Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful to have this opportunity to bring forward a debate on the co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the application of our respective competition laws, the subject of the agreement that we are noting today.
Our competition regime is based on rules established while we were a member of the European Union. I go back quite a long way on competition legislation. Way back in 1998, when I was a member of the Standing Committee on the Competition Bill, I moved an amendment on the definition of vertical agreements and their relationship to bloc exemptions. Nigel Griffiths, then the Labour DTI Minister, said that he might agree with the amendment but could not accept it, and that the Government were waiting on the European Commission. He said:
“Including a definition that was unacceptable to the Commission … would, therefore, be jumping the gun”.
Post Brexit, we can at least determine our own competition regime, but there are very good reasons, not least in terms of promoting investment in this country, for having constructive engagement with the European Commission on how our two regimes address common issues.
The treaty agreed in February is a very welcome mechanism to support that co-operation. We in this Parliament have completed our scrutiny. The European Parliament approved it on 16 September and we await the European Council’s approval, so it could come into force about a month thereafter. The co-operation that it provides for is not the same as our former membership of the European Competition Network, but it has a number of positive elements. These include the mutual notification of an enforcement activity which is likely to affect the other’s important interests, and the ability to share information. In the latter respect, it will be important in practice for the companies which consent to the sharing of their information to be clear whether, and how, their information may form part of the evidence which the other authority will use in their consideration or determination of a case.
There is already co-operation between the authorities. The merger case of Safran and Collins, for example, showed evidence of co-operation, requiring divestiture of the former’s existing North American business as it acquired—in North America—that of Collins Aerospace. The three authorities in this case, the Department of Justice in America, the Commission and, for us, the CMA, used judicial enforcement in the American case, conditional clearance in the Commission’s case and binding undertakings from the CMA. Those are three different mechanisms, but one could see that they were all directed towards the same structural remedy.
Of course, differences in relevant markets can lead to differing remedies. In the merger of Vandemoortele and Délifrance, both the Commission and our CMA identified the risks to competition in what are called frozen laminated dough products, which I think of as frozen croissants. The European Commission required the sale of two plants in France while the CMA required the sale of the plant in Worcester. Differences in approach were, however, highlighted some three years ago by the Microsoft and Activision merger case. The European Commission looked to enforceable access obligations to support future competition in cloud gaming, but the CMA required the cloud gaming rights to be sold to Ubisoft, as a stronger protection. We may see divergent views in future, but these co-operation provisions should ensure that each takes the other’s interests fully into account. They should be operating more nearly to a shared evidence base.
So why have I initiated this debate? It is because the co-operation in the treaty does not extend to the digital markets competition regime. The Digital Markets Act in the European Union and the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act in this country are the relevant pieces of legislation and are not part of the agreement that has been reached between the two jurisdictions. They are excluded because the treaty base for the Digital Markets Act is an internal market one, not a competition one, under Articles 101 or 102 of the treaty.
I should declare an interest. Following my participation in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill debates back in 2023 and 2024, I thought it important for us not to fire and forget, as they might say in the armed services, but to follow through on how the new digital markets regime is being implemented. My colleagues at Low Associates, with which I have a registered interest, assisted me. We convened a number of discussions, including on 1 October last year and on 1 October this year, both in Brussels, about how the two digital competition regimes are working, including representatives from DG COMP of the Commission and the digital markets unit of the CMA, leading companies, challenger businesses and experts. This showed again that there is ongoing co-operation and engagement between the two authorities, but it is none the less instructive to compare and contrast.
Both are intended to be ex ante pro-competitive. That is, where companies acquire significant market power, their behaviour in the market should be the subject of scrutiny and be consistent with the principles and, where necessary, specific requirements that would maintain effective competition and maximise consumer benefits. This is needed because, as the Furman review for our Treasury concluded, traditional competition remedies were moving too slowly to maintain competition in such fast-moving technology sectors.
Although the regimes have shared objectives, the ways they go about them are different. The DMA for the Commission sets largely quantitative criteria for its designation of gatekeeper platforms. It has concluded such reviews on average in two months, with seven companies designated in relation to 23 core platform services. I note that the iPadOS scrutiny from the Commission took eight months, because it did not meet the quantitative threshold and therefore required a qualitative investigation. Our DMCC looks to investigate whether a company has significant market status. It is essentially a qualitative process and has taken, on average, nine months. That is two months versus nine months.
The DMA has a list of obligations to be applied to a gatekeeper platform. The DMCC has a set of principles from which conduct requirements may be applied. The degree of prescription in the DMA is clear. For example, it has five specific data obligations about processing data, against self-preferencing using data acquired, data portability, access to data for users and access to competing search engines. The DMCC has only one: that significant market status companies should “not use data unfairly”. We can none the less see a positive example of alignment, including in this respect, in that the CMA’s choice of conduct requirement for Google Search, announced in June, on data portability is aligned with the obligation under the DMA. The CMA was clear that Google could apply in this country by making DMA-compliant API available to UK users on the same terms and to the same standard as in the European Union.
