Hansard·Grand Committee·Vol. 860

UK-EU Agreement on Competition Laws

Thursday, 15 October 2026

22 contributions5 members

Contributions

  1. Motion to Take Note

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  2. Moved by

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  3. Lord Lansley

    That the Grand Committee takes note of the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union regarding Cooperation on the Application of their Respective Competition Laws. Relevant document: 2nd Report from the European Affairs Committee, Session 2024–26. (Special attention drawn to the report )

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  4. Lord Lansley (Con)

    My Lords, I am grateful to have this opportunity to bring forward a debate on the co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the application of our respective competition laws, the subject of the agreement that we are noting today. Our competition regime is based on rules established while we were a member of the European Union. I go back quite a long way on competition legislation. Way back in 1998, when I was a member of the Standing Committee on the Competition Bill, I moved an amendment on the definition of vertical agreements and their relationship to bloc exemptions. Nigel Griffiths, then the Labour DTI Minister, said that he might agree with the amendment but could not accept it, and that the Government were waiting on the European Commission. He said: “Including a definition that was unacceptable to the Commission … would, therefore, be jumping the gun”. Post Brexit, we can at least determine our own competition regime, but there are very good reasons, not least in terms of promoting investment in this country, for having constructive engagement with the European Commission on how our two regimes address common issues. The treaty agreed in February is a very welcome mechanism to support that co-operation. We in this Parliament have completed our scrutiny. The European Parliament approved it on 16 September and we await the European Council’s approval, so it could come into force about a month thereafter. The co-operation that it provides for is not the same as our former membership of the European Competition Network, but it has a number of positive elements. These include the mutual notification of an enforcement activity which is likely to affect the other’s important interests, and the ability to share information. In the latter respect, it will be important in practice for the companies which consent to the sharing of their information to be clear whether, and how, their information may form part of the evidence which the other authority will use in their consideration or determination of a case. There is already co-operation between the authorities. The merger case of Safran and Collins, for example, showed evidence of co-operation, requiring divestiture of the former’s existing North American business as it acquired—in North America—that of Collins Aerospace. The three authorities in this case, the Department of Justice in America, the Commission and, for us, the CMA, used judicial enforcement in the American case, conditional clearance in the Commission’s case and binding undertakings from the CMA. Those are three different mechanisms, but one could see that they were all directed towards the same structural remedy. Of course, differences in relevant markets can lead to differing remedies. In the merger of Vandemoortele and Délifrance, both the Commission and our CMA identified the risks to competition in what are called frozen laminated dough products, which I think of as frozen croissants. The European Commission required the sale of two plants in France while the CMA required the sale of the plant in Worcester. Differences in approach were, however, highlighted some three years ago by the Microsoft and Activision merger case. The European Commission looked to enforceable access obligations to support future competition in cloud gaming, but the CMA required the cloud gaming rights to be sold to Ubisoft, as a stronger protection. We may see divergent views in future, but these co-operation provisions should ensure that each takes the other’s interests fully into account. They should be operating more nearly to a shared evidence base. So why have I initiated this debate? It is because the co-operation in the treaty does not extend to the digital markets competition regime. The Digital Markets Act in the European Union and the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act in this country are the relevant pieces of legislation and are not part of the agreement that has been reached between the two jurisdictions. They are excluded because the treaty base for the Digital Markets Act is an internal market one, not a competition one, under Articles 101 or 102 of the treaty. I should declare an interest. Following my participation in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill debates back in 2023 and 2024, I thought it important for us not to fire and forget, as they might say in the armed services, but to follow through on how the new digital markets regime is being implemented. My colleagues at Low Associates, with which I have a registered interest, assisted me. We convened a number of discussions, including on 1 October last year and on 1 October this year, both in Brussels, about how the two digital competition regimes are working, including representatives from DG COMP of the Commission and the digital markets unit of the CMA, leading companies, challenger businesses and experts. This showed again that there is ongoing co-operation and engagement between the two authorities, but it is none the less instructive to compare and contrast. Both are intended to be ex ante pro-competitive. That is, where companies acquire significant market power, their behaviour in the market should be the subject of scrutiny and be consistent with the principles and, where necessary, specific requirements that would maintain effective competition and maximise consumer benefits. This is needed because, as the Furman review for our Treasury concluded, traditional competition remedies were moving too slowly to maintain competition in such fast-moving technology sectors. Although the regimes have shared objectives, the ways they go about them are different. The DMA for the Commission sets largely quantitative criteria for its designation of gatekeeper platforms. It has concluded such reviews on average in two months, with seven companies designated in relation to 23 core platform services. I note that the iPadOS scrutiny from the Commission took eight months, because it did not meet the quantitative threshold and therefore required a qualitative investigation. Our DMCC looks to investigate whether a company has significant market status. It is essentially a qualitative process and has taken, on average, nine months. That is two months versus nine months. The DMA has a list of obligations to be applied to a gatekeeper platform. The DMCC has a set of principles from which conduct requirements may be applied. The degree of prescription in the DMA is clear. For