Lord Sandhurst (Con)

My Lords, I will speak briefly to these amendments, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to insert an explicit reference to Section 77 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make it plain that courts may mitigate a sentence to a community order where appropriate. This amendment is not necessary. The Bill does not alter the courts’ ability to consider the full range of mitigating factors, nor does it disturb their discretion to impose a community sentence where that is the just and proportionate outcome. What it does is imposes an obligation to suspend a prison sentence where otherwise a prison sentence might be imposed. Those powers remain firmly in place. To single out Section 77 of the Sentencing Act for restatement in the Bill might imply that the legislation would otherwise curtail judicial discretion to impose a community sentence. That is not the case. For this reason, we do not consider the amendment to be needed or helpful. Amendment 29A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would place a statutory duty on courts to consider a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. Although we understand and appreciate the intention behind the proposal, we do not support it. The courts are already required to work upwards through a full hierarchy of sentencing options, including setting community sentences, before custody is reached. That is the well-established principle in law and practice. Sentencing judges are highly experienced in applying those principles. To introduce a further procedural step will not add substance but create additional bureaucracy in an already very complex framework. It risks increasing administrative burdens on the probation services and court staff, and generating uncertainty about what additional assessments or reports might be required to satisfy the new duty. We should not legislate for processes that the system is not resourced or structured to deliver. Above all, a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, by definition, imposed only when the custody threshold has already been crossed. To require courts to revisit considerations that are already inherent in the sentencing exercise risks weakening clarity and undermining judicial confidence in the tools at their disposal. For all these reasons, although we respect the intentions behind both amendments, we do not believe that they would strengthen the sentencing framework. We cannot support them.