lansley, which offer something akin to a halfway house. It might be that a halfway house is satisfactory or it might be that the Government are willing to come forward with some significant changes. I am happy to discuss them. I will say, however, that the test of success and acceptability of any halfway house is both in the equity of the case, which is the justice required to manage conflicts of interest in a transparent way, and in the practical test of whether it is sufficient to persuade the private sector—rail, freight and open access —to continue investing in rail infrastructure. If the uncertainty and inadequacy of the appeal process is such that the private sector has no confidence in being able to seek redress against a decision that it finds unacceptable and wrong, it will simply cease to invest and there will be very little more going on for the railways on that front.
The Transport Select Committee in the other place reached much the same conclusion. It described the judicial review-based appeal mechanism as “overly narrow” and specifically warned that it could jeopardise the Government’s own objective of increasing rail freight.
I will also speak very briefly to my Amendments 264 and 265 in this group, which are adjacent to that topic rather than core to it. They would require consultation with open access operators on the appeal process. Open access operators should not be considered merely any other persons for the purpose of consultation, as they are clearly a strongly affected stakeholder. I beg to move.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, my name is on the first amendment in this group. I fully support the statement by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, about the question of independent regulation. I have spent a lot of time over the years talking to the existing regulators—now the Office of Rail and Road—and they have developed over the years. The key to me is that they have gained the confidence of the industry, which is so important. If the industry does not have confidence in this, it will not go into the system: it will probably give up and walk away. I see no reason to change the existing ORR role and remit; it has a good reputation, and it deals with complaints pretty quickly for a regulator. Many other regulators take a lot longer. We should get rid of any idea of everything having to go through a judicial review and stick with the ORR. We have talked about the ORR many times this afternoon; it needs support from politicians and Ministers, and it will do a good job. I fully support these amendments.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group, which are not all for entirely the same purpose. They are essentially to explore the question of how exactly appeals to the ORR on the part of operators of rail freight and others will be considered. I am grateful not only for the meeting last week with the Minister but for the letter that he sent this morning, which my noble friend Lord Moylan referred to earlier. I did not think it unreasonably long; it quite thoroughly explained how judicial review might be thought to work. From my point of view, it demonstrated that, although judicial review is often thought of as a narrow, very limited potential for appeal, it is possible to go to further grounds using judicial review principles, but not as far as we need to. Noble Lords who have been Ministers will be well aware of the reasons why Ministers put judicial review appeal grounds into legislation: it is because they want it to be narrow. The letter that the Minister sent me was very clear, for example, that if a decision-maker is not taking something into account or is taking into account something that is irrelevant to the issue, that may give grounds for judicial review. But the letter was slightly wrong in talking about not taking proper account of statutory duties. It is not quite that wide; it concerns where account is not taken of statutory duties. There is also the question of the circumstances in which a decision is held to be rational or not. The letter from the Minister quite accurately says, “Is it within the range of reasonable decisions for a public authority?” In essence that is to say—as we are often very clear when thinking about judicial review—could a reasonable decision-maker have arrived at this decision? That is not the same as balancing the considerations that a regulator has a responsibility to balance. We will doubtless return to this on Report. There are three solutions, the first of which is the judicial review solution, in which there are three broad grounds for appeal. One is that the decision is illegal. I do not think we are arguing about that; if it is wrong in law, it can be appealed on judicial review grounds. The second is that the decision is irrational; I just referred to the question of whether it is a decision that a reasonable decision-maker could make. That gives a limited scope for appeal. The third asks whether the decision is the subject of procedural impropriety, which gets us into the territory that I really want to explore, because it is, in essence, procedural. Was a matter considered or not? Was an irrelevant matter considered or not? It is not: how were the considerations that should form part of that decision balanced by the regulator? Was it a proper balancing, taking account of all the circumstances in the legislation, or not? My Amendment 258 is the operative one here for these purposes. We can leave out the first part—if there is an error of fact of any significant importance, it could be the basis for an appeal, even on a judicial review basis. The second grounds proposed are “that GBR failed properly to have regard to a relevant matter”. I think the Minister would say that that could be a judicial review decision, but the word “properly” is of limited use in a judicial review context. The next two parts are the most important. One is “that GBR failed to give appropriate weight to a relevant matter”. It is not just that GBR did not consider it; it is that it did not consider it properly or give it weight. The question of how much weight should be given to issues is at the heart of the balancing of responsibilities and duties by a regulator. The next one is “that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”, which, frankly, is just a way of expressing the view that the regulator has many powers and responsibilities, so have they been exercised in a way that is proper? I did not make all this up—I looked to see whether there might be suitable examples elsewhere that give us scope for thinking about this. The one that I came across was in the Civil Aviation Act 2012, Schedule 1 to which relates to where operator determinations might be appealed against in the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Paragraph 3(1) says that the appeal against operator determinations to the CAT could be made on the basis that it was wrong on one or more of the following grounds: “that the determination was based on an error of fact; … that the determination was wrong in law; … that an