Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)

My Lords, this group has a number of amendments in my name: Amendments 50A and 51B; Amendment 53A to Schedule 3; and Amendment 196A. There are two separate issues involved in these amendments; I will speak first to those that relate to the restrictions on the number and roles of commissioners. Last week, we had a really useful debate on the areas of competence. In a sense, this debate shadows that because the commissioners are supposed to shadow the areas of competence. Those of us who were thinking about other areas of competence—in particular, the arts, culture and so on—were looking for some flexibility. These amendments seek similar flexibility in the related roles of commissioners. New Section 29A, to be inserted by Clause 9, says that mayors may appoint up to seven people and that their functions align with the competence areas. This is potentially an unnecessary example of central control. I would argue that mayors should be free to appoint people to roles determined by them. Why do I think this? Because every area is very different and every area will have different priorities. Broadly speaking, the areas of competence are wide-ranging. We were arguing that the arts and culture should be an additional area, but they could be within one of the areas of competence; this may mean that a mayor will wish to appoint an additional commissioner. I use this as an example because it is what we were debating last week. This issue is important because you need to bring in the right people for the right jobs, covering those areas of competence and where mayors will make a particular and special emphasis. It also makes the devolution framework very rigid for the future, which is bad for two reasons. First, it would require primary legislation to enable a change in responsibilities and job titles, or to add more commissioners. Over time, I suspect there will be new priorities in different areas. Secondly, the restrictions would also prevent mayors appointing people to roles which they might want to fill, inhibiting the innovation we want to see from the devolution model—which, in general terms, I think we all applaud. For example, some already appoint active travel commissioners, who would either be out of scope in terms of the legislation or be prevented from continuing in their roles. The amendment, therefore, deals with this by getting rid of the restrictions. Fewer restrictions would allow mayors to make commissioner appointments to different roles, depending on the needs of their own area, region, county or counties. For example, instead of a single transport and local infrastructure commissioner, we could see some areas appointing a bus commissioner or an active travel commissioner under these provisions; such appointments would still be subject to other scrutiny provisions on commissions contained in Schedule 3 to the Bill. Overall, this change would create the right kind of flexibility in the mayoral model, while keeping mayors responsible for keeping a lid on costs through transparency and scrutiny. I anticipate that the Minister will argue that we have to have restraints on costs, and I do not disagree with that. My second area of interest in this group is the restrictions on mayoral political advisers; Amendment 196A deals with that issue and argues for mayoral special advisers. Currently, the central government model of transparency and flexibility on special adviser appointments has, I think we could fairly argue, been a success in balancing value for money for the taxpayer with the ability of Ministers to bring in the right level of expertise. I recently read a really interesting book called Every Journey Matters, which looks at the history of the first 25 years of Transport for London. The thing that emerges very strongly from that account of TfL’s first 25 years is the quality of advice that TfL was able to tap about commissioners, support staff and, effectively, special advisers—though I do not think they were called that back in the day. All the mayors have drawn on that and, I think, benefitted from it. One could fairly argue that TfL is one of the most successful metropolitan transportation networks and systems in the world, and the quality of advice has made that difference. Therefore, the model from the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 should be applied to mayors, given their increasingly broad role and responsibility. There are three issues relating to the current system of appointments of political advisers by mayors. First, mayors are able to appoint political advisers only if it is covered in the relevant secondary legislation; in other words, they are governed by secondary legislation. Most mayors are allowed only one political adviser under relevant statutory instruments, which also cap the pay at the level of local government political assistance, which is something like £45,000. This opens the potential for differences which are unfair and need to be standardised. Secondly, there are no requirements for transparency on mayoral political adviser appointments or pay, unlike for government special advisers under the 2010 Act. Thirdly, there is no code of conduct for mayoral advisers, unlike for government special advisers, though the code of conduct is not required under primary legislation. The amendment applies the central government model of special advisers to mayors; it would deal with these issues by allowing mayors to appoint mayoral special advisers, subject to an annual transparency requirement, and by their being paid in line with the relevant commissioner allowances, which the Bill already specifies should be determined by remuneration committees. It also moves away from the political adviser designation, so that mayors may be able to appoint special advisers to fulfil a variety of roles, just as Ministers are able to. Mayors can then bring in the people they need as they wish, subject to local oversight on pay and public scrutiny of the total cost, as we do with national government.