Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful to my two noble and learned friends who have just spoken and to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for their comments in support of the principles behind these amendments. I should say that my Amendment 32 goes further than the other amendments because it is intended to allow such applications to be made by a defendant for trial by judge alone, and not just in lengthy and complex cases.
My amendment asks for a new right to apply for—not to select but to apply for—trial by judge alone. Many noble Lords who have spoken in the debates today and at Second Reading strongly support the right to elect trial by jury. If we have such enthusiasm for the right to elect trial by jury, why not allow defendants to elect trial by judge? That would set out a level playing field. It seems entirely logical and something that we have overlooked. Speaking only for myself to this extent, I have been waiting a long time to find a Bill in which the proposal in Amendment 32 is in scope. It is not entirely dependent—it is not dependent at all—on the rest of the Bill, but here we have the vehicle to create this new right that would save time and money and give a greater sense of justice.
In a very dusty basement in my inn of court, Gray’s Inn, there were two shelves full of the manuscript notes of every single case that I ever did from 1971, when I started practising at the Bar. Later, they were reduced to computerised form, which really put me in my place, because the expert who reduced them, every word of them, managed to put them on a single stick, which I have in a drawer at home. I am able to access this very personal library of all the cases that I have done. I do not do criminal trials any more, but one thing that I always used to do was to make a note at the end of my notes about what I as an individual—not just as a barrister but as a person—thought was the right or wrong result of the trial. On a number of occasions, only a few cases but significant ones, I placed words like, “Wish we’d been able to have judge alone”. In a number of others, I placed the words, “Made a mistake —we did not apply for trial in the magistrate’s court and should have done”.
There are many cases where trial by judge alone, or indeed trial not by jury but in the magistrate’s court, is not only in the best interests of the defendant—and probably of the witnesses and victims, because of the reduced machinery required in presenting the evidence in court—but is actually in the interests of justice. In one of those cases, an appeal took place, in 1988—16 years after I was junior counsel in a murder case in which our client was convicted. There were no court records whatever, but I was able to provide from my library of notebooks the only record that the Court of Appeal could use. I had to redact a limerick that I had written about a rather pesky judge, but otherwise it was the record of the case. It was not a case in which I would have advised asking for trial by judge alone, but I had written at the end, “Maybe without the jury he would have been acquitted”. It took 16 years for him to be acquitted by the Court of Appeal, and there are such cases.
I have great respect for jury trials. As a prosecutor or as a defender, if you like that sort of thing, there is nothing like making your story the one that the jury hear, enjoy and adopt. An advocate in jury trials is working with a jury; it is quite a different discipline from working with a judge. When you have a trial in front of a judge alone, you have a much more mechanical process—that is not to criticise judges for being mechanistic, but it is just a fact—in which the judge looks at the issues and tables them on one side of the page, as it were, and on the other side of the page tables the issues that have to be determined by the court. I am looking at the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, opposite, whose husband is an experienced and highly respected judge in the north-west of England.
I have great respect for jury trials, but for some cases there are disadvantages about them. There is the potential lengthening of the case in front of a jury. I once did a case in London in which my client, a respected chartered accountant, was accused of fiddling the VAT in relation to some somewhat dubious services provided in a basement club somewhere near Soho. He had to wait a very long time to be acquitted in a case in which the judge quite plainly, if trying the case alone, would have said, “There just isn’t the evidence here. Why have we wasted all this time?”
As well as potential length and complexity, there are issues that have already been mentioned such as the publicity, the unforeseen consequences of publicity and, above all, the absence of written reasons for a verdict. As I mentioned at Second Reading, in Northern Ireland there are courts that deal with cases—admittedly, a special kind of case, cases involving terrorism issues and matters arising from the Troubles—that are heard by judges. I reviewed them for the Government during the time that I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The acquittal rate in those courts in Northern Ireland is higher than the acquittal rate in front of juries in so far as you can describe comparable cases. With a judge in an appropriate case, you have a reasoned judgment explaining why the judge has reached a particular decision. That is applicable especially in historic sex cases and in accountancy-heavy cases, and, as Northern Ireland has shown, it can often leave a defendant more satisfied that he or she has had a fair hearing.
I suggest that this is a simple amendment which would probably save some time, which would ensure that the right to jury trial was extended or removed in a proper way and which would add something creditable to our system which is replicated in some Commonwealth countries that have almost exactly our systems of trial.