Contribution
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the characteristically clear and persuasive speech by the noble Baroness. I also want to say how much I enjoyed the eloquent, moving and wise speech by the noble Lord, Lord Stace. We have much to look forward to in the future from his contributions to this House. While I am at it, may I say that I am looking forward to the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Leveson? He and I go back a long way: 55 years ago we started appearing against one another in quite a lot of pretty knockabout cases, many of them tried by juries up in the north-west. We enjoyed every minute of it, I think, and I am sure we will enjoy being together in your Lordships’ House.
I have had the good fortune of appearing before juries in hundreds of cases over the decades. I have loved every minute of it—well, almost every minute of it. I respect the attention and integrity of juries, and their sense of justice. In the eyes of a jury, every case is a story, and they judge life’s stories—sometimes, unfortunately, life’s horror stories. However, the system is not perfect. The Criminal Cases Review Commission, for example, was set up largely to deal with cases where there had been injustices before juries. The jury system is vital; it works, but it is not set in stone.
One of the things that has not changed in the English and Welsh jury system is the number of jurors we have—the apostolic number, as it is sometimes called. But let us look at some of our sister jurisdictions with the same common law background, or at least a hybrid, similar background—that is a reference to Scotland. In the Isle of Man, for example, I have addressed a jury of seven in a long fraud case. Scotland has juries of 15. If we look at the system we have, which again, has sisters in Australia and Canada, and look up the changes there have been in the jury systems in those countries, we see that, although they are very much trying cases as we do, many of the cases that were heard before Australian and Canadian courts have been removed from juries, for exactly the kinds of reasons we are talking about on this Bill.
Of course, juries were required in some civil cases when I started at the Bar. The removal of juries was regarded as the end of the world as we knew it in relation to some of those actions—libel actions, for example—but that has proved not to be the case. We have not suffered a crisis of injustice where juries have been removed. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, for whom I have an enormous admiration, that if the tapestry has some tears in it, we can repair it by some fairly small darning around the edges.
In a previous debate, a Labour Member of this House, who I will not name, referred to the rather undistinguished fact that my first jury trial was not defending a TV star on a shoplifting case but was actually a breathalyser case for an incident that occurred outside Birkenhead public library. Breathalyser cases were tried by jury from 1967 until 1988. If we were to say to barristers and solicitors now, “Let’s put breathalysers in front of a jury”, they would say we were mad.
Indeed, from looking at the history of various crimes we see that low-value criminal damage cases—now up to £5,000 damage—generally do not go before juries; nor do common assault and battery, and a large number of quite important administrative cases. In my view, we are simply adjusting the system. We in this place make new crimes—triable by jury, quite a lot of them—and we have to make space in the jury system for those crimes. It is perfectly reasonable to place them before magistrates.
However, I have some words about the extending of magistrates’ jurisdictions, which I hope the Minister, who has been very helpful in meeting us in relation to the Bill, will attend to. First, although he spoke of successful recruitment of magistrates recently, there is an awful long way to go to find enough magistrates of the right quality, with the right sort of experience and the right kind of judgment to do all the new cases they will be trying. Secondly, we need to ensure that they are given effective, high-quality training. Thirdly, we need to ensure that there is commitment from a large proportion of them. It will not be satisfactory if a group of magistrates are seen to be trying all the former “either way” cases in their court because they happen to be available, do not work, have more time, or have a particularly sympathetic employer. I suggest to the Minister—I think this is intended to be covered in Clause 18—that payment should be made to magistrates who are replacing jurors, for example if there is a case of more than two days. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said earlier, some of those cases could go on for up to five days or more.
Next, I am afraid I am going to refer to a case. It is very important that, in accordance with the case of R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham, 1992, provision of sound and concise reasons should be available in every case. The Crown Court will not be able to decide whether permission should be given for an appeal—I support adding a permission requirement—if it does not see cogent reasons from the magistrates. That will take some time and some training. It will also require that every magistrates’ court should have a really competent clerk or magistrates’ legal adviser in front of it to help if it has any legal problems with its cases.
Further, juries are not always the best choice. I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Macdonald’s suggestion that we should consider allowing people to elect trial by judge alone. I can think of a large number of cases that I have done—I single out some historic sexual abuse cases—where I would have advised my client that he, and it is usually he, would have a better chance of a fair trial in front of a judge alone, with a lot of the emotion removed from the case.
I can give as an analogy, and it is a very loose analogy, non-jury trials in Northern Ireland, where the most recent available figures show an acquittal rate before a judge alone of 28.7% compared with an acquittal rate before a jury of 21.8%. We need to take such facts into account in determining whether what is advised in the Bill is wise. I believe it is, in general, but we will no doubt be able to desiccate the Bill to ensure that that wisdom is of the highest order.