Contribution
My Lords, we move on to Part 3 of the Bill, and I rise to speak to the first four amendments in this group, which concern misconduct in public office. I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for discussing them with me, as he promised to do.
This Government are to be commended for accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission, in its report of 2020, that the common-law offence be abolished and replaced by the statutory offences in Clauses 13 and 14. The common-law offence is an ancient one, but fell largely into disuse during the 20th century. Attempts to use it again more recently—for example, against journalists and purported whistleblowers as part of Operation Elveden—have demonstrated its defects. As the Law Commission put it at paragraph 3.41 of its report:
“The unifying concern is that the offence fails to provide the certainty and clarity that the criminal law demands, and is therefore prone to error, misuse and abuse by law enforcement agencies”.
My amendments focus on Clause 13, which creates what the Law Commission described as
“an offence of corruption in public office”.
The offence is intended to catch acts performed by public office holders for a corrupt purpose, including financial gain and the facilitation of a sexual relationship. An offence will be committed only if the officeholder knows, or ought to know, that the use of their office for such a corrupt purpose is a seriously improper act—a question to be decided by the jury with regard to the matters listed in Clause 13(3). The recommendations of the Law Commission have been watered down in two crucial respects. The purpose of my amendments is to strengthen the offence in the Bill so that it regains the clarity, precision and efficacy that the Law Commission recommended that it needed.
Amendments 81, 83 and 84 address the fact that a Clause 13 offence is committed only if the person uses their office
“to obtain a benefit … or to cause another person to suffer a detriment”.
Interpreted with the caution appropriate to all criminal statutes, this appears to mean that the offence can be committed only if a benefit is actually obtained or a detriment actually suffered. That may not be what the Government intend.
During Commons Bill Committee last December, the Minister there stated that the offence can be committed where public office is used with the intent or—to use the Law Commission’s preferred word—purpose of obtaining a benefit or causing detriment; that would match the position under Section 2 of the Bribery Act 2010. I noticed that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, used the same formulation when summarising Clause 13 in his response on Monday to Amendments 31 and 82, as in col. 479 of Hansard. However, this is not a case where an assurance from the Dispatch Box will suffice. Our courts, increasingly and not unreasonably, tend to focus on the words of the statute that we ask them to apply. It is hard enough to explain the law to juries, and harder still when the law is not clear on its face. My amendments would put beyond doubt the interpretation that the Government themselves appear to favour.
My other amendment, Amendment 85, seeks to narrow the defence provided for in Clause 13(5). The Law Commission recommended what it described at 5.104 of its report as
“a statutory ‘public interest’ defence—that would be available in certain, limited circumstances—most likely in the context of unauthorised use or disclosure of official information”.
It went on to explain, by reference to principle and precedent, why it was appropriate to impose the legal burden of establishing this defence on the defendant. This narrow whistleblower’s defence has been replaced in the Bill with a far broader defence of “reasonable excuse”. That could be rather significant in practice. It would open the way for defendants charged with seriously improper, corrupt conduct to avoid penalisation by relying on such matters as short staffing or lack of training—matters which are obviously not in the public interest, but which a jury might be persuaded constitute a reasonable excuse.
The impact assessment rightly makes the point that honest mistakes or finely balanced operational decisions should not be caught by this offence. However, the combined requirements of corrupt purpose and seriously improper behaviour present a high bar to conviction, in contrast to the position under Clause 12, some of the foibles of which we discussed on Monday. Therefore, the case for a narrower defence to Clause 13 is, if anything, stronger than the case for a narrower defence to Clause 12, which was so ably made in that debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 86 would place the legal burden of establishing this defence on the defendant, as recommended by the Law Commission on orthodox grounds in 5.112 to 5.122 of its report; I entirely support that amendment.
In Amendments 88 and 89, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, also raises the issue of what, if any, defence is appropriate to the Clause 14 offence under “Breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury”. So far as I can see, the Law Commission did not see the need for any statutory defence to a charge under Clause 14. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s position on why a defence, particularly such a broad one, as provided by Clauses 14(2) and (3), is necessary. I beg to move.