Graeme Downie

Graeme Downie

Labour — Dunfermline and Dollar

Speaking in the House of Commons on 17 November 2026

Debate

The Economy: Impact of Hostile State Activity

Contribution

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. A couple of months back, I held an event in Parliament with the ambassadors from Finland, Norway, Denmark and Estonia, all of whom talked about the importance of engaging businesses in conversations about how we defend the UK in cyber-space and elsewhere. Businesses are vital for disseminating information and building capacity with their employees, and will potentially be a target themselves. We must always guard against that. Royal Mail and Advanced, the software supplier to the NHS, were both hit by ransomware gangs alleged to operate with the Kremlin’s tacit consent. International post was disrupted for weeks, NHS systems were down and thousands of appointments were lost. That must have had a cost, but we do not know what it was. This is getting worse: MI5 has said that state threats now exceed terrorism, and its work on them has quadrupled. The National Cyber Security Centre dealt with 80 nationally significant incidents in the year to August, and its chief executive says that about three quarters of cyber incidents hitting our critical infrastructure are linked to hostile states. We call this “grey zone” or “sub-threshold”, but tell that to the business that lost a week of trading, the patient whose appointment was cancelled or the taxpayer paying for another police investigation. For them, there is nothing grey about it. Russia is the most reckless hostile state, but it is not alone—take China, for example. In September, MI5 warned that more than 100 UK academics had worked on projects funded by an institute tied to China’s Ministry of State Security. The strategic intelligence firm Strider has identified more than 8,000 joint publications since 2020 between UK researchers and Chinese military-linked institutions in vital fields such as AI, quantum and aerospace. With Iran, the plots have moved to military sites: seven were arrested over RAF Fairford, and more than 50 arrests have been linked to Iran in a year. Every one of those costs money—in police, protection, and security at our bases. With North Korean IT workers applying for jobs at two major UK banks, a pharmaceutical firm and the civil service and sending more than 90% of their pay to Pyongyang, a British firm that hires one of them is bankrolling a weapons programme without knowing it. Space is the threat that nobody sees: UK Space Command says that Russia is jamming our satellites on a reasonably persistent basis. A Government-commissioned study put the cost of a major satellite navigation outage at about £1 billion a day. Those costs are currently invisible, and we must begin counting the actual cost to the UK economy each year. Let me be specific about what needs to happen. This is fixable, and the Treasury will be delighted to know that most of it costs next to nothing. First of all, give it an owner. The Treasury sees every bill, so it should lead the method, working with the Cabinet Office, on attribution. Secondly, set a date for an annual assessment published to Parliament, starting with the Budget next year. Thirdly, use some of the information that we already collect and extrapolate into cost. For example, the NCSC sees these incidents; could it be asked to publish cost estimates alongside attribution? Fourthly, count the Defence bill. The Ministry of Defence should cost physical hostile activity, cable patrols and shadow fleet interceptions. Fifthly, make it an official statistic. The ONS should add questions to its business survey, the Home Office should extend its method for costing crime to costing state threats, and insurers should be asked to share claims data, with proper protections in place, of course. Sixthly, and most importantly, as I mentioned in response to the intervention of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone), tell the public about this threat and what it is costing them. Finland, Estonia, Denmark and Norway have spoken plainly to their people about the threat and they are more resilient as a result. People will back preparedness when they see what it can do and what the costs are to them. One of the great strengths of our democracy is that we are able to have open, transparent conversations with the public and build the trust that we will ultimately need if we should come under attack. Without using that strength of democracy, our opponents will exploit it and use it as a weakness to undermine confidence in the Government and other state actors as we try to convince the public of the need to defend themselves. They will only see that threat and give the Government the licence to respond effectively if they know what it is costing them and if we are honest and upfront about the fact that we are under threat from hostile actors every single day. Finally, the Treasury could invite the Office for Budget Responsibility to treat hostile state activity as a fiscal risk. It looked at geopolitical and cyber risk in 2022: it is perhaps time to look again. I have three direct questions for the Minister: who in the Government will take forward the Prime Minister’s commitment, what is being collected and when can we see some of those first figures? In closing, Lord Sedwill said in Oslo last week that deterrence needs some “jeopardy for our adversaries”. He is right, but we cannot judge whether we are making Putin pay if we do not know what he is making us pay first.

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