example, it has five specific data obligations about processing data, against self-preferencing using data acquired, data portability, access to data for users and access to competing search engines. The DMCC has only one: that significant market status companies should “not use data unfairly”. We can none the less see a positive example of alignment, including in this respect, in that the CMA’s choice of conduct requirement for Google Search, announced in June, on data portability is aligned with the obligation under the DMA. The CMA was clear that Google could apply in this country by making DMA-compliant API available to UK users on the same terms and to the same standard as in the European Union. Comparisons between the two regimes are limited as yet. The DMA has been in force for nearly four years. It is more than three years since the first gatekeepers were designated under the DMA. The DMCC has been in force for less than two years, and the first SMS designations were only a year ago. In this country, we have yet to see how far-reaching the use of conduct requirements will be. We have seen that the CMA is using its flexibilities to enter into voluntary agreements, as with AWS on cloud services, instead of designation, although I should note that the Commission is using some flexibilities in its agreement with Booking.com, although the gatekeeper designation remains in place. We have yet to see whether and in what circumstances the CMA chooses to use pro-competition interventions in relation to the companies with SMS designation. This is available where the authority has, “reasonable grounds to consider that a factor or combination of factors relating to a relevant digital activity may be having an adverse effect on competition”. I was led to wonder why this measure is in the Act. If there is an adverse effect on competition, a market investigation is available under competition law. Why would the CMA not tackle the issue through its wide-ranging power to impose a conduct requirement? One reason may be that if a conduct requirement is used and the company is in breach of the requirement, it may claim that the benefits outweigh the detriment from the breach—it is called the countervailing benefits exemption—and the CMA may wish to use pro-competition interventions to avoid such a potential route for the company. We do not know; we have not been in this situation yet. The European Commission does not entertain such an exemption from its obligations. We should be cautious about the use of the countervailing benefits exemption, as monopolists can always demonstrate short-term benefits to consumers, but at the cost of long-term loss of competitive gains, innovation and market entry. As one who took part in the scrutiny of the Bill, I am not clear that the ex ante pro-competition regime in this country is yet being used in the way we intended. I expected that an ex ante regime would mean that the conduct requirements would generally be applied to SMS companies, by agreement wherever possible, providing a tailored but relatively comprehensive operating model for how that company relates to its users, competitors and customers. It is not one that is necessarily imposed only because there is evidence of harm to which a remedy must be applied, but generally in order to avoid any adverse effect on competition arising. That is the principle of an ex ante approach. That is not, in practice, how the companies or the CMA appear to be thinking. They continue to regard SMS designation as tantamount to a finding of dominance in a market, and they appear to think that a conduct requirement is needed only where a remedy must be applied, implying, of course, that there is a harm to which that remedy relates. This is only a very partial application of ex ante regulatory principles. I expected more, and more rapid, designation of SMS companies. The way I think of it is if it looks like an elephant, it is an elephant, and we might as well agree that it is an elephant quite quickly. The investigative process to determine that Google had significant market status in relation to general search services took nine months. It is an admirably thorough piece of work, but it still only told us what we already knew, and in those nine months, the exceptional growth in access to AI materially altered how Google responded to search, and, of course, the CMA had to extend its study to include the AI overview. Indeed, the use of stand-alone AI assistants is now materially changing the shape of the market, so that the prospect of a five-year forward look, as the Act envisages, is increasingly unrealistic. In the Commission, the definition of platforms includes virtual assistants, and we will have to see whether this is a sufficient fit for the development of AI services. Although the DMA is often characterised as rigid, the pace at which the Commission is able to designate, its willingness to interpret obligations and undertakings and its follow-through in enforcement all suggest elements for potential comparison between the two regimes. That said, the DMCC should be fairly recognised as a work in progress. The DMA, following its review by the Commission this year, which judged it to be “fit for purpose”, should be seen as an established regime. Our CMA is guided by reference to four Ps: pace, predictability, proportionality and process. In its implementation of the DMCC’s ex ante competition regime—a new and challenging responsibility—I suggest that the CMA should look constructively at how the Commission’s regime under the DMA achieves more pace and, indeed, more predictability. It should also ask, and indeed challenge, the Commission’s approach: does it pay a price in terms of incentives to investment and growth, and does it deliver the optimum benefits to consumers? The CMA can and should be ready to think, without prior assumptions other than its statutory requirements, about both the designation process and the application of conduct requirements. The European Commission should be fully aware of the risk that an ex ante regime, unless applied with flexibility, proportionality and clear process, will inhibit investment and innovation by market leaders that continue to be among the primary sources of future economic growth. Both regimes are building and learning. The issues they are dealing with are of great significance. We have not even begun to assess whether the ex ante regime is preventing what are called “killer” acquisitions of new and innovative market entrants. That is why I regard the benefits of co-operation between our CMA and the European Commission to be at least as important in this context as they are in the application of competition law, which is the subject of this agreement and treaty. It is also why I call on the Government, through the trade and co-operation agreement, to secure further agreements relating to co-operation in the application of rules aimed at maintaining effective competition and consumer benefits in digital markets. I thank noble Lords once again for this opportunity. I look forward to our short debate, and I beg to move that we take note of this treaty.

