The Economy: Impact of Hostile State Activity
Tuesday, 17 November 2026
Contributions
Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)Labour
I beg to move, That this House has considered the impact of hostile-state activity on the economy. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan. There is a tax being levied on this country right now and it is not in a payslip, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs does not collect it, no Chancellor announced it, and nobody in the House has voted for it, but every business, taxpayer and public service is paying it. It is something I have called the “Putin tax” and the Government do not know how much it is. That is not a guess: I checked. In September, I asked how much Russia’s originating cyber-attacks cost the UK economy. I did get incident numbers, but no cost, and the numbers lumped every hostile state together so I could not even find what Russia’s share might be. I asked the question across Government and not one Department held an estimate of the cost of Russian attacks on the UK. Working with my team in the office, we tried to do it ourselves and we published “The Putin Tax” report on 7 October. Our estimate is that the Putin tax is costing between £2 and £2.5 billion a year to the UK economy and that is a floor, not a ceiling. Let me be straight about the method we used, because I want the Minister to hear this from me: we took the Government’s figures that cyber-crime costs British business £14.7 billion a year and assumed Russia was behind roughly a tenth of that. We added the incidents that could be identified and verified by independent sources. That included the Leyton warehouse arson ordered by the Wagner Group, with around £1 million of damage; the investigation into drone activity around Lakenheath in 2024, costing more than £600,000 of police time; and we modelled the threats to our sub-sea cables. The estimates used are very rough and also very cautious, but that is not the whole story because it is not just my figure any more. Moody’s has now modelled what state-sponsored cyber activity could cost the UK economy and its finding was stark: in any given year there is a roughly one in 10 chance of a cyber-attack by Russian state-backed hackers costing UK business at least £4 billion.
Will Stone (Swindon North) (Lab)Labour
My hon. Friend has highlighted perfectly that we are seeing an uptick in foreign interference and attacks on our democracy and civil institutions. Does he agree with me that prevention is part of the cure and we should be investing more resources in 101 information taskforces?
Graeme DownieLabour
My hon. Friend is absolutely right: prevention is key to this, as well as making sure we have the capacity in our civil resilience to respond to the threats we are facing and making sure, and I will come to this later on, that the public are fully aware of the threats we face and what capabilities we need to respond to them. We estimate that Russia accounts for as much as 80% of all losses from state-sponsored cyber threats—that was one of the other findings from Moody’s report—with ransomware by far the biggest driver. That works out at roughly £100 per taxpayer per attack per year. That is a very conservative number. Moody’s analysis counted only direct costs to business through downtime, recovery, ransoms and legal bills. It left out the hit to British GDP, public services and households, and it did not include physical attacks. It leaves out the criminal gangs operating from Russia that are not directly state-run. These are modelled scenarios, not forecasts, but a one in 10 chance of a £4 billion hit every single year is a risk that no Chancellor would ignore if it were a flood or a pandemic. Now we have two estimates: one from me and one from a private, credible, modelling firm. Neither comes from Government and I think that should trouble us. The official figure for what hostile states cost Britain should come from the Treasury. I took this report and its findings to the Prime Minister and asked him in the House to commit the Government to collecting this information and publishing it regularly, so the public would know what Putin’s aggression is costing them. He said: “I agree with my hon. Friend about the importance of monitoring the data, and I will see what more we can do on that.” —[ Official Report , 12 October 2026; Vol. 791, c. 46.] That is a very good answer and I welcome it, and I feel the argument is beginning to be won. Indeed, last night in his speech to The Guildhall, the Prime Minister named Russia’s “campaign of disruption” and the weaponising of energy and supply chains as a key threat faced by the UK. At the UN in September, the Prime Minister said that the Kremlin spends about £1.3 billion a year manipulating information, and he promised a national resilience public awareness campaign—the fourth recommendation of my “Putin Tax Report”. The Government know what Russia spends on attacking us and are preparing to tell the public about the threat; the one thing still missing is what those attacks are actually costing our economy. We measure the cost of floods and fraud, because the response costs money and we need to know whether that response is working. For hostile states, there is no equivalent.
Alex Easton (North Down) (Ind)Independent
Does the hon. Member agree that we need a twin-track approach across the whole of the United Kingdom to strengthen business and economic resilience and protect our critical infrastructure and cyber-security from the damage that an attack can cause, and to use intelligence, diplomacy and sanctions to identify hostile states’ activities and make it more costly for those responsible?
