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Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 26 October 2026

Debate

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I would like to join with the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham. I have, as has been indicated, signed their amendment, but I echo also what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has said about the way in which the Minister has gone about dealing with the Bill. Noble Lords will be glad to know that I will not be speaking on other groups of amendments, other than one. That gave me a very good insight into the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Lloyd, goes about things. We had three separate meetings in the Recess; she has been exemplary in the way that she has tried to deal with the arguments and with Members of your Lordships’ House and I want to put on record my gratitude to her for that. So why have I signed Amendment 164? Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the Secretary of State with formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess. We certainly know that, in the past, everything from the National Health Service onwards has been subjected to attacks: in that case the NHS was attacked by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist, though. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed. The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness. This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all. Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations, our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before Parliament within six months, this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift. Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It was an inquiry into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance of the Government to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place the People’s Republic of China, which we found to be the state that was the most responsible for transnational repression in the United Kingdom, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries, we have failed to do so. I would be grateful when the Minister comes to reply if she is able to give us any information about whether Mr Dan Jarvis, who is responsible for security issues and who promised to continue to keep this issue under review, has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations and also the concerns raised by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, has often spoken about in your Lordships’ House. Strategic ambiguity, which is what I think has been the order of the day, does not deter authoritarian regimes; it merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience, we must replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical, transparent and accountable framework, and I urge the Government to embrace this vital measure and to accept Amendment 164 in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham.

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