Contribution
I thank noble Lords for their interventions and constructive debate on this group. I will start by addressing the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the assurances sought by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose.
On the question of safeguards and guardrails, the noble Lord and I are coming from the same place. The vendor-related amendments I have tabled have clear statutory tests. The Secretary of State can give a direction only if two conditions are met. First, they must consider that a risk to national security arises, or could arise, from an operator’s use of a vendor’s goods, services or facilities, and, secondly, the direction is necessary and its requirements are proportionate.
The Secretary of State must consider whether other, less excessive measures would address the risk. Other regimes work the same way. We have designed the framework so that risks are managed early, through non-statutory guidance and voluntary referral routes. We want to avoid, as far as possible, costly interventions such as replacing embedded vendors.
On the question of notices and representations, I agree that operators and vendors should have a say before a direction is given. That is why my amendments require the Secretary of State to consult both the operator and the vendor before giving a direction, unless doing so would be contrary to national security.
I do not think a fixed period for representations in primary legislation is the right approach. Instead, my amendments include a delegated power for the Secretary of State to set statutory timelines in secondary legislation for deciding whether to give a direction. Under this approach, we must consult operators, vendors and all other stakeholders on what those timelines should be before regulations are made. It gives us the flexibility to amend the timelines through secondary legislation, should we assess that this is necessary.
On judicial authorisation, I must be clear: the Government cannot accept a requirement for a court to authorise a direction before it is given. These are national security judgments, informed by advice from the intelligence community. They are rightly made by the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament. That does not mean there is no judicial oversight. Operators, and in most cases vendors, will be able to challenge directions and enforcement decisions by judicial review in the High Court.
On review and renewal, I understand that the noble Lord wants directions to expire after a fixed period. I do not think this is wise. A direction must be necessary and proportionate when it is given, and the same applies when it is varied. Businesses also need certainty and not frequent reviews. This approach follows established precedent under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021. The requirements on what a direction must contain also limit its scope. In practice, this means that directions are likely to be tied to specific procurement decisions and mitigations, not ongoing reporting requirements.
On reporting, I agree that Parliament should be able to see how these powers are used. I am proposing that the Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament setting out how the power has been used. The Secretary of State must also publish a notice when the direction is given, varied or revoked, unless this would unreasonably harm national security or commercial interests. This follows the National Security and Investment Act model. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord and the noble Viscount will feel reassured that the safeguards they seek are built into the framework and that they will not press their amendments.
Turning to Amendment 164, let me be clear that this Government are serious about protecting our essential services from hostile states; it is a central tenet of the Bill and the amendments I have tabled. However, I disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that a register of foreign powers aids us in that objective. Indeed, this House had that debate during passage of the Telecommunications (Security) Act, where it was agreed that a country-specific approach is not appropriate. A register can create false certainty. National security threats do not come solely or consistently from a fixed group of foreign powers; for example, a company acting with hostile intent may have close ties to a hostile state while being registered elsewhere. Hostile actors evolve and adapt, so we must focus on identifying and mitigating the risk itself, rather than maintaining a list of countries. Our assessment of risk will always be led by expert security advice, and it should not be constrained by an arbitrary list. However, I understand the important points made about clarity and information on where our threats are coming from. The NCSC annual report highlights the risks posed by foreign actors, and we work with it to mitigate those risks. The report clearly articulates the cyber threats from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, as well as cyber criminals. I hope that also addresses the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
I take the points from the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about addressing the information gap and providing businesses with information. That is exactly why the vendor risk framework will be underscored by guidance. This will support businesses to conduct an informed risk assessment of their supply chains, rather than cutting out countries on a list, which would have economic impacts without addressing the national security risks—the worst of both worlds. There is, and has always been, a delicate balance between national security and economic and diplomatic co-operation. An arbitrary list cuts across this. A case-by-case risk assessment, using guidance and based on expert security advice, is the only sensible way to do it.
To address the question from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about further deliberations by the Government on his committee’s report, I will write to him with an update following this debate.
I am grateful to noble Lords for this debate. I believe that we share the same aims: decisions about vendors should be evidence-based, proportionate and open to proper scrutiny. I hope I have provided reassurance that the vendor risk management framework provides these safeguards through its statutory tests, the duty to consult, judicial review and reporting to Parliament.