error was made in the exercise of a discretion”. That is why I have used the third of the grounds and put it into Amendment 258, because that is the operative basis, and it encompasses in that phrase whether appropriate weight has been given to the matters that a regulator has to consider. We are in territory between judicial review and an appeal on its merits, as my noble friend said. I have applied myself to the Bill on the basis that the Bill is around establishing a directing mind. It is clear that, if one were to give an appeal on its merits, one would substantially create a second directing mind—an appellate mind, as it were—and the intentions of the Bill would not be established. We may not agree on whether that is the right intention, but I do not think that we can simply put something into the legislation that so fundamentally undermines the purposes of the Bill itself. We may come back to that on Report. Some people may want to do that; I personally would not. There have been many instances in recent years when previous Administrations have likewise thought that giving an appeal on the merits is going too far—that it effectively deprives the original decision-maker of the ability to establish the policies and decisions that it is their responsibility to achieve. The only other thing is that there are other amendments that are looking at the question of what the ORR can do if it determines that an appeal should be upheld. There are two amendments that do different things—let us not bother with precisely how it happens—but essentially I have not seen any reason why the legislation should not be simpler. Instead of the current drafting, where the ORR upholds an appeal it should send it back to GBR to reconsider that decision and have the ability to give a direction to GBR about how it should conduct that reconsideration. I do not see the need for everything else—it should be able to quash all or part of the decision and send it back to the ORR, and nothing more than that. That would seem to be the simple and effective way of the ORR behaving. I would suggest that that reinforces the view that it is fundamentally GBR that has to make the decision, so when it goes back for the reconsideration it can make sure that it is consistent with all its responsibilities as the intended directing mind for the railways. I hope that that explains this. It is quite a wide range of issues that we have to think about—but fundamentally at this stage it is just about setting out that there is scope to bring into the legislation something appropriately beyond judicial review for the particular purpose of enabling there to be appeals that can look at where there has been some transparent failure on the part of Great British Railways to balance the competing duties and responsibilities that it has to exercise.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I hope that I can be relatively brief, because my noble friends have explained that the two opposing views—they are not really opposing but—
Lord Lansley (Con)
Contrasting.
Lord Harper (Con)
I thank my colleague for a more diplomatic way of expressing it. Fundamentally, the provision set out in the Bill—the plain vanilla judicial review—goes too far in one direction. I say in passing that the letter referred to that set this out was not shared with everybody. I have not had a copy of it. It sounds like we are not missing an enormous amount by not having it, because it just sets out the judicial review principles, but it was not sent to all of us, so I have not seen it. Forgive me if I am repeating things that are covered in it. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, a Front Bench spokesman, was not sent a copy of it either—that was perhaps a bit of an oversight by the administrative machinery, as it were.
I am not comfortable with a pure judicial review decision for the reasons that we have set out, because the ORR is independent and GBR clearly is not independent. Even if this was not what is going to happen, there is absolutely a concern among open-access operators and freight operators that GBR will not make these decisions in an even-handed way. On a number of occasions through Committee on this Bill when concerns have been expressed about GBR’s decision-making, the Minister has tried to reassure the Committee by referring to the various appeals to the ORR in the Bill. Because they are only on judicial review grounds, those are quite narrow.
This is where I probably lean a bit more towards my noble friend Lord Lansley’s proposed solution. As I set out on one of the earlier groups today, I am comfortable with GBR being the single directing mind. That was what was set out in the draft legislation I was responsible for. But I would like the Minister to reflect on something. If he does not definitively reply today, he could perhaps write to us so that, if he does agree, we can cut out a lot of tabling of amendments on Report. It is this: in the circumstances that this Government have decided, where all the passenger operations that were previously done by the private sector will be done by GBR, there is clearly a big conflict of interest. We know that that potential conflict exists, and I gave an example of a private sector operator, with BT and Openreach, where Ofcom reached exactly that conclusion: that a single entity was making decisions about its retail operations having priority access to the infrastructure. It directed a complete split—albeit with the same ownership—between those legal entities. There is clearly a big risk here.
I differ from my noble friend Lord Moylan in that I think there is a risk that, as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, if you go completely to appeals on the merits, there are two dangers. One is that there are lots of appeals to the ORR and everyone who does not like a decision appeals it, and the ORR then sets up making different decisions. Also, as those of us who have been Ministers know, if you know what the appeal mechanism is, it changes how you make decisions.
I am more minded to go with my noble friend Lord Lansley’s sensible compromise: widening the scope for appeal, which is sensible. That strikes the right balance, keeping GBR as the guiding mind but recognising that there is a real risk of this conflict taking place. The Minister has a real interest in reflecting on this because, if he sticks with the legislation as drafted, which does not really appeal to any of us on these Benches, we may end up getting amendments on Report that go more in the direction of my noble friend Lord Moylan. The House may end up agreeing with us, then the Minister has to make a decision about whether he wants to have that argument. However, if he were to reflect on what my noble friend Lord Lansley said, and perhaps bring back a government amendment if he does not think my noble friend’s amendments are as elegantly drafted as they could be, we may end up in a happy compromise where we all broadly think the Bill has been improved and do not end up pushing those further amendments to have appeals on the substance.