Graeme DownieLabour
I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. A couple of months back, I held an event in Parliament with the ambassadors from Finland, Norway, Denmark and Estonia, all of whom talked about the importance of engaging businesses in conversations about how we defend the UK in cyber-space and elsewhere. Businesses are vital for disseminating information and building capacity with their employees, and will potentially be a target themselves. We must always guard against that. Royal Mail and Advanced, the software supplier to the NHS, were both hit by ransomware gangs alleged to operate with the Kremlin’s tacit consent. International post was disrupted for weeks, NHS systems were down and thousands of appointments were lost. That must have had a cost, but we do not know what it was. This is getting worse: MI5 has said that state threats now exceed terrorism, and its work on them has quadrupled. The National Cyber Security Centre dealt with 80 nationally significant incidents in the year to August, and its chief executive says that about three quarters of cyber incidents hitting our critical infrastructure are linked to hostile states. We call this “grey zone” or “sub-threshold”, but tell that to the business that lost a week of trading, the patient whose appointment was cancelled or the taxpayer paying for another police investigation. For them, there is nothing grey about it. Russia is the most reckless hostile state, but it is not alone—take China, for example. In September, MI5 warned that more than 100 UK academics had worked on projects funded by an institute tied to China’s Ministry of State Security. The strategic intelligence firm Strider has identified more than 8,000 joint publications since 2020 between UK researchers and Chinese military-linked institutions in vital fields such as AI, quantum and aerospace. With Iran, the plots have moved to military sites: seven were arrested over RAF Fairford, and more than 50 arrests have been linked to Iran in a year. Every one of those costs money—in police, protection, and security at our bases. With North Korean IT workers applying for jobs at two major UK banks, a pharmaceutical firm and the civil service and sending more than 90% of their pay to Pyongyang, a British firm that hires one of them is bankrolling a weapons programme without knowing it. Space is the threat that nobody sees: UK Space Command says that Russia is jamming our satellites on a reasonably persistent basis. A Government-commissioned study put the cost of a major satellite navigation outage at about £1 billion a day. Those costs are currently invisible, and we must begin counting the actual cost to the UK economy each year. Let me be specific about what needs to happen. This is fixable, and the Treasury will be delighted to know that most of it costs next to nothing. First of all, give it an owner. The Treasury sees every bill, so it should lead the method, working with the Cabinet Office, on attribution. Secondly, set a date for an annual assessment published to Parliament, starting with the Budget next year. Thirdly, use some of the information that we already collect and extrapolate into cost. For example, the NCSC sees these incidents; could it be asked to publish cost estimates alongside attribution? Fourthly, count the Defence bill. The Ministry of Defence should cost physical hostile activity, cable patrols and shadow fleet interceptions. Fifthly, make it an official statistic. The ONS should add questions to its business survey, the Home Office should extend its method for costing crime to costing state threats, and insurers should be asked to share claims data, with proper protections in place, of course. Sixthly, and most importantly, as I mentioned in response to the intervention of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone), tell the public about this threat and what it is costing them. Finland, Estonia, Denmark and Norway have spoken plainly to their people about the threat and they are more resilient as a result. People will back preparedness when they see what it can do and what the costs are to them. One of the great strengths of our democracy is that we are able to have open, transparent conversations with the public and build the trust that we will ultimately need if we should come under attack. Without using that strength of democracy, our opponents will exploit it and use it as a weakness to undermine confidence in the Government and other state actors as we try to convince the public of the need to defend themselves. They will only see that threat and give the Government the licence to respond effectively if they know what it is costing them and if we are honest and upfront about the fact that we are under threat from hostile actors every single day. Finally, the Treasury could invite the Office for Budget Responsibility to treat hostile state activity as a fiscal risk. It looked at geopolitical and cyber risk in 2022: it is perhaps time to look again. I have three direct questions for the Minister: who in the Government will take forward the Prime Minister’s commitment, what is being collected and when can we see some of those first figures? In closing, Lord Sedwill said in Oslo last week that deterrence needs some “jeopardy for our adversaries”. He is right, but we cannot judge whether we are making Putin pay if we do not know what he is making us pay first.
Dr Rosena Allin-Khan (in the Chair)Labour
I remind Members to bob if they wish to be called in the debate.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)Democratic Unionist Party
It is always an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan and I thank you for being available for this debate. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) on securing what I believe to be a timely and critical debate. I want to look at three things and focus on something that has happened in Northern Ireland and, indeed, in the hon. Member’s constituency as well. When we talk about the impact of hostile state activity on our economy, we rightly look at cyber-attacks on industry and the sabotage of undersea cables. I think of the undersea cables off the west of Ireland that go towards the United States. The protection is offered not by the Republic of Ireland because they do not have the ability, but by the United Kingdom’s Navy and security forces. Sometimes we need to have that relationship and we are always aware of the interference in our supply chains as well. Across Northern Ireland, Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, we have seen over the last month how digital and hybrid threats hit our communities in the most personal and devastating way imaginable—by targeting our children. Twice within the space of a single month—first on 19 October and again last Wednesday on 11 November—more than 300 schools across Northern Ireland received malicious bomb threat emails originating from outside the United Kingdom. To mention just three, in my Strangford constituency schools such as Victoria primary school and Londonderry primary school in Newtownards, as well as Grey Abbey primary school were caught up in that disgraceful campaign. Parents were worried sick for their children and panicked by the threats. Every time there is a bomb threat we must take action and clear the schools to make sure our children are safe and not in any way threatened. At Victoria primary school in Newtownards, teachers had no choice but to evacuate young children out of their classrooms into the cold, walking them to a nearby church while police carried out the necessary searches. I think of disabled children in particular. Those with autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or particular educational challenges were disorientated by having their day changed and had to face up to something that was alien to their very nature. Let us be under no illusion about the human and economic toll of this issue. Think of those—I use this word all the time—wee children standing frightened in the cold. Think of the sheer panic felt by mothers and fathers who had to drop everything, leave their workplaces, race down to the schools and get their children at the gates not knowing if their sons or daughters were safe. The threat of bomb scares is something we became well aware of during the years of conflict in Northern Ireland. Think of the precious hours of education stolen from our young people and the productivity lost across every town and village when businesses, workplaces and emergency services are thrown into chaos. To have two such co-ordinated scares within a month is utterly unacceptable. I declare an interest, having served in the Ulster Defence Regiment for three years and the Royal Artillery Territorial Army for 11 and a half years. Let me say this clearly: even in the darkest days of the troubles in Northern Ireland, primary school children were never targeted as they have been in the past month. Deliberately weaponising fear against innocent children in their classrooms crosses every line of human decency. Although the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the education authority have confirmed that those emails were hoaxes, a hoax is not a harmless prank when it terrorises thousands of families, brings schools to a standstill and panics and worries parents. Whether those attacks originated from Russian actors, middle eastern groups, Iranian sources, republican sources or any other hostile state or proxy using artificial intelligence and overseas servers to sow division and disruption, Government must treat them with the utmost seriousness—they have done so on the previous two occasions and will do so again. Our communities deserve answers. What is happening behind those co-ordinated attacks across the United Kingdom and Europe? Are our security forces and cyber-security agencies treating these threats against our schools as the national security priority that they clearly are? I should have welcomed the Minister to her place; I apologise for not doing so at the beginning, and I look forward to her response to our queries and concerns on behalf of our constituents. Our economy relies on stability, security and a thriving next generation. Whether that threat comes from Moscow, the middle east or anywhere else on the globe, our children and their education must be protected by all means necessary. Only last Friday, the Microsoft failure highlighted our cyber-reliance. We need greater resilience and a self-contained cyber-system. I am minded of the seriousness of what happened on Friday: my office in Newtownards had no IT contact from about 8.30 in the morning, when the ladies come to the office, through to almost two o’clock. The Minister gave a good response yesterday in the Chamber, and it seems that the Government have a plan of action, but we need to know what that is, perhaps in advance.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)Labour
The hon. Member is making some excellent points. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for securing this debate. On the specific area of cyber-resilience, does the hon. Member think that legislation currently going through Parliament needs to be more ambitious, and to be widened beyond national infrastructure to space infrastructure and food security? Ten days ago across Europe, freezers were rendered useless by a cyber-attack. Does he agree we must have food security, logistics and production covered in that legislation?
