Contribution
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for attempting keyhole surgery at this late stage. I suspect that some noble Lords want to go a little further in the surgery than keyhole, but I will try to assuage those fears as part of the response to the debate that we have had.
In answer initially to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 are important national security powers available at the UK border. They already allow a counterterrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person travelling through a port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. These powers do not require an examining officer to have any degree of suspicion to use them. They are already in place and have been since 2000, so they are not new powers.
This clause introduces a power for law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts—the cloud, wherever that cloud currently exists—that are accessible via a device examined under existing powers that allow suspicionless stop and search at ports for national security purposes. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has rightly said, this responds directly to a long-standing concern raised by the independent reviewer, who noted that current legislation does not adequately address cloud access. I hope that, to some extent, this assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on these matters. I accept and understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and, in moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are concerned about these issues and ensuring that we have enhanced safeguards around these powers; notably, that the retention of this cloud data for counterterrorism purposes must be reviewed after three months and that it can be retained only where a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is involved in terrorism.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 391 builds on this. In respect of the information retained, it looks to put in an objective test for assessing necessity of retention. Let me just say, including to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that the Government fully recognise the need for robust safeguards. I accept the points that have been made around the Committee on that. We need to have robust safeguards when exercising powers to extract or retain information from electronic devices under Schedules 7 and 3. However—this is normal practice, and I hope it will assuage the Committee’s concern—normally, and, I strongly believe, in this case, the statutory codes of practice for examining officers are the appropriate place to set out the detailed operational safeguards. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and other noble Lords who have spoken, we are seeking to address the concerns raised by updating the code of practice that already exists to include the measures in the Bill to provide the safeguards of the requirements that have been mentioned by noble Lords in their contributions today.
Codes of practice are a long-standing approach that allows the Government to update protections flexibly and promptly and ensures that they can remain fit for purpose as operational needs and legal standards evolve. I hope I can help all those who have spoken on this and who have requested keyhole surgery on the legislation. The codes of practice are subject to parliamentary approval, so in order to take this matter forward, in the event that the Bill and these clauses become law, the clauses themselves are not brought into effect until such time as the codes of practice have received parliamentary scrutiny of an affirmative nature. We would not seek to implement the clause until the codes of practice were approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is the normal practice that, following Royal Assent, there would be consultation on what the code of practice could potentially involve before it was passed by both Houses.