Contribution
My Lords, I welcome the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, because it enables us to go to the core of what this legislation is all about. Light-touch amendment it is not, but I think it goes to the heart of what we need to talk about.
As I said at Second Reading, I really welcome bringing NHS England essentially into the department. It restores ministerial accountability to Parliament and, for a £200 billion service, that is very important. Essentially, it seems to me that we are going back to a 1948 Bevanite model of the NHS. Of course, we do not recall his dictum, but it is very famous—that when a bucket of slops is kicked over by a maid in hospital in Tredegar, its echo should sound in the corridors of Whitehall. Bevan also said at the time, because of course he backed off Morrison, who wanted local government to control the NHS, that he wanted lots of decisions to be made locally through the hospital management committees and regional hospital boards that were set up. Of course, the moment it started, the Ministry of Health, as it then was, started to issue circular after circular. That is perhaps an inevitability of the way you get there, when you have a national health service funded simply through taxation.
There are some genuine issues around the relationship between the centre and the local National Health Service which we need to tease out. We had a round table at which the chief executive of the NHS Alliance spoke about the concern that the alliance has that integrated care boards will find that their room for manoeuvre is very limited. One response to that is that ICBs’ accountability was solely going to be to the centre. The Government’s decision to keep Healthwatch is very important in terms of having more local accountability—that is why it is so welcome. I know that noble Lords are concerned about Ministers taking over responsibility for the appointment of chairs and non-executives, but I think that we should also keep councils of governors of foundation trusts. They are local people, elected by members of those trusts, who do the current round of appointments. We will come to this later on in our debate on Clause 30. I am really looking for the Government to look at this again.
There are some real issues about the future relationship of the centre to the locality. I commend the brief that we have had from the King’s Fund, which poses some key questions. What should the boundary be between legitimate national oversight and routine operational management? What would prevent this broad power becoming a mechanism for day-to-day management from Whitehall? How will you deal with bottlenecks, and the practical risk that moving a large number of functions and decisions towards the Secretary of State could slow the NHS down rather than speed decisions up, particularly around the appointment of chairs and non-executives? Which of the Secretary of State’s most consequential intervention powers will be subject to intervention, advice or scrutiny? In what circumstances would Ministers expect to intervene in local service reconfiguration? What safeguards will ensure decisions that are often best made locally and on clinical grounds? How is the greater role for local government and mayors to operate alongside stronger central powers and require the Secretary of State to have regard to local decision-making? What statutory safeguards will there be in relation to the powers of the Secretary of State to appoint, suspend or remove the chair and other non-executive directors? For the Secretary of State’s most consequential intervention powers, is there a case for putting relevant decision-making criteria on the face of the Bill?
I do not know the answer to that, but I think that, by Report, it would be helpful if my noble friend could explain in a little detail how the Government think the new arrangements are going to work and how you will prevent unnecessary micromanagement from the centre.