Jim ShannonDemocratic Unionist Party
On that specific incident of freezers across Europe, it is hard for me, as non-practical person who does not understand all of modern life, to grasp how that can happen—yet not only did it happen, it was the second or third time. We need to take action to create the resilience the hon. Gentleman referred to. I hope the Minister will give us some reassurance on that. In Northern Ireland we have a porous border with the Republic of Ireland. That makes it easy for anti-United Kingdom spies or agents, or those who want to sow mischief and carry out hoaxes, probably financed by Russia, Iran or others. What is being done, Minister, to ensure that the Republic of Ireland border is not as porous as it seems to be at this moment in time? What is the relationship between the PSNI and the Garda Síochána? Is it a working relationship that can stop those involved in terrorism crossing over? Those are the particular circumstances that we have in Northern Ireland. I will conclude by saying that between these attacks and the Government recommendations to stock the cupboards, Ministers have told us to be prepared. There is nothing wrong with that. It is the right thing to do; whether it is stocking foodstuffs, torches, bottles of water or whatever the case may be, it is good to have the recommendations that the Government have made and to follow them. However, families are frightened, and that is the position that I am speaking from today. I believe that this House needs to be seen to be acting in the best interests of this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I say this with respect: thus far, confidence has not been inspired. I look to the Government and to the Minister in particular to step up to the mark and to reassure me, my constituents and all of us in Northern Ireland that we are prepared and ready for whatever the future may bring.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)Labour
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for securing this debate. I believe that in the decades ahead, when scholars write about Britain’s readiness for conflict, they will think of the contributions he has made in this place and no doubt of the phrase he has coined, the “Putin tax.” From the outset, I will be clear that I think we are discussing three types of hostile nation state activity today. First, of course, there is the most egregious form, in which a nation state actor directly targets Britain; the second is where a hostile nation state sponsors a non-state actor; and, thirdly, there is cyber-crime, which I will focus on. Cyber-crime is an area I know well; my University of Chicago adviser, Professor Bob Pape, has written extensively about it. It is where a non-state actor operates in effectively a laissez-faire environment, whereby a nation state provides sanctuary or tolerates funding of, or recruitment by, international cyber-crime groups, or simply declines to act in the face of such groups. In the academic literature, that is called “passive sponsorship”, and we must focus on that. Therefore, we must also pay close attention to what I term the dandelion effect, whereby hostile nation states train international cyber-criminals, who then operate freely in cell-like structures. Moving on from this definitional pause, that is exactly where I will focus my remarks today. When I was a member of the Public Accounts Committee, I was one of the lead members on an inquiry into cyber-resilience. A striking case was the chilling ransomware attack on Synnovis, which I believe you will know something about as well, Dr Allin-Khan. Synnovis is the NHS blood testing supplier for Guy’s and St Thomas’, the hospital just over the road from Parliament. Blood and specimen testing was disrupted, and more than 11,000 appointments were missed. That had a knock-on effect on blood cross-matching, leading to an urgent appeal for type O blood donations. In fact, I was struck by the comment by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar that there must have been a cost, but we did not know what it was. In the case of Synnovis, the cost may have well been a human life. A key lesson from the Synnovis case is that hostile state and non-state actors will increasingly target public supply chains. Nothing is off limits, especially the health and safety of our constituents, and those state and non-state actors will always seek the lowest common denominator of vulnerability in the supply chain. That is the area that I will turn to next. I was a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Department for Business and Trade when it had the challenging job of working with MPs whose constituents had been impacted by the Jaguar Land Rover cyber-attack, in particular tier 2, tier 3 and tier 4 manufacturers. The Cyber Monitoring Centre said that attack cost the British economy between £1.6 billion and £2.1 billion—it even showed up in Bank of England forecasts—and called it the most expensive in British history “by some distance.” I note with interest the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), the former Minister for the Armed Forces, who is here in Westminster Hall today. He has said: “We know the Jaguar Land Rover attack was state-sponsored.” When someone with such an outstanding record of service says that, we should take heed. Later I will touch on the role of Government in creating an open conversation with the public about the cost of cyber-risk to the British economy. I also want to mention the recent attacks on Harrods, Co-op and Marks and Spencer. It was a really difficult time for M&S team members in the York Vangarde store in my constituency; there were issues with everything from the café to online ordering. No doubt the cost of those specific attacks amounted to over £1 billion. I mention them because hostile nation states or their proxies are evidently intent on targeting the great British high street itself and the brands that so many of us are familiar with such as Jaguar Land Rover, M&S Co-op. With a similar modus operandi, criminals in Japan targeted a ransomware attack at Asahi—what an iconic Japanese beer that is. I mention that as an example of cyber-criminals working on behalf of a state-sponsored actor to target deliberately the core brands and institutions that are psychologically fundamental to the average citizen’s conception of the economy itself.
Matt WesternLabour
My hon. Friend is making a very good speech. I want to pick up his point about the businesses affected in 2025. Does he share my concern about the threat posed by the narrowing base of managed service providers to these sorts of companies? Does he agree that it presents a vulnerability in itself?
