Baroness Brinton (LD)

My Lords, my Amendment 13 and the other amendments in this group look at the arrangements set out in Clause 3 on how courts should manage the difficult issue of the rights of a person with parental responsibility who is a convicted child sex offender. The range of proposals, and indeed my Amendment 13, are probing at what point being a convicted child sex offender must take priority over the rights that a child sex offender may have as a parent himself or herself—although it is usually a man. A range of proposals in Amendments 14 and 22 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, argue for any sexual offence, which is broadly what we are arguing too, and Amendments 15, 19 and 27 from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, argue for a conviction of more than six months. The Government, of course, start at the point of four years and above. There are real tensions here, and I am particularly looking forward to the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, who with his practical experience can help us non-lawyers bridge the differing priorities of having parental responsibility and the role of the family court versus the criminal court. This is where I want to start. I am pleased that the Government recognise, in Clause 3, that we should have a clearer position on when convicted child sex abusers lose their parental rights. It has been iniquitous that parental rights have trumped the safeguarding of children, even when the person with parental rights has been convicted of CSA, child sexual abuse, including, astonishingly, of their own child or stepchild. The charity We Stand and the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, have long campaigned to protect children from an abuser with parental responsibility and I thank them for their briefings. It is extraordinary that a parent convicted of raping their child has been able to retain access to and decision-making for that child even when they are in prison. There is absolutely no doubt that this has caused other parents and family members much distress, and often considerable expense when they have been to the family court to ask for access to be stopped, so we on these Benches welcome Clause 3 as a starting point. However, we are not convinced that it is quite strong enough. One example is that the serious sexual offences listed in proposed new Schedule ZA1 to the Children Act 1989 include both indecent imagery offences and contact offences. Imagery offences have a minimum sentence of a community order, and this means that it could be argued that a Section 3 serious offence can be triggered at any sentencing threshold. However, the majority of sentences for indecent imagery tend to fall between three months and one year. Sentencing guidelines for contact offences start at a minimum of one year, so that would exclude these offenders under the Government’s proposals. That is why Amendment 13 includes all convicted child sexual abusers. This is not about punishment of the offender; it is about protecting all children. We know from research that most child sex abuse takes place in the family environment and therefore that those children are at the highest risk from the offender. We Stand told us that research from the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse shows that natural parents are the highest-offending group in intra-familial child sex abuse, which accounts for over two-thirds of offences. As a result, the children of convicted child sex offenders are already at the most risk. A non-abusing or protective parent has a legal duty to protect their child from any child sex offender and any level of offending. I personally saw, in a case some years ago, how hard it can be for a non-abusing parent to protect their child when they also have to fight the family court’s assumption about the rights of the other parent, even one who is a convicted child sex abuse offender, because that trumps the offence. We know that the protective parent will often have little or no legal aid to fight to protect their children, including having no right to know where the offender is. This means that papers cannot be served. They also have no right to any information about the offender’s rehabilitational risk assessments, and that is also extraordinary. How can they comment on them or ask for assessments to be made? They are the ones looking after the children. Another problem is the limited timeframe on protective orders, such as prohibited steps orders, and, worse, no powers of arrest if these orders are breached by the offender. One consequence of this is that it makes no sense at all. Extraordinarily, the offender has the right to make multiple applications to vary or overturn protective orders and to make repeated requests for contact with the children. In households where there has also been coercive control and domestic abuse, these repeated requests continue that abuse. Too often, the family courts see it only through the eyes of the offending parent trying to assert their rights. Section 91(14) of the Children Act is the basis for that. We Stand notes that the basis of the Children Act 1989, and more recent primary legislation that has not yet been repealed, states that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life is linked to the furthering of the welfare of a child. This means that judges and other authorities, such as social services and Cafcass, are forced into a legal anomaly. They must balance the potential harm to a child from a convicted sex offender and parent with legislation stating that both parents’ involvement in the child’s life furthers the welfare of that child. This leads to inconsistent outcomes. Even if the presumption is repealed, this fundamental belief is still enshrined in the introduction and guidance to the Children Act. Children of the CSA parent are often at greater risk than other children who are automatically protected by existing criminal restrictions, such as sexual harm prevention orders and registration requirements. Other protective parental concerns include non-molestation orders granted by courts, often for very short durations—six months or a year—so they are not an alternative to prohibited steps orders. They have to defend themselves in a family court to counter allegations made by the offender, often including parental alienation, even after a CSA conviction. What is worse, the nature of the courts means that they often end up in a revolving door and are in and out of the family court for years, which has emotional and financial consequences for them, and the fact of the CSA conviction never changes. That leads to how the family court might think that parental responsibility being exercised by the offender parent is realistic; surely it is not. Research shows that those guilty of online and non-penetrative offences are at just as high risk of reoffending against their own children. This is important, and the reason why Amendment 13 has reduced the bar from a four-year sentence to any CSA conviction. Surely, for safeguarding reasons, now is the time to change the legal responsibility to the offending parent having to prove why they are safe to exercise that parental responsibility, through rehabilitation courses and often assessment by professionals. The position of the court must start with the assumption of the protection of the child, not with the rights of the offender parent. That is why all convicted child sex offenders with parental responsibilities should have a prohibited steps order for each child at the time of their conviction. The PSO should have a penal notice attached to it to prevent breaches, and a PSO is useless if it does not have the power of arrest if there is a safeguarding issue. Because many protective parents and their families are in a living hell, it would be good if the legislation can be retrospective, or there should be specific guidance to the family court that the protective parents are to be assumed to have overriding parental responsibility.