Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)

I am really thrilled to be supporting the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, because obviously he is so sure of everything he says that I must be doing the right thing. I will deal with Amendments 447 and 448 slightly differently, because they are different. I support Amendment 447 because it directly responds to how the law is currently interpreted by the courts. The Supreme Court has made it clear that someone can be convicted without any requirement to show that they intended to support terrorism. The offence is about the suspicion of others, not the intention of the person charged. That might explain the law as it stands, but it also exposes the problem. Under this interpretation, people are criminalised not for what they mean to do but for how their actions might be perceived or might be used symbolically by other people. The court accepted that this interferes with freedom of expression but concluded that the interference was justified because Parliament chose to prioritise disruption and prevention. This amendment asks Parliament to look again at that choice. Criminal law normally punishes intentional recklessness. Here, however, we are dealing with offences that can be triggered by clothing, images or symbols, with no need to show encouragement, promotion or support in any real sense. That is a very wide net, and one that risks catching protest, journalism, art, research or sheer provocation. The Supreme Court has told us plainly that if this is to change it must be done by Parliament. That is exactly what this amendment does. It ensures terrorism laws target people who genuinely seek to assist terrorism, not those whose conduct just creates an appearance or a reaction. I obviously feel very sensitive about this, being a serial protester. On Amendment 448, the Terrorism Act gives the state some of its strongest powers, and rightly so, but with powers that strong, we should be very careful about who gets caught up in them. Amendment 448 follows directly from the same Supreme Court judgment and addresses its practical consequences. The court accepted that Section 13 interferes with freedom of expression but held that the interference was justified because the law was clear and because Parliament had chosen that. It is all our fault. That leaves people prosecuted under these provisions with very little room to explain themselves. If you carry or display something and it falls within the scope of the offence, your purpose largely does not matter. This amendment introduces a basic safeguard—a defence for those who can show that they did not mean to encourage, incite or enable terrorism. The Supreme Court emphasised foreseeability that people should be able to control their conduct if the law is clear, but foreseeability alone is not the same as fairness. A system that criminalises without regard to intent places an enormous burden on lawful expression and legitimate activity. By putting a defence on the face of the statute, Parliament would make it clear that these offences were aimed at genuine support for terrorism, not incidental, critical or contextual engagement with proscribed organisations.