Mr ChartersLabour
When I think back to my time at the Financial Conduct Authority, where we were thinking about a similar concentration risk in the financial sector, I agree that that might well be an issue that the Government want to consider. Hackers have deliberately and repeatedly targeted British companies that are not just critical pillars of our economy, but institutions and fundamental parts of the British way of life itself. These actors are attacking public services. There is the Synnovis example I mentioned, but there is also the Kido International incident, in which a ransomware gang attack targeted a London nursery company via phishing, and obtained personal data and photographs of more than 8,000 children. What is next? Well, it is not good, I am afraid. I want to talk about the interlinkages between quantum compute, AI and cyber-crime. We are all now living in the age of AI and grappling with both its costs and its opportunities, but we are fast approaching the dawn of a post-quantum world. What does that mean? Private information could become readable, attackers could impersonate trusted organisations, and information stolen today could be read and decrypted later. Almost no secret may be safe. The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem and elliptic-curve cryptography are the algorithms that underpin the entire security of the British economy, and quantum computing risks breaking the very security they rely on. Put simply, quantum compute means that traditional security keys can be cracked. Quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography and quantum decryption have been mentioned only in passing—just once in the Commons, according to Hansard . A few weeks ago, with a visiting delegation of Canadian MPs, I had a briefing on quantum cryptography at the institute for safe autonomy at the University of York. Currently, quantum computers cannot break widely used cryptographic algorithms at scale—but soon, with enough cheap computing, the societal vulnerabilities and the economic risks to the economy will become enormous. Thankfully, the University of York is pioneering work on unbreakable quantum keys, which I am sure will go on to protect some of Britain’s most critical economic systems. I do not want to turn this debate into a computer science lesson, but I ask the Minister whether the Government agree that we need to accelerate research and innovation funding for quantum cryptography. Thankfully, the NCSC has confirmed that it is pursuing post-quantum cryptography and quantum random number generators, but there is more to do. I will touch on the need to have a national conversation on defence and resilience, but does the Minister agree that we need to fortify the UK economy today, so that it is ready for the risks arising from quantum compute in the future? Some estimates suggest that a first-generation machine capable of breaking RSA-2048 could cost hundreds of millions of pounds. Initially, such capabilities will be at the behest of only the most capable hostile nation state actors; yet, just as we are experiencing with frontier AI models, advances in mathematics and computing will reduce both the capital cost and number of qubits required. It is doubtful whether Moore’s law has such relevance to the cost per qubit, but over time we would expect that technology around quantum compute could end up in the hands of hostile nation state actors. It is my hope that in these short remarks today we might start a policy conversation in Parliament on how Britain prepares for the transition to a post-quantum world tomorrow—a conversation that foregrounds how we protect the cryptographic foundations of the British economy from hostile state actors who will no doubt be seeking to get their hands on this technology. I will touch briefly on a related matter: the security of the UK’s internet connection itself. The then Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), showed leadership typical of his tenure in his previous office when in April he revealed that our armed forces tracked Russian subs whose mission was to survey cables. I commend the Government’s risk review of critical undersea infrastructure security, and I welcome the new criminal penalties regime with broad territorial application. In particular, I praise the Government for being open with the public about the threat to deep sea cables. As the consultation said, there is a risk of subsea cables being “tapped into” by hostile nation states such as Russia that seek what is known as sensing data that could compromise British national security. There are two main lessons from that. First, as the Government are rightly doing, we need to ensure that legislation keeps up with technological advancements. Secondly, in my view, the Government were right to take the decision in effect to declassify the files relating to the disruption of Russia’s month-long failed covert submarine operation. Recommendation 26 in the strategic defence review calls for a national Government-led conversation on defence and resilience, so that people and businesses understand the risks, trust official advice, and are ready and not frightened in the event that essential services are disrupted. Ministers are therefore absolutely right that now is the time for openness with the British public about the level of threats we face from nation state actors. I for one welcome examples of that which move the conversation along. While of course balancing the risks around declassification of incidents, we should look for similar opportunities in future. Let this, too, be a clarion call to the private sector to invest in cyber-security. I am reminded of what JP Morgan CEO, Jamie Dimon, said: “For every pound JP Morgan saves through AI-driven productivity, much of it is likely to be spent on cyber-security”. And let me add that I had written my speech before I heard about the outages affecting US banks yesterday. From our weekly shop to our online clothes order, car service and blood matching, and even our children’s details at pre-school, we are all exposed to the risks of hostile cyber-activity. Those risks are unimaginably greater with the advent of AI, quantum computing and the risks to our critical undersea infrastructure. The hostile cyber-activity of nation states, non-state actors and cyber-criminals operating in permissive environments poses a threat to the British way of life itself. Debates like today’s support the aim of the SDR to have an open conversation with the public about those risks, and I commend hon. Members’ contributions today on this very important topic.
Al Carns (Birmingham Selly Oak) (Lab)Labour
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for bringing forward this really important debate and for his work in highlighting the cost of Russia’s activity to our economy. It is worth taking a step back and looking at where we are today in the world situation. In the Pacific, there is a build-up of military capability unseen since the second world war—whether they be subsurface, surface, airborne, army or space capabilities, it is moving at a rapid rate. We see conflict right across the middle east: Saudi Arabia into Yemen, the Houthis into Saudi Arabia, and America and Israel into Iran. And here in Europe, right on the edge of the mother of all democracies, we see one of the biggest wars since the second world war, which has now cost 1.5 million casualties—more than America took in the entire second world war. The implications of force on force and conflicts around the world are resulting in people trying to find weakness in democratic societies and to punish us for our support of the right to self-determination, particularly in Ukraine, as highlighted in the report by my hon. Friend. As they fail to undermine NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force or democratic nations, they seek asymmetric or grey-zone tactics. Of those tactics, cyber-attacks alone cost £14.7 billion a year. That is 0.5% of our GDP. If I say that to people in this room, they will absolutely understand it. If we were to say it to everybody across the country, it might get lost in translation. Will the Minister say how we are going to take some of these big, holistic figures and turn them into detail so that they resonate with the rank and file of the population from Scotland to Cornwall, and from London to Wales and Northern Ireland and back again?
Jim ShannonDemocratic Unionist Party
I mentioned this in my speech, but does the hon. and gallant Gentleman share the concern that I and others in the circles that I move in have about the meaning of the big three—President Trump, President Xi and President Putin? I know that there has to be dialogue and understanding, but we sometimes wonder whether the three biggest countries in the world, with perhaps the three biggest dictators—with great respect to the one from the United States of America—are positioning themselves to advance claims upon other parts of the world. Does the hon. Gentleman share that concern?