I am not sure, if the Minister were to do that, whether he would persuade my noble friend Lord Moylan. He may or he may not. I am sure my noble friend will look at what was brought back in substance and see whether it is acceptable. However, there is merit in doing that. Just purely a judicial review appeal is too narrow. It does not sound like it is going to satisfy many people at all. It is the safeguard on which the Minister has leant when defending many of the other concerns that people have raised on the Bill. Strengthening that safeguard, from his point of view, helps to preserve the underlying Bill structure and the GBR structure that he wishes to see, and enable it to be more successful. Therefore, it would be wise for the Minister at least to reflect on it then come back to the Committee in due course with his considered views.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am in the Moylan-Berkeley school of thought on these amendments, for a simple reason. I had experience of the Competition Appeal Tribunal and its mechanism. I won an appeal and found that all that happened was the process went back to the beginning and the result was exactly the same as the previous one. So there is a case, given the importance of having some sort of appeal in this Bill, to have a proper appeal process. I support my noble friend Lord Moylan and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, on this.
Lord Grayling (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly in support of the principle articulated by both my noble friends. I apologise to the Minister and other noble Lords that I was unable to be here earlier this evening for some of the amendments that I tabled. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for raising some of the issues that I had intended to, had there not been a diary clash. I simply want to say that the current setup in the legislation is not satisfactory in a variety of ways. It is effectively allowing GBR to mark its own homework. Unless it marks its own homework correctly—or incorrectly—then what it decides will go. That goes against the spirit of fairness and many of the principles that the Minister has articulated. Ironically, given the fact that we now have a Prime Minister who is set on realigning us with the European Union, either through the single market or, indeed, by rejoining the European Union, this is one part of the many measures in the Bill that will be dismantled immediately, were we to do that. A good principle of European law was that the railway system of today has to have an independent, proper means of providing for access and pricing. Those have to be dealt with fairly and independently. If they are not, that is illegal under European law. I welcome the fact that in many respects the Minister is pursuing some of the Brexit benefits in taking the line that he is—but if the Government are seriously going back to alignment with the single market in whatever form, this is simply not a way that would be legally permissible. So it is not the right thing to do, and it contravenes government policy. My two noble friends have come up with two different approaches, both of which have merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on those and come back on Report with a better way in which to do this.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, as the Bill has been going through Parliament, much of the debate and concerns raised by the rail industry, open-access operators and freight operators has been around the process to decide access to the railway to operate services outside Great British Railways and the appeals process. Much concern was raised on this at one of the meetings of the rail APPG that I attended about the high threshold for any appeals—the judicial review level that is needed and has been discussed. Noble Lords have set out the thinking behind their amendments and represented many of the views that have come across from open-access operators. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, set out what judicial review might mean in different ways and that you could appeal in detail. I want to highlight this with a fairly current example of access issues, which shows some of this dilemma. Transport for London wants to run four additional trains an hour for passengers at peak times on the Elizabeth Line from May 2027. In the current system, Network Rail has objected; so we might say that that would be Great British Railways objecting. From memory, the DfT may even have paid for these new trains—that is at the back of my mind—helping the supply chain and creating jobs with new trains.
Lord Harper (Con)
Yes, we did.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
I thank the noble Lord; my memory is serving me correctly even at this hour. In the end, the ORR has supported Transport for London against Network Rail to allow the trains to operate from next May. The ORR issued direction on 3 August 2026. It stated: “Capacity analysis by Network Rail and GTS indicates that the proposed rights can be accommodated”. Just to be clear, GTS operates the Elizabeth Line services under a concession agreement for Transport for London. So the ORR, looking at the capacity analysis that both sides had done, said that actually there was capacity there. The appeals mechanism has got to be at the right level. I do not know whether this current TfL example would have been able to appeal under the judicial review criteria process that we have in the Bill before us. Yet the ORR, looking at the data, clearly ruled in favour of the operator and for the benefit of passengers. All the modelling showed that there was capacity on both sides. I think it is a good, live example and a warning flag for any future appeals system that, with something like that, you have got to have transparency. You have got to show the data that you are using to make a decision. In the end, there is capacity on that line. There is a huge demand from passengers. There are new trains that have been funded. Let us have them operating for the benefit of passengers. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on this important, contentious area. With a few tweaks, there could be a way forward that would probably satisfy most Members in this Room today.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, first, I apologise that the letter that I sent to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, this morning was not circulated to other noble Lords. That was my omission. I was very keen to get it out this morning. I will ensure that it is circulated to noble Lords as soon as possible. I have made it my business to make sure that all the correspondence that I have sent to individual noble Lords on this has been circulated to others, but we will check to make sure that there is no correspondence to one noble Lord that is not copied to everybody else. I do apologise for that. There are things to agree on in this debate. The Bill must provide a robust route for operators to appeal against GBR’s decisions. My concern, which noble Lords will understand, is that we do not position the appeal body, the ORR, as a second, parallel decision-maker that can impose its own judgments in preference to GBR’s. It does not have end-to-end route and network expertise. I was going to say that we can see the results of having too many decision-makers every day. I am sorry to say that the circumstances described just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, are another example of fragmented decision-making on the railway in circumstances where GBR thinking about its wider duties to passengers would have come to a different decision on its own. I regret not having known about this at the time. Otherwise, I might have done something about it well before it got to that stage. It demonstrates why the railway needs to be managed by a body that has wider considerations for passengers and the economy. At the noble Baroness said, if the trains had been bought with public money, it would be ludicrous. Having said that, judicial review principles are a well-established mechanism for holding public bodies to account. A clear example of that is in the High Court: when the High Court reviews decisions made by government departments or regulators, it focuses on whether the decision was made lawfully and fairly, rather than replacing it with its own judgment. These principles afford the decision-maker appropriate latitude to make informed judgments, to weigh different considerations against each other and to reach a balanced decision, but they also safeguard against decisions that are unreasonable or irrational, fail to take proper account of relevant statutory duties, are inconsistent with its own published policies, processes and criteria, or are otherwise unlawful. That is the standard to which GBR should be held. GBR must be the decision-maker on access, and the ORR should be there to ensure that GBR is reasonable, rational and consistent with its duties and policies. The Bill deliberately requires the ORR to apply judicial review principles and the amendments would, as we have discussed, widen the process and make it merits based.
