Contribution
If my noble friend will forgive me, I will get to that subject shortly.
What I have said highlights the potential role for reservation charges in encouraging operators to release paths where they are genuinely no longer required, helping to ensure that scarce capacity can be repurposed to support new freight services and future growth where there is demand. The Bill therefore balances the important flexibility needed for those differences to be considered fairly, while simultaneously avoiding blanket exemptions that could undermine effective capacity management and efficient use of the railway.
On Amendments 241, 248 and 249, I begin by clarifying that Clause 64 concerns the framework for GBR’s charging scheme and the circumstances in which charges may apply. It is not the mechanism through which disruption is addressed. That is the purpose of Clause 65 and the performance regime. The Bill is clear that, where GBR is responsible for disruption, it should compensate affected operators. Indeed, we expect GBR to remain liable in most circumstances because it will almost always have the ability to influence service recovery, infrastructure resilience or operational decision-making.
However, there may be exceptional circumstances where disruption is genuinely outside GBR’s control. For example, following a major terrorism incident, where the railway is subject to police investigations, security searches or evacuations, GBR may have little or no ability to influence when normal services can resume. In such circumstances, it would not be right to automatically require taxpayers to fund compensation payments for events that GBR could neither prevent nor reasonably mitigate. Importantly, the Bill does not attempt to define every such circumstance in legislation. Instead, GBR will be required to consult on its approach, publish its policy transparently and remain subject to appeal through the ORR. That allows the framework to evolve alongside the railway and its users, rather than being constrained by a fixed statutory definition.
I want to provide some reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, regarding freight operators and Amendment 249. Clause 65(3)(b) applies specifically to GBR because GBR is uniquely responsible for the operation, maintenance and renewal of the national rail infrastructure. Third-party operators do not carry those responsibilities and therefore are not exposed to liability for infrastructure failures, engineering works or other matters that sit beyond their control. For that reason, an operator outside GBR could not be held responsible for disruption caused by infrastructure failures or planned engineering works undertaken by GBR. The Bill already allocates responsibility according to which party is best able to manage and influence the risk in question. More broadly, Clause 65 is intended to achieve a fair balance between protecting operators when they are affected by the actions of others and protecting taxpayers from bearing costs where GBR could not reasonably have prevented or mitigated the disruption.
On Amendments 245, 246, 247 and 250, the charging and performance schemes will not be developed in isolation. As under the current framework, GBR will be required to develop these arrangements through a detailed and highly consultative process, working closely with the sector, including the ORR. That is why the published draft access and use policy is being consulted on currently, and I hope it will demonstrate this approach. The Bill already establishes important safeguards. It sets out the matters GBR must consider when developing charging arrangements—for instance, in relation to transparency, requirements for consultation with affected parties, and in providing route to appeal where operators believe decisions are inconsistent with statutory requirements or published policies. Given those circumstances, a requirement to lay these schemes before Parliament for a further three months would not add any substantive protections for operators. In fact, all this would realistically achieve is delaying implementation and reducing the system’s ability to respond efficiently to industry needs.
The noble Lord also suggests a minimum of 12 months’ notice be given before changes are made to the charging scheme. The Bill already provides significant stability through the wider funding and charging framework. Charges will be developed within the context of GBR’s funding period review process, conducted every five years, giving operators greater visibility of costs and future expectations. In the highly unlikely event significant changes were ever required to be made in the middle of a funding period, the Bill also requires GBR to consult affected operators, specifically before making, replacing or revising its charging scheme. Operators will therefore have an opportunity to review and make representations about proposed charges. They will also retain rights of appeal to the ORR.
Finally, the analysis referred to by the noble Lord’s amendment was produced by the ORR in advance of the new access and charging framework set out in this Bill ever being developed. Its purpose was to inform ORR decision-making under different sets of regulations, institutional arrangements and responsibilities—which the Bill disapplies for GBR. We would expect GBR to consider relevant evidence, analysis and stakeholder views when developing its own charging policies. However, we do not believe it would be sensible for Parliament to require GBR, potentially many years or decades from now, to have regard to a particular publication produced under the previous framework, especially given that the organisation it applied to no longer holds the charging responsibilities it sets out in the first place. Rail markets, technology and the needs of users will continue to evolve, and charging policy must be able to evolve alongside them. The Bill already provides for consultation, transparency and regulatory oversight of any future charging scheme. We believe these are the appropriate safeguards, rather than tying future charging decisions to legislation or specific documents.
To the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, about the abstraction rate, he will, I hope, have seen—because we discussed it last week—the access and use policy at page 35, a piece which is seeking to move away from a narrow, not primarily extracted test and towards a fuller assessment of what delivers the greatest benefits to passengers, taxpayers and the wider economy, ensuring decisions are based on the full picture rather than weighted towards a single abstraction metric. It will still include an abstraction rate, but it will allow these wider factors to be considered. We believe that is beneficial to applicants. We also think that railway capacity is too valuable and too scarce to be allocated based on a single headline measure. I know from conversations that applicants find that single test to be disproportionately difficult when some of their cases include some of the things that people want from the railway network which go beyond abstraction itself.
The right decision depends on the circumstance of each case, including passenger demand, operational performance, capacity constraints and the wider benefits a service can bring, and the approach will ensure that all these considerations are taken into account, rather than applying a crude pass and fail test. If a proposed new service brings significant economic benefits, perhaps by opening new direct rail connections that will support economic regeneration, jobs, housing and growth, then GBR will need to weigh those benefits against any abstraction impacts, and in some instances there may be a strong case to grant access even where there are higher levels of abstraction.