Al CarnsLabour
I do share that concern. In some cases, we are seeing the alignment of states that, in previous years, would have been far apart in everything from their theoretical view on democracy all the way through to their economies. When it is boiled down to a US or British perspective, we have to focus on what keeps us united: the right to self-determination, freedom of speech and the democratic principles that we have fought for for the last 70 years. Once they go, they are gone and we will not get them back, so we have to focus on what unites us, not on what separates us. No attack of the sophistication and scale of the JLR attack is likely to have taken place without a state’s awareness. When that is materialised and drawn down, it is half the two-child benefit cap for the year. It is hundreds of thousands of children plunged into poverty because a non-state actor within a state has targeted one of our most treasured institutions. Then we flip into business. I always say that we make 99% of the best products in the world and outsource 99% of the scaling, but unfortunately we are also the victim of industrial espionage. On average, £7 billion of business secrets are stolen from the country every year. How much does that affect the economy? How does that affect the supply chain? It would be useful to have that type of analysis from the Government to highlight some of the security issues that we face. Then, of course, we have the hearts and minds of the nation, which is one of the most important things. From open-source information, we can see that during the war between America and Israel and Iran, certain targets were destroyed in Iran, which knocked out 3% of all Scottish independence media—it went black overnight. Now, why is Iran interested in supporting Scottish independence media? Because a nation that is divided along national, societal, religious or community lines is a nation that is weaker. The Government need to push to protect information—what is true and what is not—and look at where that influence is coming from.
Will StoneLabour
My hon. Friend highlights some crucial points. I agree with him about foreign adversaries entering the grey zone and using asymmetric warfare against us. We absolutely have to have a conversation with the public. Does he agree that, as warfare evolves, we need to change how we respond to it? A deterrent is a deterrent only if our adversaries believe that we will actually do something.
Al CarnsLabour
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. We need to deter more forcefully. The united stance across the House on Ukraine is one of the things that I am proudest of in the last 10 years. We have led the world in supporting Ukraine. We need more of that, but we have to think about asymmetric threats, and particularly about how we impose cost should we be targeted in the future—indeed, we are probably being targeted right now. Let me delve into a couple of the conflicts that are taking place. We could speak to the nation today and say, “Hey, the Black sea is closed”—one of the major transit routes for grain from Ukraine, the world’s food basket, has been closed for years—but where is the analysis of the impact? Because of the blockage of the Black sea, we have plunged collectively probably millions of people into poverty across sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, and increased food inflation, which was huge at the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Again, explicitly translating military action and crisis into economic impact would be very useful to highlight the issues that we are facing. Thousands of ships have now been stopped from going in or out of the strait of Hormuz. What does that really mean? It means that a huge supply of ammonia can no longer come out of the strait of Hormuz. So what? Well, ammonia is a key component of fertiliser. That means that the planting season now, and the planting season next year, are going to be really bad. Combine that with the lack of grain through the Black sea and food costs are going to go through the roof—maybe not for the UK, which will be isolated from some of the impact, but it will hit food poverty all over southern elements of the Mediterranean and across the middle east. The same goes for methanol exports—that has a big impact on industry. Again, let us explain that, because we need this national conversation to help us understand why conflict overseas can affect us here in the United Kingdom. When we talk in this House about conflict and international events and crises, there is an onus on us as politicians, on all sides of the House, to really try to translate what that means for every business, for the cost of living for every citizen in the United Kingdom, for our sanctity as a democracy, and for spending and the allocation of resources across Government. I have a couple of questions for the Minister. First, the SDR mentioned a national conversation. When will it take place? As part of that conversation, will there be a yearly publication showing the cost to our economy of hybrid grey-zone conflict or other conflicts? It would be very useful to have that as a centrepiece of that national conversation. Secondly, is there any update on the development of the national centre for information defence? That is so important to protecting democracy, given Russia’s meddling in democratic parties here in the UK, with people turning up on Russia Today, all the way through to certain members of Reform in Wales getting 10 years in prison for taking Russian money.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)Liberal Democrat
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Dr Allin-Khan. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) on bringing such an important debate to Westminster Hall. Threats to the UK from foreign states take many forms: espionage, foreign interference in our political system, sabotage, disinformation, cyber-operations and even assassinations. Just yesterday, the House of Lords National Resilience Committee issued a warning about the UK’s preparedness for escalating threats and emergencies. The UK is increasingly being targeted by state-backed actors, and it is vital that we have strong legislation to deal with those threats. State-backed cyber threats show the danger of relying on hostile or unpredictable states for our critical national infrastructure. Recent suspected sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltics highlights the hybrid threats that we must prepare for. More directly, businesses feel the impact of the activity most directly through their energy bills. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has reinforced the need to significantly reduce the UK’s dependence on fossil fuels and invest in renewables, both to cut energy bills and to deliver energy security. Last week’s Microsoft outage highlights the extent to which British businesses could be affected by hostile state activity. The outage exposed the severe national vulnerability created by our over-reliance on a single overseas technology provider across the NHS, policing, schools, courts, local councils, businesses and Parliament itself. Although our understanding is that the outage was not caused by a hostile state cyber-attack, it is nevertheless a stark warning of the potential impact of failures at major tech providers that the UK’s services rely on. If a technical failure can bring our frontline services to a standstill, just imagine the harm that a cyber-attack on the handful of overseas providers that the UK relies on could cause. The Liberal Democrats are calling on the Government to develop a digital sovereignty strategy that puts security at its heart and supports British innovation and businesses. The Liberal Democrats tabled an amendment to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill that would have required the Government to publish such a strategy. It is concerning that the Government did not support it. We can no longer ignore the risks of over-reliance on American and Chinese technologies. Given the far-reaching consequences, from hospitals to schools and businesses, will the Government now back our call for a digital sovereignty strategy? Have the Government undertaken impact assessments in the event of a failure of key software? What are they doing to support UK tech firms to develop domestic alternatives? The Liberal Democrats would ensure that critical national functions are powered by technology that the UK can actually control. It would involve trialling changes to the procurement of digital services. The Government are the UK’s largest buyer of technology, but they almost never buy British. The use of UK technology must be actively championed rather than treated as an afterthought. Currently, US and Chinese companies manage 90% of all global AI computers. By identifying high-risk foreign vendors and pivoting to trusted home-grown alternatives, the UK can gain greater strategic independence, bolster our national security and create high-skilled jobs at home. The Liberal Democrats would explore tax incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises to adopt stronger cyber-security technology, especially