Contribution
My Lords, I thank in his absence the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and his committee for a careful and useful report. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, for standing in at short notice and introducing the debate.
The committee rightly notes in its report that this debate is the only opportunity this House has to consider the treaty in detail. It has been in provisional operation for three months now; it needs no legislation here and, as others have said, cannot be stopped by this House under the 2010 Act.
I repeat what I have said in other debates: after the EU exit, it cannot be right that treaties of such importance can come into force without a clear yes/no vote in this Parliament. One day this process will have to be changed.
In his evidence last month, the Minister was kind enough to suggest that if the committee wanted to know why an agreement was not included in the TCA, “it should get Lord Frost in and ask him”. I am always happy to appear before the committee, but in fact the Minister went on to give more or less the correct answer. Negotiating the biggest trade and co-operation agreement in the middle of a pandemic meant simply that there was not time for everything, particularly given the situation resulting from the EU commitment in 2017 to give Spain, effectively, a veto on any deal, and it was inevitable that this would have to be dealt with separately. I actually think that the interim agreement at the end of 2020 was not a bad agreement in the circumstances, but it was never going to last, and that is why we are where we are now.
We all know the situation in Gibraltar; I know the issues directly as I was for a time the Foreign Office director responsible for Gibraltar after the previous Labour Government’s attempt to reach a so-called shared sovereignty deal. We know that 15,000 people cross the frontier every day. Frontier workers make up about 40% of Gibraltar’s workforce, and restrictions at the frontier always affect Gibraltar’s economy negatively. We know how fraught the issues are; we know the politics of the issue in Spain. We know too that Gibraltar voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU, and these realities all have to be acknowledged and accepted.
I understand why a fluid border—to use what is apparently the new term of art for these circumstances— for people and goods between Gibraltar and Spain is so important and why achieving it is so important to Gibraltar. That is the context for the concerns that I shall go on to express.
The first is the airport, and particularly border control. It is all carefully hedged but, for the first time, Spanish officials will be carrying out border checks on arrivals into British territory. Under the treaty’s provisions, they can search British travellers arriving in the course of border control and demand their fingerprints. That is new. What is less clear to me, even now—having read the treaty and all the evidence sessions around it—is that there nevertheless still seems to be some unclarity about how the interaction between Spain and Gibraltar will work in this area, or perhaps has been working for the last three months. It is not clear who has the final say and who is really constrained in their discretion here.
To take just one example, the Minister said in his evidence session:
“When an individual is the subject of an alert on the Schengen Information System … or they do not meet the requirements for entry into the Schengen area, Spain may refuse them entry into Schengen. In those circumstances … the Government of Gibraltar have taken their own decision to mutually recognise decisions taken by Spain to refuse entry … based on security or public safety concerns”.
From subsequent discussion in the evidence session, it seems that this is automatic.
Like others, I am delighted to see the Chief Minister here today. When he was asked about this, he said that,
“Gibraltar would make its decision and, if it permits the individual to come in, the individual goes to the Schengen check also to be permitted access to Schengen. If that individual is permitted access to Schengen they have no problems. If we permit access to Gibraltar but access to Schengen is not permitted, the individual has the right to visit only Gibraltar and not Schengen”.
Maybe I am missing something here, but I am not quite sure how these two statements can be reconciled—maybe they describe slightly different situations—unless the right to enter Gibraltar is a right unable to be exercised in practice, only in theory. I will have some questions for the Minister on this, but I will move on.
My second concern is hot pursuit. I asked the then Ministers about this in June last year. The answer was that Article 41 of the Schengen convention would not apply, but it has subsequently become clear that that has largely been reproduced in this treaty. Spanish officers will be able to follow suspects into Gibraltar by land; there are safeguards, but the principle has been conceded.
The third is dynamic alignment arrangements in the treaty. Under Article 19, if Gibraltar does not accept and implement a new EU Act, the whole arrangement ends unless the co-operation council can agree an alternative within three months. We are now becoming familiar with the arrangement by which disputes about the meaning of EU law are sent by an arbitration panel to the ECJ. Gibraltar now has a customs union with the EU, which takes it out of British trade policy for goods. All this means a loss of control.
My fourth concern is the exit clauses. Under the concordat, as the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, noted, the UK has undertaken that it will not terminate the treaty, except in the most exceptional circumstances, unless three-quarters of Gibraltar’s Parliament or a referendum support it. The committee also notes that the concordat
“does not constrain the EU’s own rights of termination or suspension”.