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  5. Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)

    My Lords, it is a real pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who is expert, experienced and rightly much admired for his distinction. He has opened this debate showing that expertise, experience and distinction. I declare a past interest: for eight years, I was one of the part-time chairs of the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In my profession as a barrister, I take a close interest in collective actions and the availability of competition proceedings in the United Kingdom, which are a very important part of our service economy. We are referring to what I regard as a practical, sensible and proportionate agreement that has now been reached. It does not surrender any British sovereignty. It does not bind the United Kingdom to European competition rules—there is a great similarity between our competition rules and those of the European Union, but we are not bound by them in law—nor does it diminish the authority of our CMA or the UK courts, including the Competition Appeal Tribunal. What it does is recognise a simple reality: that modern markets do not stop at national borders. In the United Kingdom, the evidence of that is most clear in Northern Ireland. I happen to have the privilege of being the chair of the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee of this House. I make a plea to the Minister in relation to this process and this debate that every effort be made to ensure that no further complexities are applied to Northern Ireland businesses as a result of this agreement. Believe me, if she looks at our last committee report, she will see how complexity affects the way that businesses deal with competition in United Kingdom where Northern Ireland is involved. It is a truism that businesses that operate in the United Kingdom increasingly trade, invest and compete across the whole European continent. We are dealing with major mergers—some of them referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—cartels, abuses of market power and anti-competitive practices. The importance of those at root is that they frequently affect consumers and small and big businesses on both sides of the channel, so when you find that regulators are investigating precisely the same conduct in various countries, it must be in the public interest that they should be able to communicate effectively, co-ordinate where appropriate and avoid unnecessary duplication. That is especially so where there is the possibility that a remedy can be achieved without resort to the complexities that arise under the conflict of laws, as we lawyers call it. The agreement that we are considering creates a framework for that co-operation. It enables the relevant authorities to notify one another of investigations that may affect their interests, co-ordinate enforcement activity where appropriate and exchange information, subject to robust safeguards of confidentiality and due process. I believe that the regime for digital markets competition should be the subject of a separate agreement because there are very complex different issues that need to be considered there, but that agreement could take its cues from this agreement. For example, I take some professional interest in standard essential patents, SEPs. An SEP is a patent that protects the technology required to implement an industry-wide technical standard. That sentence refers to a huge raft of industry: telecoms, consumer electronics, connected vehicles—those connected to the internet, as most of the vehicles we drive today are—and the internet of things. Those who have standard essential patents have to commit to a FRAND—a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory—agreement, which ensures that they have the advantage of their patents but the consumers do not have to pay through the nose. The practical result is that, for a car that is connected to the internet, for example, a one-off fee of around £20 or £25 is paid when the car is built, which guarantees that you can use your cruise control and everything else in that car for life. That is important and we need to think about it. The alternative to this agreement would be less efficient enforcement, greater regulatory uncertainty and increased costs for businesses and taxpayers alike. Parallel investigations conducted in isolation risk inconsistent outcomes, unnecessary expense and avoidable delays—and the delays in this country are short compared with most of the other countries we are talking about. Cartels do not respect national boundaries, fraud is neither patriotic nor passive, dominant firms operate internationally and digital markets are global in character. Regulators therefore require mechanisms for co-operation if they are to remain effective. Some may fear that any agreement with the European Union inevitably represents a step backwards from Brexit. Although I am not an enthusiast for Brexit— I am the exact opposite—I do not share the view that this represents a step backwards from Brexit. Indeed, Brexit was claimed to be the United Kingdom’s ability to govern itself, and this agreement is part of giving the United Kingdom the ability to govern itself. It is an exercise of that very sovereignty that we all cherish whether we are pro or anti Brexit. A sovereign nation is entirely free to enter into co-operative agreements that advance its national interests. With this agreement we retain independence but we are not isolated. It means that we can choose our partnerships in a manner that benefits our citizens and economy. Importantly, the agreement preserves the complete autonomy of all parties. Decisions remain in the hands of the United Kingdom authorities applying UK law and the EU authorities applying EU law. No supranational decision-making is involved and there is no obligation to reach the same conclusions if we do not want to. It simply gives us the opportunity to work better, with joined-up thinking and working and co-operation on what is sometimes an extraordinarily complex subject factually, technically and legally. In a world in which economic activity is increasingly interconnected, effective regulation requires dialogue, co-ordination and mutual respect between trusted partners. In my view, this agreement achieves just that.

