Contribution
My Lords, Amendments 425 and 426 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. We on this side of the Committee cannot support them. These amendments are well intentioned, and we understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but we believe they will cause more problems than the issues they are trying to address. I do not see, for example, that they would have had any impact on the behaviour of the officer in the Everard murder or in other cases of police misconduct.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that current or former police officers should have their service as a police officer treated as an aggravating factor when being sentenced for a criminal offence. We, like the noble Baroness, believe that police officers should be held to a high standard. Abuses of power should be treated with the utmost seriousness, but the amendment is far too wide and risks creating unintended outcomes. Sentencing should, as far as is reasonably possible, be a specific exercise based on the facts of the case before the court.
At present, the courts already have the ability to treat an abusive position of trust or authority as an aggravating factor where relevant. This will allow for judges to distinguish between offences that may have been connected to an individual’s role as a police officer and those that are completely independent of it. They should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Amendment 425 would apply regardless of whether the offence had any connection to police service, resulting in the inclusion of offences that were wholly unconnected to an officer’s professional role and committed perhaps many years after the officer had retired or left the force.
Introducing such a provision, even as a rebuttable presumption, risks introducing an unnecessary and inappropriate counterproductive legal complexity. In practice, judges reflect on the defendant’s status and whether it is an aggravating factor. Furthermore, it would require the court to judge a person by their job and quite possibly what they were doing many years before. It could be 20 years before the commission of the offence and wholly unconnected with their service.
Similarly, we have significant concerns about Amendment 426. Pensions are deferred pay. They have been earned by service. I appreciate that issues arise where, while being so paid, the officer embarks on perhaps corrupt behaviour, but the police service will have to think about how it addresses that. It requires careful consideration of terms of service. If the police service wishes to include appropriate terms to address that sort of conduct, it is a matter for careful and balanced drafting, not for the relative sledgehammer—I mean that politely—proposed here. Once money has been earned and transferred to the relevant individual, that money is now their property. This amendment would undermine that principle and give the courts the power to deprive someone of money that may be entirely unrelated to the crime of which they are being convicted. It is potentially a large mandatory fine on top of any other sentence. We all know that police officers who go to prison face undoubted unpleasantness and very often have to be offered solitary confinement and protection. That in itself is a very substantial penalty.
We agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the risks of these amendments and the steps that should equally be taken to improve the way in which the police service operates. But the forfeiture of pension rights for just any criminal offence, especially in cases distinct from instances of abuse of police powers, could lead to disproportionate unintended consequences. We recognise that maintaining public confidence in policing is essential, but that confidence must be upheld through clear standards and conviction when things go wrong, then more effective punishment if needed; and, if necessary, by revision of the terms of service, but done by a matter of the terms of service, not by this rather blunt instrument. We look to the Minister for assurances on those points.
Relevant penalties must be imposed on the basis of conduct, not just status, so we cannot support the amendments. The context in which the sentence is passed is the fact of service; that would be relevant, but it is relevant only if that particular case comes before the court.