B

Baroness Kramer (LD)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 10 November 2026

Debate

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026

Contribution

My Lords, I fully accept that these two instruments contain sensible changes to reflect the introduction in the case of stablecoin in one and, in the other, to promote innovation within the crypto sphere. I will not do a line-by-line analysis—the Minister has laid out much of that—but I have some concerns. I will address each SI in turn to reflect those areas of concern. Using the same order as the Minister, I start with the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026. This SI exempts qualifying stablecoin from regulation related to most dealing and arranging activity. I recognise that, as the Minister pointed out, this does not apply to general lending or borrowing, but it removes regulation from institutional collateral and repurchase arrangements. I recognise that the word “institutional” is intended to show that consumers would be protected even though there is a relaxation of lending and borrowing rules around repos and collateral. But, to me, the very fact that we are making this distinction again between institutional and consumer in the way we regulate—or in whether there is any regulation at all—raises again the whole issue of the regulatory perimeter. The mini-bond scandal of just a few years ago is a powerful example of how bad actors manipulate around the edges of the regulatory perimeter established by the FCA to exploit people who think they are protected by FCA regulations when they are not. It is not difficult to confuse people, because the FCA’s approach means that some activities of a firm are regulated, while others—carried out by exactly the same firm but merely with a different customer base, as it were—are not. Many investors can be fooled and exploited. I would just like to hear the Minister’s comments, because I am concerned. The crypto industry has plenty of honest players but it is also a magnet for the criminal, the corrupt and the inept. I would like a lot more assurance that this SI is not setting up the next mini-bond scandal, particularly around the area of institutional repos and collateral, which could easily be reformed in such a way that consumers could be persuaded that they were indeed qualified and sophisticated enough to purchase them, and then we will be back into another Woodford and that sequence of scandals. I am also mindful that, when those mini-bond scandals first broke, the FCA basically said, “Nothing to do with me, guv—they’re outside the perimeter”. I would like to have some assurance that the FCA is now recognising that that perimeter cannot be such a hard line; it has to have some flexibility when there is obvious abuse. The second of the statutory instruments deals essentially with the sandbox. I certainly do not object to it but again I have questions. I recognise that I was somewhat involved in the early days of the sandbox approach, and it has played a very important role in supporting innovation by using practical experience to get regulation right. It was first conceived of and introduced by UK financial regulators after the financial crisis to develop an effective regulatory framework for the fintechs, which is how I got involved in the process. The model, indeed, has been both recognised and copied around the world. This SI, however, significantly extends the scope of the sandbox. The primary weakness of the sandbox system is that the regulator picks and chooses who gets to go in. When it picks out one of several small rival companies looking at approximately the same kind of innovation, it hugely advantages that entity that is chosen to go into the sandbox. Rivals suddenly find that they may struggle to get investment. Then, when the regulations appear, they are very much structured around that particular sandbox experience and so are often very tailored to the specific company that was in the sandbox and in effect they shut out relatively close rivals. Companies have not dared to complain about a lot of this publicly because they are afraid that they will be treated as FCA troublemakers. How will the Government and the FCA address this issue now that the scope will be very much wider, drawing in many more pieces of legislation and a much bigger activity base? Secondly, what kind of oversight does Parliament have as these innovations are introduced? This statutory instrument assumes permanent enactment by negative SIs, but the scope of the legislation essentially makes regulatory innovation subject only to regulatory decision-making. That is a direction which many of us in this House have raised before, and it seems that these changes in particular double down on that concern over both scrutiny and oversight. As regards the breadth of the shift of what had previously been primary legislation now to the regulator, much of the motivation seems to be driven by the introduction of DIGIT, a digitally native short-dated government debt instrument that the Government intend to issue in 2027. Although DIGIT depends on known technology in the form of blockchain, the risks of unexpected technology failure are high, liquidity is an issue, and the system clearly lacks interoperability. How is Parliament supposed to raise these issues and challenges, given the way in which decision-making is essentially transferred to the regulator, which as far as I can tell has not provided satisfactory answers on any one of the issues that I just listed? The SI also makes it clear that the regulator can go on to make changes which are far more sweeping than the examples it discusses in the Explanatory Memorandum that is attached. I would very much like the Government to address some of these concerns.

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