those in strategically important supply chains. We urge the Government to take that action. The UK needs to reduce its economic dependency on China, given the Chinese Communist party’s increasingly arbitrary decisions, coercion tactics and human rights abuses. We would make the UK economy more resilient by reviewing preferential UK market access agreements with China, strengthening foreign direct investment screening and cyber-defences, and by including increased data transparency requirements. We would also encourage greater diversification of UK trade, investment and supply chains, particularly with other democracies. We would cease research co-operation on technology with China and its companies and researchers if adequate reciprocity and transparency cannot be achieved. On energy, allowing Russian fossil fuels to be imported through third countries means Putin will keep profiting from selling Russia’s crude oil. The Government must implement a full ban on importing oil products derived from Russian crude, as they originally said they would. The Liberal Democrats are calling for a complete ban on UK companies providing maritime services, such as insurance, for Russia’s fossil fuel exports, and instead investing in home-grown renewable energy to improve our energy security, which can only be a good thing for our businesses and households. Even on the individual level, hostile state actors can pinpoint people living in the UK and target their bank accounts. Victims of transnational repression can have their bank accounts frozen by foreign Governments, imposing incredible financial hardship on them. Over the last few years I have picked up bits of individual casework from my constituents, particularly those who have come here from Iran and Hong Kong, who continue to suffer considerably from transnational state repression. I urge the Government to work closely with our policing services and set up a hotline for transnational repression to ensure the victims can receive the specialist assistance that they often lack when reaching out to neighbourhood policing services, who fail to appreciate the significance of transnational repression. We live in a more dangerous and less stable world. We must work with our allies to protect our national security and our businesses by building robust frameworks. With our next UK-EU summit just days away, we call on the Government to establish a growth and defence partnership with Europe, including joining the single market, forming a new UK-EU customs union and agreeing a new defence pact.
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)Conservative
I apologise for my throat, Dr Allin-Khan. I think it might have been hacked by foreign actors. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) on securing a debate on such an important issue. The book “The New Economic Warfare” contains a chapter on economic aggression, which is apposite. Remarkably, it was written in 1941 and appeared in 1942—nothing new under the sun, then. Although the players and methodology might have changed, the perils remain the same. Such was the consternation of the then Business and Trade Committee when it considered British economic security and how to steel ourselves against foreign interference, it recommended nothing less than the creation of a dedicated economic security Minister armed with an overarching economic security Bill. I was a member of that Committee when those recommendations were issued earlier this year, but they have not been accepted by the Government. Given what we have heard today, perhaps the Economic Secretary might give us a clue as to whether the Government might revisit that Select Committee report. After all, the so-called Putin tax is estimated at around £2.5 billion, as we have heard, which is likely an underestimate. It is money we can ill afford. It would be better spent on myriad other areas. This slow drain is designed to weaken us, to bleed us out and sap our resilience. The Jaguar Land Rover hack put a 0.17% dent in GDP, making it the worst such attack so far. Mystery surrounds the people behind such interference; the euphemism is often “foreign state actors”. The Business and Trade Committee accepted evidence that the latest iterations of the hacking threat sees hostile state actors—whoever they may be—form an unholy alliance with highly organised criminal gangs. These shadowy state actors order the cyber-bullets and identify their targets, and the criminals make the bullets and fire them. It is also clear that much public risk is in private hands. Commercial companies are out there in a danger zone. Their so-called threat surface is vast. Is sufficient help being given to them? A recent headline read “GCHQ warns companies after cyber-attack”—“after” being the key word. “After” is the runway behind the aircraft, not in front. It is useless. Firms with tight margins must purchase and update security software and are not even obliged to report to the Government should they fall victim to an attack. Of course, stigma may play a role in firms not wanting to admit a breach, and the Government ought to help ameliorate that. There is also no coherent approach to the response to attacks. Some firms appear to have paid ransoms, while others have held out. An example of the latter seems to have been the Co-op, which hammered down its own systems and returned to pen and paper in a bid to defeat hackers. I liken their approach to a surgeon removing a patient’s diseased limb: painful, maiming, but necessary. Either way, companies must pay up or pay out to their detriment. Military electrical equipment is often hardened against the electromagnetic pulse emitted by a nuclear weapon. That prevents the equipment being fried by the electrical spectrum from such a weapon. We have heard today from many hon. Members about some of the problems we face. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made the relevant point that a hoax alone is sufficient to cause absolute chaos, and an actual bomb is not needed. The hon. Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) referenced quantum and the rising threat that poses. Meanwhile, the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) was concerned that what we are talking about may be lost in translation if we talk to the public. I gently say to him that his Aberdeen lilt is not that difficult to understand, but on a serious point, we need to inform the public about the dangers we face. Does this not indicate that we ought to be hardening our economy against the shock of hostile state activity? What are the Government doing to shield our economy, which is the very lifeblood of Britain? General Sun Tzu advocated “winning without fighting”. Our adversaries know that cyber-attacks offer deniability and the very real chance of victory without firing a shot. The old adage was that no country is more than three missed meals from revolution; now we may be no more than three failed attempts to pay by chip and pin away from surrender. Why send in tanks when our enemies can cripple our ability to buy food or fuel by attacking banking? We know in the information war that shaping attacks are well underway. As the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak said, when American and Israeli bombs shattered Iranian command and control bunkers, a series of social media activists agitating for Scottish independence fell silent on platforms such as X. These are the so-called sock-puppet accounts for Tehran’s monotheocracy, which seek to weaken Britain by amplifying the separatist narrative and using the nationalist threat to weaken Britain from within. China knows it can outpace and outmuscle us on the economic front. The UK’s weak safeguards against Chinese subsidies for its industries are a risk acknowledged by this Government but—perhaps feeding the Chinese dragon in the hopes it will immolate us last—they do not set out triggers for escalation, defined response options or the consequences that hostile actors should expect. On this, as with so many other areas of hostile activity, we remain reactive, lacking focus on deterrence before interference occurs. Is the way to protect our economy not to resist external interference and draw together this Government’s unsatisfactory, piecemeal defences under that Minister of economic security, allied to an MOD funded and resourced for the modern era? Should we be sharing intelligence with companies on the frontline of this new grey-zone war? Should a cross-Government security Minister not lead on everything from the physical security of our underwater infrastructure, such as data cables, to cyber-threats and economic coercion, such as the dumping of artificially subsidised goods and products, including steel? Only the Conservatives have a fully funded plan to increase spending to 3% of GDP by 2030. All taxes linger and ratchet one way—upwards, ever upwards. This so-called Putin tax will be no different, and we face a Beijing surcharge on top of that. National security must come before social security. A threat to our whole society demands a response from the whole of society. Government must lead. The public are paying up; when will this Government step up?
