Contribution
My Lords, I will limit my remarks to the three amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, to which I have attached my name. The reason that I support these amendments is not to get in the way of what we want to do with GBR; it is to make sure that the transition is fair and workable, and that there is the relevant certainty on which those private sector operators depend.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe already referred to Lumo and Hull Trains. Those companies procure trains and commit capital years in advance. To fund that capital, they rely on the rights and commercial agreements that they have reached. Their 10-year agreement, which is worth around £500 million, including maintenance, for 14 British-built Hitachi trains, illustrates the scale and duration of those commitments. We are talking about significant amounts of money, employing lots of people and serving significant numbers of customers.
Importantly, as pointed out by my noble friend Lady Neville-Role, the fact that these open access operators exist keeps the other operators more competitive. There is clear evidence that, where they compete with LNER, for example, LNER is forced to set lower prices and deliver better services to customers, so everybody benefits.
The problem with the clause as drafted is that it gives the Secretary of State very wide powers to alter existing access arrangements. I know that the Minister said that existing rights will be honoured, but that is not what the Bill currently says. This is not the concern of just those of us in Committee; the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was fairly scathing about this clause. It referred to the Government’s memorandum and the various reasons that the Minister gave for the clause. It said that there was a good case for a delegated power to deal with the transition from one model to another but that
“in seeking to deal with the transitional position, the Government have proposed a power that is drafted in strikingly broad terms and without any express or implied reference to its purpose. While clause 71(2) illustrates some of the things that the power may be used for it does not narrow the scope”.
The committee also said:
“The power essentially confers a unilateral right to amend contracts to which the Government is a party. The Memorandum implicitly recognises the potential for interference with the private rights of train operating companies and is at pains to clarify that the Government intends to use the power in a limited way”.
To be fair, that memorandum explains that:
“The Government has committed that the core rights in these contracts will be preserved as far as possible”.
Accordingly, it says that the Government
“considers that the core commercial value of the access contracts—enabling the contract-holder to run trains on GBR’s network and therefore make a commercial gain—will not be unduly affected”,
and that
“the power will not be exercised lightly and would only be used for absolutely necessary changes, such as to reflect the creation of GBR”.
I emphasise one or two of those words because they are quite flexible, and private sector companies borrowing hundreds of millions of pounds to procure trains to run a commercial operation are not high-margin businesses. Even if the Government make changes that are only as far as possible and not unduly affected, and make changes that are absolutely necessary, all those things could be met and you could still change the contract in a way that made it not commercially viable for the company to be running it, or where their investors would not otherwise have invested the money. Making those changes unilaterally and retrospectively is not acceptable.
The Delegated Powers Committee said the assurances would not be necessary if the delegated power was more constrained, for example by reference in the Bill to its purpose. The committee made the point that it does not judge delegated powers on how the Government say it will use them but on how any Government might use them. So it is no good the Minister saying he is lovely and reasonable and this Government are lovely and reasonable and are not going to do certain things. If they are able to, any future Government, whom he is not able to bind, could use those powers inappropriately.
The committee said the exercise of this power could interfere significantly with private contractual rights. It said that while there are mechanisms to ensure that train operating companies are protected to some extent because there are powers to provide for dispute resolution and payment of compensation—they are mentioned in Clause 71(2)—the creation of those mechanisms and the effectiveness of their protection are entirely at the Government’s discretion. There is nothing in the clause as drafted that says there have to be provisions for compensation or mechanisms for dispute resolution. It says the Government can do that but does not say the Government have to do it.
In light of the Government’s intentions, the clear recommendation of the committee was that the power in Clause 71(1) should be amended so that it can be used only for purposes that give effect to those intentions. In other words, on the things the Government said they wanted to do in the memorandum and the limits within which they were going to use that power, the committee is very clear that they should be constrained in the Bill.
The final thing the committee said was that exercise of the power in Clause 71(1) is subject to the negative procedure. The memorandum from the Government says that is because this is a transitional and technical matter and that because of this, the affirmative or hybrid procedure that could be triggered by it would not be justified. But the committee said it is true that the power covers the transition between access regimes, and the resulting regulations are likely to be technical, but those are not in themselves reasons for avoiding the affirmative procedure if the potential effect of regulations is sufficiently important that automatic debate by Parliament is appropriate and avoidance of the hybrid procedure is a surprising approach to justifying the negative procedure. Where private rights are sufficiently protected, it is common for Bills to include a dehybridisation provision, so that regulations subject to the affirmative procedure do not trigger the hybrid procedure.
Now, the power as currently drafted may be exercised to interfere significantly with private contractual rights, and parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation has a role in ensuring appropriate protection of those rights, particularly if they are not sufficiently protected by the power itself. The committee in its second recommendation said:
“Since the power in Clause 71(1) may significantly affect private contractual rights, we recommend to the House that to ensure appropriate protection of those rights, its exercise is subject to the affirmative procedure.”
So there are two very important recommendations there from the Delegated Powers Committee, which I think are sensible and to which the Government should respond.
The Minister has referred on a number of occasions to the access and use policy, which GBR is consulting on. The draft model contracts that are in the future access and use policy have mechanisms for unilateral variation and, although those proposals are not final and are obviously being consulted on, the fact that GBR is envisaging unilateral variation of contracts reinforces the need for clear protection of the agreements that are currently in place, because it is clearly, given that they are consulting on having unilateral variation of contracts, not outside their thinking that that may be something they wish to do.
The amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and I have tabled still allow the technical changes needed to keep those existing agreements operational as responsibilities transfer to GBR, but they prevent material rewriting of the commercial bargain or the agreed allocation of risk, and they end at the start of GBR’s first funding period, so it is genuinely transitional and not open-ended.
My question to the Minister is: if the Government’s intention, as set out in their memorandum to the Delegated Powers Committee, is genuinely that these are to be used only to make existing agreements work under the new structure, why are the Government taking powers that go much further? If the Minister wants private operators to have the confidence to continue to invest in delivering services which are enormously valued by the public—my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe referred to those provided by Hull Trains and Lumo Trains, which are enormously valued by the public and supported by Members of Parliament along the line of route—and to continue making sure they exist, I think he should do what the Delegated Powers Committee has recommended and limit the power in the Bill.