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  6. Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD)

    My Lords, I am genuinely grateful to both noble Lords for their technical knowledge and for introducing this debate. I freely admit that I am not an expert in this area, much as I believe strongly in effective competition law, but the report from the European Affairs Committee suggests that all it has done is to read the agreement—it gives us no guidance at all, whereas the two noble Lords have given us a very clear presentation of what the agreement is about. It is voluntary and non-controversial for practical purposes, because it is not enforceable. Based on genuine good will, it is a partnership to try to make our relationships work. Of course, the context we have at the moment is that, Brexit or no Brexit, the EU remains our biggest trading partner. The basis on which we trade with it is of mutual importance for us to get access and for it not to discriminate against us, and vice versa. So, whether you are for or against Brexit, we need to have rules for trading across the entire market. This is a practical step based on a voluntary agreement that has already been in place. I tried to look around and find out how many examples there are of this kind of co-operation under the existing situation. There were a few, including one in the motor trade and one in pharmaceuticals—reference was also made to digital, which I will come back to—but not very many. This suggests that we are still working fairly well with our European partners and that the main trading companies understand the rules and probably apply them. But you need rules enforceability where there are breaches or threats of breaches. In the light of this, I was slightly taken aback by the need for companies to be prepared for dawn raids and how they should react to them. There have been one or two in this context, and obviously they apply more widely. Having said that, I want to make a few points. If the Minister could give any examples of where this has already worked and how it might work more effectively, that would be helpful—certainly from my point of view—but, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, rightly said, investment purposes are part of the reason for this. Again, our investment opportunities are in a very dynamic state at the moment. Our relationship with the United States is extremely fraught. In many ways, the business-to-business, company-to-company and market-to-market levels are still working and will, I hope, continue to work, but they are being interfered with at the top and by major players in a very disruptive way. This has implications for the UK’s ability to attract, or fail to attract, investment. The question we have to ask is: to what extent are we prepared to compromise our own independence in order to attract investment on terms that are unfavourable or less favourable than we would like? In my view, that reinforces the need for us to reset our relationship with the EU, because it is a more trusted partner. Whatever we might worry about delay and bureaucracy, we understand each other much better, and we are on the same page. This point may not quite be relevant to this debate, but it concerns me—particularly in the digital context—that we are talking about three or four individuals whose personal wealth is the same as that of a medium-sized country. Two days ago, I heard the point that, individually, any one of them could end world hunger with their own resources. But that does not appear to be what motivates or mobilises them. What worries me is the fact that, in many ways, what they want to do with their wealth is use it powerfully to interfere in, pressure or blackmail markets. We need a robust but flexible competition arrangement that enables us to operate in and attract investment in those markets but also protect our own interests. It will not surprise noble Lords to hear me say that this is a step in the right direction, in terms of a reset, but I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that, had we not left the EU, we would not have needed it. It has possibly given us a bit of space that we did not have. On the bigger picture, if we ever go back into the single market—I certainly hope that we will—the customs union and, ultimately, full membership of the European Union, to what extent does some of the space that we have been enabled to create during Brexit justify us not re-entering a very close relationship with the EU, in terms of the compromises and the benefits? Indeed, to what extent can we negotiate a relationship that takes some account of those changes? In my own dealings with the EU, in a whole variety of circumstances when we were members, the UK was an innovator, to the benefit of the EU. That is one of the reasons why it misses us right now. We were prepared not to go along with the centralist conventional wisdom and prepared to challenge it. This was one of the reasons why many of the smaller countries, such as the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, were so fraught when we left: they saw us as championing that view against what they saw as French, German and possibly Italian dominance. That balance has gone. That aside, it seems to me that if you are in business in the UK and more than 40% of your export market is across the channel, you have to conform to the rules and regulations that apply to be part of that market. What you want is to ensure that the rules are mutually and fairly enforced both here and there. This agreement seems to be designed to ensure that that is the case as far as competition is concerned. One of the problems of the past few years is that many small and medium-sized businesses will probably regard this agreement as of no relevance to them because they have stopped trading in the EU because of the technical difficulties. People might have said before Brexit that it was bureaucratic, but when we were in the EU the bureaucracy was negotiated at a senior level, and as a company trading within the EU, it was assumed that you were conforming to the rules and you did not have to prove it. Now you have to prove it, which if you are a big corporation, you can probably do at some expense, but if you are a small or medium-sized business, it is just too much trouble and too costly, so you do not do it. I think that is one of the reasons why we have suffered. Given that it is voluntary and unenforceable, will the Minister say what the experience of the arrangement we have had until now has taught us about how it will work? Will she perhaps give us one or two examples of where and how has it been applied? To come back to the digital space, I am a member of the International Relations and Defence Committee, which is in the middle of an inquiry into multilateralism in the changing world and is having a sub-inquiry into the role of AI in multilateralism. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, made the point that things are moving at a terrifying pace, and it is difficult to know how any rules or regulations are going to work because they are ahead of the game on two counts. First, there is the technology that is being developed, and you have the extreme instance of it taking over the world and killing us all, and, secondly, the people creating these things do not know necessarily what they are creating or who will use it for good or bad. An awful lot of companies are already using AI and may be using it in ways that are hugely beneficial. Indeed, I think it was suggested that one of the reasons the previous quarter’s growth figures were slightly higher than expected was productivity bonuses from the application of AI. At the same time, AI could be used for anti-competitive reasons or for extreme competitive advantage, which is one of the reasons why I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that we almost certainly need a separate agreement in the digital space. We have a real problem in the sense that 98% of AI innovation is being driven by the United States, a significant but small bit is being driven by China and the UK is third, although it has been pointed out that that is equivalent to being the third Gallagher brother. It is innovative and well targeted and gives us some advantage in a small way, but it does not give us any leverage in the market in terms of what is happening elsewhere. I believe it is important that we have a separate agreement, but I worry about how we can possibly get it in place fast enough and, having got it in place, about how it can work in a way that takes account of the pace of development. Funnily enough, the strength of this agreement is its weakness. It is flexible and unenforceable, but it is based on a genuine understanding of each other’s aspirations and a general requirement to work together to ensure that all parties know that there is an effective competition space and that there are parties who will work together to ensure that it is enforced. If the Minister can give some practical examples, I think that would enlighten us. I tried to find one or two, and I was slightly disappointed. All I was told is that there is an agreement, and I got every different aspect of this agreement, but not how specifically it might be applied. If not actual examples, then theoretical examples could help us better understand in practical terms from a business point of view what this will mean so either what it might threaten them with—not too much, I hope—and what it might provide them as an opportunity. If the Minister can answer those questions, I would much appreciate it.

