Contribution
It is a real pleasure to speak in this debate with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for so ably setting out the petitioners’ cause. I am above all grateful to the petitioners themselves for bringing to this House such a critical issue—in fact, potentially the most important issue: how we can protect our precious but disturbingly quite fragile democracy. I agree with all the comments that have been made in this debate so far about the Rycroft review and the elections Bill.
We have to recognise that the circumstances we are in today are different from those of 10 years ago. I genuinely believe that, back then, for most political parties the fear or shame of being found to have broken the rules was incredibly important, and it was just as much a motivator for compliance as the letter of those rules themselves. Sadly, with some parts of politics—particularly those associated with Kremlin-based interests—shame is no longer a motivator. We are in a post-shame set of circumstances, and that means that we need stronger rules. I agree with my hon. Friend that the time has come for a cap on donations, as well as the many other proposals that he and others set out.
It is essential that the Government fulfil the promises they have made in their welcome strategy related to the elections Bill on the integrity of digital communications. I agree with the Security Minister, who has done so much on these issues, that there is little evidence that Russian bots influenced the outcome of the last general election. However, he will be well aware that there is evidence that the prevalence, reach and AI-enabled effectiveness of bots is growing pretty much every day. As Global Witness showed, even back in 2024, posts from bot-like accounts spreading disinformation and hatred were viewed more than 150 million times in the run-up to the election.
We cannot have a system for election regulation that is still based on leaflet and newspaper campaigning, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) described. Campaigning and attempts at influence now take place online, and our electoral legislation needs to catch up. I hope that the election Bill will ensure that that happens.
The case of Moldova was mentioned earlier. I had the privilege of visiting that country last year with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. I spoke with many election officials and politicians, including President Maia Sandu, and I agree that we see the same playbook being used time and again; of course, it has been used to greater intensity in a country that is right on the frontline of the war in Ukraine. We need to shift out of what is often called the normalcy bias of thinking that the exercise of influence is something unusual, into a far more vigilant state. That must include a national conversation, as the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) said. The public need to understand the extent of the threat from Russian-influenced campaigns far more.
There is an analogy here, which was discussed in relation to the elections Bill, with the threat from Russian-enabled cyber-attacks. I still hear individuals speaking about cyber-attacks as if they are somehow a one-off, but we know now—this was discussed in relation to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—that cyber-attacks are costing our economy about 0.5% of GDP. What happened at Jaguar Land Rover, in just one single cyber-attack, lead to a reduction in our projected GDP. To put that in context, my understanding is that in 2024, all of agriculture contributed 0.56% of our GDP. Cyber-attacks are a huge threat, and we need to improve public awareness of them and of the exercise of influence, too.
That needs to take place in key institutions, as well as more broadly. I was pleased that the Security Minister met with universities, as well as MI5 and others, to help them to identify the threat of foreign interference. That was really positive. I realise that much of that work was connected to Chinese interference, given what happened with Sheffield Hallam University, but it is clear that a variety of authoritarian states and individuals are increasingly seeking to intimidate academics and researchers. The centralised route for reporting attempts of academic interference is welcome, but I strongly urge the Government to look at other measures, such as ensuring that universities are prepared for vexatious, multiple freedom of information requests. They have been weaponised against those researching the spread of online disinformation and hate, in some cases with links to authoritarian regimes, including Russia.
We also need to be far more vocal about the extent of Russian-linked sabotage in our country. I am sure many Members here will be aware of the horrific burning of the warehouse in Leyton in east London. Fewer people, perhaps, will be aware of the credible links to Russia when a package caught fire in a DHL warehouse near Birmingham. The methods we see being used by Russian-based operatives in our country are very similar to those operating across other nations.