Contribution
My Lords, in moving Amendment 9, I shall also speak to a number of the other amendments I have tabled in this group. I apologise for the fact that there are 14 such other amendments. I will therefore, I am sure, be forgiven if many of my arguments are summarised very briefly and if I rely on the explanatory notes that appear on the Order Paper.
Behind this set of amendments, of course, is one’s anxiety about “judge only” trials. That is indeed a very important issue that we are going to address, I think, in group 6. I share the very serious reservations about “judge only” trials, but the arguments will be deployed in group 6. I shall not deploy them now. But it would be prudent, against the possibility that the Government will press ahead with “judge only” trials in certain circumstances, for this Committee to consider how faults and omissions within the present Bill can be remedied. That is what my raft of amendments is designed to achieve.
I will start with Amendment 9, which is the lead amendment in this group. It is designed to ensure that “judge only” trials can be ordered only when all the defendants on the indictment are charged with the relevant offences. It seems to me to be rather hard that a defendant who is not himself or herself charged with a relevant offence should be swept up into a “judge only” trial, because other defendants are. That seems to me to be bad news and I would like to see it addressed by my amendment.
I turn to Amendments 14 and 15. I am deeply concerned with the proposition that a “judge only” trial can be ordered when a court is satisfied that, because of the length or complexity of the trial, it is more appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury. As a Minister of very long standing—I was a Minister for 13 years—I know that the word “appropriate” is a weasel word. It is used by Ministers, the Executive, civil servants and, no doubt on occasion, the judiciary to cover anything they want it to cover. It is a bad word to use and it is not, in my view, a judicial word.
What I have tried to do in Amendment 14 is ask myself what one is trying to address. I suggest what one is trying to address is when the length or the complexity of the case is such that it cannot reasonably or fairly be tried. That is different from “appropriate”. It is a judicial concept, a concept of justice, which I very much hope would commend itself to your Lordships’ Committee.
Rather similar observations arise in the context of my Amendment 15. Looking at the substantive bit of the Bill, we see that judges are required to determine whether it is not in the public interest to hold a jury trial. But, again, the “public interest” is not really a judicial concept. What we should be doing is determining in this context whether it is fair to a defendant to have a jury trial. That is what Amendments 15 and 16 are designed to do. I hope that that might commend itself to the Committee.
I am conscious that I am standing on a raft of many amendments, and I do not want to weary the Committee. So, I will just summarise in brief the other amendments in my name, pointing to the explanatory note wherever possible. Amendment 18 is a procedural amendment designed to ensure that a defendant can make full representations, oral and written—a hearing if required—when this issue has to be determined. That seems to me to be wholly fair: very difficult to argue against, I would think.
Amendment 19 concerns the filter of the Lord Chief Justice or a nominated judge; this, again, is a very useful protection. Amendments 20 and 28 concern rights of appeal—I know the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is at one with this. Amendments 23 and 24 deal with the circumstances in which an order can be revoked. Again, we should be considering questions of fairness and justice; that is what my amendments are designed to do.
I come to Amendments 26 and 27. These, though procedural, are very important. The purpose is to ensure that a defendant has an early statement of the outcome of the proceedings. In the general run of cases, the defendant is entitled to know the outcome within not more than seven days of the conclusion of the proceedings, and they are entitled to a full and proper written judgement. These procedural requirements are not apparent on the face of the Bill.
Having gone through my amendments at a bit of a scamper—it was a broad raft and I am conscious that 14 amendments is an awful lot—I conclude by expressing the hope that some at least might find favour in the eyes of this Committee. I beg to move Amendment 9.