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Lucy Rigby)Labour
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I thank hon. Members for their contributions, and my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for securing the debate and for highlighting his report. It is fair to say that the issues raised by hon. Members in this debate go right to the heart of our national security for the reasons they covered very well, and which I will also discuss. Let me be very clear: the report makes an important contribution to our understanding of the economic consequences of hostile state activity. I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar highlighted the Prime Minister’s words both in reply to the report and at the Guildhall last night. If my hon. Friend had not highlighted them, I would have done so. The central argument of the report is powerful: that Russia’s aggression imposes on this country not simply a security cost but an economic cost that is borne by British taxpayers, British businesses and British public services. It is clear that Russia’s hostile activity, from cyber-attacks on our institutions to sabotage on our streets, imposes significant costs. The report estimates that the Putin tax costs the UK £2 billion to £2.5 billion each year and that confirmed incidents alone have generated £1.6 billion to £2.1 billion of economic losses, and argues that the true cost is even higher than those figures. I think we all acknowledge that the economic consequences of hostile activity do not step at the immediate cost of repairing the damage caused by an attack. They of course also include the costs of disruption to production and supply chains, of recovery and of spending by businesses and Government on increasing resilience. There are also wider economic consequences when services that people rely on—some of which have been well highlighted in this debate—are disrupted. That demonstrates why economic security and national security can no longer be considered in isolation of each other. Preparing for the world as it may turn out to be is critically important. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made that point well, including the importance of stability and certainty to economic growth. That is exactly why we are making the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war. As hon. Members know, with our NATO allies we have committed to spend 5% of GDP on defence and national security by 2035, including investment in cyber-resilience and infrastructure resilience to protect our economy from exactly the type of threats discussed in this debate. We are also responding directly and enforcing the toughest ever sanctions on Russia. We are cracking down on those who help the Kremlin to evade those sanctions. Our co-ordinated sanctions action with international allies has deprived Russia of $495 billion to date, and of access to weapons and equipment. The impact of sanctions is clearly seen in Russia’s weakening financial standing: growth has stalled, interest rates remain high, the rouble is significantly depreciated, and the federal budget is expected to remain in deficit throughout this year. However, sanctions are only part of our response. As multiple members of the Government have made clear, there is absolutely no place for Russian illicit finance in the UK. The hon. Member for North Down (Alex Easton) alluded to that in his valid points around making it more difficult and costly for hostile states to undertake their activity. That is why we are going after the money laundering networks, which have all sorts of complex structures, and the professional enablers that allow sanctioned actors, and others, to hide and move their money. Our new anti-money laundering and asset recovery strategy, which is backed by over £550 million of investment over the next three years, will strengthen the capability of financial intelligence and law enforcement services to target those networks at home. Part of deterring Russia is of course ensuring that we are at the frontline of European and NATO security. It is important to mention that our support for Ukraine is critical, as has rightly been highlighted during this debate. Russia remains the most acute threat to our national security and the security of our continent. Our economic pressure on Russia and our financial support to Ukraine remain the best policy to support Ukraine and bring Russia to the negotiating table. It is important to underline that the UK has a broad toolkit to deter, disrupt and respond to hostile state activity, supported by economic security measures including investment screening, export controls and procurement powers. We continue to take action to strengthen our economic security and resilience as all the threats that we are talking about evolve, working closely with regulators, including those in the financial system, as well as businesses and international partners. Multiple hon. Members have raised the importance of resilience right across our economy and, as they would expect, that is a top priority for the Government. We are continuing to urge all organisations to take action and follow the expert guidance of the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority. My hon. Friend the Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) made the case very well to follow that guidance and ensure that each business is fully aware of the risks and the importance of resilience. With regard to the recommendation in the report for the NCSC to publish annual assessments, it publishes an annual assessment of the cyber threat, which includes activity attributed or linked to state and state-aligned actors. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the former Department for Science, Innovation and Technology published the cyber-security breaches survey in April, and that research into UK cyber-resilience includes the cost to the economy, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar is no doubt aware. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper), rightly raised the importance of the resilience of our financial system, which goes right to the heart of my brief as Economic Secretary. Working with the Bank and the Financial Conduct Authority, we are strengthening the cyber-resilience of our financial system so that hostile states cannot undermine the stability on which every single business and household in this country depends. We are taking forward designations under the critical third parties regime. To the point made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), we have recently—not that recently, actually; it was a few months ago now—designated Microsoft, and it is really important that we continue to keep under review the designations that we have under that critical third parties legislation, because it is a very important tool in our armoury. The issues that we are discussing today obviously go right across the economy and are not isolated to any one sector. The cyber-security and resilience Bill, as has been raised, will increase UK defences against cyber-attacks to protect the services that the public rely on to go about their normal lives. That Bill will deliver a step change in the UK’s national security, making essential and digital services more secure in the face of cyber-criminals and state actors who will use every tool in their armouries to disrupt our way of life.