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  7. Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)

    My Lords, we are all very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley not only for securing this debate but for delivering what I found to be one of the most impressive speeches I have heard on this subject, displaying a wide knowledge of not only the background, but the way ahead, which is really what this debate should be all about. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for introducing me to standard essential patterns. Wow! I think we were all blown away by his expertise in this area. We have always regarded him as an eminent lawyer, but I had not quite appreciated the extent to which he has moved on a much wider stage. Let me make clear that we on these Benches support effective international co-operation in the enforcement of competition law. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, that we need to hear from the Government some clear examples of how this new agreement is going to operate in practice. Where anti-competitive behaviour affects consumers and businesses across borders, competition authorities must be able to work together. Effective competition is essential if we are to have confidence in our economy, and it also encourages investment and innovation. I pause here to reflect on the words of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie. We in this country are proud to have some of the most brilliant scientists in the world. We have won more Nobel prizes than the rest of Europe put together. A few years ago, when I was involved as Cabinet Minister for Science, we launched the world wide web, which had been thought up by the most brilliant young 18 year-old Cambridge undergraduate operating at CERN, the Large Hadron Collider. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, that we thought at the time that things were moving so fast they were almost out of control with the development of the internet. I was the first Minister to receive a mobile phone, and I could hardly carry it because it was so heavy. Things move on, but it is very important to have effective competition because it is essential to the confidence we can have about the future, and it encourages investment and innovation. It also gives consumers greater choice and ensures that businesses succeed because they offer better products and services. This agreement makes a number of practical changes intended to achieve just that, in particular, where UK and EU competition authorities are pursuing the same or related enforcement activities. They will now have now have a formal framework through which they can co-ordinate those activities. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify exactly how the Government expect this to operate in practice. Let us look back to some of the suggestions that have been made during this debate. One objective should surely be to reduce unnecessary duplication, yet greater co-operation between regulators could in some circumstances also make it easier for parallel investigations to take place. A business operating in both the United Kingdom and the European Union could still face two investigations, two sets of information requests and potentially different remedies. Can the Minister therefore say what safeguards there are to ensure that this agreement genuinely reduces duplication and regulatory burdens rather than simply facilitating parallel enforcement by different authorities? Article 3 states that a competition authority should notify the authorities of the other party where enforcement activity, “is likely to affect the important interests of the other Party”. Yet, as I understand it, “important interest” is not defined in the agreement. That leaves an obvious question for businesses and their legal advisers. What factors will the CMA or European authorities take into account when deciding that an important interest has been engaged? Do the Government intend, either independently or jointly with the European Union, to publish criteria or guidance explaining exactly how that test will operate? Of course, much of the UK’s competition policy sits outside this agreement. This debate takes place against a much wider question about the direction of competition policy in this country. Competition policy has to protect consumers and tackle genuine anti-competitive behaviour. But it must also recognise that Britain is competing internationally for capital, entrepreneurs and innovative businesses. The Government themselves have instructed the CMA to give greater consideration to growth and investment. The CMA’s report last year, as my noble friend Lord Lansley pointed out, outlined the four Ps —pace, predictability, proportionality and process—and says that its objective is to create a regulatory environment that attracts investment and gives businesses confidence. This is so important in the area that we are discussing. Technology is expanding fast. I acknowledge that. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce, is quite right—it is moving at pace. The CMA now exercises significant powers over some of the world’s largest and most innovative companies. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 gave the CMA an extensive new regulatory regime alongside its existing merger and competition powers. I believe that the Government therefore need to be able to demonstrate that the cumulative effect of these powers is supporting, rather than deterring, investment in the United Kingdom. What assessment have they made of the impact of the DMCC Act and the CMA’s digital market regime on investment, innovation and business confidence in the UK? Similarly, have Ministers reviewed whether the CMA’s existing merger control powers are appropriately calibrated to the Government’s stated objective, which I hope we all share, of making Britain one of the best places in the world in which to invest? Last year, the CMA acknowledged: “UK law gives us an unusually broad jurisdiction by international standards. This can create uncertainty over whether we will review a particular deal or not”. Only last week, we saw the Government intervene on public interest grounds in the BT-TalkTalk transaction under the Enterprise Act 2002, citing the continuity of telecommunications services. There may well be exceptional circumstances in which such intervention is justified but the Act also allows Governments to specify new public interest considerations. We should therefore be very careful that the public interest does not gradually become a cover for the political interest. The CMA itself has previously warned that a repoliticisation of merger control could well undermine business confidence. What assessment have the Government made of the risk that expanding ministerial intervention powers could create uncertainty, raise the regulatory risk attached to investing in the UK and, ultimately, deter investment? Finally, the Government announced a competition reform Bill in the King’s Speech in May. We were told that it would “make competition investigations faster and more predictable, reduce unnecessary burdens on businesses” and strengthen accountability. We are now in October and that Bill has still not been introduced. Can the Minister tell the Committee exactly when the competition reform Bill will be laid before Parliament and whether the Government remain committed to the reforms that were announced in the King’s Speech? We have raised a whole range of questions and we all now look forward to the Minister’s response.

