Mr Paul Kohler

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Vaz. I congratulate the hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sorcha Eastwood) on securing this important debate. I recognise that I am new to this portfolio, and those who have spoken before me know far more about it than I do, so I am still in listening mode. I have found many of the arguments compelling, if contradictory. I invite the hon. Member for Belfast South and Mid Down (Claire Hanna) to intervene on me to explain her answer to the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister), if she wants to do so, because I would have liked to hear her answer. Maybe she can do so later. I begin by reaffirming the Liberal Democrats’ full, unwavering support for the Good Friday agreement. It transformed Northern Ireland by establishing institutions robust enough to bridge the deep sectarian divisions, an achievement that endures today. The Northern Ireland of today is not the Northern Ireland of 30 years ago, but maintaining the agreement does not mean preserving those institutions in aspic—quite the opposite, in fact. As a former sub-dean at University College London’s faculty of laws, I feel compelled to cite the warnings of its constitution unit, which in its recent work on Stormont reform highlighted how the current arrangements make institutional collapse all too possible and any recovery politically costly. The question we are therefore compelled to ask is whether strand 1 institutions are still fit for purpose in today’s Northern Ireland, and, if not, what reforms are necessary. Time does not permit an exhaustive list of the potential merits of reform, but three stand out clearly. The first is greater stability. Allowing the formation of the Executive to proceed when a party entitled to nominate the First Minister or Deputy First Minister refuses to do so would prevent a single party from vetoing Government altogether. That principle already applies to other ministerial posts, and would strengthen, not weaken, devolution and power sharing. The second is more effective decision making. Continued use of parallel consent and an overly lax triggering mechanism for a petition of concern has repeatedly blocked budgets, the election of a Speaker and legislation, even where there is overwhelming Assembly support. Replacing parallel consent with a weighted majority and restricting petitions of concern to their original purpose of protecting vital interests would still provide minority safeguards, absent the danger of deadlock. I would like someone to intervene on me on that point to explain why weighted majority does not give protection to minorities—because surely it does give some protection.