I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for raising his concerns with me. That enabled me to think very carefully, to write to him—if not everybody else, who will get the letter tomorrow, for which I apologise—and to look at this in detail with our lawyers. That letter is the consequence of that. It goes into considerable detail; I apologise for that. For example, it would not be sufficient for GBR to acknowledge a relevant duty and move on; it will need to properly consider its duties in reaching a decision, and there would need to be a lawful and rational basis for its approach.
For example, if it considered its duties in relation to freight but attached relatively little importance to them compared with other duties, it would need to have a sound and rational basis for doing so. For example, this might be because the evidence demonstrated materially greater impacts on other network users or because the evidence relating to freight on the relevant part of the network supported the balance that GBR had struck, but it would need to explain its evidence and the reasoning underpinning that assessment.
On appeal, the ORR would consider whether GBR genuinely had regard to the relevant statutory duties in reaching its decision and would examine the reasoning underpinning that assessment, including whether it had misunderstood or misapplied a relevant duty, failed to take proper account of it or reached a decision that was irrational in the light of the considerations that ought properly to have been taken into account while reaching the decision.
The ORR’s assessment of rationality will include consideration of any irrelevant factors that have been taken into account by GBR and any relevant ones that have been ignored, and will also take note of any conclusions made by GBR that seem entirely at odds with the facts and arguments considered.
Where GBR’s treatment of a duty or its overall balancing exercise is irrational in the light of underlying evidence, where GBR has failed to take proper account of a relevant statutory duty, or where it has taken account of an irrelevant factor in reaching its decision, the ORR will be able to uphold the appeal and either send the decision back to GBR for reconsideration or quash all or part of the decision.
What the ORR cannot do is use the remedies set out in the Bill merely because it would have reached a different view had it been the decision maker. The ORR must assess whether GBR’s assessment is rational in the light of the evidence and whether it is within the range of reasonable responses of a public authority, not whether it would have made the same exact decision. That judgment has to be for GBR, as the expert body in charge of the railway.
Lord Lansley (Con)
At the risk of trespassing on the Whip for short interventions, I will try to keep this very short. I have had the benefit of reading the Minister’s letter, and he is referring to this rather important point. There are many references to what the decision-maker—the ORR in this case—has to properly take into account and so on, and to the question of whether the decision then taken, taking into account all the duties and so on, is one that is irrational. We are getting to the Wednesbury test: is it a decision that no reasonable decision-maker could have made? That is where the problem arises, because we want it to be something that can test the decision that is being made, looking at the balance of those considerations, not just whether issues have been considered.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. He will know—or I hope he knows—that we discussed at some length what he is talking about. I agree with him about not double-guessing GBR as it needs to take its decisions, but I will go away and further consider what he and others have said in the light of this discussion. We have had an interesting discussion with a number of different views, and the thing that chimes with me most is his understanding that GBR has to make these decisions, because somebody has to be in charge of the network. I turn to Amendments 259 and 262. I note that both noble Lords seek to question why the ORR can quash and replace some decisions but not others. The distinction in the Bill is deliberate. The appropriate remedy reflects the different nature of the matters or decisions under appeal. When an appeal concerns policies or strategic documents, such as GBR’s access and use policy, the ORR can remit decisions to GBR for reconsideration. The ORR may also give legally binding directions as to that reconsideration, which GBR must follow. Those documents involve complex and interconnected judgments about the operation and use of the railway, in which many factors apply, and where there is often more than one acceptable answer. The interconnected nature of the policies and processes set out in these documents also means that quashing a single element in isolation will often not make sense. It is therefore right that GBR reconsiders the provision in light of the appeal and the ORR’s directions. This approach also reflects that it is GBR, not the ORR, which has the expertise and whole-network view, and is therefore able to take these decisions in the best interests of all railway users and its wider duties. This ensures that the issue identified on appeal is addressed, while preserving GBR’s responsibility for the resulting strategic judgment. This will also enable GBR to more effectively learn from its mistakes. For specific operational decisions, such as refusing an application for a train movement to be added to the working timetable, the Bill goes further. In those cases, the ORR may quash all or part of the decision and send it back to GBR for reconsideration, with directions. But in some limited circumstances, the ORR can substitute its own decision. It may be helpful to think of this like marking somebody’s homework. GBR is writing its homework by making the decision, then the ORR marks that homework. The ORR uses GBR’s legal duties, its published processes and policies and so on, as its marking scheme. Some decisions might only have one possible correct answer, like a maths problem; in those cases, the ORR could immediately substitute the correct answer in place of GBR’s incorrect one. But, for much of GBR’s homework, there will be no single right or wrong answer. GBR will need to exercise significant judgment. In those cases, it will be for the ORR to check GBR’s workings and ask whether GBR got to its decision in a rational and reasonable way. If it did not, the ORR can send the homework back to GBR, with appropriate