Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)

My Lords, for the benefit of the absent noble Lord, Lord Russell, I will attempt to speak in a paperless fashion, which means that if I engage in verbal streams of consciousness I hope that the Committee will forgive me. There is a range of amendments in this group, many of which I support, a number of which I have sympathy with and a few that I oppose. That is perhaps natural, given the fact that a number of amendments in this group pull in completely opposite directions. Of the amendments that I support, I draw particular attention to Amendment 460, which would require that before an abortion could take place there is at least a clinical appointment, that guidance is given and that it is done through that route. Noble Lords have come up with a range of solutions to what we all appreciate is a sensitive situation and have tried to square the circle. The evidence from prosecutions that have taken place, and where there have been convictions, is that in almost every case there has been an absence of clinical support and someone has, in effect, gone on a form of solo run. Albeit that it may well have been in very difficult circumstances and taken with a heavy heart, nevertheless that is the route down which they have gone. In the limited time available, I will concentrate on supporting the Clause 191 stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, because, with respect to those who drafted Clause 191, it is somewhat disingenuous, radical in its implications and dangerous, particularly for women. Let me explain why. Mention has been made that it does not legally change the time limits. In a strict legal sense, that is true, but it does turn those time limits into a façade. If you have a situation in which an act that remains illegal can be carried out but the person who carries it out is immune and protected from prosecution in all circumstances—in blanket circumstances—you have a law that is utterly ineffective. It is the equivalent of saying that we will retain speed limits on motorways but anyone found driving on a motorway beyond that speed limit will not be prosecuted. It is somewhat disingenuous. A more honest approach would have been an amendment that simply said, “We want to move the time limit to the point of birth”. That is, in effect, what Clause 191 does, but the changes that it makes are disguised as the mirage that has been put in front of us. This is a radical change. Within this Committee and society as a whole, there is a wide spectrum of views on the issue of abortion. Some, and I am one, would take a much more restrictive approach towards abortion and feel that with our current laws the balance is wrong. Others take a much more liberal or permissive view. The settled compromise between those positions is to say that, at present, the determining line between what is legal and what is not is whether a child can be born and viable at the point of birth. The point has been made that that line has shifted from 28 weeks to 24 weeks. There is a good argument that it should come down a little bit more. But Clause 191 will, in effect, shift the ground in some cases to a situation in which that abortion can take place up until the day of birth. That is a radical step that is out of sync with public feeling.