Contribution
My Lords, I declare my interest as a non-practising barrister. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, even though I feel unable to follow her conclusions.
In 2020, Mr David Lammy, who was the ministerial author of the proposals in this Bill, said:
“Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea”.
He has also said that jury trials are
“one of the big contributions that flow out of Magna Carta”.
He was right on the first two points and almost right on the third—and here I have to disagree with my noble friend Lord Ashcombe. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who cannot be here today, has shown in his magisterial recent Selden lecture on the history of jury trial, trial by jury actually began just a little while after Magna Carta when Pope Innocent III banned trial by ordeal in November 1215, after which, following a writ of King Henry III in 1219, travelling judges began to use a local jury to determine guilt or innocence. Whether it began in 1215 or 1219, jury trial has long been part of our national history.
The traditions which make a country what it is are like a tapestry—one that has many threads. If you start to remove those threads, the tapestry begins to unravel and becomes threadbare. The traditions start to dissolve and the essential soul of the nation, bit by bit, begins to get lost. Jury trials are a part of that tapestry. The principle that we are entitled, if accused of a serious offence, to be tried by our fellow citizens, has become deeply embedded in our national psyche.
While I welcome the removal of the original Clause 3 of the Bill, I view with great concern the proposals to curtail the right to trial by jury, some of which go beyond the recommendations of the Leveson review. I am particularly concerned by the provisions of Clause 1, which would remove the current right of an adult defendant charged with an “either way” offence to elect for a Crown Court trial. What are these “either way” offences? They include theft and shoplifting, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, fraud and drug offences. Quite apart from the obvious consequences of a conviction for these offences, the reputational damage could be even more severe. That is not something which a court would be entitled, under the provisions of the Bill, to take into account when deciding the appropriate venue for trial. I also have concerns, among other provisions, about Clause 3, which removes the right to jury trial in long and complex cases, and Clause 6, which removes the automatic right to appeal to the Crown Court against conviction or sentence in the magistrates’ courts.
As we have heard from the noble Baroness and previous speakers, I recognise that not all your Lordships share in these concerns, but there is one provision in this Bill which I hope all Members of this House would unite in opposing. That is the provision in Part 2 of new Schedule 3ZA which would enable the Secretary of State to add by order—by order, my Lords—to the number of offences which come within the scope of the new schedule, meaning the offences in respect of which jury trial would no longer be available.
As the Government’s own Explanatory Notes put it, this would enable the Secretary of State to
“add offences which are not related to fraud or financial crime to the Schedule”.
He could add any offence, by order, to the schedule—this is monstrous. Your Lordships have long been accustomed to what have been termed, not always accurately, Henry VIII clauses—but this is not a Henry VIII clause; this is a Joseph Stalin clause. It is an absolute outrage, and it should not be allowed to remain in the Bill, whatever the fate of some of the other provisions to which I have referred. There is much scope for your Lordships to improve the Bill, and I hope we make the most of this opportunity.