feedback, and tell it to try again. Giving the ORR a broader discretion to substitute its own judgment would blur responsibility and undermine GBR’s role as the single directing mind. GBR must have the space to apply its end-to-end operational knowledge to optimise best use of the network. Likewise, if we were to go the other way and remove the option for the ORR to substitute its own decision in these specific circumstances, the matter would have to go back to GBR even when there would have been only one lawful decision that GBR could have reached. This would add an unnecessary further step, with associated time and complexity for the parties involved. The limited substitution power therefore supports an efficient and proportionate appeals process without giving the ORR a general power to take decisions in GBR’s place. It preserves the balance at the heart of the framework: GBR remains responsible for decision-making, while the ORR provides effective independent oversight. This process clearly provides protection for operators, and I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am looking at the various appeals that can be made, and there is no provision for an appeal against any decisions that GBR makes under Clause 63. Why is that?
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I will take the noble Lord’s question away and answer it in writing. This time, I will of course copy it to everybody. On Amendments 263 and 264, the clear intention of the framework is to provide a proportionate and accessible route of appeal to the ORR, which would avoid the time, complexity and expense associated with court proceedings. The Government also intend that the ORR will set its own practice and procedure for its appeals process, engaging with industry as it does so. The Secretary of State’s regulation-making power does not interfere with the ORR procedure; instead, it enables provision to be made, where necessary, about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought and in relation to fees and time limits. The power does not give the Secretary of State a role in determining individual appeals, which will remain the ORR’s responsibility. The regulation-making power is intended as a fallback should the appeals process become unworkable or operational changes become necessary. For example, we do not think that it would be appropriate for the ORR to set its own fees; any proposal to charge fees ought to be subject to ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny. These powers are not intended to be exercised routinely, but could be useful if the ORR proposed to make changes, such as introducing fees, that ought to be subject to wider scrutiny. The power can be exercised only after consultation with the ORR and any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate. That provision is deliberately flexible and has been included to enable consultation with stakeholders, including open access operators where relevant, without creating an unnecessarily rigid statutory list. On Amendment 265, to be clear, before issuing, revising or replacing its appeals practice and procedure, the ORR must consult any other persons it considers appropriate, in addition to any named statutory consultees. This deliberately gives the ORR flexibility to consult relevant stakeholders, including open access operators, without creating an inflexible and unwieldy statutory list. Importantly, engagement on the ORR’s future appeals process and procedure is already happening. The ORR published its appeals process discussion document in December last year and sought early views from the industry on its emerging approach. This included its thinking on indicative time limits for when an appeal may be brought and appeal windows. Open access operators have therefore already contributed to the development of the ORR’s emerging appeals process and will have further opportunity to do so through the ORR’s formal consultation following Royal Assent. I therefore urge the noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, it struck me in the course of this debate that any decision made by the ORR must be judicially reviewable, because it is a public body. So a decision made by the ORR, even on judicial review-type grounds, could still find its way through the courts. There will still be multiple directing minds involved. The argument that a single directing mind is crucial to the welfare of the railways is an assertion; it is not demonstrated. As my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham—sadly, he has gone home at a respectable time—said on Second Reading, what the Minister objects to as fragmentation is known in other sectors as specialisation. The benefits of a single directing mind have to be demonstrated and argued for; they cannot simply be asserted. It is clear that it is perfectly possible for the Government to be subject to a proper appeals process, because, as I say, there is a question not only of the equity involved but of the assurance that the private sector needs, if it is to continue investing in something that can generate only a long-term return. It is fair to say that the Minister has listened to those concerns. I was unpersuaded by the letter that he sent to my noble friend Lord Lansley, a copy of which I did in fact get because it was passed to me by my noble friend. I hope other noble Lords do not feel that I was unduly advantaged by being included in the circulation—I was not, but my noble friend sent me a copy of the letter.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
Everyone was equally disadvantaged.
Lord Moylan (Con)
Everyone was equally disadvantaged. I wanted to be clear that no particular privileges were granted to me, but my noble friend passed me a copy of it, so I was able to read it this morning.
I have some familiarity with the process of judicial review and the thinking that goes into it. As I said earlier—I did not mean it in a dismissive way—all the letter really did was to set out how judicial review works. There was very little in it which was new or particular to this Bill. I hope that the noble Lord feels the current position is unsustainable. He seemed to indicate, and this is what I found so interesting in his conversation with my noble friend Lord Lansley, that he might be willing to come forward with a compromise between now and Report, which is not very far away, it would appear. If that is the case, we will be able to return to this subject with greater enlightenment on every part when we come to that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 253 withdrawn.