Comparisons between the two regimes are limited as yet. The DMA has been in force for nearly four years. It is more than three years since the first gatekeepers were designated under the DMA. The DMCC has been in force for less than two years, and the first SMS designations were only a year ago. In this country, we have yet to see how far-reaching the use of conduct requirements will be. We have seen that the CMA is using its flexibilities to enter into voluntary agreements, as with AWS on cloud services, instead of designation, although I should note that the Commission is using some flexibilities in its agreement with Booking.com, although the gatekeeper designation remains in place.
We have yet to see whether and in what circumstances the CMA chooses to use pro-competition interventions in relation to the companies with SMS designation. This is available where the authority has,
“reasonable grounds to consider that a factor or combination of factors relating to a relevant digital activity may be having an adverse effect on competition”.
I was led to wonder why this measure is in the Act. If there is an adverse effect on competition, a market investigation is available under competition law. Why would the CMA not tackle the issue through its wide-ranging power to impose a conduct requirement? One reason may be that if a conduct requirement is used and the company is in breach of the requirement, it may claim that the benefits outweigh the detriment from the breach—it is called the countervailing benefits exemption—and the CMA may wish to use pro-competition interventions to avoid such a potential route for the company. We do not know; we have not been in this situation yet.
The European Commission does not entertain such an exemption from its obligations. We should be cautious about the use of the countervailing benefits exemption, as monopolists can always demonstrate short-term benefits to consumers, but at the cost of long-term loss of competitive gains, innovation and market entry.
As one who took part in the scrutiny of the Bill, I am not clear that the ex ante pro-competition regime in this country is yet being used in the way we intended. I expected that an ex ante regime would mean that the conduct requirements would generally be applied to SMS companies, by agreement wherever possible, providing a tailored but relatively comprehensive operating model for how that company relates to its users, competitors and customers. It is not one that is necessarily imposed only because there is evidence of harm to which a remedy must be applied, but generally in order to avoid any adverse effect on competition arising. That is the principle of an ex ante approach.
That is not, in practice, how the companies or the CMA appear to be thinking. They continue to regard SMS designation as tantamount to a finding of dominance in a market, and they appear to think that a conduct requirement is needed only where a remedy must be applied, implying, of course, that there is a harm to which that remedy relates. This is only a very partial application of ex ante regulatory principles.
I expected more, and more rapid, designation of SMS companies. The way I think of it is if it looks like an elephant, it is an elephant, and we might as well agree that it is an elephant quite quickly. The investigative process to determine that Google had significant market status in relation to general search services took nine months. It is an admirably thorough piece of work, but it still only told us what we already knew, and in those nine months, the exceptional growth in access to AI materially altered how Google responded to search, and, of course, the CMA had to extend its study to include the AI overview. Indeed, the use of stand-alone AI assistants is now materially changing the shape of the market, so that the prospect of a five-year forward look, as the Act envisages, is increasingly unrealistic.
In the Commission, the definition of platforms includes virtual assistants, and we will have to see whether this is a sufficient fit for the development of AI services. Although the DMA is often characterised as rigid, the pace at which the Commission is able to designate, its willingness to interpret obligations and undertakings and its follow-through in enforcement all suggest elements for potential comparison between the two regimes. That said, the DMCC should be fairly recognised as a work in progress. The DMA, following its review by the Commission this year, which judged it to be “fit for purpose”, should be seen as an established regime.
Our CMA is guided by reference to four Ps: pace, predictability, proportionality and process. In its implementation of the DMCC’s ex ante competition regime—a new and challenging responsibility—I suggest that the CMA should look constructively at how the Commission’s regime under the DMA achieves more pace and, indeed, more predictability. It should also ask, and indeed challenge, the Commission’s approach: does it pay a price in terms of incentives to investment and growth, and does it deliver the optimum benefits to consumers?
The CMA can and should be ready to think, without prior assumptions other than its statutory requirements, about both the designation process and the application of conduct requirements. The European Commission should be fully aware of the risk that an ex ante regime, unless applied with flexibility, proportionality and clear process, will inhibit investment and innovation by market leaders that continue to be among the primary sources of future economic growth.
Both regimes are building and learning. The issues they are dealing with are of great significance. We have not even begun to assess whether the ex ante regime is preventing what are called “killer” acquisitions of new and innovative market entrants. That is why I regard the benefits of co-operation between our CMA and the European Commission to be at least as important in this context as they are in the application of competition law, which is the subject of this agreement and treaty. It is also why I call on the Government, through the trade and co-operation agreement, to secure further agreements relating to co-operation in the application of rules aimed at maintaining effective competition and consumer benefits in digital markets.
I thank noble Lords once again for this opportunity. I look forward to our short debate, and I beg to move that we take note of this treaty.