Contribution
My Lords, in speaking to this group, which has many amendments in my name, I will speak in particular to Amendment 40. Amendment 30 is consequential and is a probing amendment. Most of my amendments in this group ask the question why the Secretary of State requires such huge powers of direction. I know that, in the next group, we will come to what happens if the Secretary of State uses those powers of direction. This is a probing amendment, and I will be very clear at the end about exactly why I am probing.
When you abolish a body the size of NHS England, its powers have to land somewhere. In this Bill, they land overwhelmingly on the desk of the Secretary of State. Clause 11 is the heart of that. It gives the Secretary of State a general power to direct integrated care boards on how they exercise their functions. I want to take the Committee through what that power actually does, because I do not think its breadth has been fully grasped. New Section 14Z61 lets the Secretary of State direct a board—one board, several boards, indeed all ICBs—on whether to use a power at all; on when and how a function is exercised; on the conditions to be met first; and on what the board must take into account.
Where an integrated care board’s decision depends on it forming an opinion, the Secretary of State can inform that opinion themselves and direct the ICB to act without forming an opinion at all. The board’s judgment becomes optional. There are three exceptions: there should be no directing the appointment of an aimed individual, the care of an individual patient or treatment contrary to NICE guidance. They are all sensible and my amendment keeps each one, applying them to its commissioners, which I will talk about later. But outside those three exceptions, there is little that the Secretary of State could not direct an integrated care board to do.
Look at what the department told the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee: the department’s memorandum is remarkably candid. It concedes that NHS England has no general power to direct boards at all; it can direct only on primary care or where a board is failing or at risk of failing. It concedes that the Secretary of State’s existing
“power to direct NHSE … has only been used on highly technical functions”.
That is not a transfer; it is a brand new power far wider than anything NHS England has ever held dressed up as housekeeping.
How will this be scrutinised? It will not. The memorandum says plainly that there will be “no parliamentary procedure”—neither affirmative nor negative; nothing. Instead, there will just be publication
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
after the event. On the companion power in Clause 8, which will let the Secretary of State order a board to take on any of the Secretary of State’s health functions, the department says that directions are preferred because they act
“without taking up valuable parliamentary time”.
Scrutiny is not a waste of parliamentary time: it is the job of this House and this Parliament.
The memorandum goes further. Directions are chosen, it says, because changes can be made
“more quickly than they would through regulations”
and
“in a level of detail that would not ordinarily be included on the face of primary or secondary legislation”.
Translated, this route is chosen precisely because it avoids Parliament. It tells us that the two powers may be used together to direct a board to take on a function under Clause 8 and then direct how to carry it out under Clause 11. That is not strategic commissioning; it makes the ICBs a branch office of the Secretary of State.
There is an inconsistency, too. The department says that waiting times and patient choice requirements in Clause 16 belong in regulations because they
“need to be consistently applied across the NHS”.
Yet it justifies directions on service specifications and clinical pathways on exactly the same grounds of national consistency. If consistency demands regulations for one, why does it demand no parliamentary procedure at all for others? I note that Clause 16 will omit Section 6E, the existing regulation-making power, and put narrower powers on waiting times, patient choice and appeals in its place. Beyond those, rules that Parliament could see can be replaced by instruction it reads about afterwards.
Even the failure regime in new Section 14Z62A, which will let the Secretary strip an ICB of its functions, sack the chief executive and direct who replaces them, at least requires published reasons. The general power used on an ICB that is doing perfectly well does not even require that. The pattern continues. The Government’s October supplementary memorandum adds yet more direction powers over new maternity and neonatal commissioners and describes no procedure for how to do so. I also note that it describes these as “subordinate legislation”; subordinate legislation that Parliament never sees is a curious creature.
Add the removal of the mandate and the removal of the prescribed content of performance assessments, and the direction of travel is obvious. The things that give ICBs a framework and gave Parliament sight of it are taken out, and the things that allow ministerial instruction are put in. The Health Foundation is right that this hands too much of the day-to-day running of the NHS to Ministers, and a Secretary of State who can direct any ICB on anything will rightly or wrongly be blamed for everything.
My amendment is deliberate in its broadness, as I want to understand the Government’s thinking. I, for one, do not think that it will be accepted by the Government; that is why it is a probing amendment. It does not deny that the Secretary of State must be accountable for the NHS, but it offers a different way of doing it. First, the Secretary of State would set national outcomes for the health service in England, laid before Parliament, with an annual report on progress. That would replace the mandate that the Bill abolishes. Secondly, the Secretary of State would set outcomes for each board, after consulting it and having regard to local needs assessments and neighbourhood health plans. Those outcomes are results for patients, not instructions on means. That is the line between holding to account the NHS and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State operationally running it.