Amendments 254 to 265 not moved.
Clause 68 agreed.
Clause 69 agreed.
Clause 70: Access rights
Amendment 266
Moved by
266: Clause 70, page 41, line 23, leave out paragraph (b) Member's explanatory statement This amendment probes why it is necessary to omit regulation 5(8) of the 2016 Regulations , which states that it is the duty of the infrastructure manager (ie Network Rail now, GBR in future) to ensure that the entitlements conferred by regulation 5 (ie access for freight and international passenger services) are honoured.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords—
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, does the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres, intend to move that we do now adjourn the Committee? We have less than 30 minutes to go and will be starting on a group where, habitually, and this is not a criticism at all, the Minister is briefed to speak for up to his full allocation of 20 minutes. We will not hear his answer and will be breaking after a few speeches. I think the Committee would appreciate it; the House has gone home. We are not falling badly behind in any sense. We have conducted ourselves with discipline and good will in the course of this Committee over the last six days. I think the Committee would appreciate it if she were to move that we do not continue.
Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)
We have just under 30 minutes. I believe we can start it and finish at 9.15 pm, which we were all aware would be the time we finish. We do not know whether we are getting additional amendments next week or whether things might get degrouped et cetera. If we could possibly continue, we will note who is here and continue if we do not finish this evening, but at least we would have made a start on it.
Lord Moylan (Con)
Is the noble Baroness saying that we are going to stop at 9.15 pm or immediately at the end of the speech being made at that point? Some of us have not actually been able to have a loo break in the course of the last five hours. We should stop these five-hour sessions. They are too long.
Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)
I understand the noble Lord’s frustrations. The time is what is set and what it has usually been, as has been regulated. We can see how far we get and then take a break. If we find we get somebody who speak just before 9.15 pm then we can stop then but I think we have time to hear at least some speakers.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)
We have to stop at 9.15 pm.
Lord Harper (Con)
Before we move on, first, I want to clarify something briefly; the Chair has already done this, I think. It was made very clear to the House by the committee that set out the changes to the way in which Grand Committees operate that the deal is that, having moved from four hours to five hours, five hours is a hard stop. To be clear, that has been made clear. The reason why I want to talk about this whole point around stopping is that seven Members have attached their names to amendments in this group. I understand why the Whip wants to make progress but I say from experience that, if we start the group but can make only one or two speeches, we will end up having a needlessly repetitious debate when we return to the Bill on Monday because, frankly, people cannot always remember what happened nearly a week beforehand. So I am not sure that we will make an awful lot of progress, but I hear what the noble Baroness says. We are all content to proceed if she wants us to do so, but I am not sure that it will mean us getting the business done enormously more expeditiously than we would otherwise do.
Lord Lansley (Con)
In any case, I have been invited to begin by the Chair. Amendment 266 in my name just asks a question. Frankly, when I tabled my amendment, I did not understand how it was going to work, but I have worked it all through. In effect, we are going to get two access arrangements: one for GBR, which can pretty much determine its own access arrangements, determine for itself who can access its infrastructure and so on; and, separately, one for infrastructure managers in relation to whom the existing arrangements under the 2016 regulations will be applied in pretty much the same way as they apply now to Network Rail. Indeed, the way in which the Bill is drafted creates a new statutory duty on infrastructure managers to provide access rights to others in a way that they do not necessarily do now—or would do at the moment through Network Rail. Who are these infrastructure managers? Principally, they are organisations such as HS1, Eurotunnel and the Heathrow Airport spur. There might be one or two in TfL that the Minister knows well, and which are themselves infrastructure managers and are not under the control of Network Rail. With this amendment, all I am looking for is the Minister to say, “There is no further intention than to apply the existing 2016 approach to infrastructure managers other than GBR”. I beg to move Amendment 266.
