Contribution
My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose of these regulations. Nuclear safeguards and the system for reporting, inspection and verification gives the International Atomic Energy Agency and the wider world the confidence that our civil nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes and is not being diverted into weapons programmes. Without a credible safeguards regime, we cannot trade in civil nuclear material, operate our existing plants or attract the international partners on whom our nuclear ambitions depend.
The 2019 regulations established our domestic regime post Brexit. This instrument, some seven years on, does several things. It removes transitional provisions that were only ever intended to smooth the exit from Euratom; tightens and clarifies the language operators must work within; introduces new offences to plug enforcement gaps; adjusts reporting timelines to give the Office for Nuclear Regulation more time to scrutinise what it receives; and, most significantly for our international standing, transitions the UK from Euratom-style basic technical characteristic questionnaires to the IAEA’s own design information questionnaire format. It also amends the associated fees regulations to put the ONR’s cost recovery on a clearer statutory footing.
On these Benches, we recognise this as an essential and overdue update to a globally recognised regulatory system, and we support it. We particularly welcome the removal of the Euratom transition provisions and the move to the IAEA’s design information questionnaire format as a sensible step forward towards international harmonisation that will ease collaboration with our partners and materially support the UK, US and global civil industry partnerships.
Our support, however, should not be mistaken for uncritical or entirely enthusiastic support for the wider nuclear policy: we continue to have some concerns about the delivery of large-scale plants. We recognise that nuclear is obviously a crucial part of our energy mix, and we are supportive of the move towards more small modular reactors.
On the detail, I apologise, as I have several questions for the Minister. On the new offences, these regulations introduce criminal liability for non-compliance with particular safeguards provisions and for the failure to declare a change in facility type—corrections to an oversight in the original 2019 regulations. I just want to ask the Minister about this gap, which feels significant in our enforcement regime and why it was allowed to persist for seven years before being addressed here. I further seek assurance that the ONR now has everything that it needs as both legal powers and operational capacity to pursue enforcement action all the way to prosecution, where the gravity of a breach demands it.
On reporting timescales, the Minister has set out the window for operators to declare design information changes, but can he confirm that this tighter window will not place a disproportionate burden on the more than 130 qualifying facilities with limited operations? As he is well aware, we are talking about smaller-scale universities and corporate operations.
On the transition to the new IAEA forms, I welcome the Government’s decision, following consultation feedback, to extend the transition period for adopting the design information questionnaire from two years to three.
I feel that one question did not get sufficient attention in the other place. Are there specific risks during the migration and transition? Moving from one accountancy and control system to another is not just an exercise done on paper. There is a period during any transition when records may exist in two formats simultaneously, when staff are learning new systems and when the potential for gaps or miscategorisation is at its highest. We will also see some new definitions from the SI. What specific guidance will the ONR provide to operators to ensure that no accounting anomalies fall between the two systems and that the integrity of our nuclear accounting records is maintained throughout what will be a difficult transition period?
On record-keeping, this instrument extends the retention period for operating and accounting records from five years to 30. That is a big change. I notice that the costs in the supporting documents were quite low, but keeping computer records for that long is quite a complicated exercise, as computers become obsolete. Is that not putting on too much of a burden? Will the Minister say something about extending computer record-keeping and its security over that long period of time?
Finally, on repurposed facilities, the instrument introduces requirements for operators to notify the ONR 200 days before a change of facility type. Given the Government’s policy ambition to rapidly deploy small modular reactors, are they certain that these regulatory time changes are flexible enough not to impact the rollout and operation of small modular reactors?
We support this instrument. It will strengthen our safeguards regime, bring us more closely into step with our international partners and help guard against the unlawful diversion of civil nuclear material, so we fully support it.