Earl Howe (Con)

My Lords, I feel it is appropriate that we should have at least a short debate on Clauses 35, 36, 129 and 130, partly because they raise concerns that are very similar to those I had intended to flag when responding to the group of government amendments that were, in the event, not moved. Our debate on that group of amendments must remain a pleasure in store. However, these clauses together confer on Ministers the power to take over the enforcement and prosecutions of local authorities or other enforcement authorities, either for individual cases or entire categories of cases. The inclusion of these powers in the Bill needs explaining, first, because they appear to go much further than is necessary or appropriate and, secondly, because they raise a number of important questions about the relationship between central and local enforcement and about accountability. At present, the Bill rightly places day-to-day enforcement in the hands of local weights and measures authorities, which have the expertise, local knowledge and operational independence needed to make these judgments. Under these clauses, however, the Secretary of State or the devolved Ministers could simply direct that those functions are to be discharged instead by Ministers centrally. There is no statutory test to be met before that happens, no requirement for the local authority to have failed or refused to act, and no mechanism for consultation, appeal or review. By any standard, that is a very wide power to exercise over democratically elected local authorities. In effect, it allows central government to displace local enforcement at will. Inherent in the exercise of this power is a risk that enforcement decisions become politicised. Local authorities act impartially and are guided by the evidential tests and the public interest. One can imagine a situation in which a future Government—I am not saying this one—choose to intervene and adopt an approach of their own when taking over investigations or prosecutions. How will we safeguard the impartiality of decision-making? How will the basis of any decisions be scrutinised or, indeed, challenged? There is the added issue of proportionality. If these are intended as reserve powers for exceptional circumstances, the Bill should say so. At the moment, there are no thresholds, no published criteria and no requirement even to lay a Statement before Parliament when such powers are used. We have tabled these stand part notices to probe the Government on several points, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to the following questions. First, why does the Secretary of State need these powers at all, given the enforcement architecture already in existence and set out elsewhere in the Bill? Secondly, in what circumstances does the Minister envisage using them? Is this a genuine power of last resort or something that might be used more routinely? Thirdly, what safeguards will there be for local authorities whose functions are overridden? Will they be consulted, or have the right of challenge? Fourthly, how will accountability work once a Minister takes over enforcement? Will there be a published direction, a report to Parliament or any means of scrutiny? Finally, how do these powers sit with the devolved authorities? We all want effective enforcement of the law, and there may be rare cases where national co-ordination is required. However, I think we need some further and better particulars from the Minister.