Contribution
I am grateful, again, to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, for her amendment. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London made a compelling case in arguing against the amendment. I thank her for her support, as I too will not be supporting the amendment.
I took the words “blanket refusal” from what the noble Lord, Lord German, said, which is a really important point on this amendment. The noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that there was a blanket refusal for anybody who claimed status on the grounds of religious persecution, even if that person converted to a new religion after they arrived in the UK. It would mean there would potentially be people who would arrive in the UK, or who are here, and did not fear persecution when they left their country, but who may well have found religious faith on arrival in the United Kingdom, through a range of routes, and therefore would not be able to claim persecution before returning to their country. That does not seem fair to me. The 1951 refugee convention applies a definition regardless of where the fear of persecution arises. It includes situations where fear develops after arrival in the host country, in which case the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, would apply.
I took strongly what the noble Lord, Lord German, said about the independence of decision-makers who will consider claims involving religious conversion. They will fully explore the motivation of that conversion and what it means in a person’s life. They will explore whether the conversion took place in the UK. It is reasonable, even taking on board the right reverend Prelate’s comments, to ask for some evidence of that conversion. As the right reverend Prelate said, ministers in the Church of England are not going to take every conversion on the face of it; they have a strong process to go through to ensure that someone is welcomed into the faith.
In cases of religious conversion, conversion alone does not guarantee refugee status. Ultimately, an individual could convert and say that that is the reason they should stay, but the decision-maker will look at whether the risk of return to the person’s country of origin has an implication for the credibility of the religious conversion, based on the evidence before them. Conversions may be rejected as not genuine or accepted as genuine but, even where a conversion is accepted, there has to be some form of detailed examination of an individual’s circumstances and the situation in the person’s country of origin.
In determining whether an individual has a well-founded fear of persecution, the assessment cannot be disregarded on the basis of actions taken after arrival in the UK, even where there is suspicion or evidence that such actions were taken in bad faith to generate or strengthen an asylum claim. Frankly, every claim must be judged on its merits according with the rule of law and our international obligations. Decision-makers scrutinise the timing of conversion and consistency with prior beliefs and behaviour. A finding of a person acting in bad faith can be relevant to the person’s credibility and whether they will face risk on return to their country of origin.
I cannot accept this amendment. If it were adopted it would reduce the volume of grants and potential bad faith claims, but it would also breach our obligations under the 1951 refugee convention, which was put in place after a conflict that caused a significant number of refugees.
Sufficient guidance is in place for Home Office decision-makers to make a judgment on the basis of each claim. The noble Baroness’s amendment would cause difficulty and result in individuals who have genuinely converted being returned to their country of origin, maybe to face further persecution—which, as the right reverend Prelate said, is not a matter of being chided or ostracised but could result in their deaths because of their religious faith. I therefore cannot accept the amendment and I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw it.