Contribution
My Lords, I think it will be no surprise to Members of the Conservative Party that we oppose Amendments 34 and 72. It is quite interesting that, once the rat had been let out of the sack that the amendment was not capable of being put to the House, of course, this debate turned into a Second Reading debate about other issues on the way we should be talking about this matter. I will turn to that in a moment, but let us just take these amendments at face value as they are written, because that is what the Report stage of a Bill is about: reporting about amendments which we are discussing, not about raising other issues which should have been raised at Second Reading way back in the beginning.
These amendments embody an approach of absolute and mandatory deportation that sacrifices judicial discretion and proportionality in favour of unworkable rigidity, thereby undermining fundamental legal safeguards and international obligations. Amendment 34 proposes a sweeping new deportation regime. The explanatory material states:
“This new clause would require the deportation of any foreign national who is convicted of any offence in the United Kingdom”.
Further, it seeks to amend the Immigration Act 1971 by requiring a court to sentence a non-British citizen over the age of 17 convicted of “an offence” to deportation from the United Kingdom. You might call this the “Mars bar” scheme, whereby anybody who steals a Mars bar will be deported, or, perhaps, if that was not serious enough, you may have to steal a multi-pack of Mars bars rather than a single one.
We must oppose this proposal on multiple grounds. First, there is a lack of proportionality and balance. The amendment would introduce an obligation to make a deportation order with no exceptions and no discretion. Such an absolute provision ignores the circumstances of the offence, mitigating factors or the length of time a person may have lawfully been in this country. It comes to something when a noble Lord prays in aid the ECHR to support us against an amendment from the Conservative Party. That is an extremely interesting way forward.
Secondly, on risk of torture and human rights breach, this obligation to deport would apply even if removal would send the person concerned to a country where they would face torture or even, in some countries, where they have capital punishment. The proposal is unworkable and contrary to our international obligations.
Thirdly, on vulnerability in modern slavery, Amendment 34 would remove protections for under-18s and victims of human trafficking. For example, a small child who arrived in the UK, committed a crime, was sentenced to prison and was subsequently found to be a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of forced criminality would be subject to automatic removal without any court or tribunal mechanism to consider the circumstances of their case.
Fourthly, on eroding criminal safeguards, Amendment 34 seeks to amend Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 by omitting instances of “knowingly” from certain immigration offences. Removing this element of mens rea—a lack of knowledge as a defence—will likely result in consequential deportation decisions being subject to more challenges under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Amendment 72 would place a duty to remove foreign offenders on the Secretary of State. It mandates that a deportation order must be made against any non-British citizen who
“has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment”—
this is different in this amendment—and “has completed their term”. Crucially, it dictates that:
“The Secretary of State must make the deportation order … within the period of seven days”.
This amendment falls foul of some of the critical flaws in Amendment 34—first, in terms of an unworkable timeline and mandatory duty. Placing a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to execute a deportation order within a rigid seven-day period against any person sentenced to imprisonment disregards the complex process required for removal, particularly when a human rights for protection claim is lodged.
Secondly, there is an absence of scrutiny and due process. Such an absolute obligation removes necessary judicial oversight and requires deportation without considering the individual’s human rights. The objective of mandating deportation in this manner risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not necessarily increase removals from the UK.
Thirdly, the amendment conflicts with legal principles. In mandating deportation for any offence, conviction without exception, it ignores the fact that deportation orders can be made against those who are victims of coercion or human trafficking. To support these kinds of absolutist amendments, especially in the context of deportation, is incredibly difficult for anyone who believes in the rule of law and due process.
We must remain resolute in our commitment to deport those who abuse our hospitality by committing crimes in the UK, but the paths produced and proposed by Amendments 34 and 72 substitute effective, balanced legislation with measures of legal absolutism. We must empower the Government to act decisively, but we must do so in a way that respects fundamental rights, due process and proportionality. These amendments fail all those critical tests.