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  8. Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath) (Lab)

    My Lords, I am very pleased to respond for the Government. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for securing this debate and all noble Lords who have contributed today on such an important topic. I was trying to list each of their experiences, expertise and knowledge, which are highly extensive, but then I realised that I would use far too many of my potential 20 minutes on it. I have known two noble Lords for some years and met two others more recently, and I am getting to know their expertise even better, so I feel in very august company in responding. I hope that I can cover all their points. If for any reason there are any outstanding queries at the end of my 20 minutes, particularly given the extensive list from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I will of course write to noble Lords accordingly, but I will try to cover as many as I can. The United Kingdom and the European Union are close neighbours and major trading partners. We share an interest in ensuring that markets are open, competitive and fair and that anti-competitive conduct does not harm consumers or hold back innovative businesses. This is particularly important as our economies continue to adapt to technological change, including the opportunities and challenges presented by digital and AI-enabled markets, mentioned in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce. In an increasingly interconnected global economy, conduct and transactions often cross borders and affect several jurisdictions at once. Effective enforcement therefore depends not only on strong domestic regimes but on practical co-operation between competition authorities. That is why the Government negotiated the UK-EU competition co-operation agreement, signed in Brussels on 25 February this year, as noble Lords are aware. The agreement is the first supplementary agreement to the trade and co-operation agreement to have been signed since that agreement entered into force in 2021. It delivers on the commitment in Article 361 of the TCA, which provides for a separate framework for co-operation on competition matters. It is also the UK’s first ever international co-operation agreement, marking an important step in the Government’s ambition to deepen co-operation with international partners in competition on issues of shared interest. The agreement will facilitate enhanced dialogue and operational co-operation between the Competition and Markets Authority, the European Commission and the national competition authorities of EU member states. This is the EU’s first so-called umbrella agreement, which extends the co-operation framework to the EU member states’ national competition authorities. In practice, this means competition authorities will be better able to co-ordinate where they are investigating similar or parallel cases. They will be able to notify one another of relevant enforcement activity, co-operate on investigations into cross-border anti-competitive practices and give careful consideration to each other’s important interests. This matters because closer co-operation can make enforcement more timely, coherent and effective. It can help to avoid unnecessary duplication for authorities and businesses, so clearly outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, and, ultimately, it can support more effective action to address harms, protect consumers and promote fair and dynamic markets. This agreement also supports the Government’s mission to deliver economic growth. Effective competition in dynamic markets drives investment, innovation, productivity and, ultimately, growth. It strengthens the conditions for sustainable economic growth and delivers long-term benefits for businesses and consumers. The Government have set out their priorities and expectations for the Competition and Markets Authority through their strategic steer. This emphasises the importance of considering action taken by competition and consumer protection authorities internationally and, where appropriate, ensuring that parallel regulatory action is timely, is coherent and avoids unnecessary duplication. This agreement will be an important tool in supporting those objectives. Noble Lords will rightly expect co-operation of this kind to be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. The agreement is clear that each authority will continue to apply its own competition law and take its own decisions that reflect its important interests. It creates a framework for co-operation where that is helpful and appropriate, while fully respecting the independence of each authority and its enforcement activities. Any information sharing will remain subject to domestic law. The agreement also contains clear protections governing confidentiality, onward disclosure and the purposes for which information may be used. These safeguards help ensure that co-operation can take place in a way that provides certainty and reassurance for businesses, while protecting confidential information and respecting the independence of each authority. Noble Lords raised the question of why the agreement does not include digital competition within its scope. At this stage, the priority has been to establish and bring into force a practical co-operation agreement that delivers tangible benefits for competition enforcement and consumers. Noble Lords will be aware that the UK’s digital markets regime came into force only in January 2025, after negotiations for the UK-EU competition co-operation agreement concluded. It is right that the regime is given time to bed in domestically and that experience is gained of its operation in practice before it is included in a formal co-operation agreement. Furthermore, it is not unusual for the EU to adopt a phased approach to international co-operation agreements, where a first agreement establishes the foundation for co-operation, with more advanced co-operation considered later as relationships mature and practical experience is gained. Indeed, this has been the approach taken by the EU with other key partners such as Canada. The agreement should therefore be seen as a foundation rather than an end-point. That is why the agreement includes a review clause which provides an opportunity for both parties to consider whether co-operation should develop further in future. Since signing, the agreement was laid before Parliament on 15 April, and the United Kingdom’s parliamentary scrutiny process concluded on 10 June. The European Parliament has since given its consent, and the agreement is now progressing through the European Union’s remaining procedures. We look forward to the necessary steps being completed so that the agreement can enter into force. The agreement also gives us an opportunity to look ahead. It commits the parties to initiate