Mr Luke Charters

Mr Luke Charters

Labour — York Outer

Speaking in the House of Commons on 17 November 2026

Debate

The Economy: Impact of Hostile State Activity

Contribution

When I think back to my time at the Financial Conduct Authority, where we were thinking about a similar concentration risk in the financial sector, I agree that that might well be an issue that the Government want to consider. Hackers have deliberately and repeatedly targeted British companies that are not just critical pillars of our economy, but institutions and fundamental parts of the British way of life itself. These actors are attacking public services. There is the Synnovis example I mentioned, but there is also the Kido International incident, in which a ransomware gang attack targeted a London nursery company via phishing, and obtained personal data and photographs of more than 8,000 children. What is next? Well, it is not good, I am afraid. I want to talk about the interlinkages between quantum compute, AI and cyber-crime. We are all now living in the age of AI and grappling with both its costs and its opportunities, but we are fast approaching the dawn of a post-quantum world. What does that mean? Private information could become readable, attackers could impersonate trusted organisations, and information stolen today could be read and decrypted later. Almost no secret may be safe. The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem and elliptic-curve cryptography are the algorithms that underpin the entire security of the British economy, and quantum computing risks breaking the very security they rely on. Put simply, quantum compute means that traditional security keys can be cracked. Quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography and quantum decryption have been mentioned only in passing—just once in the Commons, according to Hansard. A few weeks ago, with a visiting delegation of Canadian MPs, I had a briefing on quantum cryptography at the institute for safe autonomy at the University of York. Currently, quantum computers cannot break widely used cryptographic algorithms at scale—but soon, with enough cheap computing, the societal vulnerabilities and the economic risks to the economy will become enormous. Thankfully, the University of York is pioneering work on unbreakable quantum keys, which I am sure will go on to protect some of Britain’s most critical economic systems. I do not want to turn this debate into a computer science lesson, but I ask the Minister whether the Government agree that we need to accelerate research and innovation funding for quantum cryptography. Thankfully, the NCSC has confirmed that it is pursuing post-quantum cryptography and quantum random number generators, but there is more to do. I will touch on the need to have a national conversation on defence and resilience, but does the Minister agree that we need to fortify the UK economy today, so that it is ready for the risks arising from quantum compute in the future? Some estimates suggest that a first-generation machine capable of breaking RSA-2048 could cost hundreds of millions of pounds. Initially, such capabilities will be at the behest of only the most capable hostile nation state actors; yet, just as we are experiencing with frontier AI models, advances in mathematics and computing will reduce both the capital cost and number of qubits required. It is doubtful whether Moore’s law has such relevance to the cost per qubit, but over time we would expect that technology around quantum compute could end up in the hands of hostile nation state actors. It is my hope that in these short remarks today we might start a policy conversation in Parliament on how Britain prepares for the transition to a post-quantum world tomorrow—a conversation that foregrounds how we protect the cryptographic foundations of the British economy from hostile state actors who will no doubt be seeking to get their hands on this technology. I will touch briefly on a related matter: the security of the UK’s internet connection itself. The then Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), showed leadership typical of his tenure in his previous office when in April he revealed that our armed forces tracked Russian subs whose mission was to survey cables. I commend the Government’s risk review of critical undersea infrastructure security, and I welcome the new criminal penalties regime with broad territorial application. In particular, I praise the Government for being open with the public about the threat to deep sea cables. As the consultation said, there is a risk of subsea cables being “tapped into” by hostile nation states such as Russia that seek what is known as sensing data that could compromise British national security. There are two main lessons from that. First, as the Government are rightly doing, we need to ensure that legislation keeps up with technological advancements. Secondly, in my view, the Government were right to take the decision in effect to declassify the files relating to the disruption of Russia’s month-long failed covert submarine operation. Recommendation 26 in the strategic defence review calls for a national Government-led conversation on defence and resilience, so that people and businesses understand the risks, trust official advice, and are ready and not frightened in the event that essential services are disrupted. Ministers are therefore absolutely right that now is the time for openness with the British public about the level of threats we face from nation state actors. I for one welcome examples of that which move the conversation along. While of course balancing the risks around declassification of incidents, we should look for similar opportunities in future. Let this, too, be a clarion call to the private sector to invest in cyber-security. I am reminded of what JP Morgan CEO, Jamie Dimon, said: “For every pound JP Morgan saves through AI-driven productivity, much of it is likely to be spent on cyber-security”. And let me add that I had written my speech before I heard about the outages affecting US banks yesterday. From our weekly shop to our online clothes order, car service and blood matching, and even our children’s details at pre-school, we are all exposed to the risks of hostile cyber-activity. Those risks are unimaginably greater with the advent of AI, quantum computing and the risks to our critical undersea infrastructure. The hostile cyber-activity of nation states, non-state actors and cyber-criminals operating in permissive environments poses a threat to the British way of life itself. Debates like today’s support the aim of the SDR to have an open conversation with the public about those risks, and I commend hon. Members’ contributions today on this very important topic.

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