Mark Garnier

The point of ringfencing at the time was to separate the retail banks from the wholesale and investment banks. If the hon. Lady remembers, the Liikanen reforms sought to cage the tigers and ringfence the investment banks into units, whereas our reforms looked to put a fence around the deer park to look after the retail banks. The problem is that this creates a cliff edge as customers get past a certain turnover—I think they go from being in the retail bank to being in the wholesale bank when they get to £5 million of turnover. The only bank that has changed that is Barclays; it has set that limit at £100 million, which makes the retail bank much more open, and arguably could make it slightly more vulnerable. Of course we do not want the big banks to fail—although, having said that, we have to have an element of risk within the banking system. It is important that we keep that. However, we have a number of systems that have come in later and that other countries have looked at, such as the bail-in bonds and the MREL regime. Returning to the competitiveness point, we now find ourselves with a ringfencing regime that creates extra costs and administrative burdens for banks that other countries do not have. We also have a system that can protect consumers, the bail-in bonds, whereby we have regulatory capital that can potentially be converted from bonds into equity to solve that problem.