a joint review within two years of entry into force and establishes a framework through which co-operation can continue to develop over time. As markets evolve, it is important that authorities are able to maintain a constructive dialogue and share expertise where that supports effective enforcement and better outcomes for consumers and businesses. Digital markets are naturally one example where the UK and the EU share the objective of promoting competition, supporting innovation and delivering better outcomes for businesses and consumers. On the question around the timing with the EU on digital competition, noble Lords should be reassured that there is already close working between the UK and the EU on this, both as competition authorities and policymakers. The CMA and the European Commission maintain a close dialogue on competition matters, including digital markets. There are also existing opportunities for the UK Government and the EU to discuss digital competition established under the trade and co-operation agreement, as well as wider discussions through the G7 or OECD. Just this morning, UK and EU officials met through the trade specialised committee, where they had the opportunity to discuss level playing field issues, including competition and digital competition policy. On domestic digital competition, the Government’s position is that the UK is very active in this space. Since the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act came into force, the CMA has made significant progress in implementing the new regime. Over the past year, the CMA has concluded three strategic market status investigations; designated Google in search and both Apple and Google in mobile ecosystems; imposed remedies; and launching a further SMS investigation into Microsoft’s business software and cloud services. In search, the CMA has already imposed conduct requirements relating to publisher controls, the fair ranking of search results and data portability. Notably, the publisher controls remedy is a world first. It gives publishers greater control over how their content is used in AI-generated summaries. In mobile ecosystems, the CMA has secured commitments from Apple and Google relating to app review processes and data use, while also consulting on measures relating to app store steering and access to NFC functionality to support competition and innovation. In cloud services, the CMA has secured commitments from Amazon and Microsoft to improve interoperability and switching, while continuing to investigate competition concerns in business software and cloud licensing. The regime is already proving its worth in terms of both speed of impact and resilience to future developments in this fast-moving area. As a number of noble Lords have highlighted today, competition challenges increasingly have an international dimension. This agreement does not seek to make our respective regimes identical—nor should it. Rather, it ensures that independent authorities can work together more effectively where there is a shared interest in doing so. In sum, the agreement represents an important step forward in competition co-operation between the UK and the EU. It provides a practical framework for closer engagement between our competition authorities, supports more effective enforcement in cross-border markets and establishes a strong foundation on which co-operation can continue to develop in future. I turn to some of the specific issues raised by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, spoke about complexity for businesses in Northern Ireland. Our intention is that the competition and co-operation agreement will reduce complexity for businesses operating in Northern Ireland through, for example, fewer duplicative requests for information. I have a detailed answer on standard essential patents, but I would be happy to write to the noble Lord to save a little time on that; as he might expect, it is all good news. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce, said that he is interested in the advantages. Theoretically, this agreement could have real advantages for businesses subject to, for example, a merger investigation in both the UK and the EU, which could include a reduction in costs and duplicative requests for information—this was also of concern to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral—greater predictability in outcomes and co-ordinated enforcement. Further, the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, asked how the UK’s digital market regime will be able to adapt to developments in AI. I have already touched a bit on AI. The UK’s tools under the digital markets regime are intended to be flexible to address competition issues as digital and AI markets evolve. For example, the CMA’s publisher control conduct requirement in Google Search is a world first, allowing publishers to opt out of their content being used to power AI features. The CMA will act in areas that will have the greatest benefits for UK markets and consumers. I turn to some of the detailed questions from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral. The term “important interests” is not defined in the agreement in order to give respective competition authorities the flexibility to consider which enforcement activities may affect the important interests of the other party on a case-by-case basis. I hope that the majority of the noble Lord’s other, more general questions were covered by my earlier remarks; if not, I have committed to ensuring that he and others receive further detail on the specific questions and issues that came up. In conclusion, I repeat—

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  9. Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)

    If I may say so, it would be a great relief to us all if the Minister could tell us when the competition reform Bill is going to be laid before Parliament. Can she give us a rough idea? Also, are the Government still committed to the commitments put forward at the time of the King’s Speech?

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  10. Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)

    The Prime Minister has been clear that he will honour the manifesto. It is simply a matter of parliamentary time. I do have any more detailed information to provide at this moment, but I am aware that the department is pressing to ensure that there is parliamentary time available; that is going through the usual appropriate channels.

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  11. Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)

    Picking up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, can the Minister pass on this message through her officials: there will be deep frustration if, when such a Bill appears, it does not resolve what is known as the PACCAR problem, which she and her officials will understand fully?

