Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)

My Lords, these regulations introduce a number of changes following the Government’s 2022 review and the 2024 consultation. I thank the Minister for his clear introduction and for emphasising the important principle of getting things right first time, which partly explains why these reforms have taken time to come in. Some of the changes appear to be sensible. Refining due diligence requirements so that enhanced due diligence applies to unusually complex transactions rather than all complex transactions seems a proportionate step. Likewise, reforming the trust registration service to close identified gaps, while creating an exemption for low-value, low-risk trusts, appears to strike a reasonable balance between maintaining safeguards and reducing unnecessary burdens. To that extent, His Majesty’s Opposition welcome the direction of travel. However, these regulations also raise a wider and very important question about whether the current anti-money laundering regime is operating as effectively, proportionately and fairly as it should. It is right—indeed, it is essential—that we are robust in tackling money laundering, terrorist finance and financial crime, but it is also essential that the system does not impose excessive costs, drive firms into defensive behaviour or leave innocent customers and legitimate businesses without access to banking services. The purpose of anti-money laundering regulation is, of course, to prevent crime, but there is growing evidence that the regime can also have a serious unintended consequence, and customers who have done nothing wrong are nevertheless finding themselves excluded from banking services because they are deemed too costly, too complex or too risky to serve. The IEA’s 2024 report, Debanked, argues that under the current regime certain categories of customer may present a higher initial risk profile, but that the cost of establishing whether they are, in fact, engaged in criminal activity can exceed the value of their business to the bank. The result is that some accounts are closed pre-emptively. The same report also estimates that compliance with anti-money laundering regulations costs UK banks £34 billion a year. That is a very significant burden and one that is ultimately borne by consumers and businesses. That is a huge multiple of the £178 million of savings in compliance costs which I think the Minister mentioned. To put it into context, the sums spent on some of the enforcement agencies are also relatively small. Nearly £100 million is spent on the Serious Fraud Office and £195 million on the Insolvency Service. Police funding, because police are very important in money laundering, costs nearly £20 billion, but that includes the excellent efforts of the City of London Police in this area, which were mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. What assessment have the Government made of the impact of the current AML regime on access to banking services? Are the considerable costs—the £34 billion I mentioned—imposed by this regime being matched by clear evidence of a proportionate reduction in financial crime, drawing on the resources I have described? Will the Government consider a broader review not merely of whether the system is functioning according to its own internal processes but whether it is delivering the right outcomes in the real world and whether the enforcement regime is fit for purpose? The Minister has mentioned the economic crime plan. I turn to the issue of complexity. An anti-money laundering and sanctions regime must be clear if it is to be effective. I know this from my experience of trying to enforce the law in the business area. Professional advisers and regulated entities struggle to understand their obligations. If this happens, the result will naturally be worse enforcement. I was slightly concerned to hear that the Solicitors Regulation Authority has described the UK sanctions regime as “complex and challenging”. That should give us pause for thought. If professionals whose work depends on understanding and applying the law find the regime difficult to navigate, we should not be surprised when banks and firms respond by taking the safest possible course—even when that means withdrawing services from customers who may pose no real risk. Can the Minister confirm whether organisations such as the SRA were consulted before these regulations were laid? Can he explain whether the regulations will materially reduce the complexity in the system? Do the Government intend to bring forward wider reforms to make the regime easier to understand, easier to apply and therefore more effective in achieving its core purpose and preventing financial crime? Finally, I turn to redress. The consequences of debanking can be severe. A person or business whose account is closed may be left unable to receive payments, pay staff, meet obligations or even operate normally. Yet the process for challenging these decisions can be slow, opaque and deeply frustrating. In 2024, the APPG on Fair Business Banking published a report which found that thousands of customers were being debanked each month, often as a result of financial, regulatory and reputational pressures on banks. Shortly afterwards, the Treasury Committee published data showing that debanking-related complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service had risen by 44% from 2023. These figures should concern us as they suggest a more systemic problem. There are also particular groups that appear to be disproportionately affected: individuals with links to higher-risk jurisdictions, politically exposed persons such as ourselves, small businesses, charities and organisations with international connections—at a time when we are trying to encourage overseas investment. A further group the Government should examine closely is defence companies. A survey by ADS, the trade body representing 1,500 small defence companies, found that nearly three-quarters had struggled to access basic banking services, with respondents citing reputational concerns as a key factor behind that trend. I think I will return to this subject when we come to debate the financial services Bill. These groups are not necessarily illegitimate customers yet, in practice, they seem to be treated, with the way in which the current regime operates, as though they are inherently suspect. Given the Government’s stated priorities of driving economic growth and increasing defence spending, this is surely an issue to which the Minister should be paying close attention. What consideration have the Government given to the impact of the AML regime on these groups? What steps are being taken to ensure that banks do not respond to regulatory pressure by simply excluding legitimate customers? Does the Minister accept that, if increasing numbers of affected customers are turning to the Financial Ombudsman Service, there is a strong case for looking at not just individual complaints but the structure of the regime itself? I asked that question at the beginning of my remarks.