Jim ShannonDemocratic Unionist Party
I thank the Minister very much for those answers, and I commend her for everything she has said. In my contribution, I mentioned that the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is porous, so people are able to filter through—for example, actors from enemy states. We need to have a working relationship; we cannot do these things on our own. We are part of NATO, and although the Republic of Ireland is not, of course, there has to be a working relationship. Can the Minister give us some idea of how that relationship can be built and secured to the Republic of Ireland’s benefit as well as ours?
Lucy RigbyLabour
I am grateful to the hon. Member for raising that issue. Clearly, we need to make sure that all the measures we are talking about—indeed, all the measures that are to come—protect every single element of our country, including the border to which he refers. I appreciate that there is a strong economic underpinning to this issue; there is also a strong security underpinning. To the extent that I do not cover his question, I will ensure that the Security Minister or the right person in the Home Office addresses him in writing. The hon. Member also raised an important point about school hoaxes. I will seek to get him an answer to that as well, as I appreciate just how disruptive that activity can be. Clearly, as a Government, we need to make every effort to protect people from it. My hon. Friends the Members for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) and for York Outer raised a critical issue: specific sectors affected by recent cyber-incidents, some being core services and indeed core brands. It is important to recognise the psychological impact of that as well as the disruptive nature. I am deliberately skipping forward in the interests of time, which I think I may be limited on. If you need to, Dr Allin-Khan, I am sure you will give me an idea.
Dr Rosena Allin-Khan (in the Chair)Labour
You have time.
Lucy RigbyLabour
Okay, let me talk a bit then about the AI aspects of the issue. At the Budget, the Government provided an additional £150 million to address AI-enabled cyber-risks, alongside a further £120 million for the AI Security Institute to strengthen its testing and research and to develop technical standards. My hon. Friend the Member for York Outer raised the issue of quantum. I spent yesterday morning at Barclays, discussing the important migration to post-quantum cryptography. As my hon. Friend will know, that needs to start at least by 2028, and then be completed gradually by the target date of 2035. Quantum is a huge—gargantuan, actually—growth opportunity for the UK, particularly for financial services, but as my hon. Friend alluded to, it also poses really significant risks to the sector, especially combined with AI and technologies like tokenisation. From a Government and a regulatory point of view, we need to ensure that, while seeking the benefits of these new technologies, the entirety of our economy is resilient to those risks.
Mr ChartersLabour
I thank the Minister for that, because it is important that Ministers across His Majesty’s Government follow the recommendations in the SDR and, exactly as she is showing leadership in today, use their ministerial roles across Whitehall to spark a national conversation. I encourage the Minister to keep bringing the financial services sector and regulators around the table to discuss the post-quantum world.
Lucy RigbyLabour
I hope it is reassuring for my hon. Friend to hear that present at yesterday morning’s roundtable were the Bank, regulators and really senior representation from across the financial services sector. There is a real emphasis on making sure that our economy is sufficiently prepared for quantum technology to maximise the benefits—the UK is a leader in quantum—and take account of the risks. My hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar asked me about quantification and specific work on other recommendations in the report. Although we are looking carefully at the evidence and analysis in the report, alongside wider evidence available to Government, quantifying the full economic impact of hostile-state activity is, as my hon. Friend will appreciate, inherently complex. I am told we do not currently plan to publish a stand-alone Government estimate for national security reasons, but we will continue to assess those impacts as part of our wider work to understand and respond to the threat.
Graeme DownieLabour
Earlier on, the Minister mentioned that reports are already gathered by the National Cyber Security Centre and DCMS that quantify the number of incidents. Can she work with those Departments to do more to put in a range of costs that they come across in those incidents? I appreciate the difficulty of coming up with a single figure but if, when we are dealing with incidents, we can also come up with a range of costs, that will at least give people an indication of the type of cost we are talking about.
Lucy RigbyLabour
I am more than happy to see what can be done in relation to my hon. Friend’s question, within the remits of what is considered secure. I will certainly take that away because I understand his wider point. On the report’s recommendation to launch a national public awareness campaign, helping the public prepare for emergencies is, of course, central to building a more resilient country. As hon. Members know, we have launched a Be Ready campaign to raise awareness of the simple steps that households can take to ensure that they are prepared for everyday emergencies, such as severe storms or flooding. Some of the steps highlighted within that campaign relate to other preparedness issues that we are discussing today. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) raised a number of specific questions that, as I think he knows, are outside the scope of my brief. I shall not seek to answer them from this position for fear of answering them wrongly, but I will ensure that he receives the written answers that his questions fully deserve. The hon. Member for Richmond Park raised an important question about transnational repression and having a register. In the same vein, that is well outside the scope of my brief, I am afraid, so I cannot give her an answer today that she will consider in any way informative. I promise that I will take her question away and ensure that she receives a substantive answer. In summing up, I reiterate how grateful I am to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar for raising the report and, indeed, to all hon. Members for their contributions on these important issues.
Graeme DownieLabour
I thank the Minister for her response and all hon. Members for participating in the debate. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and my hon. Friend the Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) both illustrated well that anything that has an economic cost also has a human cost. Schools in my area were also affected by the hoax that the hon. Member for Strangford referred to. My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) also talked about the relevance of food security. That cyber-attack had an economic cost but will ultimately have affected people as well. Recently in my constituency, people who work in the defence sector have seen their homes targeted with intimidation. If that has the effect of putting people off working in those industries or of intimidating them, that has not only a human cost but an impact on the UK’s industrial capacity. We are seeing these attacks that look economic, but we also have spill-over attacks, as the Minister acknowledged. I thank all hon. Members for their participation. This issue will not reduce—in fact, I suspect it will continue to escalate over the years, as we see attacks by Vladimir Putin and others continue to work on our economy, society and information spaces. I am also sure that this will not be the last time I raise these issues in the House. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered the impact of hostile-state activity on the economy.
Sitting suspended.
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Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5439290.