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  12. Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)

    I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am aware of the issues that he mentions. Again, those are absolutely in the minds of both officials and Ministers; we are on it, if I can say that. I will remark once again on the privilege I have felt in listening to noble Lords, including the extensive practical experience of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, as a former Minister. I loved the idea of the very first mobile phone; I look forward to seeing pictorial evidence at some point, because it would be quite amusing to see how big mobile phones were in those days. There is all that extensive knowledge: of course, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has extensive experience from Northern Ireland and the Competition Appeal Tribunal as well, while the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was speaking about these issues in 1998 is humbling. I cannot put it any higher than that, so I thank you all. Today’s debate has demonstrated the breadth of our shared interest in ensuring that competition works effectively for businesses and consumers. This agreement provides a strong foundation for closer co-operation with our European partners, while preserving the independence of our respective competition regimes. It is a positive step in its own right, but it is also part of a wider constructive UK-EU relationship. The Government look forward to building on that co-operation in the years ahead.

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  13. Lord Lansley (Con)

    My Lords, this has been only a short debate but one that was full of content and interesting—indeed, entertaining—contributions. I am most grateful to those noble Lords who have taken part for their support in discussing these issues. When we are not contemplating legislation, we rarely have an opportunity to talk about these issues. Unlike some other legislatures, which seem constantly to revisit competition policy and try to influence the Executive, we hand the legislation over to the Executive. Then, as I said in my speech, we sometimes fire and forget, but the issues behind this subject are so important that it is vital that we take every opportunity to bring them forward. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred to standard essential patents. He will recall that we covered some of these issues in the then product safety Bill. Given my conversations with the Intellectual Property Office since, I am hopeful that the Government will respond before the end of the year.

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  14. Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)

    They have responded.

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  15. Lord Lansley (Con)

    Have they?

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  16. Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)

    Yes, yesterday.

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  17. Lord Lansley (Con)

    Oh, the noble Lord is ahead of me. That is a very good basis on which we can bring these issues back. Frankly, the European Union is in balk. The Commission has withdrawn its proposals, and the European Parliament is challenging that in the European court, so the EU cannot make progress. We should think that it is incumbent on us to try to lead the way. I hope that we will be able to have a constructive debate—if necessary, outside the formal processes of Parliament—on how we can take SEPs forward. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, that I think there is an interesting example. The Safran/Collins one I referred to is an interesting example of co-operation. I hope we can see different jurisdictions doing things in their own terms differently, but with the same objective and, as it happens, the same remedy. That is a very good example of the way in which I hope this kind of co-operation will proceed in the months and years ahead. The noble Baroness was very positive about the possibility of taking forward co-operation by phases. Of course, from the European Union’s point of view, the legislative base for this agreement does not extend into the Digital Markets Act, so we may need to think about something new under the trade and co-operation agreement rather than simply an extension of this agreement. But I hope that we will put that into the mix for 20 November—the many things that I hope will form part of a “positive reset”. My noble friend Lord Hunt talked about investment and innovation and the balance. The competition reform Bill, when it comes, presumably will be directed very much to the balance between promoting investment and growth and ensuring that we maintain effective competition. I said in my opening remarks that monopolists have always been able to demonstrate short-term benefits to consumers; the problem is that they kill long-term investment and innovation because they kill market entry on the part of others, and market entry is absolutely critical in this. The Furman review was very clear that there had been very many acquisitions of start-up and innovative companies in the digital space by the leading market players. We have not had an SMS designation here long enough to be able to see how far this new regime, through the notification procedures under the DMCC, will enable intervention to ensure that market entrants are able to succeed in digital markets. It is fundamentally an interface between the digital competition regime and the conventional competition regime because notification under the DMCC leads directly into merger reference under the Enterprise Act, on which Standing Committee I was honoured to serve back in 2002 as well. Digital competition and conventional competition cannot be disentangled; they are part of the same thing, and it will be important to see the co-operation under this agreement, working, I hope, to help to support the scrutiny of merger references in the digital world. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce, talked about the power and wealth of the tech magnates. They are, as it were, the railway barons of the modern age. I think we should hope that there is a bit of Andrew Carnegie about this. Although you might argue about his desire to maximise profit and the way he went about it, his purpose was to maximise profit so he could deploy that money for the public interest, not least in Dunfermline, if I recall correctly. There is a bit of the Carnegie philosophy about some tech leaders—not all. They are not railway barons or creating Standard Oil or US Steel but they are creating the companies dominating our industry today and, if this is a new golden age, I hope we find some of that. However, let us remember that the golden age led to the anti-trust legislation in America in the early part of the 20th century. Here in the 21st century, we have to make sure that our anti-trust and pro-competition regime is equally as effective in preventing the abuse of dominance—

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  18. Baroness Ramsey of Wall Heath (Lab)

    I am sorry to ask the noble Lord to give way for a moment, but I need to make a correction for the record. The competition reform Bill was mentioned in the King’s Speech, not in the manifesto.

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  19. Lord Lansley (Con)

    I thank the Minister very much for that and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I hope we will have the opportunity in future to take forward some of these important issues.

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  20. Motion agreed.

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  21. Committee adjourned at 1.24 pm.

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Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5417794.