B

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 11 November 2026

Debate

Health Bill

Contribution

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow two of your Lordships’ House’s real experts in this area, and I look forward to hearing from a third shortly. To extend the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we are singing from the same hymn sheet, but just different parts. That is what this group of amendments is doing. I will start with my Amendments 168, 169 and 172B, and I will deal with Amendment 268 at the end, which is somewhat different. These three amendments address different parts of the same problem. Who has access to NHS patient data? Who controls the infrastructure holding that data? Should the NHS should continue to rely on Palantir to provide that infrastructure? I will start with the principle behind all three: NHS patient data belongs to a public health service under public control. It should not be accessible to commercial companies simply because the NHS has entered into a contract with them to provide the technology. The Government will no doubt say that patient data remains under NHS control and that Palantir acts as a data processor and cannot use the information for its own commercial purposes. Those are important contractual assurances, but they do not, as the other amendments in this group highlight, answer the issues that are raised. There is a difference between owning the data and having control over the systems through which that data is accessed, processed and managed. There is also a difference between a contractual promise and having the practical ability to guarantee that sensitive information remains beyond the reach of commercial contractors. In fact, we know that that is exactly what is happening. NHS England has confirmed that three Palantir engineers have administrative-level access to the national data integration tenant, part of the federated data platform. A further 12 Palantir engineers have had more limited project-specific access for particular data sets and tasks. Now, this is not an allegation that Palantir employees are routinely browsing individual patient records, but administrative-level access to a system holding identifiable patient information is a serious responsibility. It raises huge questions about the boundary between public control and commercial access. I note that the National Data Guardian herself has questioned this. She said that the information about external contractors having access to identifiable patient data appeared to be inconsistent with the data protection impact assessment she had previously reviewed and she sought clarification from NHS England on this. Amendment 168 addresses this directly. It would stop commercial entities and their employees, officers and subcontractors from accessing identifiable NHS patient data. That includes not just direct access to patient records but administrative and privileged access to databases, as well as access through software, support, maintenance and testing. We need this because we cannot allow the distinction between accessing patient records and administering the systems that contain them to become a loophole in the protection of confidential information. Commercial suppliers can still provide technical services. The amendment does not prevent the NHS from buying software or obtaining technical support, but it requires those services to be delivered using anonymised records. The NHS should be able to benefit from technical expertise without giving commercial companies access to identifiable patient information. We come to the specific issue of Palantir, which is covered by both amendments. Palantir, as has already been alluded to, is not an ordinary technology supplier with no wider controversies. Its work with the Israeli military has drawn serious criticism from human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, which has documented the company’s links to Israel’s military activities in Gaza. It is also important to look at the ownership and the philosophy of this company. In March, Alex Karp said he believes AI will shift power away from “highly educated, often female voters who vote mostly Democrat” and towards working-class men. I asked the Library to have a look at the ownership and control structures of Palantir. I thank it for its very detailed research, to which I am not going to subject noble Lords in detail. The key point is that Alex Karp, to whom I have just referred, co-founder Stephen Cohen, and chairman Peter Thiel have between them 49.99% of voting power because of the stock structure of the company. I note that the major institutional shareholders are Vanguard Group and BlackRock, Inc. They are not known for being companies that stand up for human rights, the rule of law or the public good. They have very distinct financial interests. In particular, the company’s chairman, Peter Thiel, is known for his controversial views. At the Oxford Union in 2023, he said that the NHS makes people ill and should be privatised. I note also, in a broader context, that he is on the record as framing politics as an existential struggle against the Antichrist. Mr Thiel has named possible suspects for the Antichrist, including Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Greta Thunberg and people who are critics of artificial intelligence. Now, that is quite disturbing. I would also note the fact that he was asked, in a video available online under the headline “Peter Thiel and the Antichrist”, whether he preferred the human race to endure. The interviewer said: “You’re hesitating”. Peter Thiel said: “Well, I don’t know. I would … There are so many questions around this”. The interviewer repeated: “Should the human race survive?” After 18 seconds, Mr Thiel said, “Yes”. I have some questions to put to the Minister within the framework of the fact that the UN guiding principles on business and human rights make it clear that businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights. Have the Government properly considered those responsibilities when awarding and continuing this contract? Have they assessed Palantir’s links to breaches in international human rights law? Will the Government explain what human rights due diligence was undertaken? I will jump to Amendment 172B. I stress that it does not say that we have to switch off Palantir immediately. It is a proposal for a transition away from Palantir, with patient care and data security protected throughout. The Government may point to the benefits that they say the federated data platform is already delivering. Of course, better use of data can help hospitals to manage waiting lists and make better use of resources, but none of that requires the NHS to surrender its control.

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