Lord Grayling (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 267 in this group is in my name. There is a really important principle here. The Minister has quite a lot of reassurance to give on this particular part of the legislation because, at face value, it allows the Secretary of State to issue regulations that rewrite the existing access arrangements. We know that both the Treasury and, I have to say, this Secretary of State are not wildly keen on the existing open access contracts. The Secretary of State recently wrote a letter to the ORR that basically said, “No more open access. We can’t cope with it and we don’t want it”; I am paraphrasing, but the Minister knows full well that that was the broad gist of what she wrote. The Treasury certainly does not like open access, for the reasons we heard from various noble Lords in our earlier debates. Ultimately, Treasury officials see this as a loss of revenue and, as a result, a theoretical increase in the subsidy that they have to provide for the railways. I do not doubt that the Treasury would like to see open access disappear altogether and, having taken the decision to have a unified Great British Railways, would like to have that as the only organisation operating passenger services on the network. Yet there has been a significant expansion of open access in recent years. Right now, we see the launch of a Lumo service from London to Stirling using the west coast main line, rather than the east coast main line, which is one of the busiest railways in the country. The ORR has identified potential train paths that are available to do that, but I do not doubt that the Treasury’s view will be, “Oh no, not another open access operator. We don’t want that”. I also do not doubt that, in the Department for Transport and under the leadership of the Secretary of State, there will be a degree of reluctance given the letter that was written to the ORR saying, “The Government do not want to see more open access on the rail network”. This particular clause appears to allow the Secretary of State to use congested infrastructure, constraints in the infrastructure or similar to say, “We are going to rewrite some of our existing open access operators’ contracts”. The Minister is shaking his head slightly, but that is what it says: it clearly allows the existing access arrangements to be overwritten for infrastructure reasons. The only logical infrastructure reasons there could be for taking those contracts away would be if the Government said, “Actually, there’s not enough space. There are too many constraints. There are blockages and things we don’t want to do in terms of infrastructure management. We want to run fewer trains”. So I want to hear a clear explanation of the purpose of this from the Minister. My amendment is basically designed to set some clear limits on how it can be used. I very much want to hear the Government justify this clause and explain why what I am proposing is not necessary and should be rejected. Although we will not divide on this tonight, I hope that, at the very least, the Minister will go away and come back with a more reasonable clause that properly protects the interests of the existing open access operators—unless there are absolutely exceptional circumstances, in which case proper compensation would need to be paid. It is very much over to the Minister to justify something that seems entirely unjustifiable.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 267 in the name of my noble friend Lord Grayling and echo everything he said. We are looking for a firmer guarantee that the power in Clause 71 is not intended to revisit, reduce or extinguish existing access rights. As we have heard, the amendment would limit the power so that it applies only in circumstances where it is necessary for transferring contracts to the new regime. As drafted, Clause 71 creates an unacceptable degree of uncertainty for non-GBR operators, notably open access operators. I understand that they could also become subject to open-ended and retrospective change. The associated risk will put off capital investment. Clarity in the legislation is needed for continued investment by rail freight and open access operators. I am a huge fan of open access, and I believe that Lumo and Hull Trains have highlighted its success. I know from experience that Lumo offers tremendous value: I recently got a return ticket from London to Carlisle for £17. My only complaint is about the luggage racks, which are too small for airline-compliant suitcases, leading to a scrabble for the admittedly generous but inadequate space at the end of each carriage. The services to Stirling and Edinburgh, which I have tried, are reliable, and the competition that they provide will keep the GBR-owned fleet on its toes. I have not tried Hull Trains, but I gather that it recorded a 94% satisfaction rate in this year’s rail customer experience survey. I have one final question, which arises from what the Minister said in our debate on Monday. Open access operators, freight carriers, cafés and other services along the nationalised railways all have an interest in GBR’s business plan. We do not want any of them to be driven into cutting back services needlessly or going into insolvency at a time when all SMEs are under pressure from tax and cost increases. When will GBR’s business plan be consulted on, and when will the business planning be concluded and the plan approved? The industry needs certainty in both the Bill and the plans going forward.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, these are interesting amendments because some of them originate from European railway legislation 10 or 20 years ago that concerned congested infrastructure and tried to persuade the relevant member state or infrastructure manager that they could not take any more trains so they had better invest in the infrastructure. In parallel, one gets the feeling with some of these applications that Network Rail would prefer not to run any more trains because they might become less reliable and they would have less time for picking up any delays. Therefore, it is important that there is an independent assessment of what is possible, desirable and viable for the capacity of what is still called a congested piece of infrastructure. If the railway can take more freight or passengers, open access or not, then surely that is what it is there for: to offer its customers a good service.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, I will limit my remarks to the three amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, to which I have attached my name. The reason that I support these amendments is not to get in the way of what we want to do with GBR; it is to make sure that the transition is fair and workable, and that there is the relevant certainty on which those private sector operators depend. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe already referred to Lumo and Hull Trains. Those companies procure trains and commit capital years in advance. To fund that capital, they rely on the rights and commercial agreements that they have reached. Their 10-year agreement, which is worth around £500 million, including maintenance, for 14 British-built Hitachi trains, illustrates the scale and duration of those commitments. We are talking about significant amounts of money, employing lots of people and serving significant numbers of customers. Importantly, as pointed out by my noble friend Lady Neville-Role, the fact that these open access operators exist keeps the other operators more competitive. There is clear evidence that, where they compete with LNER, for example, LNER is forced to set lower prices and deliver better services to customers, so everybody benefits. The problem with the clause as drafted is that it gives the Secretary of State very wide powers to alter existing access arrangements. I know that the Minister said that existing rights will be honoured, but that is not what the Bill currently says. This is not the concern of just those of us in Committee; the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was fairly scathing about this clause. It referred to the Government’s memorandum and the