Under Article 66, the EU will take the necessary steps to end the agreement if Spain so requests, so Spain has a sword of Damocles over Gibraltar. In a way, it always has had such a sword, but it has been given a new legal and usable version of it, which future Governments in Spain may seek to use as leverage. Since the current Spanish Government may—I personally hope they will—lose the election and may be succeeded by one that tends to be more aggressive on Gibraltar questions, this is maybe not an entirely theoretical question.
Those are the concerns I have about this treaty. Where does this leave things? The Chief Minister, whose long service to the people of Gibraltar I acknowledge as he prepares to stand down, told the committee that:
“I can put my hand in the Gibraltarian political fire and tell you that not an iota of our sovereignty has been compromised”.
He is correct in the sense that Gibraltar or the UK can always denounce the agreement, just as the UK could always leave the EU if it did not like its sovereignty-destroying effects, but as long as Gibraltar is part of this agreement, it is losing sovereignty in the sense that it does not have a say in the laws that govern it. It is subject to a legal system in certain areas over which it has no say, and if it does not adopt EU laws in a long list of areas, and cannot persuade the EU to accept alternatives, it loses the entire treaty.
Gibraltar’s rights to allow entry to British citizens and third-country nationals are compromised, shall we say, in practice, and it is not clear to me—I will come back to this—whether it has rights to refuse entry to Schengen nationals at all. I note there was some unease in Gibraltar about some of these terms from the opposition and Sir Peter Caruana, among others, but not going so far as to oppose the treaty. I think they are right to be uneasy. I think we all have a right to comment on this, and my view is that I do not think that this treaty is going to be good for Gibraltar in the long run, assuming it wants to stay part of the UK orbit. Of course, there are gains on the border, but there are also losses in important areas, such as the import of food and goods, border controls and information-sharing, taxation and so on. It seems inevitable to me that, over time, the effect of this treaty will be to produce a tilt towards Spain and the EU and away from the UK. Gibraltar must live with the constant risk that the treaty will be denounced if it is insufficiently compliant. There are plenty of points of leverage. To me, that is a pity.
That said, there is no suggestion, indeed quite the contrary, that Gibraltarians do not want this deal. It passed in Parliament unanimously. There is no suggestion that HMG have put pressure on Gibraltar to accept it. So be it on every question, except I think those pertaining to the military base itself. I do not think that the Government can be more sovereigntist than the Gibraltarians themselves. I would rather something different had been agreed, but I do not oppose it. If Gibraltar has decided that this is the price of the working frontier, I do not think it is for us to overrule Gibraltar, and I do not even think, in contrast to the reset proper, that a future Government should reverse it.
However, we have to recognise that this treaty changes something in the relationship and things may not be in future as they have been before. There is only so much cover this country can give Gibraltar in the areas where it has ceded sovereignty, and in those areas, Gibraltar and its authorities are going to have to find an accommodation over time from a position of weakness with the EU and Spain if it wants those arrangements to continue. I regret that, I do not oppose it, but that is the situation that the treaty has created, and I think we ought to be honest about it.
To finish up, I have a small number of questions for the Minister. Let us come back to the travel question on arrivals by air or sea. If a British citizen arrives in Gibraltar for tourism and the Spanish refuse Schengen access, can that person still enter Gibraltar—yes or no? If a Brit arrives to work in Gibraltar with a residence permit and the Spanish refuse access to Schengen, can that person still enter Gibraltar to work or live—yes or no? Can Gibraltar refuse entry to Schengen nationals? I think that the Minister promised to clarify this at the evidence session. If I missed the clarification, I apologise, but I could not find one, so I would be interested in the answer to that question. Furthermore, could the Minister give a clear statement of what this Government will do if a future Spanish Government use any of these arrangements to put further pressure on Gibraltar in any area? What is the Government’s view on Gibraltar’s opposition requests for a stronger concordat? Is this something that is being considered? Finally, do the Government have in mind any arrangements for reporting to Parliament on the treaty and its operation over time?
I end where I began. An important treaty has come into force with no vote and no power for us to stop it. It does bring real gains for Gibraltar, and I do not deny them, but it also hands Spain and the EU a variety of new legal weapons to be used against Gibraltar. Gibraltar has made its choice, and I accept it. We are not losing Gibraltar and sovereignty over it—I agree with that—but we are sort of sharing it more than we ever have before, it seems to me. I think a bit of honesty about this would be welcome. Dynamic alignment and outsourcing of legal powers is a bargain whose terms are easy to sign and sometimes hard to live with. I hope that I am wrong, but I fear that future Ministers here and in Gibraltar, perhaps facing a less friendly Government in Madrid, will come to understand the risks of what has been agreed, and maybe even come to regret it.