Contribution
I will speak to Amendment 56, which, rather confusingly, appears on Today’s List in this group and the next, but I promise your Lordships that I will spare the House a reprise of what I am going to say. The amendment is similar to one debated in Committee. It is concerned with lawfare—the danger that our troops, whether cadets, reserves or regulars, face not from adversaries on the battlefield but from lawyers and the dead hand of the law.
I begin by making it clear that I am not for a moment suggesting that our troops should operate in a law-free zone. The amendment makes it clear that they should be, and always will be, subject to the law of armed conflict. The concern arises from the ECHR and its incorporation in our own Human Rights Act. We cannot amend the ECHR and, as a matter of choice, we have legislated to take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence. In practice, this means that we almost always follow the jurisprudence of the European Court in Strasbourg. In Committee, I referred to some of the decisions, there and here, that have left our troops inappropriately constrained by the law—Al-Skeini being one and Smith v Ministry of Defence, referred to obliquely by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, being another. That, unfortunately, had the effect of essentially eroding the concept of combat immunity, which was well-established in our common law.
The incursion of law into military operations has left our troops in an embarrassing position with some of our allies. Because of legal advice, they can be sidelined and accused of something called legal freeloading. Accidents happen in war, and actions taken in the heat of battle may be regarded as excessive when studied by judges in the calm of the courtroom, particularly when viewed through the prism of that slippery word “proportionality”. For some time, Policy Exchange has highlighted this problem, beginning with Tom Tugendhat’s paper, The Fog of Law. This amendment would provide a carve-out from the Human Rights Act for our troops when they are engaged in overseas operations. Some of the persecution of our troops by the likes of Phil Shiner for events in Afghanistan or Iraq—not obviously European theatres of war—would have been avoided had this amendment been part of the law.
When I addressed your Lordships’ House in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he found my remarks incomprehensible. I will try to be a little clearer today for the benefit of the noble Baroness the Minister, who is in his place. I think the noble Lord’s point was that it was no good amending the Human Rights Act, which we are entitled to do as a sovereign legislature, because litigants can always take their cases to Strasbourg. I do not disagree with that, but we are entitled to amend our domestic law. How Strasbourg would respond is not always easy to predict. There is respect there for our national courts—I am clear on that, having visited Strasbourg and spoken to judges there. Further, the convention is a living instrument and the court is perfectly capable of changing course. So while the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was right, it does not relieve us of the task of improving our law and giving our Armed Forces better protection. Noble Lords will be aware that it has always been open to a country to derogate from the convention in times of war, under Article 15. The amendment would elevate the word “may” to the word “must”. This is a change at domestic level, unfortunately justified by experience.
The likelihood of our troops being engaged in military operations has increased and is increasing. We should provide our troops with adequate legal protection. I hope that those noble Lords who wish to remain in the ECHR will recognise that this amendment does not represent a dilution of adherence to the ECHR, the HRA or Europe more generally. It reflects the fact that even the best laws need amendment from time to time. I am rather more interested in the fate of our troops than in an overzealous adherence to the ever elusive concept of “human rights”.