various reasons that the Minister gave for the clause. It said that there was a good case for a delegated power to deal with the transition from one model to another but that “in seeking to deal with the transitional position, the Government have proposed a power that is drafted in strikingly broad terms and without any express or implied reference to its purpose. While clause 71(2) illustrates some of the things that the power may be used for it does not narrow the scope”. The committee also said: “The power essentially confers a unilateral right to amend contracts to which the Government is a party. The Memorandum implicitly recognises the potential for interference with the private rights of train operating companies and is at pains to clarify that the Government intends to use the power in a limited way”. To be fair, that memorandum explains that: “The Government has committed that the core rights in these contracts will be preserved as far as possible”. Accordingly, it says that the Government “considers that the core commercial value of the access contracts—enabling the contract-holder to run trains on GBR’s network and therefore make a commercial gain—will not be unduly affected”, and that “the power will not be exercised lightly and would only be used for absolutely necessary changes, such as to reflect the creation of GBR”. I emphasise one or two of those words because they are quite flexible, and private sector companies borrowing hundreds of millions of pounds to procure trains to run a commercial operation are not high-margin businesses. Even if the Government make changes that are only as far as possible and not unduly affected, and make changes that are absolutely necessary, all those things could be met and you could still change the contract in a way that made it not commercially viable for the company to be running it, or where their investors would not otherwise have invested the money. Making those changes unilaterally and retrospectively is not acceptable. The Delegated Powers Committee said the assurances would not be necessary if the delegated power was more constrained, for example by reference in the Bill to its purpose. The committee made the point that it does not judge delegated powers on how the Government say it will use them but on how any Government might use them. So it is no good the Minister saying he is lovely and reasonable and this Government are lovely and reasonable and are not going to do certain things. If they are able to, any future Government, whom he is not able to bind, could use those powers inappropriately. The committee said the exercise of this power could interfere significantly with private contractual rights. It said that while there are mechanisms to ensure that train operating companies are protected to some extent because there are powers to provide for dispute resolution and payment of compensation—they are mentioned in Clause 71(2)—the creation of those mechanisms and the effectiveness of their protection are entirely at the Government’s discretion. There is nothing in the clause as drafted that says there have to be provisions for compensation or mechanisms for dispute resolution. It says the Government can do that but does not say the Government have to do it. In light of the Government’s intentions, the clear recommendation of the committee was that the power in Clause 71(1) should be amended so that it can be used only for purposes that give effect to those intentions. In other words, on the things the Government said they wanted to do in the memorandum and the limits within which they were going to use that power, the committee is very clear that they should be constrained in the Bill. The final thing the committee said was that exercise of the power in Clause 71(1) is subject to the negative procedure. The memorandum from the Government says that is because this is a transitional and technical matter and that because of this, the affirmative or hybrid procedure that could be triggered by it would not be justified. But the committee said it is true that the power covers the transition between access regimes, and the resulting regulations are likely to be technical, but those are not in themselves reasons for avoiding the affirmative procedure if the potential effect of regulations is sufficiently important that automatic debate by Parliament is appropriate and avoidance of the hybrid procedure is a surprising approach to justifying the negative procedure. Where private rights are sufficiently protected, it is common for Bills to include a dehybridisation provision, so that regulations subject to the affirmative procedure do not trigger the hybrid procedure. Now, the power as currently drafted may be exercised to interfere significantly with private contractual rights, and parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation has a role in ensuring appropriate protection of those rights, particularly if they are not sufficiently protected by the power itself. The committee in its second recommendation said: “Since the power in Clause 71(1) may significantly affect private contractual rights, we recommend to the House that to ensure appropriate protection of those rights, its exercise is subject to the affirmative procedure.” So there are two very important recommendations there from the Delegated Powers Committee, which I think are sensible and to which the Government should respond. The Minister has referred on a number of occasions to the access and use policy, which GBR is consulting on. The draft model contracts that are in the future access and use policy have mechanisms for unilateral variation and, although those proposals are not final and are obviously being consulted on, the fact that GBR is envisaging unilateral variation of contracts reinforces the need for clear protection of the agreements that are currently in place, because it is clearly, given that they are consulting on having unilateral variation of contracts, not outside their thinking that that may be something they wish to do. The amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and I have tabled still allow the technical changes needed to keep those existing agreements operational as responsibilities transfer to GBR, but they prevent material rewriting of the commercial bargain or the agreed allocation of risk, and they end at the start of GBR’s first funding period, so it is genuinely transitional and not open-ended. My question to the Minister is: if the Government’s intention, as set out in their memorandum to the Delegated Powers Committee, is genuinely that these are to be used only to make existing agreements work under the new structure, why are the Government taking powers that go much further? If the Minister wants private operators to have the confidence to continue to invest in delivering services which are enormously valued by the public—my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe referred to those provided by Hull Trains and Lumo Trains, which are enormously valued by the public and supported by Members of Parliament along the line of route—and to continue making sure they exist, I think he should do what the Delegated Powers Committee has recommended and limit the power in the Bill.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 270 in this group ensures that regulations made under this clause cannot override or interfere with existing access agreements or rights held by non-GBR infrastructure managers. There is concern, rightly or wrongly, as we have heard today, that even the current open access operators are at risk once GBR comes into operation and all franchises are finally being run as a public service. This amendment seeks some reassurance from the Minister about the Government’s plans for open access and for the current access agreements in operation today and for many years to come. Clarity and certainty are absolutely needed for this sector. I look forward to the Minister’s response next Monday.
Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)
My Lords, I beg leave to adjourn the debate on Amendment 266.
Debate on Amendment 266 adjourned.
Committee adjourned at 9.12 pm.
Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5421867.